
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AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION



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
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In This Issue

This issue contains four articles and a review essay. The articles examine a variety of topics. The issues their authors raise range from arguments about the limits of the hegemonic authority of missionaries and white colonial travelers to diverse ways of understanding twentieth-century East Asia. The review essay assesses efforts to explain the current Bosnia conflict and its implications for historians' attempts to analyze contemporary events. The issue also contains a full complement of book and film reviews.

Articles

Pier M. Larson examines how the people of highland Madagascar came to understand and practice the Christianity introduced to them by British missionaries during the early nineteenth century. Larson argues that the Malagasy grafted European Christianity onto their language and existing religious practices. He emphasizes, for instance, that the Malagasy concept of *fivavahana* (supplication) came to designate religion/worship/prayer in Madagascar and that British missionaries adopted evangelistic strategies suggested to them by the Malagasy. As a result of the way they engaged the foreign missionaries intellectually, the Malagasy forced the Europeans to change their strategies of evangelization and their theology in order to make it more effective and compatible with Malagasy ways of thinking and acting. Most important, Larson uses this analysis of Malagasy experiences with Christian missionaries to critique studies of imperial cultural history that assume European cultural and intellectual hegemony without actually demonstrating it. He contends that the Malagasy example of "subalterns'" intellectual authority over Christianity provides particularly compelling evidence of the cultural limits of colonial domination because the spread of Christianity is one of the most lasting and powerful cultural legacies of European imperialism. And his analysis suggests that while the "subjects" of European empire were often politically and economically weak, their intellectual worlds and local discourses dominated colonial popular cultures and forced colonizers to speak in local idiom rather than impose and rule through foreign ones. Larson's essay thus addresses some of the central questions in the current debate about the impact of imperial culture on colonized peoples and does so in a way that raises important theoretical as well as substantive issues.

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Angela Woollacott analyzes white Australian women's responses to different British colonial racial structures at ports of call en route to England in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She argues that the significance of these women's accounts of their voyages to England, and their interactions with colonized people at the ports of call, is that they were compelled to articulate the meaning of their whiteness in relation to both Australia and the larger British Empire. Woollacott contends that the record left by these Australian travelers contradicts the arguments of scholars who claim that white women subverted hegemonic colonialism. Instead, she maintains, at least some white Australian women while in these ports positioned themselves as powerful both in terms of class and race. The accounts left by these women thus suggest that historians should examine the connections among the settler colonies or dominions and the other colonies of the British Empire, and consider the complicity of dominion subjects in the colonial system. As a significant contribution to the emerging scholarship on "whiteness," Woollacott's article thus illuminates a number of critical issues in the history and experience of European colonialism.

Prasenjit Duara seizes the opportunity provided by the growing interest in transnationalism to explore the problem historically. He explains that transnationalism tends to be seen as a late twentieth-century development associated with advanced capitalism, flexible production, and postmodernism. However, he maintains, if, as many claim, nationalism emerged in the era of capitalism, then it surely has always had to deal with the boundary-crossing and globalizing impetus of capitalism. Following this insight, Duara explores how nationalist regimes and spokesmen dealt with the transnational demands, flows, and ideals generated not only by capitalism but also by historical forces such as universalizing religions and population movements not easily confined to the new, territorially sovereign nation-states. He does so by focusing on three topics in East Asia during the first half of the twentieth century: the convergence of Chinese and Japanese ideals of pan-Asianism, the Chinese republican regime's effort to incorporate the non-Chinese peoples of the vast peripheries into the territorial nation-state, and finally that regime's efforts to cultivate the loyalty of overseas Chinese to the nation-state. Duara also has a methodological goal. He seeks to displace the nation-state as a "natural" or taken-for-granted framework for historical study by revealing how the nation-state sought to confine history and build sovereignty within its claimed territory. Duara's essay is thus a compelling argument about the ways in which the complex and multidimensional relationships between nationalism and transnationalism should be studied.

Wm. Roger Louis offers a different look at East Asia by narrating critical events in the history of Hong Kong during the years leading up to 1949, when the British feared that the Chinese Communists might attempt to seize the colony by force. Against the present background of Hong Kong's restoration to China, Louis crafts a narrative of the earlier era to determine the assumptions on which British rule was based. Drawing on archival sources in Hong Kong and London, his tale reconstructs the clashing presuppositions of the two central figures in the story, two postwar


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governors of the colony. One hoped that Hong Kong might develop a British allegiance leading to the establishment of an independent state within the Commonwealth, much like Singapore. The other thought that any attempt to create a Hong Kong identity would merely arouse the suspicions of the Chinese government, whether Nationalist or Communist, and that British rule therefore should be based on the assumption that the colony would be restored to China in 1997. Louis sets his story in the larger context of British colonialism, post–World War II decolonization, the Cold War, and the history of Hong Kong itself. His article also raises methodological questions. Endorsing the recent revival of the narrative, Louis's presentation is based on the assumption that narrative history can be just as sophisticated and analytical as any other form of historical analysis. His essay thus addresses important issues of historical method as well as questions about imperialism and decolonization.

Review Essay

Sarah A. Kent assesses the recent literature on the current crisis in Bosnia. It is a literature written mostly by journalists and filled with conflicting arguments, assertions, and points of view. Rather than dismiss the work out of hand as useless, she suggests how it can be read usefully by historians. She does so by examining its governing assumptions and stated objectives. Treating the work as a body of primary sources allows her to suggest how such immediate analyses of contemporary events can be subjected to historical analysis. As a result, Kent's essay is not only a useful primer on the recent Bosnian literature, it is as well an example of how historians can use their skills to understand the sources produced by contemporary conflicts. Her essay is thus of interest to all historians who wrestle with the question of how historical issues and methods can be used to understand the present.

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Madagascar In the Western Indian Ocean, About 1820-1835.

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"Capacities and Modes of Thinking": Intellectual Engagements and Subaltern Hegemony in the Early History of Malagasy Christianity

PIER M. LARSON

> We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart.
>
> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* (New York, 1990), 1: 101.

IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, nearly all current scholarship on European expansion struggles with how to conceptualize cultural exchange in contexts of unequally distributed power. Historians of colonial culture have recently sought to explore this tension by examining how European cultural discourses contributed to the production of imperial power.[1] Key to this "new discursive history" with its emphasis on the capacity of ideas to transform human relationships has been a concern with how European powers discursively defined imperial subjects as governable others. Heavily influenced by readings of Michel Foucault that place emphasis on the role of knowledge in the service of state power, many of the new imperial histories investigate colonial discourses of personhood, religion, space, race, gender, sexuality, and the body to show how European intellectual hegemony transformed colonial subjects' mental worlds, organizations of knowledge, and daily routines.[2] While they opened new and important terrains of investigation into the relationship of knowledge and the production of power in colonial contexts, neo-Foucauldian studies of imperial discourse have underestimated the intellectual

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[1] When speaking of the political contexts of European expansion, the narrative of this article shifts between concepts of colony and empire. It does so not to suggest that the two are interchangeable but that the argument applies in both cases.

[2] Some of the new colonial histories were debated in articles authored by Gyan Prakash, Florencia E. Mallon, and Frederick Cooper in the *AHR Forum* of *AHR* 99 (December 1994). The present article is composed in dialogue with these contributions and has benefited from their insights and perspectives. Specifically, this contribution grows directly out of Cooper's recommendation that historians embark on histories of engagement in colonial contexts.

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resilience of "colonized minds." With their assumptions about the ability of colonially formulated discourses to constrain persons at the periphery of European empire, the new discursive histories parallel dependency and world systems theories, which claimed that "peripheries" were economically organized in a manner functional for Euro-centered capitalism. But colonized people routinely engaged and rearranged colonial discourses by fitting them into local systems of knowledge. Like everyone, people at the periphery of the European empire could only understand what was new to them by analogy to what they already knew. By filtering European discourses through their own orders of meaning, "subalterns" limited the potential of those discourses to rule effectively in the service of colonial power.

The spread of Christianity in Africa and elsewhere in the former colonies is among the most successful, deep-rooted, and lasting cultural legacies of European expansion. By focusing on a particular example of Christian evangelism, this study of discourse and European imperialism takes as its example one of the most engaged categories of intellectual encounter between Europeans and "other" peoples. Because successful Christian evangelism entails meaningful intellectual encounters, discourses of mission Christianity in the modern world constitute a fertile testing ground for theories of discourse and imperial power. By means of a case study of Christian evangelization in the highlands of central Madagascar, this article suggests a modification of the neo-Foucauldian paradigm in colonial intellectual history. I investigate a common paradox in the global history of Christianity: highland Malagasy peasants appropriated the religious idiom of European missionaries yet transformed it to suit their own cultural logic. On the one hand, the Malagasy appropriation of Christianity represented a successful project of evangelization supported by both British imperial authorities in the Indian Ocean and King Radama of highland Madagascar, who himself was in the process of constructing an island-wide empire. But on the other, the Malagasy conversion inverted the relationship of intellectual-cultural constraint that often characterizes recent history and theory of colonial culture. Unable to determine the words and concepts through which the Malagasy made sense of Christianity, European missionaries were obliged to transform their language and shift their theology to make it more compatible with Malagasy culture. They were obliged to evangelize on Malagasy terms, and in ways that made intellectual sense to their audiences. At the same time, missionaries remained among the materially and politically powerful in Malagasy society. This paradox in Malagasy intellectual engagements with foreign religious emissaries—the hegemony of a subaltern intellectual discourse over that of a materially dominant and politically connected elite—suggests a rethinking of the ways in which colonial cultural, intellectual, and discursive projects are commonly conceptualized.[3] Far from producing their intended outcome, imperial discourses were often transformed and vernacularized by the subjects of European rule. Studies of power and knowledge in imperial contexts need to pay greater attention to the basic process of subaltern reception

[3] The term subaltern hegemony is inspired by Ranajit Guha, "Dominance without Hegemony and Its Historiography," in Ranajit Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on South Asian History and Society* (Delhi, 1989), 210–309.

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and conversion of European discourses. By their active engagement with the intellectual material of colonial discourses, imperial subjects constrained, limited, and transformed the cognitive culture of the foreign and politically dominant.

AT THE INVITATION OF KING RADAMA, Protestant missionaries of the London Missionary Society (LMS) commenced preaching and teaching in 1820 in and around the capital of the expanding Merina kingdom of central Madagascar. Radama sought the literacy offered by missionaries to create an effective imperial bureaucracy. At the same time, he embraced the military and technical assistance offered by the British government, using it to fashion a permanent standing army with which to more effectively conquer and rule the far-flung quarters of his rapidly expanding empire. For their part, British authorities were interested in supporting an informal Malagasy empire by promoting literacy, Protestantism, and British influence in the capital, Antananarivo, ensuring their nearby Indian Ocean plantation colony at Mauritius a vital source of food and labor, and destroying a protracted history of French colonial influence in Madagascar. With these geopolitical goals in mind, Sir Robert Farquhar, governor of Mauritius, and his diplomatic emissaries to Antananarivo aided the LMS mission financially, diplomatically, and logistically until missionaries were required to leave Madagascar in 1836. During the first fifteen years of their presence as royally protected and sponsored emissaries at Radama's capital, LMS missionaries primarily concerned themselves with learning the Malagasy language, translating the Bible into the vernacular, and operating schools for children recruited for them through royal edict. (Most of these children were later drafted into high positions in the army and administration.) With the permission of Queen Ranavalona, who came to power at Radama's death in 1828, missionaries conducted their first baptisms in May 1831. By the end of that year, however, Ranavalona changed her mind about Christian baptisms and withdrew her permission for them after some 150 individuals had been baptized, most of them adults.[4]

What did it mean to be a Christian within the early Merina kingdom, and who

[4] For general histories of the Merina kingdom, see Hubert Deschamps, *Histoire de Madagascar*, 4th edn. (Paris, 1972); Mervyn Brown, *A History of Madagascar* (London, 1995); Phares M. Mutibwa, *The Malagasy and the Europeans: Madagascar's Foreign Relations, 1861–1895* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1974); Michel Prou, *Malagasy "Un pas de plus": Vers l'histoire du "Royaume de Madagascar" au XIX^e siècle*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1987); Pier M. Larson, "Desperately Seeking 'the Merina' (Central Madagascar): Reading Ethnonyms and Their Semantic Fields in African Identity Histories," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22 (December 1996): 541–60. For a history of the LMS mission, consult Bonar A. Gow, *Madagascar and the Protestant Impact: The Work of the British Missions, 1818–95* (New York, 1979); Norman Goodall, *A History of the London Missionary Society*, 1895–1945 (London, 1954). Baptismal statistics for 1831, the only year during which baptisms were permitted, are not complete. Baptisms were conducted at two chapels run by David Griffiths and David Johns, respectively. Griffiths reported having baptized 96 persons by the end of 1831. See Edward Baker and Griffiths to J. Clayton, Antananarivo, February 2, 1831, Archives of the London Missionary Society (Council for World Mission Archives), Library of the School for Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Madagascar Incoming Letters, Box 4, Folder 1, Jacket D (hereafter, these letters are cited in the following abbreviated form providing both date and location: 02/02/31, LMS/4/1/D). These statistics are from the extract of David Griffiths' baptismal register appended to the preceding letter. Baptismal statistics from David Johns' chapel do not appear in LMS records. Various comments in LMS letters from 1831, however, suggest that about half the number of individuals were baptized at Johns' chapel

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were the early Christians? Historians of Madagascar have traditionally conceptualized Christianity as a systematic and well-defined foreign complex of ideas and practices introduced into Madagascar by European missionaries to which some Malagasy converted by means of the sacrament of baptism. "As a personal engagement," writes Bruno Hübsch, "adherence to Christianity signified above all openness to a divine message exterior to Madagascar."[5] Gwyn Campbell explains Malagasy Christianity in more contrastive terms: "Christianity represented an alien cosmic order that could take deep root in Malagasy society only if, firstly, traditional ancestral powers were seen to be failing to guarantee national security and prosperity, and secondly if the pantheon of Christian powers could subsequently demonstrate that they were able to restore and maintain the national welfare."[6] According to these interpretations of evangelization, religious transformation in early nineteenth-century highland Madagascar was a zero-sum game: what "traditional ancestral powers" lost to a crisis of religious confidence, missionaries gained for their alien practice of Christianity.[7] These categorical theories of conversion are ultimately based on mission understandings of Christianity. Conversion, according to the LMS, transpired at the transformative moment of baptism after a disciplined period of instruction at the feet of LMS clergy.[8] A corollary of such a theory of conversion, Christianity in highland Madagascar consisted of those ideas and practices that circulated within the well-bounded, restricted, and mission-sanctioned community of baptized Malagasy. Christianity, for the missionaries, was clearly recognizable and carefully controlled under the intellectual authority of foreign clerics.

Cultural studies of early Christianity in highland Madagascar have adopted the foregoing theory of religious transformation and broadened it intellectually. Françoise Raison-Jourde, for example, has theorized a dichotomy between Malagasy oral and British literate culture that informed the evangelistic and linguistic work of the LMS missionaries.[9] She argued that the missionaries applied a narrow

as at Griffiths'. See especially Griffiths to Directors, Antananarivo, 12/10/31, LMS/4/1/C; J. J. Freeman to Philips, Antananarivo, 16/10/31, LMS/4/1/D.

[5] Bruno Hübsch, *Madagascar et le christianisme* (Fianarantsoa, 1993), 222.

[6] Gwyn Campbell, "Crisis of Faith and Colonial Conquest: The Impact of Famine and Disease in Late Nineteenth-Century Madagascar," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 32 (1992): 415.

[7] For similar interpretations, see Gow, *Madagascar and the Protestant Impact*, 12–13; Gerald M. Berg, "Writing Ideology: Ranavalona, the Ancestral Bureaucrat," *History in Africa* 22 (1995): 80–81; Maurice Bloch, *From Blessing to Violence: History and Ideology in the Circumcision Ritual of the Merina of Madagascar* (Cambridge, 1986), 18–28.

[8] This theory of conversion was fundamental to the LMS mission and is found in the practices of accepting for baptism only those Malagasy who had memorized catechisms and had taken instruction from the missionaries in religion and literacy. David Jones, the first LMS missionary to arrive in Antananarivo, boldly emphasized this point to King Radama in conversation, saying, "I would not even admit *him* as a Christian convert unless I should find clear evidence of his true conversion & that he was really sensible of what I teach him from the Bible, which is always the given standard of all our missionaries to teach the heathen." Jones to David Bogue, Antananarivo, 03/11/20, LMS/1/2/B. See also William Ellis, ed., *History of Madagascar, Comprising also The Progress of the Christian Mission Established in 1818; and an Authentic Account of the Persecution and Recent Martyrdom of the Native Christians* (London, 1838), 2: 447 (hereafter, this work, a collective publication of the LMS missionaries edited in its final form by Ellis, is abbreviated *HOM*).

[9] Françoise Raison-Jourde, "L'échange inégal de la langue: La pénétration des techniques linguistiques dans une civilisation de l'oral (Imerina, début du XIX^{e} siècle)," *Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations* 32 (1977): 639–69. See also Raison-Jourde, "L'acculturation par l'écriture sainte à

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technical understanding of language to their work of creating a written Latin orthography for Malagasy and in producing their tools of literacy and conversion: vocabularies, catechisms, dictionaries, and translations of the Bible. The Victorian penchant for scientific technique and clear-cut translations, she contended, led to missionaries' lack of interest in the social context and richness of the Malagasy language. This process was especially salient in the production of a Malagasy-English dictionary published in 1835, which proposed single rather than multiple definitions for Malagasy terms and rarely illustrated Malagasy words through the use of explanatory phrases.[10] Raison-Jourde wrote:

> The translation of the Bible between 1824 and 1827 represented a prime cultural achievement during which the status of the [Malagasy] language was overturned by the auxiliary works that the translation produced: the creation of a treasure of words rapidly pushed toward the systematic collection for a dictionary, beginnings of grammars that commenced with a description of the language and proceeded to a fixing of compulsory norms taught in the schools.[11]

Expanding on the British missionaries' lack of interest in Malagasy oral culture, she continued:

> the first wave of missionaries (between 1820 and 1836) insisted little about the importance of the oral culture and the fundamental role in the society of the exchange of words. The missionaries are silent about the duality of the indigenous oral and the Christian written, which introduced divergent modes of transmission, and which bit by bit transformed the cultural field into a place of confrontation.[12]

The technical interests of the missionaries, Raison-Jourde concluded, led to a "neglect of systematic transcription of oral treasures" and "permitted the valorization, once and for all, of a culture of literacy over a culture of orality."[13] While Raison-Jourde correctly identified the avowed single-mindedness of LMS missionaries in the technical aspects of their language work—they were primarily interested in the task of creating what they considered a linguistically accurate translation of the scriptures—she overstated the degree to which the field of cultural interaction between the Malagasy and the missionaries became a battlefield between literate and oral forms of communication. Such a confrontational theory of conversion fails to account for the inability of LMS missionaries to control the flow, interpretation, and appropriation of their Christian message.[14] The boundaries

Madagascar: Une religion de l'écriture dans une civilisation de l'oral," in *Histoire du texte: Recherches sur la place du livre dans le christianisme* (Paris, 1974), 72–82; Françoise Raison, "Ethnographie missionnaire et fait religieux au XIX^{e} siècle: Le cas de Madagascar," *Revue française de sociologie* 19 (1978): 525–49; Raison, "Le travail missionnaire sur les formes de la culture orale à Madagascar entre 1820 et 1886," *Omaly sy anio* 15 (1982): 33–52; Raison-Jourde, "Quand la culture d'élites devient culture populaire: Cent ans de rapports de force linguistique en Imerina," in B. Jewsiewicki and H. Moniot, eds., *Dialoguer avec le léopard? Pratiques, savoirs et actes du peuple face au politique en Afrique noire contemporaine* (Paris, 1988), 74–107.

[10] David Johns, *Diksionary Malagasy, Mizara Roa: Ny Faharoa'ny, Malagasy sy English* (Antananarivo, 1835).

[11] Raison-Jourde, "L'échange inégal de la langue," 639–40.

[12] Raison-Jourde, "L'échange inégal de la langue," 640.

[13] Raison-Jourde, "L'échange inégal de la langue," 660.

[14] Raison-Jourde has not revised the assertions in her work on the early nineteenth century. In a

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between Christian and non-Christian in the early Merina kingdom became fuzzy and unpredictable in practice.

INTERPRETATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY AS DISCONTINUOUS WITH MALAGASY WAYS often rest on missionary conflicts with spiritual beings called *vazimba* during the 1820s. Although they have been the subject of much inquiry in Malagasy history, *vazimba* are difficult to define with precision.[15] Contemporary narratives identified *vazimba* as the original inhabitants of central Madagascar.[16] Unlike spirits of those deceased who were properly buried in carefully maintained family tombs, *vazimba* spirits were said to inhabit the highland landscape, especially near ancient burial places such as raised mounds of earth.[17] "Their graves . . . resemble small barrows, or gentle elevations of earth," wrote the missionaries in their collectively published two-volume monograph, *History of Madagascar*, "with an upright stone placed in or near the centre, and a number of smaller stones rudely thrown together, like the ruins of an ancient grave."[18] When, in 1829, iron pyrite miners performing royal labor service (*fanompoana*) unearthed old bones contained in a canoe and encrusted with the mineral, they were immediately identified as being those of a *vazimba*.[19] In practical terms, *vazimba* were associated with any remains or tombs to which the living could not attach a distinct memory.[20] *Vazimba* were nameless ancestral spirits lacking proper and remembered ties to living kin through regularly maintained stone tombs and the periodic performance there of appropriate rituals by the living. Unpredictable in their perpetual state of social alienation, *vazimba* brooded angrily and dangerously.

Because much of highland Madagascar's irregular landscape can be construed as containing the remains of *vazimba* graves, the most common offense against *vazimba* spirits was (and remains) inadvertently disturbing their dwelling places. On the other hand, as powerful spirits, *vazimba* were in a position to channel their power, if properly requested, to the benefit of humans. Because of their ambiguous role as powerfully dangerous yet potentially beneficial beings, *vazimba* are fre-

recent book on Malagasy Christianity during the second half of the nineteenth century, however, she has come to recognize "phenomena of diffusion, of exchange of cultural traits, in short an important and poorly understood porousness of religious boundaries." Françoise Raison-Jourde, *Bible et pouvoir à Madagascar au XIX^e siècle: Invention d'une identité chrétienne et construction de l'état, 1780–1880* (Paris, 1991), 6. It is precisely such a history of creative middle ground in highland Malagasy intellectual and religious history of the early nineteenth century that the present study pursues.

[15] See Gerald Berg, "The Myth of Racial Strife and Merina Kinglists: The Transformation of Texts," *History in Africa* 4 (1972): 1–30.

[16] *HOM*, 1: 123–26; Raombana, *Histoires* (Fianarantsoa, 1980), 137–42; R. P. Callet, ed., *Tantara ny Andriana eto Madagascar: Documents historiques d'après les manuscrits malgaches*, 2 vols. (Antananarivo, 1981), 1: 7–8, 147, 237.

[17] See David Jones, David Griffiths, and John Canham, "Copy of a Journal, Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou, Septr. 1823," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, entry for 20/09/23, Archives of the London Missionary Society, Journals, Madagascar and Mauritius, Box 1 (hereafter, LMS/J/1), p. 24.

[18] *HOM*, 1: 125.

[19] James Cameron to J. Arundel, Antananarivo, 25/09/29, LMS/3/2/B.

[20] See also Bloch, *From Blessing to Violence*, 42.

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quently requested to fulfill personal wishes.[21] "All I can learn satisfactory of this superstition," wrote LMS missionary John Jeffreys early in 1823,

> is that the vazimba was a great Hero formerly, and who has been ever since regarded with a kind of religious veneration by the people. It is difficult to ascertain the exact sentiments of the people as to this superstition. But they say that if people are very poor or sorrowful they bring a little money and leave it on the stone and kill a sheep or fowl, and that afterwards they prosper and are happy. Many will not go near it and say that if they touch the wood or the stone they will become sick & die.[22]

During the early decades of the nineteenth century, there were several prominent *vazimba* tombs in the vicinity of Antananarivo at which highlanders gathered to present their requests (*fivavahana*) and to kill poultry and small livestock, spilling their blood and posting their heads on poles erected from the ground. The missionaries' first recorded encounter with *vazimba* spirits transpired right in their classroom. The following is an entry in David Griffiths' journal for February 15, 1822:

> One of our scholars, a boy, was taken ill in a singular manner. His indisposition commenced with a pain about his shoulders and afterwards his head & heart were so affected that he was struck deaf and dumb. His wild leaps & jerks filled us with consternation, and perceiving no change likely to take place I ordered him to be conveyed home. On the following morning he attended school and was apparently quite well, but in the afternoon he was taken ill in a similar manner and at the very same time as on the preceding day. N.B. This boy continued to attend the school for several days, and the moment the sun would reach a certain place (about 4 P.M.) he would be taken ill in the same manner, every afternoon. Of the nature and the cause of which I could not attain satisfactory accounts.[23]

Three months later, the "illness" revisited Griffiths' school; this time, Griffiths made greater progress in his inquiries into the causes of the boys' behavior.

> May 10th. Two of our boys in the school were taken ill similarly to the boy on the 15th of Febry. One of them fell down quite [in]sensible and speechless. I enquired of the children what was the matter, they replied that he was *mararan savat*, or that is sick or sickened.

Mararin-javatra, "sickened by a thing," is vernacular for what anthropologists of Madagascar call spirit possession, but it seemed unsatisfyingly vague to Griffiths. "This is so unaccountable by the Malagasy," he explained in his journal, "that they have no other name for it." The children were being possessed by something (a *vazimba* spirit, the children later informed him) that Griffiths found at once both challenging and silly.[24]

What happened next in this missionary encounter with a *vazimba* spirit is extraordinary, for it must have been read very differently by Griffiths, on the one hand, and by his young Malagasy students, on the other. Griffiths explained: "Having sprinkled a little water on the face of the one that was most frightened, he

[21] Françoise Raison, "Les Ramanenjana, une mise en cause populaire du christianisme en Imerina," *Asie du Sudest et monde insulindien* 7 (1976): 271–93; Robert Cabanes, "Cultes de possession dans la plaine de Tananarive," *Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes des Coutumes* 9 (1972): 33–66.

[22] John Jeffreys, Journal, 15/01/23 through 19/05/23, LMS/J/1, pp. 3–4.

[23] David Griffiths, Journal, 18/01/22 through 19/07/22, entry for 15/02/22, LMS/J/1.

[24] Griffiths, Journal, 18/01/22 through 19/07/22, entry for 10/05/22, LMS/J/1.

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asked his pardon and thrown a little more he revived and got the better of his fright and was soon able to attend to his lesson." Griffiths had resorted to the British custom of splashing water in the face of the half conscious to revive them to full self-presence, the state of sobriety required of any devotee of Christianity. Sprinkling of water, however, was the most common means in highland Madagascar by which elders, chiefs, or sovereigns transmitted the life-giving power of an ancestral blessing (*hasina*) to their subordinates. As in other parts of Madagascar, water calmed particularly active bouts of possession. While Griffiths knocked more sense into his student with each application of water, he at the same time—doubtless unknowingly—suffused his own healing and calming power of sacred blessing over him, driving the *vazimba* spirit away. Having effected a tangible result, Griffiths immediately sought the contradictory goals of claiming the possession as the fancy of heathen imagination while at the same time declaring his power over it:

> To banish such fooleries out of their minds, I asked what it was and what it was like and if any would see it any more, to let me know. I would beat it, and drive it away and prevent it to injure any of them, & If they can, to take hold of it, and bring it to me. And then I would ask it what it wants and what business it has here to frighten the children in my school, filled with amazement at my boldness they hesitated the truth of it, I told them that they saw nothing, but what they imagined or dreamed about and that there is nothing to fear save God who made all things &c.[25]

Encounters such as these between foreign missionaries and numinous Malagasy powers were key to the cultural positioning of mission Christianity, for LMS missionaries were casting about during their early years in highland Madagascar to classify "native" belief and define the nature of a Malagasy theology as opposed to a Christian one. The existence of supernatural beings in the highland world might constitute evidence of false gods—or "the principal idols of this people," as *vazimba* were sometimes termed by LMS personnel.[26] Convinced they bore witness to a "one true God," the missionaries sought opportunities to confront spiritual beings who they defined as ontological enemies and thereby prove the superiority of their God before the eyes of skeptical Malagasy.[27] In another of his journals, Griffiths wrote:

> Messrs Jones Canham and myself took a walk to the East of the Town [Antananarivo] and passed by the Tomb and altar of the *Vasimba*. Many of the scholars were with us, and being desirous to convince them of the fooleries and vain superstitions respecting this Divine God or half deified hero, we made every one on the spot to cut a small branch of the holy tree called *Fan*. As they were taught to believe that if any one should cut a branch of this tree, he would die in the course of a few days, some of them cried out *O pray let us be excused*, and others attempted to run away crying out *I shall die. I shall die*. But we took no denial, as we proceeded a little farther we happened to miss the road. The children immediately attributed this to the *Vasimba* and said had you not made too free with the *Vasimba* you would not have missed the road. Continuing our walk we came to some water and there not

[25] Griffiths, Journal, 18/01/22 through 19/07/22, entry for 10/05/22, LMS/J/1.

[26] Jones, Griffiths, and Canham, "Copy of a Journal Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, entry for 21/09/23, LMS/J/1, p. 30.

[27] An evangelical strategy with scriptural antecedents in the encounter between Elijah and the prophets of Baal, 1 Kings 18: 20–40.

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being a bridge we were obliged to wade through. In crossing Mr. Canham struck his toe against a stone, but with slight injury, however one of the boys behind said to another "The white man has hurt his foot because he has taken the wood of the *Vasimba*.["] In the course of a few days we asked the children if they had been sick. They replied in the negative. Now we wish you to tell us whether we or the Malagash speak the truth, they replied it evident that it is you, but the Malagasy say now that because we were with you the *Vasimba* would not hurt us, as it is likely that he is afraid of you. We said, If the *Vasimba* could do any thing to the Malagasy he could hurt us as well as them. But the fact is there is nothing to hurt any body.[28]

LMS records contain several narratives of such incidents in which the missionaries and their schoolchildren desecrated places of *vazimba* supplication to prove the impunity with which practitioners of the new cult might transgress the boundaries of prevailing numinous practice and demonstrate the superior protective powers of their God.[29] Such incidents of purposeful confrontation have led scholars of central Madagascar to write that highlanders who participated in mission Christianity and vandalized *vazimba* graves "departed from ancestral ways."[30]

These interpretations are convincing when considered in light of opposition by priests of the royal talismans (the *mpitahiry sampy*, termed "idol keepers" by the missionaries) and pronouncements from the royal court during the reign of Queen Ranavalona (1828–1861). Keepers of a certain royal talisman called Rabehaza had complained to King Radama, missionaries noted, that LMS schoolchildren had "forsaken the custom of their forefathers" by ridiculing the talisman's powers.[31] In the mid-1830s, Queen Ranavalona began to accuse baptized Christians of abandoning her and "following the ancestors of the white men." *History of Madagascar* recounts the contents of an edict in which the queen forbade her subjects to actively practice mission Christianity. The edict was delivered to an estimated 150,000 assembled subjects in Antananarivo on March 1, 1835, by high officers of the court. Part of the message, directed to baptized followers of the missionaries, reads: "Remember, it is not about that which is sacred in heaven and earth, that which is held sacred by the twelve sovereigns, and all the sacred idols, that you are now accused; but it is *that you are doing what is not the custom of our ancestors*; that I abhor, saith Ranavalomanjaka."[32] Someone within the LMS felt compelled to comment about this critical passage by restating its meaning. The clarification, which comes in the form of a footnote to the *History of Madagascar*, is most likely the work of William Ellis, whose name the compendium carries but who was peripherally involved in its production, or John Jeffreys, one of the LMS missionaries in Madagascar who is known to have had primary responsibility for compiling the disparate documents that constitute the volume. The footnote reads: "Meaning

[28] David Griffiths, Journal (also signed by Jones, Canham, George Chick, and Thomas Rowland), 01/08/22 through 10/04/23, LMS/J/1.

[29] See Jones, Griffiths, and Canham, "Copy of a Journal Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, entry for 21/09/23, LMS/J/1, pp. 30–35.

[30] Berg, "Myth of Racial Strife," 9; Bloch, *From Blessing to Violence*, 18; Gow, *Madagascar and the Protestant Impact*, 11–14.

[31] Jones and Griffiths to George Burder, Antananarivo, 12/03/24, LMS/2/1/A. Radama was unsympathetic and reportedly replied, "you mind and take care of your idol and worship according to your own manner and custom and let the children mind their own work and business in the school."

[32] *HOM*, 2: 497, emphasis mine.

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by this, 'It is not respecting mere unimportant circumstances in established usages, that I accuse you, but of the grave offence that these changes are radical, and overthrow the very character of our national religion altogether.'—It was not a change from one idol to another, but from idolatry altogether, to the service of Jehovah."[33] The crucial sentence is the last one: baptized Malagasy Christians were not being accused of adopting new idols (*sampy*), the author of this clarification suggested, but of abandoning an entire system of idolatry altogether.

There are two points of significance here. The first is that the LMS evangelists agreed with the interpretation suggested by Ranavalona in her edict that Christianity represented a fundamental break with the "ways of the ancestors," an abandonment of existing "idolatry." Second, and more significant, missionaries found a clarification of the queen's words necessary, which suggests that highland Malagasy embraced alternative understandings of Christianity as an extension and perhaps a refinement of existing practices of "idolatry." Highland Malagasy constructed what Stuart B. Schwartz has called an "implicit ethnography" of Christianity that differed from the interpretations of foreign missionaries and the Malagasy royal court.[34] The keen abilities of highlanders to assign local meanings for Christianity, missionary printer Edward Baker observed in one of his letters, "serve to illustrate the genius of the Malagasy, to evince their susceptibility of christian instruction, and quick talent in applying that instruction to the capacities and modes of thinking of their countrymen."[35] Rather than representing a "change from idolatry altogether," as the missionaries put it, Malagasy conversion to Christianity entailed assimilation of mission religion to the cultural logic of Malagasy sacred practices (a process also known as syncretism).[36] Malagasy Christianity should be understood, then, as a "change from one idol to another" rather than an abandonment of "idolatry" altogether.

THE INTRODUCTION OF CHRISTIANITY INTO CENTRAL MADAGASCAR is what Frederick Cooper has described as a "story of engagement," the beginning of a fascinating cultural, intellectual, and philosophical encounter, one over which mission and royal control was always at best tenuous and one to which common Malagasy contributed in significant and meaningful ways.[37] Rather than a cultural confrontation, Malagasy Christianity issued from the creative production of new forms of expression and thought. While these new productions owed much to the evangelistic message of foreign missionaries, they were firmly anchored and articulated in the Malagasy language and Malagasy modes of thinking. Missionaries enjoyed privileged status as foreign envoys and protégés of Radama, but their evangelistic

[33] *HOM*, 2: 497, unnumbered footnote.

[34] Stuart B. Schwartz, "Introduction," in Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge, 1994), 1–19.

[35] Baker to Arundel, Antananarivo, 01/09/30, LMS/3/3/D.

[36] I avoid "syncretism" in this article because in the context of missions it is usually employed by evangelizing Christians to make negative judgments about creative syntheses of religious beliefs and practices.

[37] Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," *AHR* 99 (December 1994): 1535.

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strategies were the result of intellectual negotiation, reflecting choices they did not always freely exercise and work they did not necessarily conduct themselves. (Early biblical translations from English to Malagasy, for example, were conducted by mission school students, not the missionaries.) Taking my cue from the popular historical consciousness of the people of highland Madagascar with whom I spoke while conducting extensive oral historical fieldwork since 1989, I understand Malagasy conversion to Christianity not as a transformation from something Malagasy to something essentially different and alien, but as the creation of a new religious consciousness and practice from various familiar and familiarized cultural resources and traditions. For the highland Malagasy, becoming Christian has entailed a progressive journey toward a refinement of spiritual understanding undertaken together—and often in tension—with foreign missionaries.[38]

Fundamental to an intellectual history of highland Malagasy Christianity is the conceptual association made by early producers of Malagasy Christian discourse between the English language concepts of religion, worship, and prayer and the highland Malagasy practices of *fivavahana* (oral supplication in a variety of forms offered to various spiritual beings and ancestors). The logic of this conceptual association was probably supplied by those Malagasy attempting to explain local practice for Francophone slavers, who frequently ventured into the Malagasy highlands during the late eighteenth century in search of captives. But *fivavahana* was not the only possible choice for conveying the European notions of prayer, worship, and religion. The earliest European vocabularies of the Malagasy language based on the island's southern and eastern coastal dialects employ the terms *sakabiri* (from *fisa*, song, and *kabiry*, large) and *voreche* (or *vorika*, which in the Merina dialect of highland Madagascar now means sorcery, witchcraft, poison) for prayer.[39] With hindsight, *voreche* seems a particularly inappropriate translation of prayer/worship, but only because the contemporary meanings of *vorika* have been significantly shaped by the uses to which people in highland Madagascar have put the word over the last four centuries.[40] *Fivavahana* seems not to have figured in the cultural vocabulary of coastal Madagascar until the era of Christian expansion from

[38] Notes and recorded interviews from fieldwork in central Madagascar since 1989. This work is discussed in Pier M. Larson, "Multiple Narratives, Gendered Voices: Remembering the Past in Highland Central Madagascar," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 28 (1995): 295–325. See also the work of anthropologist Maurice Bloch, who writes, "To the Merina Christianity is not something foreign which conflicts with traditional values. This explains how many Merina can describe Protestantism as 'the religion of our ancestors'—in other words, something truly our own." Bloch, *Placing the Dead: Tombs, Ancestral Villages, and Kinship Organization in Madagascar* (London, 1971), 28. See also Bloch, *From Blessing to Violence*, 27: "As a result Christianization for the Merina meant adding to beliefs and practices. Only in a few areas was this a matter of replacing old beliefs and practices by new ones." Yet contrast this to Bloch's discussion of a separation between Christianity and "Merina religion" in *From Blessing to Violence*, 20–26.

[39] Etienne de Flacourt, "Recueil des principaux mots de la langue de Madagascar tournés en français et mis par ordre alphabétique," in Gabriel Ferrand, ed., *Etienne de Flacourt, dictionnaire de la langue de Madagascar d'après l'édition de 1658 et l'histoire de la grande isle Madagascar de 1661* (1658; rpt. edn., Paris, 1905), entry for "prière," 220; Barthélémy de Froberville, "Grand dictionnaire de Madagascar" (*ca.* 1815), British Library, Manuscripts Division, Add. Ms. 18125, 130v, entry for "Vorèche."

[40] This is what is problematic about Ludvig Munthe's commentary on the choice of Malagasy terms for Christian concepts in the catechism published by Catholic missionaries to southeast Madagascar in the mid-seventeenth century. Munthe's dissatisfaction with the use of certain terms is based primarily on the fact that by the twentieth century those terms had come to be strongly associated with non-Christian practices, a projection of contemporary meanings into the past. Munthe, *Le catechisme*

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the highlands beginning in the late nineteenth century, when it came to denote Christianity exclusively.[41] In the middle of the seventeenth century, *sakabiri*, *voreche*, and *fivavahana* each posed possible translations for the linked European ideas of prayer, worship, and religion, albeit ones with differing implications and limited to the regions of the island where the words were commonly employed.

Fivavahana derives from the Malagasy noun root *vava* (mouth) and the verb *mivavaka* (to supplicate, pray), both of which are cognates of the proto-Malayo Polynesian reconstruction for the noun mouth, **baq+baq*.[42] The conceptual linkage made by Malagasy translators between *fivavahana*, on the one hand, and prayer, on the other, was a practical way in which both highland Malagasy and Europeans could classify each other's numinous practices and thereby generate a mutual understanding of a shared domain of sacred life. The Malagasy naming of Euro-Christian practice as *fivavahana* was but a local form of the global phenomenon of the vernacularization of Christianity. Vicente Rafael has demonstrated how Tagalogs "reread" Spanish Catholicism in translation by infusing religious doctrine with a Tagalog sensibility, employing vernacularizations of Christianity to subvert the colonizing intentions of the Spanish clergy. Paul Landau has recently analyzed with fascinating detail how the Tswana-speaking people of the Ngwato kingdom of southern Africa came to know mission literacy, biblical texts, and instruction in mission schools as *thuto*, "teachings," "education," and, eventually, "civilization."[43] While providing a useful intellectual classification for practices of the cultural other, the equivalencies between prayer and *fivavahana*, or between education and *thuto*, were significant and fundamental for the meanings of Christianity because, while they generated cross-cultural understanding, they also modified the vernacular meanings of the respective (European and African) practices to which they referred. Originating in the Malagasy cultural translation of European sacred practices, the reflexive equating of *fivavahana* and prayer emerged as a primary preoccupation of British missionaries in highland Madagascar after their arrival

malgache de 1657: Essai de présentation du premier livre en langue malgache; Approche théologique, historique, linguistique et conceptuelle (Antananarivo, 1987), 35–36, 43–45, 51 n. 68.

[41] De Froberville's *Grand Dictionnaire*, based heavily on east coast dialects, does not contain an entry for *vavaka* or *fivavahana*. Anthropologists Sara Fee, Karen Middleton, and Jennifer Cole report that *vavaka* (or *vavake*) is not indigenous to southern or eastern Malagasy dialects and has been introduced from the outside (communications with the author, 1996).

[42] Malagasy is the westernmost member of the Malayo Polynesian subgroup of the Austronesian family of languages, most of which are spread throughout the islands of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. See R. David Zorc with Malcolm D. Ross, "A Glossary of Austronesian Reconstructions," in Darrell T. Tryon, ed., *Comparative Austronesian Dictionary: An Introduction to Austronesian Studies* (Berlin, 1995), part 1, fascicle 2, p. 1112. **Baq+baq* is a redoubled monosyllabic Austronesian root; the plus sign is a convention employed to demonstrate this characteristic. (The asterisk is a standard convention from historical linguistics that indicates a reconstructed word.) Malagasy is only one of several Austronesian languages that today, doubtless also through Western cultural contact, demonstrate cognate relationships between the term for mouth and those for religion, worship, and prayer. This observation is based on the multiple Austronesian language glosses for religion, worship, and prayer provided in Tryon, part 4, 703, 714, 716.

[43] Vicente L. Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988); Paul Landau, *The Realm of the Word: Language, Gender, and Christianity in a Southern African Kingdom* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1995), 15–17. See also Landau's discussion of *Lefoko la Modimo*, "the Word of God," as a "primary means of [Christian] self-identification," 17–19.

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there in 1820. LMS research in highland Madagascar revealed *fivavahana* as a practice of orally addressing a variety of spiritual beings, including ancestors. Through exploratory conversation with their hosts, the LMS missionaries attempted to ascertain the cross-cultural equivalencies between praying and *fivavahana*. Consider the following conversation initiated by inquisitive missionaries traveling about highland Madagascar in 1823:

> In what place do you and the people in general say that God resides? "He is above in the East, we pray [*mivavaka*] to him at the rising of the sun, believing that he then makes his appearance there." Do you pray to any other being? "Yes; we pray to our ancestors, to our deceased friends & to the Vazimba." Do you believe that they hear you and are able to bless you? They answered in the negative. Why then do you pray to them? "Because we follow the custom of our fathers and the direction of our Sikidy," i.e. divination. Can God hear you? We do not know, but at the rising of the sun we lift up our heads and pray to him."[44]

As this passage demonstrates, LMS missionaries came to accept the associations between *fivavahana* and the practice of addressing their God in prayer and worship. The records of early evangelistic encounters between missionaries and highland Malagasy suggest that the LMS personnel consciously and repeatedly chose to engage in discussions about the doing and meaning of *fivavahana* as a culturally meaningful way of communicating their understandings about deity and proper human relationships with it. These conversations were probably far more dialogic and messy than they appear in missionary correspondence and journals, where Malagasy voices are routinely reported in English and are characteristically undifferentiated and unnamed. What is remarkable about these early discussions concerning cross-cultural intellectual matters is that the most effective connections made by both Malagasy and their British interlocutors between the literate practices of European Christianity and the oral practices of highland cults were the verbal ones. Originating as it does from the cognate proto-Malayo Polynesian and Malagasy nouns for mouth, *fivavahana* centers the English meanings of prayer and worship in verbal expression. Interestingly, it was the praying and singing of LMS Christianity that most favorably impressed early nineteenth-century highland Malagasy. During conversations with missionaries, curious peasants consistently asked for the productions of the LMS's singing students from Antananarivo.[45] The appeal of the oral dimension of a literate cult to Malagasy living in a largely nonliterate society may explain why *fivavahana* with its verbal associations emerged as a central trope for Christian practice.[46] It also helps to explain the cultural logic underlying the choice of *fivavahana*—and the coastal terms *voreche* and *sak-abiri*—to gloss religion, worship, and prayer: all of them demonstrate convincing

[44] Jones, Griffiths, and Canham, "Copy of a Journal, Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, entry for 17/09/23, LMS/J/1, pp. 11–12.

[45] See especially the repeated requests by villagers for the singing schoolchildren in Jones, Griffiths, and Canham, "Copy of a Journal, Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, LMS/J/1, pp. 13, 17–18, 48, 52.

[46] Although Madagascar was a largely nonliterate society, a secretive literacy in the Malagasy language using Arabic script, concentrated primarily on the island's southeast coast but with some influence in central Madagascar by the early nineteenth century, was practiced well before the arrival of Europeans in the Indian Ocean. See Ludvig Munthe, *La tradition arabico-malgache vue à travers le manuscrit A-6 d'Oslo et d'autres manuscrits disponibles* (Antananarivo, 1982).

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verbal associations. While the LMS missionaries attempted to determine the contours of appropriate Christian discourse in the Malagasy language, their efforts were subject to the limits of what was culturally meaningful in Malagasy translation. Missionaries could not singlehandedly control either the language or the creative process of cultural translation through which they were obliged to communicate their mission of religious transformation, a point that has been powerfully argued by Lamin Sanneh for Christian missions to Africa more generally.[47]

Assimilation of *fivavahana* to Christian activity seems to have crystallized only after several years of LMS evangelism in central Madagascar. Early baptized adherents to the LMS were derisively known as "the believers" (probably *ny mpino*) rather than "the prayers" (*ny mpivavaka*), as they were later called.[48] This naming convention maintained a more categorical distinction between mission and Malagasy numinous practices than *fivavahana* did. The change in nomenclature from "believers" to "prayers" is significant because it suggests a shift from a Euro-mission concept of Christianity as characterized by belief and creed to a more Malagasy one in which the essence of being Christian lay in the nature of what one did. By 1825, prayer had become intimately associated with Christianity, centered at King Radama's court and rapidly expanding from there into the highland countryside. It is not surprising that the first mission-controlled Christian fora in which the Malagasy were allowed to officiate were prayer meetings. In their journal entry for August 10, 1825, LMS missionaries Jones and Griffiths explained:

> Being desirous for some time past to commence a prayer meeting in the native language for the benefit of these people and particularly that of some of our most promising pupils, we therefore assembled together this evening for that purpose. We hope and pray that a meeting for prayer commenced in the native tongue among these people will be lasting and attended with the blessing of God to the eternal welfare of many.[49]

Gatherings for Christian prayer were first initiated in the kingdom's capital of Antananarivo among individuals intimately associated with the missionaries. When they proved an evangelistic success and participants demonstrated what missionaries identified as a "gift of prayer," the meetings spread to outlying towns in which the LMS maintained countryside schools overseen by graduates from its teaching college at Antananarivo.[50] "In the evening there is a prayer meeting held at the chapel, and although the [missionary school] children are not compelled to attend as on the other services yet a great number of them are never wanted, many of them engage in prayer who appear to me very earnest before the throne imploring the divine blessing."[51] At first organized in the evening, prayer meetings were moved to

[47] Lamin Sanneh, *Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture* (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1989); Sanneh, *Encountering the West: Christianity and the Global Cultural Process; The African Dimension* (Maryknoll, 1993). See also Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, for a similar argument in reference to the Philippines.

[48] *HOM*, 2: 460. See also Baker and Griffiths to Clayton, Antananarivo, 18/08/31, LMS/4/1/B: "There has been a good deal of private and family persecution. The day following the first administration of the ordinance [Eucharist], many people called contemptuously after the professors, saying 'Behold the believing.'"

[49] Jones and Griffiths to Burder, Antananarivo, 16/12/25, LMS/2/2/C.

[50] Jones and Griffiths to Burder, Antananarivo, 30/05/27, LMS/2/4/C.

[51] Johns to Burder, Antananarivo, 08/11/26, LMS/2/3/C. See also Jones and Griffiths to Directors of the LMS, Antananarivo, 09/11/26, LMS/2/3/C.

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morning hours, thought "more suited for the purpose." Reasons for the greater appropriateness of the morning as opposed to the evening are not given, but the choice could not have failed to reinforce parallels with longstanding practices of *fivavahana* to numinous beings and ancestors at the rising sun. Some years later, LMS missionaries reflected,

> It afforded much satisfaction to the Missionaries to find some of the scholars not only willing to associate with them in these exercises, but capable of engaging in prayer themselves, and with simplicity, fervour, and apparent feelings of true devotion, imploring the blessings of the true God on themselves and their countrymen. These meetings were first held on an evening, but it was afterwards found that the morning would be more suited for the purpose; and they afterwards extended to the village-schools, where several teachers were found, whom the Missionaries deemed it suitable to request to conduct the services.[52]

As Christian prayer spread, it did so primarily through the practice of collective public supplication, *fivavahana*, conducted in the morning in the Malagasy language and largely led by Malagasy youth. By the end of the first decade of LMS evangelization (1830), Christian practice was commonly known as "the New Religion" (*ny fivavahana vaovao*), a term suggesting a semantic separation between "old" and "new" exercises of *fivavahana*.[53] Originating as a cultural recognition of common spirituality, the equivalency between Christian worship and *fivavahana* was also subject to revisions by some Christian practitioners and their opponents. By the late 1820s, *fivavahana* without the qualification of "new" was being employed by some to designate Christian activity. The LMS minute book for Christmas Day 1828 notes: "Two officers came before the conclusion of the Schools to say, that the Queen desired there might be neither singing, nor worship (mihira sy mivavaka,) with the children, as being inconsistent with the mourning not yet completed for the late King."[54]

When the first congregation of baptized Malagasy and professing Europeans was formed in Antananarivo in 1831, the act of prayer had emerged as the most persuasive symbol of Christian practice. In the articles of agreement drawn up by the missionaries to govern the proceedings of the new church, prayer was recognized as key to Christian activity. Article 4 of the document reads,

> We purpose by the help of God to persevere unto death, in the observance of all which God commands us to do, *especially Prayer* [*vavaka*], whether in the assembly (Ps. 62.8. 1 Jn. V.14) or in the family, morning & evening (Jas. XXIV.15. Rom XVI.5) or each one alone, (Mat. VI.5–7. Lk. XVIII.1,3) or in ejaculatory prayer, when journeying when abiding; (Ps LXII.8) also in the observance of baptism, and the commemoration of Christ's death; (Mat. XXVIII.19. Acts XXII.16. Mat. XXVI.26–30. 1 Rev. X.11–24). and the sabbath as the appointed day of prayer, when not prevented by some great obstacles Gen. II.2,3. Ezek. XX.8–11. Mat. XXVII.1. Heb. IV.10. Ps. CXVIII.24–29.[55]

[52] *HOM*, 2: 362.

[53] Johns and Freeman to Ellis, Antananarivo, 29/05/33, LMS/4/4/B.

[54] "Extracts from the Minute Book of the LMS Mission," Entry for 25/12/28, LMS/3/2/C. The Malagasy words are in the original.

[55] "Agreement of the Church of Christ at Ambodinandohalo," Antananarivo, 06/08/31, LMS/4/1/B, Article 4, emphasis mine.

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No other article in the congregation's foundational concord defines in such explicit terms what activities were key to Christian identity. By emphasizing activity over belief and placing such emphasis on prayer, missionaries were assimilating a Malagasy understanding of Christianity into their own theology. The associations between prayer, *fivavahana*, and Christian practice were axiomatic in Malagasy Christianity from the early nineteenth century, and missionaries were shifting their theology to accommodate the local meanings generated by the association. In an ironic twist of evangelistic intentions, missionaries themselves were among the first converts to *fivavahana*.[56]

Not long before the missionaries were compelled by Queen Ranavalona to leave Antananarivo, prayer emerged as a dominant form of Christian activity in the "awakening" of 1834.[57] In November of that year, a letter forwarded by missionaries to the LMS directors reported:

> There are also several prayer-meetings held in the town [Antananarivo] during the week-evenings.[58] The two principal circumstances which we wish to notice in connexion with these meetings are, first, that a spirit of prayer actually exists and increases among the natives; and second, that these meetings are convened and conducted by natives themselves. They frequently request our attendance, to give an exhortation, and lead the service; but the houses are their own residences, and they consider themselves as acting on their own convictions—at the movement of their own minds, and from a consideration of present obligation to employ the means in their power of spreading around their respective neighbourhoods the knowledge of the true God, and of eternal life.[59]

Commenting on the awakening, the missionaries noted that God was "forming for himself his own instruments," key among which were unlearned peasants and the practice of public prayer—*fivavahana*.[60] LMS personnel watched in awe from Antananarivo as Christian *fivavahana* spread across the highland countryside, sometimes through the agency of individuals they had never known, who had received no instruction in their schools, who certainly were not among the baptized, and who did not even regularly attend public worship presided over by the missionaries in Antananarivo. Writing about Vonizongo, a district to the northwest, missionaries noted that,

> at a village about sixty miles distant, a small chapel has been lately erected by the zeal and devotedness of the natives, chiefly excited, however, by the exertions of a pious woman . . . A very delightful spirit of inquiry is awakened in that district; and several of the adult natives, men of rank and importance in their station, conduct *prayer-meetings*, and engage themselves in those exercises with much apparent fervour, pleasure, and propriety. Another chapel is also being erected in a district to the south, perhaps 120 miles distant. Public worship, *chiefly for prayer and reading of the Scriptures*, is held in many distant parts of the country, principally raised and conducted by those who were formerly scholars or teachers in the missionary schools.[61]

[56] I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for the *AHR* who suggested this irony.
[57] Raison-Jourde, *Bible et pouvoir à Madagascar*, 130–38.
[58] It is unclear what happened to the morning prayer meetings referred to earlier.
[59] *HOM*, 2: 484–85.
[60] *HOM*, 2: 485.
[61] *HOM*, 2: 485, emphasis mine.

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Quite literally, the first Malagasy churches in central Madagascar were houses of prayer.

The intimate association between *fivavahana* and Christian activity was implicit in a written complaint submitted by an officer of the royal court to the kingdom's judges (*andriambaventy*) after Queen Ranavalona began to disapprove of the new praying. The charges read, in part, "They [the Christians] are always praying [probably *mivavaka*]; they hold meetings in their own houses for prayer, without authority from the queen; and even before and after meals they pray." Part of this indictment concerns how collective supplication in the new cult provided extra-royal modes of association and a means of requesting blessings through an intermediary (the Christian God) with no association to the reigning sovereign.[62] Yet praying emerges in the suit pursued by opponents of Christianity as a symbol of what it meant to join the Christian community. Despite the hostility of court officials to waxing public interest in the new praying, and especially to the large number of prayer houses (*tranom-pivavahana*) being constructed across the highland countryside, the judge who considered the charge rejected the notion that *fivavahana* was in itself quintessentially Christian and therefore an offense against royal will. Such pronouncements from the kingdom's key judicial officials tended to maintain the ambiguity of *fivavahana* as a literate and verbal numinous practice common to followers of the new praying and to those of the old.[63] As a result of these actions denying complete assimilation of *fivavahana* to Christianity, the term as employed today in central Madagascar continues to denote sacred activity in a general way, much as the English terms religion and worship do, rather than specifying any specific mode of sacred activity.[64]

When historians write of Christianity in central Madagascar during the early decades of the nineteenth century, then, they are writing about a set of practices and ideas that became locally known as the new *fivavahana* yet remained conceptually and practically linked to the old *fivavahana*. Christians were those who identified themselves with the new *fivavahana* and engaged in its complex and hybrid package of practices. These first Malagasy Christians were persons well beyond the inner circle of the baptized or even the constantly fluctuating number of "adherents" who often crowded about the few missionary-run chapels in Antananarivo. Early practitioners of the new *fivavahana* included those who attended informal houses of prayer in Antananarivo and across the highland

[62] For an understanding of the role of elders and the sovereign in mediating the relationship between the living and the spiritual world, see Bloch, *From Blessing to Violence*, 39–47.

[63] *HOM*, 2: 487–88.

[64] By itself, *fivavahana* is usually understood to refer to Christian practice. When the term is combined with the object or type of religion, worship, or prayer, such as in *fivavahan-tsampy* (religion/worship/prayer of talismen), it denotes so-called traditional Malagasy practices thought (by some Christians) incompatible with Christianity. James Richardson, *A New Malagasy-English Dictionary* (Antananarivo, 1885), defines *fivavahana* as "the place of prayer, religion," 193; Antoine Abinal and V. Malzac, *Dictionnaire Malgache-Français* (1888; reissued by Fianarantsoa: Ambozontany, 1987), as "Action de prier, formule de prière, lieu consacré à la prière; religion, secte," 176; and the newest Malagasy dictionary, Régis Rajemisa-Raolison, *Rakibolana Malagasy* (Fianarantsoa, 1985) as (in my translation from Malagasy) "respect and service to God or that believed to be God; root belief and teachings that every people has to serve and respect God; words and movements of the heart used to praise God, to thank him and ask things of him, prayer (*vavaka*)," 371. See also *Firaketana ny Fiteny sy ny Zavatra Malagasy*, entry for "fivavahana," 593–97. Because it had no pre-contact precedent, *fivavahana* is associated solely with Christianity along Madagascar's coasts.

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Untitled watercolor of a highland Malagasy village and Protestant church, *circa* 1930, by Emile Ralambo (1879–1963). A teacher, founder of a Baptist church, and political activist briefly exiled from Madagascar for participation in an anti-colonial movement in 1915, Ralambo was also Madagascar's celebrated national romanticist painter. Ralambo favored rural scenes, and his paintings are visibly influenced by his experiences as a village teacher during the early decades of this century. This painting, depicting a church inside the crumbling walls of a small village, captures the centrality of Christianity to highland Malagasy culture and symbolizes how peasants embraced the church and made it their own. Owned by the Norwegian Missionary Society, Stavanger, Norway, this reproduction is printed by permission of the NMS archive.

countryside. It is not surprising that the words which emerged to classify the activity of being Christian derived from the Malagasy lexicon rather than the European one: to be either understood or effective locally, foreign and Malagasy missionaries had to speak a familiar language and build conceptual bridges between their practices and ideas and those of their evangelistic subjects. As these considerations of glossing Malagasy Christianity suggest, the success of the new *fivavahana* lay well beyond the exclusive agency and linguistic capability of LMS personnel. *Fivavahana* was clearly an idiom in which Malagasy found meaning and continuity with longstanding ideas and numinous practices.

BECAUSE OF THE LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY'S PREVIOUS EVANGELISTIC EXPERIENCE in Polynesia, missionaries arriving in central Madagascar were predisposed to speak of indigenous sacred practices through a ready-made language of idolatry and to situate their own religious practices in opposition to them.[65] Missionary David Jones's first official transaction with Radama after arriving in Antananarivo was to

[65] For the LMS's encounter with "idols" in the Pacific islands, see William Ellis, *Polynesian Researches, During a Residence of Nearly Six Years in the South Sea Islands*, 2 vols. (London, 1829).

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dispatch a drawing to the king, a candid visual signal of his intentions. "I sent also . . . the Missionary report of 1819 & one of the Missionary sketches representing the people of Otaheite destroying their idols & building a chapel, and I requested his secretary to explaine these to His Majesty as I had explained to him."[66] Radama could not have mistaken Jones's purpose in sending him the sketch, for missionaries did not search long or far for their Malagasy idols. As Gerald Berg has demonstrated, the royal court was the center of cultic practices that served to increase the authority of the king, a system of action and belief he calls the "*ody-sampy* complex."[67] *Sampy* were assemblages of wood, cloth, and various other articles such as imported bits of iron and scissors. Their specific powers varied greatly, but they were believed to extend protection, success, well-being, and wealth to those who observed their religious practices (*fady*). These were usually defined in the negative, and thus missionaries came to know them as taboos. (The Polynesian experiences of the LMS are also relevant to this choice of words.) *Sampy* were cared for by specialist practitioners generically termed *sampy* keepers (*mpitahiry sampy*), who specialized in the knowledge of their powers and in the practice of maintaining and enhancing them. *Sampy* keepers extended the protective powers of their charges by distributing small charms (*ody*) ritually imbued with the *sampy*'s power. It was the *sampy* maintained by specialists at the royal court that Jones identified with Tahitian idols and that were critical to the construction of mission understandings of the old *fivavahana* as oppositional to the new.

The LMS interpretations of the *ody-sampy* complex as incompatible with Christianity were conveyed through a discourse of Christianity and European schooling practices as representing "true knowledge." Soon after his arrival in Antananarivo, for example, David Jones noted, "We must acknowledge that instruction is the only true means for civilizing this people, and what an encouragement it gives to people here in seeing him [King Radama] thirst for knowledge." By "knowledge," Jones meant literacy and British military and manufacturing technologies.[68] The Malagasy word that the missionaries employed for knowledge was probably *fahaizana*, a term that stresses intellectual capacity and ability to a much greater extent than its English counterpart does.[69] The missionaries' choice of words reinforced in the vernacular their own sense of cultural superiority, cleverness, and ability. Appropriating *fahaizana* for themselves, the missionaries

[66] David Jones, Journal, 04/09/20 through 14/10/20, entry for 10/10/20, LMS/J/1, p. 20. The incidents of "idol" destruction to which Jones here refers can be found in Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, 1: 205–28. A drawing of Tahitian "idols" is reproduced on 1: 211.

[67] Gerald Berg, "Royal Authority and the Protector System in Nineteenth Century Imerina," in Conrad Philip Kottak, Jean-Aimé Rakotoarisoa, Aiden Southall, and Pierre Vérin, eds., *Madagascar: Society and History* (Durham, N.C., 1986), 175–92.

[68] Jones to Charles Telfair, Antananarivo, 18/10/20, LMS/1/2/A. For a history of Western technology and the rulers of the Merina kingdom, see Gwyn Campbell, "An Industrial Experiment in Pre-Colonial Africa: The Case of Imperial Madagascar, 1825–1861," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 17 (September 1991): 525–59.

[69] In the LMS's Malagasy-English dictionary of 1835, *fahaizana* is translated as "capability, capacity, competence," Johns, *Diksionary Malagasy*, 92. Richardson (1885) defines *fahaizana* as "Ability, cleverness, competency to do anything," *New Malagasy-English Dictionary*, 220. Abinal and Malzac (1888), however, find greater congruence between the nineteenth-century European idea of knowledge and *fahaizana*: "Le savoir, la capacité, la science, l'habileté," 205.

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equated their evangelistic work with "the promotion of knowledge."[70] One of the favorite ways in which the missionaries closed their letters to London was to ask the LMS directors to pray for them "and the multitudes around us, perishing for lack of knowledge."[71] The London Missionary schools in and around Antananarivo were seen as the "fountain head from whence lessons should be taken out and the seeds of knowledge be sown in all parts of this island."[72] "Knowledge is diffused among these poor heathens through the means of the catechisms," noted Jones and Griffiths in a report submitted to the London directors.[73] Talk about *fahaizana* was a favorite way in which the missionaries began evangelistic conversations with the Malagasy:

> How are men to obtain knowledge [probably *fahaizana*], we asked them. One said "by eating much rice" and other good things, another said, "By conversing with the wise." The latter remark is just we told them, and adverted to education and the object of our mission and asked them if they would like to learn. One answered "What the King likes I shall like." Suppose the King leaves it to you; what will you choose? "I cannot answer for others, but as to myself I should like to have my family taught."[74]

When, in 1829, Queen Ranavalona refused to fill mission schools with children, missionaries asked court officers "to tell her that the word of God was the foundation of all true knowledge, and that no nation became wise without it."[75] In their optimistic moments, the missionaries reflected that "ere long some hundreds and thousands of these people shall be brought unto the knowledge of the truth."[76] "Truth" in LMS discourse, located in the ideas and practices of the new *fivavahana*, was equated with the acquisition of knowledge. This mission version of European superiority with its theory of "true knowledge" is similar in substance to ideologies of dominance articulated by Western writers and thinkers more broadly in their encounters with Asian and African peoples.[77]

While supporting a theory of highland Malagasy society in which all "true knowledge" was located in the persons and practices of the new *fivavahana* (and particularly in its foreign missionaries, their God, and their technologies), LMS personnel nevertheless conceded that knowledge in different forms was held by local people. "Heathen" knowledge was produced and disseminated by Malagasy doers and thinkers, intellectuals of various sorts. Because they espoused different knowledge systems, these Malagasy intellectuals were soon identified by mission-

[70] Griffiths to Burder, Antananarivo, 05/11/24, LMS/2/1/C; "Extract of Report by James Hastie," Antananarivo, 17/03/25, LMS/2/2/A.

[71] Griffiths, Canham, Chick, and Rowlands to Burder, Antananarivo, 06/05/23, LMS/1/3/B. See also Griffiths and Johns to William Orme, Tananarivo, 19/03/30, LMS/3/3/A.

[72] Jones and Griffiths to Directors, Antananarivo, 24/06/24, LMS/2/1/B. See also "An Appeal to the Christian World, Madagascar Missionary School Society, David Jones, David Griffiths and James Hastie," Antananarivo, 14/11/25, LMS/2/2/C.

[73] Jones and Griffiths to Burder, Antananarivo, 04/08/25, LMS/2/2/B. For a similar statement, see Jones and Griffiths to Burder, Antananarivo, 30/05/27, LMS/2/4/A.

[74] Jones, Griffiths, and Canham, "Copy of a Journal Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, entry for 26/09/23, LMS/J/1, p. 52.

[75] "Copy of Minutes from the Minute Book of the Missionaries," Antananarivo, 04/05/29 through 08/07/29, LMS/3/2/A.

[76] Johns to William Alers Hankey, Antananarivo, 06/12/30, LMS/3/4/C.

[77] Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989).

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aries as their sacred competitors.[78] "There are here three principal classes of imposters professing a knowledge of futurity," noted Edward Baker in a letter to his superiors in London: "I call 1stly. 'Diviners' called mpisikidy those who tell fortunes & answer all enquiries by an arrangement of the beans or sand . . . 2ndly. 'Astrologers' those who tell lucky & unlucky days &c by the position of the moon in the heavens [the *mpanandro*]; another Arabic superstition. 3rdly 'Idolators,' those who worship, make, sell &c idols, or charms; & deal largely in fictitious prophecies, juglery or sleight of hand &c [the *mpitahiry sampy*].[79] Though missionaries reviled local holders of knowledge such as the royal court's talisman priests, they were themselves perceived by those around them as court intellectuals within the logic of the *ody-sampy* complex. What is more, missionaries acknowledged this popular perception and used it to formulate culturally effective ways of communicating their Christian message. Evidence of this deliberate "playing" on their role as magical specialists in the manipulation of unseen powers remains in LMS documents and suggests a discrepancy between how missionaries represented their evangelistic enterprise to the British public—especially in their collectively published *History of Madagascar*—and how they understood and practiced it in the field.

The most revealing evidence for this process derives from the way in which some principal cultural objects in highland Malagasy Christianity came to be associated with the same protective powers as Malagasy charms. Once Radama approved a Latin orthography for the Malagasy language, highlanders quickly developed a keen interest in the technology of writing disseminated through LMS schools. Of course, reading and writing were an overriding concern to the missionaries because translation of the scriptures into Malagasy would make no sense unless there were individuals who could read the final product.[80] Although parents pressured by the sovereign to place their children in LMS schools were at first generally unhappy about the instruction their children received from the missionaries, they eventually favored the literacy that youths acquired there. Literacy came to be known by the term *taratasy* (from Arabic for "paper") after the esoteric and secretive literacy of

[78] I differ here from Maurice Bloch, who has suggested that the reason missionaries chose to focus on intellectuals and the *ody-sampy* complex as symbols of Malagasy "heathenism" (rather than on a set of ideas associated with ancestors and ancestral rituals) was because they were politically dependent on Malagasy sovereigns and therefore pragmatically chose not to confront the "more fundamental" beliefs in exchange for the right to evangelize in central Madagascar. Beliefs and practices concerning ancestors and mortuary ritual might be described as fundamental during the early nineteenth century. But, for that matter, so too was belief in the *ody-sampy* complex and in the practice of diviners (*mpisikidy*) and astrologers (*mpanandro*), who missionaries so pointedly attacked. As scholars of highland Madagascar have demonstrated, the royal *sampy* lay at the very symbolic basis of highland power, and missionaries' attack on the *sampy* as anti-Christian "idols" is part of the reason Ranavalona ultimately sent them packing from Antananarivo in 1836. We might stand Bloch's explanation on its head: would it not have been more pragmatic for missionaries to define ancestral beliefs and mortuary practices as incompatible with the new *fivavahana*, thus avoiding the direct confrontation with royalty over the *sampy*? Bloch, *From Blessing to Violence*, 26–27.

[79] Baker to Arundel, Antananarivo, 01/09/30, LMS/3/3/D.

[80] "Mr. Griffiths said farther that he had always understood from the Directors and from his own instructions that the most effectual means of extending any mission in such a country as this, is by establishing schools as extensive and numerous as possible, for what use would it be to have the scriptures translated without people knowing [how] to read them. Then I said that I had understood always the same." Jones to Burder, Antananarivo, 28/04/23, LMS/1/5/A.

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Anteimoro scribes at Radama's court, who had composed manuscripts in Malagasy employing Arabic script well before the arrival of LMS missionaries.[81]

Until the LMS acquired a printing press, the Malagasy attending Antananarivo's mission chapels were in the habit of borrowing catechisms, portions of scripture, hymns, and other manuscript writings from the missionaries in order to hand copy them.[82] Written texts became very popular with followers of the new *fivavahana*, a fact that missionaries found extremely gratifying given early preference for oral expressions in song and prayer. The printing press came in 1826, and the missionaries soon set about publishing a variety of tracts and small pamphlets as well as copies of individual books of the Bible. "Copies of small books, of different kinds" from the LMS press increased to over 20,000 per annum by the early 1830s, when perhaps 5,000 individuals had learned to read in mission schools.[83] A list of books printed in 1830 included the "New Testament, Different Tracts, A small system of arithmetic for use in the schools, A catechism, Spelling Books, Single Gospels."[84] Although disheartened by the lackluster support for filling their schools demonstrated by Ranavalona soon after Radama's death in 1828, the missionaries noted the broadening popular interest in their printed material. Detailing the state of the mission in 1830, the *History of Madagascar* notes:

> Discouraged as the Missionaries were by the unfavourable circumstances of the people, they had the satisfaction of beholding, during a large part of the year, greater attention on the part of those who attended public worship, and of putting into circulation many portions of the New Testament and other books. These were read not only by the people of Imerina, but by numbers, in distant provinces, who had formerly been pupils in the Mission schools.[85]

The Malagasy demonstrated a great curiosity for the ideas contained in these books. Nearly every evening in 1831, Griffiths invited individuals with questions arising from their reading of sacred texts to come and consult with him as to their significance.[86] But the books, distributed gratis or sold for small amounts of money like charms, were commonly understood as embodiments of the protective powers that had come to be associated with the new *fivavahana*. Most visibly, powers of spiritual protection manifested themselves in the fact that schoolchildren who participated in assaults on places of *fivavahana* (such as *vazimba* graves) remained healthy in the aftermath.[87] Caught up in their own understanding of the purposes and uses of books, missionaries seldom fathomed the popular appreciation of books as protective objects. An unusually perceptive account of how adherents of the new *fivavahana* used the *taratasy*, however, is provided by Edward Baker, the LMS printer. Writing of a lower officer in Radama's army, where use of charms to protect health and safety was widespread, Baker noted that soldiers were constantly crossing dangerous bodies of water.

[81] Munthe, *La tradition arabico-malgache*. Radama welcomed Christian literacy because he could not convince the Anteimoro scribes to openly teach their secret knowledge to large numbers of children.
[82] Jones to Hankey, Antananarivo, 27/04/24, LMS/2/1/A.
[83] *HOM*, 2: 458. See also *HOM*, 2: 415.
[84] *HOM*, 2: 439.
[85] *HOM*, 2: 439.
[86] Griffiths to Unknown, Antananarivo, 14/08/31, LMS/4/1/B.
[87] For production, sale, and distribution of *ody*, see Johns to Ellis, Antananarivo, 30/05/33, LMS/4/4/B; *HOM*, 1: 223–25; *HOM*, 2: 139.

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These places abound with crocodiles and the people carry about them numerous charms & idols to protect them against their powerful adversaries; he carried none, but it was frequently observed by his comrades that before entering into the water, to approach his object, he used to take from his mantle a little book, (probably the first catechism which is a prayer) and after reading attentively for a few seconds, plunge boldly in. He was often jeered on this subject by his comrades, & his reply was, "*You* have your charms to which you trust for safety, and *I* have my safeguard, the book is mine; *you* think your idols will protect you and Jehovah Jesus is my God, I trust Him."[88]

The use of Christian writings and printings as protective objects helps to explain the disproportionate interest in the new cult among soldiers in Radama's army, where mortality rates ran as high as 50 percent per annum.[89]

Belief in the protective power of literacy and its material objects, however, was not restricted merely to those who aligned themselves with the new *fivavahana*. When, in 1823, missionaries challenged an aged man in the village of Miakotso west of Antananarivo to touch a stone and piece of wood vandalized from a *vazimba* grave, he replied,

"I cannot think of doing such a thing." Why? "Because it will make me sick and in consequence of which I shall die." That is a false idea of yours, some of the children have done it and some time ago and none of them were sick. "I am not like the children, the children learn the book." The children believe what we tell them, therefore they learn, but what we tell you, you will not believe therefore you cannot learn. "But, said he, teaching with the paper [*taratasy*] and with the mouth is not the same."[90]

Not the same, that is, not because one was intimate and the other foreign but because the protective powers associated with them were considered to be different and to derive from varied origins. A careful reading of mission documents reveals that Malagasy adherents and opponents of the new *fivavahana* were not the only people who conceptualized the practices and objects of Christianity through the idiom of the *ody-sampy* complex. Missionaries continually struggled over ways to communicate their message across linguistic and cultural barriers. They attributed their inability to do so effectively during their first years of residence in central Madagascar to inherent deficiencies in the Malagasy language and to highland intellects rather than to the feebleness of their own linguistic and cultural knowledge or to their inexperience and lack of tact. After little more than six months' residence in Antananarivo, David Jones complained,

I find it a great difficulty to convey to their minds a knowledge of religion in its different branches so as to make them sensible & see plainly what I speak to them, and what adds to the difficulty is the want of words and expressions in the language to convey a knowledge of spiritual things to their minds. I have conversed with many others besides children on the same topics and have found the difficulties being in the same things.[91]

[88] Baker to Arundel, Antananarivo, 01/09/30, LMS/3/3/D, emphasis in the original.

[89] "Extract of Report by James Hastie," Antananarivo, 17/03/25, LMS/2/2/A; and Griffiths to Arundel, Antananarivo, 20/12/25, LMS/2/2/D, p. 13. Many of the students in mission schools were drafted into the army.

[90] Jones, Griffiths, and Canham, "Copy of a Journal Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, entry for 22/09/23, LMS/J/1, p. 31.

[91] Jones to Burder, Antananarivo, 03/05/21, LMS/1/2/C.

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Missionaries' conversations with highlanders in which the Malagasy offered interpretations of the LMS's evangelistic message provided foreigners with effective ideas for solving these "problems." During an intense encounter with the principal people of Ambohitraina in 1823 (environs of Antananarivo), missionaries occupied a great deal of time explicating "the supreme Being his attributes, the works of creation & providence."

> Here they interrupted us by saying "With you is the seat of knowledge, pray can you inform us of the *oudiaina*" [from *ody*, charm, and *aina*, life or breath] i.e. the means of preserving life, or literally, the medicine of life. We then referred to the tree of life & man in a state of innocency, his fall and its consequences, the infinite compassion of God in providing a saviour for all who may repent and believe in him. They listened to this with deep attention and exclaimed "That is indeed the oudiaina which we never yet could find out."[92]

Despite their repeated attacks on the "falsity" of the *ody-sampy* complex, missionaries found the idea of Christ and the scriptures as "charms of life" too tempting and cogent an evangelistic strategy to pass up. A later entry in their journal of missionary travels during September 1823 notes that in the town of Ambohipoloalina they "explained . . . the Divine Being, his perfections & laws, the fall of man and his recovery by the Oudiaina, or the Saviour."[93] The idea of Christ as a charm of life continued to resonate with both missionaries and Malagasy, for in a Malagasy language catechism composed and published in 1828, David Griffiths wrote that belief in Christ was an "ody aina." The "ody aina" passage was retained in a subsequent edition of the catechism published in 1863.[94] While missionaries repeatedly communicated their opposition to highland Malagasy beliefs in the powers and even the very idea of charms, they effectively taught Christ as a charm of life into the late nineteenth century.[95]

In a perceptive study of Tagalog familiarization with Christianity in the Philippines, Vicente Rafael describes Filipino attempts to make sense of Spanish discourses of Christianity as "listening-as-fishing," noting the fortuitous ways in which Tagalog speakers attached their own interpretations to largely unintelligible Spanish words spoken by missionary priests.[96] In a similar fashion, this history of transformations in *fivavahana* has explored how the discourse and theology of missionary evangelists were molded by the process of the Malagasy fishing for meaning among Christian ideas and practices. The foundational stories of Christianity as embodied in biblical literature and grounded in the historical experiences of early Christians in the Mediterranean were certainly alien to highland Malagasy.

[92] Jones, Griffiths, and Canham, "Copy of a Journal Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, entry for 16/09/23, LMS/J/1, p. 6.

[93] Jones, Griffiths, and Canham, "Copy of a Journal Kept during a Tour round Tananarivou," 01/04/23 through 26/09/23, entry for 23/09/23, LMS/J/1, p. 37.

[94] David Griffiths, *Ny Fanadinana na Fampiheverina ny Teny ny Andriamanitra amy ny Fanontaniana, sy ny Famaliana* (Antananarivo, 1828), 32; Griffiths, *Ny Fanadinana, na Fampiheverina, ny Tenin'Andriamanitra amy ny Fanontaniana sy ny Famaliana* (Antananarivo, 1863), 26.

[95] There are other examples of such contradictions, including mission appropriation of the term *fanafody*—remedy, charm—for Western medicines.

[96] Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 1–22.

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But the Malagasy appropriated those foreign stories with extraordinary rapidity. Missionaries were unable to control this basic process of cultural familiarization, not least because of their struggles with the vernacular during their first several years in highland Madagascar. The missionaries taught their first royally recruited students English, eventually learned Malagasy from them, and set them early on to translating the Bible from English into Malagasy. At first largely ignorant of the language and important categories of Malagasy thought, the missionaries spent their first sixteen years of evangelism catching up with where their students and evangelistic "subjects" had taken Christianity intellectually.[97] The highland Malagasy appropriated and familiarized themselves with Christianity even before missionaries formed the theological analysis of Malagasy society they later employed to guide their strategies of evangelization.[98] Christian *fivavahana* preceded missionaries into the countryside. Consequently, missionary research into Malagasy *fivavahana*, which still informs common understandings of pre-contact Malagasy religious belief, did not uncover autonomous and "pure" Malagasy ideas but an already half-digested, intellectual, and practical appropriation of Euro-Christianity. Partly convinced and converted by Malagasy interpretations of Christianity and partly repelled by them, the missionaries were forced to decide whether they would accept certain interpretations and practices of the new *fivavahana* or reject them. When they fought against the grain of Malagasy familiarization with mission Christianity during the early nineteenth century, LMS personnel were seldom successful.

The extraordinary spread of Christianity in central Madagascar even in the face of royal disapproval following the ascension of Ranavalona in 1828 and in the virtual absence of foreign missionaries between 1836 and 1861 can be explained by the failure of the missionaries to determine the cultural terms by which Christianity was understood. While they sojourned in Madagascar, the missionaries remained authoritative in certain key respects such as in determining who might be baptized or what final form the translated scriptures would take. But, as a cultural minority, however politically connected and materially powerful in relationship to their intended subjects of evangelization, British missionaries had to abdicate the meaning and much of the practice of Christianity to what made intellectual sense in Malagasy vernacular culture. The key contradiction of Malagasy Christianity was that the very practices against which the missionaries most loudly inveighed fundamentally structured the highlanders' perceptions of Christianity. In practice, the missionaries were not effectively opposing highland "capacities and modes of thinking" but operating, in the eyes of Malagasy, within a Malagasy cultural logic.

[97] The same challenge faced missionaries who returned to highland Madagascar after the death of Ranavalona in 1861, especially those working in the countryside. See, for example, Lars Dahle to Hovedbestyrelsen, Antananarivo, 22/10/70, 132/6; Egnæs to Hovedbestyrelsen, Ambohimasina, 17/06/71, 132/7; Engh to Hovedbestyrelsen, Betafo, 10/07/72, 132/9; and Engh to Hovedbestyrelsen, Betafo, 20/01/73, 133/1 (all the preceding are documents in the Archives of Det Norske Misjonsselskapet or the Norwegian Missionary Society, Misjonshøgskolen, Stavanger, Norway, Hjemme Arkiv, Inkomne Brev fra Madagaskar); James Barker to Mullens, Antananarivo, 28/12/69, LMS/8/6/D; John Parrett to Mullens, Antananarivo, 26/02/70, LMS/9/1/B; James Sibree to Mullens, Ambohimanga, 01/08/70, LMS/9/2/A; William Cousins to Mullens, Antananarivo, 03/08/71, LMS/9/4/A; Cameron to Mullens, Antananarivo, 20/02/73, LMS/10/4/C.

[98] See, for example, the synthesis in *HOM*, 1: 387–438.

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This is a widely recognized phenomenon in the global spread of Christianity.[99] If the missionaries were primarily interested in disproving the powers of *vazimba*, talisman, and charms, or the knowledge of diviners and astrologers, Malagasy adherents to the new *fivavahana* tended to interpret Christianity through precisely those paradigms. Such "bridging" from both directions to similar practices and concepts—for missionaries with eventual disapproval, for Malagasy with great interest and understanding—is an example of what James Lockhart in his study of Spanish-Nahua cultural encounters in colonial Mexico called the process of Double Mistaken Identity, "in which each side of the cultural exchange presumes that a given form or concept is operating in the way familiar with its own tradition and is unaware or unimpressed by the other side's interpretation."[100]

But it was more than that. Double Mistaken Identity suggests the maintenance of two discrete cultural systems that respective members imperfectly bridge from each direction. Highland Malagasy Christians and British missionaries, however, each transformed the parameters of their sacred understanding through reflexive intellectual engagements, and they did so early on. This is especially clear in the making of Malagasy Christianity out of the various cultural resources, numinous traditions, and religious ideas at hand, some domestic, some imported. But it was also true for missionary religiosity, although we know less about the impact of the encounter on the missionaries than we do the Malagasy. Having learned the Malagasy language, struggled to communicate their message through local idiom, and lived their own Christianity as *fivavahana*, missionaries gained a new appreciation for the meanings of prayer and an understanding of scripture as a charm of life. Double Mistaken Identity, then, lived a very short life in highland Madagascar. The paradox of this cultural encounter is that if we are interested in what it meant to be Christian in early nineteenth-century highland Madagascar, we learn more through elite evidence about Malagasy or "subaltern" Christianity than we do about missionaries' own religiosity. If the Malagasy were the evangelized subjects of mission enterprise, their "capacities and modes of thinking" largely set the parameters of the religious conversions experienced by all involved.

When the cultural translation of Christianity is understood in this way, royal and missionary theories of conversion that postulated Christianity as a break with ancestral tradition are no longer convincing. Gerald Berg has perceptively noted that Ranavalona preferred to maintain a pluralistic religious system in her kingdom, with foreign missionaries and Malagasy royal subjects each observing the customs and veneration of their own sacred ancestors, thereby preventing the erosion of the sovereign's authority as a mediator of ancestral blessings passing from Malagasy royal ancestors toward her subjects.[101] While the missionaries would like to believe that the Malagasy converted to Christianity only through baptism and instruction,

[99] Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*; Wyatt MacGaffey, *Religion and Society in Central Africa: The BaKongo of Lower Zaire* (Chicago, 1986); Wyatt MacGaffey, "Dialogues of the Deaf: Europeans on the Atlantic Coast of Africa," in Schwartz, *Implicit Understandings*, 249–67; Wendy James and Douglas H. Johnson, eds., *Vernacular Christianity: Essays in the Social Anthropology of Religion Presented to Godfrey Lienhardt* (New York, 1988); Sanneh, *Encountering the West*; Landau, *Realm of the Word*.

[100] James Lockhart, "Some Nahua Concepts in Postconquest Guise," *History of European Ideas* 6 (1985): 477.

[101] Berg, "Writing Ideology," 80–81.

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in fact the Malagasy appropriated from the missionaries only what they wished, and the missionaries themselves were obliged to convert, in part, to the ideas and practices of the new *fivavahana*. The danger to Ranavalona of Christianity, therefore, was not that a few of her subjects were stepping across a cultural frontier into an alien religion through baptism (this would have retained the separation between Christianity and the queen's authority) but that her subjects were effectively tearing down the conceptual and practical walls separating Christianity and *fivavahana*. If Malagasy and European religious practices could have been maintained separate and discrete, the number of Malagasy who converted through baptism before 1861 would have proved little challenge to the queen's authority. While missionaries were chipping human pieces from the queen's edifice of authority, highland Malagasy peasants were ripping the structure apart by their selective appropriations of Christian thought and practice. Ranavalona's response to the popularization of Christianity, detailed by other scholars, was a frantic attempt to cleanse highland cultural practice of the new *fivavahana* and to revitalize royal authority with Malagasy cultural inventions.[102]

Popular familiarization with Christianity in nineteenth-century highland Madagascar also offers new perspectives on the conversion through baptism of the next queen and prime minister of the Merina kingdom in early 1869. Espousing a mission ideal of Christianity, the leaders of the Merina kingdom conceptualized their conversion through baptism as a transformative movement from an old practice into a new one. When they publicly burned their "charms" and "idols" and forced the peasantry to do the same, the queen and prime minister, like Ranavalona before them, failed to align themselves with popular understandings of Christianity. While the holders of earthly power converted to a mission-inspired version of Christianity, the peasantry retained its practices of intellectual hybridity. The fundamental cultural fissure between highland Malagasy and their leadership, therefore, dates to the early years of LMS missionaries' work in Madagascar and not to the royal baptism of 1869.

CHRISTIAN EVANGELISM IN HIGHLAND MADAGASCAR provides fresh insights into the relationships between power, popular culture, and discourses of colonization. The Merina kingdom was not a formal European colony. While pursuing their own goals, however, missionaries were among the first representatives of British imperialism in Madagascar. British clerics were encouraged and supported by Governor Farquhar of Mauritius and were working at the invitation of King Radama to strengthen his geographically expanding and increasingly exploitative administration. Actively promoting the hegemony of a dependent state in the British secondary empire—one highly unpopular with the Malagasy peasantry—LMS missionaries became intensely engaged in daily intellectual exchanges with the highland Malagasy.[103] The way in which the Malagasy selectively appropriated Christianity is testimony to the porousness of the linguistic, cultural, social, and

[102] Raison-Jourde, *Bible et pouvoir à Madagascar*, 188–93; Berg, "Writing Ideology," 80.

[103] The relationship of a highland public to Radama's administration is discussed in Pier M. Larson, "A Cultural Politics of Bedchamber Construction and Progressive Dining in Antananarivo (Central

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class frontiers across which cultural practices commonly flow in a globally connected world.[104] The history of Christian evangelism in highland Madagascar demonstrates how fragile the "hegemonic discourses" of foreign (even indigenous) elites can be, even where they were formally promoted by state power. The process by which the Malagasy familiarized themselves with the discourses of British missionaries transformed the meanings of those discourses, frustrating missionaries' carefully laid plans for disciplining converts and defining a Christian theology in Malagasy idiom. The failure of the missionaries to determine how the Malagasy understood their message was precisely why Christianity became so rooted culturally and intellectually within the highland Malagasy milieu. Among the many paradoxes of evangelism in Madagascar was the popular intellectual domination of Christianity—a set of discourses, practices, and beliefs—by the intended recipients of Euro-Christian evangelization.

A common theme in global Christian evangelism, the pattern of vernacular familiarization with Christianity presented here suggests a rethinking of the way in which cultural dominance is commonly theorized in recent colonial history and theory. Foundational to much new work on culture and empire has been scholarship emanating from the Subaltern Studies Group, formed in India during the early 1980s. The founders of subaltern studies maintained that Indian historians had been unwilling to consider the possibility that subaltern classes could exercise meaningful autonomy in social and political life or independently contribute to nationalist projects. Ranajit Guha wrote in one of the group's foundational documents that the dominant historiography of India had failed "to acknowledge, far less interpret, the contribution made by the people on their own, that is, independently of the elite to the making and development of . . . nationalism." What subaltern studies sought was a history centered on and originating from an indigenous and "autonomous domain." The subaltern historical agency that Guha and his colleagues sought to recapture, he explained, "neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter."[105]

Emerging from subaltern studies, postcolonial theory also considerably influenced the conceptualization of imperial cultural history. While several of the current proponents of postcolonial theory were active in India's Subaltern Studies Group, many came to recognize the limits of a historical paradigm that sought to delineate a purely autonomous subaltern agency within the material and discursive constraints that characterized life in an economy of global capitalism. Thus the proposition of autonomy at the core of subaltern studies began to crumble as scholars from diverse perspectives began to demonstrate the ways in which subaltern lives were structured by experiences in a world where peasants and proletarians actively participated but in which elites usually set the terms of

Madagascar): Ritual Inversions during the Fandroana of 1817," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 26 (August 1997): 1–31.

[104] For an excellent example of this, see David B. Coplan, *In the Time of Cannibals: The Word Music of South Africa's Basotho Migrants* (Chicago, 1994).

[105] Ranajit Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India," in Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York, 1988), 39, 40.

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debate.[106] What is problematic about postcolonial theory in this debate, however, is that its adherents effectively inverted rather than critically modified the Subaltern Studies Group's proposition of subaltern autonomy. Seldom appearing as autonomous agents, subalterns were now seen as trapped within discourses and conditions not of their own making.[107] Positioned as a *critique* of the West and its colonizing powers, postcolonial theory recognized its subsumption within the "logic" of the West. Gyan Prakash explained this aspect of postcolonial theory in a recent article in this journal:

> The emergent postcolonial critique . . . seeks to undo the Eurocentrism produced by the institution of the West's trajectory, its appropriation of the other as History. It does so, however, with the acute realization that its own critical apparatus does not enjoy a panoptic distance from colonial history but exists as an aftermath, as an after—after being worked over by colonialism. Criticism formed as an aftermath acknowledges that it inhabits the structures of Western domination that it seeks to undo.[108]

The result of postcolonial theory's entrapment within dominant discourses has been the production of a philosophy of history and a historical methodology that privilege cultural monologue over intellectual engagements across imperial lines, with the difference that postcolonial theory largely highlighted imperial agency and discourses while subaltern studies recognized those of the indigenous non-elite. Indeed, the most dissatisfying dimension of postcolonial theory and many recent imperial cultural studies is the way they either sideline or altogether ignore indigenous and non-elite discourses and cultural understandings, particularly those accessible only in vernacular, simply privileging the languages and discourses of colonizers as dominant.

The intellectual resiliency of peasants in the nitty-gritty of cultural exchange in a colonial context is particularly challenging to the way in which James C. Scott has theorized peasant resistance and the "weapons of the weak." Sharing a fundamental assumption with recent cultural studies of empire, Scott assimilates "ideological" domination to "material" domination without problematizing the equivalency.[109] His work thus assumes, *a priori*, whose ideas, intellectual interpretations, and cultural practices should dominate in a cultural field encompassing rich and poor, elite and peasant. The elite dominate ideologically, and they routinely and effectively patrol what Scott terms the onstage "public transcript" for any discursive deviance from their self-constructed version of things. Forced by the everyday pressure of elite domination on the public stage, peasants are obliged to reserve their candid remarks for the offstage "private transcript." While this scenario of

[106] An influential manifestation of this trend outside of subaltern studies proper is the work of Edward W. Said, especially *Orientalism* (New York, 1979) but also *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993).

[107] See especially Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Chicago, 1988), 271–313; Gyan Prakash, "Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography," *Social Text* 31–32 (1992): 8–19; Lata Mani, "Contentious Traditions: The Debate on *Sati* in Colonial India," in Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, eds., *Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1990), 88–123; Achille Mbembe, "Provisional Notes on the Postcolony," *Africa* 62 (1992): 3–37.

[108] Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," *AHR* 99 (December 1994): 1475–76.

[109] James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, Conn., 1990), esp. 198.

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discursive interaction in power-charged relationships rings true in certain cases, it does not accurately represent the ways in which the ideas and practices of popular culture circulate across and around the contours of material power. The metaphor of the stage and the highly structured transactions between dominant and subordinate are too confining to capture the multiple rivulets of cultural flow that subtly find paths of least resistance across lines of race, class, gender, and colonial power. The everyday intellectual worlds of subalterns are significantly less constrained by the infrastructure of power than Scott allows. For Scott, ideas circulate within discretely formed classes and move across class frontiers only for extraordinary and purposeful reasons of domination or resistance. Scott assumes that all transactions in the public transcript are purposefully couched in terms of relationships of earthly power. Most things people say and do, however, are not so neatly calculated, nor is the lasting significance of much that is transacted on a daily basis immediately clear to the participants in those transactions. When the LMS missionaries lent the Malagasy the written texts to songs, hymns, and scripture for them to copy on paper, could they have imagined that the Malagasy intended to use them like charms? And if they did, why did the missionaries oblige the requests? The significance of discursive appropriations are often clear only with time, when it is altogether too late to stop them.

Drawing on selective readings of Michel Foucault, recent work on imperial discourses of the body, illness, medicine, sexuality, race, and gender in the colonies also fail to significantly engage how such discourses are transformed by subaltern populations.[110] I cannot review all these works here. A brief examination of Timothy Mitchell's *Colonising Egypt* suggests some of the practical and theoretical difficulties raised by neo-Foucauldian studies. *Colonising Egypt* represents a creative project in the important effort to shift understandings of colonial power away from power as repression to power as production. Yet, in his work, Mitchell problematically assumes that elite intentions to transform cultural practice in Egypt significantly and without meaningful modification "inscribed" Egyptians' daily lives.[111] Mitchell interprets "enframing," a process of organizing space and conceptually containing the activities of everyday Egyptian life, as a disciplinary tool buttressed by dominant discourses.[112] Enframing was dominant, presumably,

[110] Among others: Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley, Calif., 1991); David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (Berkeley, 1993); Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, N.C., 1995); Peter Hulme, *Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492–1797* (London, 1992); Hulme, *Colonial Discourse, Postcolonial Theory* (Manchester, 1994); Nicholas B. Dirks, "Introduction," in Dirks, ed., *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1992); Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago, 1991); Megan Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (Stanford, Calif., 1991); Sander L. Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985); Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Some works that cannot be placed in the Foucauldian tradition also suffer similar problems: John M. MacKenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester, 1986); Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexual Opportunity: The British Experience* (Manchester, 1990).

[111] This assumption is made at the outset: "Colonising refers not simply to the establishing of a European presence but also to the spread of a political order that inscribes in the social world a new conception of space, new forms of personhood, and a new means of manufacturing the experience of the real." Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, ix.

[112] Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, chap. 2.

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because it was official—a technique of rule used by Egyptian and British authorities in planning and administration. To the extent that carefully laid official plans did not meaningfully transform people's daily lives or Egyptian concepts of space, however, their dominance must be brought into question. Mitchell explains the effectiveness of disciplinary methods and the hegemony of colonial enframing in terms of legislation and intent rather than by effect and experience.[113] By what criteria do we determine if an idea, practice, plan, or discourse is dominant or subordinate? With reference to whom is it dominant? What kind of dominance and subordination are we speaking of? These are fundamental questions that cannot be resolved by the assumption that bourgeois, European, official, or elite cultural projects are dominant by definition or conversely that the cultural taxonomies of the indigenous and non-elite are necessarily subaltern. What is important about what people say and do, after all, is not just that they say or do it, or who says and does it, it is its reception, its practical impact, and the tangible significance of the languages and means chosen to communicate or effect it. Mitchell overemphasizes the power of European discourses of rule, a problem that parallels the lopsided attention to formal colonial institutions of governance in earlier scholarship. This model and others like it fail because they do not demonstrate how—or even if—colonial subjects internalized the intellectual parameters of bourgeois disciplinary methods.[114] Colonial discursive studies have rarely transcended these limitations because they fail to consider the local discourses and lives of popular communities where bourgeois ideology is vernacularized, ignored, engaged, reworked, transformed, or rejected altogether. Discursive studies in the tradition of Foucault embody considerable promise in the analysis of imperial power. They must not assume, however, as dependency and world systems theories once did, that the imperial periphery and colonial subjects were simply "inscribed" in a way functional for the core. Studies of colonial discourse and culture must be grounded in vernacular discourses and routines *of popular influence and relevance*, examining the interactions between such discourses and those of foreign colonial origin. The curious and disengaged sideshows of a deracinated colonial elite, however seemingly persuasive, cannot substitute for careful examination of the various sources and influences of popular culture in the colonies.[115]

"Are we just dealing with stories that elites tell themselves?" asks Derek Sayer of

[113] See, for example, the description of how Prussian military regulations were adopted by the Ottoman army, Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 36–39, and how a system of coordinated and surveyed cotton production was implemented in the early nineteenth century, 40–43. Symbolic of Mitchell's mistaking of measures possibly influential among Egyptian upper classes with mass effectiveness is his description of the impact of a book written by French author Edmond Demolins and translated into Arabic: "The translation of Demolins' work had a wide impact in Egypt, *among a certain social class*." Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 111, emphasis mine.

[114] Take, for example, the following statement: "Through its textbooks, school teachers, universities, newspapers, novels and magazines, the colonial order was able to penetrate and colonise local discourse." Most Egyptian peasants, of course, never had access to any of the above. It might be objected here that *Colonising Egypt* is not about colonization itself but about "the power to colonise" (p. ix). But how can techniques of rule be claimed as powerful tools if they are ineffective and restricted only to "certain social classes"? Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 171.

[115] Steve J. Stern's refutation of Latin America's position in Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory is pertinent in this context and parallels in many ways, on the economic plan, the criticisms I am articulating of colonial cultural studies. Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean," in Frederick Cooper, Allen F. Isaacman, Florencia

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discursive studies in a recently published collection of essays on popular culture, hegemony, and state formation in modern Mexico.[116] The question is pertinent, for it suggests that claims for the dominance of "the discursive aspect of colonial rule" must be demonstrated in practice rather than merely asserted. If colonial elites were indeed engaged in hegemonic cultural projects, what was the practical impact of those projects? Was anybody listening to them? The problem with most neo-Foucauldian studies of culture in the empire is that they overestimate the discursive power of colonial elites and underestimate the failure of elite projects to reorganize meaningfully the intellectual terms by which colonial subjects organized their worlds of meaning. Recent restatements of Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony have called into question interpretations that equated hegemony with ideological consensus, suggesting solutions to these predicaments of imperialism and culture. William Roseberry and Jonathon Glassman remind us that Gramsci spun his concept of hegemony in part to describe the failure of the Piedmont Bourgeoisie to form an Italian nation-state, and both scholars suggest that the proper way to understand hegemony is through a paradigm of struggle. If elites usually set the idioms of hegemony, not everyone subscribed to the dominant interpretations of those idioms, drawing strands of consciousness from various origins and sometimes disputing, reworking, and transforming the languages of power.[117] Advocating a fluid concept of hegemony that avoids dichotomizing "the dominant" and "the popular" (and by extension "the colonial" and "the native"), scholars of popular culture in modern Mexico have preferred to speak of a hegemonic process rather than of hegemony as such. Florencia E. Mallon explains:

> I do not . . . equate hegemony with a belief in, or an incorporation of, the dominant ideology. Instead, I define hegemony in two distinct, though sometimes related, ways. First, hegemony is a set of nested processes, constant and ongoing, through which power relations are contested, legitimated, and redefined at all levels of society. According to this definition, hegemony is hegemonic process: it can and does exist everywhere, at all times. Secondly, hegemony is an actual end point, the result of hegemonic processes. An always dynamic or precarious balance, a contract or agreement, is reached among contesting forces.[118]

Developing hegemony as a cultural process in the same compendium of provocative essays, William Roseberry suggests that scholars adopt E. P. Thompson's metaphor of a "field of force," a continuous magnetic field of cultural exchange joining ruling and subaltern groups, as a means to refine the concept of ideological hegemony.

E. Mallon, William Roseberry, and Steve J. Stern, *Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America* (Madison, Wis., 1993), 23–83.

[116] Derek Sayer, "Everyday Forms of State Formation: Some Dissident Remarks on 'Hegemony,'" in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico* (Durham, N.C., 1994), 369.

[117] William Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," in Joseph and Nugent, *Everyday Forms of State Formation*, 355–66; Jonathon Glassman, *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast 1856–1888* (Portsmouth, N.H., 1995), 12–25. Glassman called this "contradictory consciousness." See also Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, "Popular Culture and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico," in Joseph and Nugent, *Everyday Forms of State Formation*, 21.

[118] Florencia E. Mallon, "Reflections on the Ruins: Everyday Forms of State Formation in Nineteenth-Century Mexico," in Joseph and Nugent, *Everyday Forms of State Formation*, 70.

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I propose that we use the concept [hegemony] *not* to understand consent but to understand struggle; the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and movements used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself. What hegemony constructs, then, is not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination.[119]

The ways in which Malagasy familiarization with Christianity shaped mission strategies of evangelization (Christ as a charm of life) suggest we push this nested and processual paradigm of hegemony in a Thompsonian field of force one step further. By first embracing and then transforming missionary Christian idiom into something personal and meaningful, the highland Malagasy contributed "a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon" everyday life in highland Madagascar. Open to various forces and participations, the hegemonic process—which in this case was essentially a process of cultural translation and appropriation of the LMS missionaries' religious idiom—is not disembodied. When hegemonic processes are conceptually opened to the meaningful contribution of subalterns, it should not be surprising that in some cases subalterns articulate languages of hegemony that constrain the elite, rather than merely disputing, reworking, or transforming languages introduced by the politically dominant. Subalterns, furthermore, may dominate the intellectual field of force without a conscious struggle. While providing for the contributions of non-elites to a common cultural hegemony, the concept of struggle is especially problematic in the field of popular culture. People do not necessarily see the ways in which they transform ideas and practices as purposeful contests with a confining force. The making of Malagasy Christianity from a foreign idiom was an intellectual activity that creatively employed the cultural-intellectual material at hand more than a struggle against some constraining imposition. While allowing for substantial peasant contribution, the field of force metaphor as developed and employed by Roseberry nevertheless suggests that peasants react to primary intellectual forces intruding from the outside.[120] In highland Madagascar, on the other hand, those who consciously fought hegemonic interpretations and practices of Christianity were British missionaries, not Malagasy peasants.

A form of peasant hegemony fashioned from a vernacularization, reinterpretation, and theological transformation of mission Christianity, popular Christianity in highland Madagascar transformed missionary theology and strategies of evangelization. Religious translations across cultures, Vicente Rafael has reminded us, perforce entail transformations of religious meaning.[121] Once the process of Double Mistaken Identity breaks down—and it did so very quickly in highland Madagascar

[119] Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," 360–61.

[120] Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," 360: "They [peasants] exist within and are shaped by the field of force." But they may also profoundly shape that field of force. Or pp. 360–61: "the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and movements used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself." The coin can be flipped. The same is also true of politically and economically dominant populations that, like the LMS missionaries, resisted the process of Malagasy intellectual domination of Christianity.

[121] Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, esp. ix–x.

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with respect to Christianity and *fivavahana*—the terms of cultural equations are open to dramatic reorganization. In this case, Malagasy peasants so enthusiastically embraced Christianity that they transformed the missionary side of the equation. Among the poor and powerless in highland Madagascar, Malagasy Christians nevertheless came to dominate Christianity intellectually and numerically, transforming both the theology and the practice that foreign missionaries sought to impart. This case and many others like it presented by colleagues working in Africa and elsewhere challenge *a priori* claims that the intellectual discourses and cultural practices of peoples at the European periphery are subordinate by definition. In the highlands of Madagascar during the early nineteenth century, the languages and practices of Christianity were introduced by foreign missionaries but soon emerged as the transformed product of a peasant hegemony that endures into the present.

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"All This Is the Empire, I Told Myself": Australian Women's Voyages "Home" and the Articulation of Colonial Whiteness

ANGELA WOOLLACOTT

"[I]T IS SAFE TO SAY the average Australian girl cherishes an ambition to come to London some time or other, whether it be in search of fame, experience, or mere frivolous adventure," Alice Grant Rosman assured the readers of *Everylady's Journal* in October 1913. "That a large percentage realise that ambition in these days of cheap travelling may be seen from the fact—or perhaps I should say the rumour—that there are no fewer than 25,000 Australians either temporarily o[r] permanently residing in London to-day."[1] Rosman's figures were more fact than rumor. Starting with a trickle of a couple of thousand per year in the 1870s, the flow of Australians and New Zealanders to England rose to around an annual 10,000 from the late 1880s beyond the turn of the century and then doubled in the interwar period.[2] By 1911, there were 23,000 Australian-born residents of England and Wales, of whom 13,000 were female.[3] If not always the only or even the first destination for itinerant Australians, London often served as an emotional and practical base. England—and London—held such appeal for Australian women that visits there were often measured in years or could extend indefinitely. For many Australians, London represented the center of the world that mattered, the heart of the empire, and also the place where creative or professional success was defined, where the powerful arbiters were. London, even more than the rest of Britain and Europe, held out the lure of fame and achievement because it contained the most important publishers, critics, audiences, organizational headquarters, training institutes, and art schools. In September 1902, the successful Australian opera singer Amy Castles was asked by a journalist from *The New Idea* whether she came across many Australian "girls" in England and Paris. "Yes, quite a lot," she replied.

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[1] Alice Grant Rosman, "Girls Who Are Going to London Town," *Everylady's Journal* (October 6, 1913): 604.

[2] K. S. Inglis, "Going Home: Australians in England, 1870–1900," in David Fitzpatrick, ed., *Home or Away? Immigrants in Colonial Australia: Visible Immigrants* (Canberra, 1992), 105–06. By 1930, Gilbert Mant could explain that the reason "Australians Are Unpopular in London" was that "Something like 20,000 trippers are allowed to leave Australia each year." *The British Australian and New Zealander* (October 23, 1930): 18.

[3] Inglis, "Going Home," 105–06. Inglis's figures support the "rumour" cited by Rosman and add important evidence that more than half of these thousands of Australians were female.

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"In fact, I think that far too many Australians are going home to try their fortunes. Competition is very keen."[4] The thousands of Australian women resident in London in these decades included not only opera singers hoping to be the next Nellie Melba but also writers, artists, musicians, suffragists, nurses, doctors, teachers, and social workers.[5]

In this essay, my concern is not with what Australian women did when they arrived but with what they made of what they saw on the way there. Australian women viewed their own status in the British Empire at least partially through the knowledge they gleaned of the empire's constituent parts on their passages "home," as Castles and many others often termed England.[6] The voyage from Australia to England was crucially different from travel undertaken at will to a chosen itinerary of destinations, and while it bore some of the cultural valences of tourism (the group experience of already-known tourist sites), in its relatively fixed route and the powerful historical and cultural significance of the ultimate destination, it resembled a secular pilgrimage.[7] Sydney-bred writer Nancy Phelan's father commented at her departure for England in 1938 that she was off "to Mecca."[8] Australian women voyagers not only reverse the dominant story line of female migration from Britain to the colonies,[9] they complicate and go beyond the main argument of recent scholarship on women and travel.

Scholars who have sought to redress the absence of women from much of the travel literature have tended to cast women's traveling as an assertion of independence, a bid for self-discovery, and an escape from domestic gender constraints. This argument is persuasive: women's desires for the relative freedom of travel away from home and family and the sheer adventure of seeing different parts of the world have clearly been important motivational factors.[10] However, in the context of the voyage to England, travel for women was also a matter of education about

[4] *The New Idea* (September 1, 1902): 115.

[5] While a number of the women in my study achieved some degree of success or fame (divas such as Nellie Melba and Ada Crossley, writers like Miles Franklin and Henry Handel Richardson, artists such as Margaret Baskerville and Margaret Preston) and can be traced through various biographical dictionaries, the great majority are more obscure. To find these, important sources include Australian magazines of the period, and especially the weekly newspaper published in London from 1884 onwards, *The British Australasian* (later *The British Australian and New Zealander*).

[6] The first definition for "home," in Joan Hughes, ed., *Australian Words and Their Origins* (Melbourne, 1989), 259, is: "Applied to the United Kingdom, esp. England, orig. by colonists and later by their descendants." Inglis quotes from the 1892 *Australian National Dictionary*'s definition of the word "home": " 'All good Australians hope to go to England when they die. Not only does everybody, now-a-days, go "home" when able to do so, but many stay there.' " Inglis, "Going Home," 107.

[7] On the shared dimensions of tourism, travel, and pilgrimages, see M. N. Pearson, "Pilgrims, Travellers, Tourists: The Meanings of Journeys," *Australian Cultural History* 10 (1991): 125–34.

[8] Nancy Phelan, *The Swift Foot of Time: An Australian in England 1938–45* (Melbourne, 1983), 5.

[9] On this, see A. James Hammerton, *Emigrant Gentlewomen: Genteel Poverty and Female Emigration, 1830–1914* (London, 1979); Julia Bush, " 'The Right Sort of Woman': Female Emigrators and Emigration to the British Empire, 1890–1910," *Women's History Review* 3, no. 3 (1994): 385–409; and Deborah Oxley, *Convict Maids: The Forced Migration of Women to Australia* (Cambridge, 1996).

[10] Recent works that have emphasized this argument include Shirley Foster, *Across New Worlds: Nineteenth-Century Women Travellers and Their Writings* (Hemel Hempstead, 1990); Alison Blunt, *Travel, Gender and Imperialism: Mary Kingsley and West Africa* (New York, 1994); and Ros Pesman, *Duty Free: Australian Women Abroad* (Melbourne, 1996). In contrast, Sara Mills argued that rather than being tempted to see women travelers mostly as proto-feminist, we need to consider their writing within the context of colonial discourse. Mills, *Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women's Travel Writing and Colonialism* (London, 1991), esp. 4.

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and participation in the empire to which they belonged, and it thus presents a complex of issues about Australian women's self-identifications within a global framework.

There was little choice of sea route: the dominant route during this period went from east to west along the southern coast of Australia, then northwest across the Indian Ocean, through the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean, from where the traveler could either take a train overland or continue by ship to England. A secondary and somewhat cheaper route passed around the Cape of Good Hope and up the west coast of Africa. A third route, across the Pacific and then via train across North America to the transatlantic ships, was an unusual option until the 1920s, and even then was chosen by only a minority. The two dominant routes meant that Australians by necessity visited on the way to England more colonies and territories of the empire than any other imperial subjects, except perhaps New Zealanders or those in Malaya, Singapore, New Guinea, and Hong Kong. The ports of call en route from Australia to England, included, depending on the route and the shipping line, Colombo, Bombay, Aden, Port Said, and Gibraltar for those going through the Suez Canal, and Durban and Cape Town for those who sailed around Africa. Australian women bound for London thus had fleeting but direct encounters with various sites of the empire, throughout the era when Britain claimed imperial control over more territory and subjects than any other empire ever.

Their observations and narratives of these colonial sites reveal the instructive impact they had on travelers and also the strength of Australian women's identification with the colonizers. Ann Laura Stoler has suggested that, within the matrix of questions addressed by scholarship on gender, race, and colonialism, one line of inquiry we need to pursue is, what distinct investments did white women have in racism?[11] The reactions and reports of Australian women visitors to these ports of call from the turn of the century up to World War II indicate how even such transient visitors participated in the racial structures of colonialism.

The letters, letter books (an artifact of this period, a book that allowed the writer to keep a carbon copy of all letters sent), autobiographies, and journalistic and fictionalized travel accounts that Australian women wrote during and after their trips constitute a historical record of a voyage that was specific not only to Australia's colonial and geographic location in relation to England but also to a particular historical epoch. The epoch of travel that arose around the same time as, if not simply because of, the steamship, and that ended with the emergence of jet travel, can be considered a historically specific form of human mobility. The steamship itself, and certainly the constant technological improvements in the size, speed, and comforts steamships could boast, meant that travel in this epoch was culturally perceived as emblematic of the modern world. The steamship represented the possibility of traveling for leisure or enjoyment in ways that the sailing ship, with its physical privations, never could. But steamers needed to be refueled, especially on a voyage as long as that between Australia and England. Thus while

[11] Ann Laura Stoler, "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Gender, Race, and Morality in Colonial Asia," in Micaela di Leonardo, ed., *Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era* (Berkeley, Calif., 1991), 55.

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transatlantic travel was an experience mediated only by the ocean and the weather, passengers on voyages like that from Australia to England visited ports of call in their exoticized variety. In a sense, then, steamship travel prefigured the contemporary leisure cruise. But it was a vastly different experience from the jet travel that has superseded it; even on long-haul flights, jet travelers are exposed to nothing more than hermetically sealed transit lounges, alleviated only by the possibility of some duty-free shopping.

The historical records left by women voyagers on the two dominant routes reveal their understandings and observations of the journey, their fellow passengers, and the places at which they called. The voyage and their understandings of it show the ways in which travel itself was culturally privileged, even while available to people who did not possess much capital. The remarkable heterogeneity of their co-voyagers was evidence of fluid movement among and beyond the constituent parts of the British Empire throughout this period, and the conversations they shared, often over countless meals with the same table seatings, became opportunities for Australian women to learn far more about the empire than they had previously known. But it is their own firsthand observations, their descriptions of the colonized peoples with whom they had dealings at the ports of call, and their perspectives as colonizers-for-the-day that most indicate to us as readers of this historical record how Australian women voyagers positioned themselves. In their accounts, we can see their articulated self-positionings (or subjectivities) as white women in an imperial hierarchy of color. The settler colonies, which from 1901 constituted the federated Commonwealth of Australia and after World War I were termed a Dominion of the British Empire and Commonwealth, ranked below Britain because of colonial status but above the non-self-governing colonies and territories. Occupying an in-between ranking in imperial hierarchy, Australian women sought to elide the inferiority inherent in their colonialness by emphasizing their whiteness and their economic and cultural privileging. Most accounts of the empire imply or assume (even when they analyze) a masculine imperial gaze,[12] while, as Billie Melman and others have argued, critics of Orientalism tend to "write out gender."[13] Focusing on women's articulation of their own whiteness provides a means of addressing a central concern of recent scholarship on white women and colonialism, that of whether women exhibited more "complicity" or "resistance."[14] For these reasons and because the scholarship on women and travel has largely focused on individual women outward bound from the metropolitan center,[15] the historical

[12] As Mary Louise Pratt has succinctly formulated it, this reached its acme in the late nineteenth-century male explorer's "monarch of all I survey" stance. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London, 1992), 201–08.

[13] Billie Melman, *Women's Orients: English Women and the Middle East, 1718–1918: Sexuality, Religion and Work* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1992), 5; Mills, *Discourses of Difference*; Reina Lewis, *Gendering Orientalism: Race, Femininity and Representation* (London, 1996).

[14] Recent scholarship in this area includes Nupur Chaudhuri and Margaret Strobel, eds., *Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance* (Bloomington, Ind., 1992); Margaret Strobel, *European Women and the Second British Empire* (Bloomington, 1991); and Kumari Jayawardena, *The White Woman's Other Burden: Western Women and South Asia during British Rule* (New York, 1995).

[15] For example, Dea Birkett, *Spinsters Abroad: Victorian Lady Explorers* (Oxford, 1989), and *Mary Kingsley: Imperial Adventuress* (London, 1992); Blunt, *Travel, Gender and Imperialism*; and, to a large extent, Mills, *Discourses of Difference*; while to a lesser extent the same may be said of Melman, *Women's Orients*, and Susan Morgan, *Place Matters: Gendered Geography in Victorian Women's Travel*

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record left by Australian women voyagers to England is an important opportunity for us to reconstruct and to deconstruct the imperial gaze of a significant group of white women who were at once colonials and colonizers.

In *The Black Atlantic*, Paul Gilroy argued that we must break down assumptions that nationality, culture, and ethnicity are coextensive, so that the study of history and culture can encompass the hybrid and the transnational. In order to understand how the British Empire shaped the nation, Gilroy contends, the "inside/outside relationship," that is, the positioning of those whose culture and ethnicity are not coextensive with English national borders, "should be recognised as a more powerful, more complex, and more contested element in the historical, social and cultural memory of our glorious nation than has previously been supposed."[16] While in this essay I appropriate the idea of the insider/outsider to underscore the significance of studying white colonial women from the settler colonies and dominions of the British Empire, the contradictions inherent to colonial subjects' positions that this term implies obtain equally for colonialism in a wide range of historical contexts. Like other white colonial women, women from the Australian colonies, or post-1901 the Australian Commonwealth, were insiders in the empire because of their whiteness but simultaneously outsiders in England due to their colonial origins and often subordinated because of their sex. The sea voyage Australian women had to take to get to England at the turn of and in the first decades of the twentieth century proffered them moments in which they could and did bolster their own claims to insiderness in the empire to whose metropolis they were headed. The stratum of those who could and did enjoy both privileges and mobility within the empire included some colonized men (and a few women[17]), showing that racial identity could be overridden by a certain class or educational level, just as women's sexual identity was at moments governed by their inclusion in the honorific category of white men. But the cultural privilege associated with modern travel, the class status that they assumed as travelers even if not affluent, their access to markers of racial privilege at the ports of call, and their positioning as sexual or romantic subjects on board ship at the same time as they were defined as needing white male protection on shore were all components not only of their belonging to the imperial elite but also of their subjectivities as white women.

Scholars of whiteness in the United States have seen its key elements as its normativity and structured invisibility, the tendency to "forget" or overlook racialized and subordinated others, and its false unity premised on its supposed "absence of culture" and on "whom one can hold back."[18] The evidence of

Books about Southeast Asia (New Brunswick, N.J., 1996). A central point of some of this literature (though not of Melman, Mills, or Morgan) is the recuperation of women explorers in the heroic individualist tradition.

[16] Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 11.

[17] Inderpal Grewal has suggested that, while significantly fewer Indian women than men traveled to England, at least a few privileged women went for educational purposes or to accompany their husbands (besides poor women taken as servants). Grewal, *Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire and the Cultures of Travel* (Durham, N.C., 1996), 138, 141, 159–78.

[18] Ruth Frankenberg, *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1993), 6; and "Growing Up White: Feminism, Racism and the Social Geography of Childhood," *Feminist Review* 45 (Autumn 1993): 60; and David R. Roediger, *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness* (London, 1994), 13.

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Australian women's records of their voyages to England shows that in Australia, while the many white Australians who lived in coastal areas (especially in the southeast) found it easy to forget or overlook Aborigines, the imperative to establish immigration policies before and during federation led to a whiteness that was certainly normative but not quite invisible. This particular construction of whiteness came to be enshrined in the prominent "White Australia" policy, which overtly "held back" both Asians and Aborigines. Moreover, while whiteness may have been so normative as to be partly invisible in Australia itself, exposure to different colonial racial structures at times compelled women to articulate notions of themselves as white that were integral to developing Australian national identity but usually tacit. The voyage to England also shows that, unlike an "absence of culture" or community in the United States, during the decades in which Australians established and first interpreted national Australian identity, the whiteness that was crucial to that identity was premised on a shared British heritage (conflicted as that was), on notions of England as "home," and on belonging to the stratum of imperial rulers.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL in 1869 to the inauguration of Australian commercial air travel to England in 1934, the experience of the passenger was ineluctably shaped by technological developments that held global geopolitical significance and were represented as artifacts of modernity. Central to the revolution in worldwide transportation of this period was the steamship. The P&O (Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company) line, one of the major carriers throughout these decades, inaugurated steamship service to Australia in 1852 but faced competition as a direct consequence of the canal.[19] Between 1870 and 1940, the size, speed, and comforts offered by vessels plying the Australian route were increased due to both the pressures of competition and engineering advancements in ship power and design. The first P&O steamer to service Australia weighed around 700 tons;[20] the small fleet built in 1888 in honor of Queen Victoria's fiftieth year of rule the year before were each about 6,500 tons; and by the 1920s the ships that P&O built to replace their devastating losses during World War I ranged from 15,000 to 21,000 tons.[21]

Greater size meant ever larger numbers of passengers could be accommodated, but even more subject to superlatives in advertising copy were the passenger comforts and technological features (including electric lights, lifts, and laundries, telegraph and on-board telephones, and cinemas) of what became cast as ocean-going hotels. By 1929, the P&O line was describing its latest steamer as "A City Within A City. Enclosed by the steel sides of the great liner, a miniature Metropolis moves out upon the waters!"[22] The feature of the ship that passengers most commonly registered in their letters and diaries was the weight, such as Dr. Helen Mayo's reference in her typescript autobiography that when she left Adelaide for

[19] "An Historic Note," *The Home* 8 (February 1, 1927): 1.
[20] *The British-Australasian* (November 19, 1903): 1657.
[21] "Historic Note," 1; *The Home* 6 (October 1, 1925): 1.
[22] *The Home* 10 (January 2, 1929): 1.

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London in February 1904, it was on "the P. & O. Arcadia, a 6,000 ton mail steamer" ("mail" meaning that it was carrying mail by government contract, which translated in social terms as a better class of ship).[23] Besides larger size indicating a smoother voyage, it is likely that tonnage was used metonymically to represent the ship's age, capacity, and standard of amenities. But passengers also understood that their own claims to urbanity depended on the modernity of their ship. Improvements in the vessels themselves both produced and were driven by the increasing numbers of passengers as the demand for berths rose. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, travel to Britain and other parts of Europe was a commodity rich in social and cultural meaning for Australians.

While travel itself became perceived as a marker of bourgeois status in this period, the technological conquest over distance and the collapsing of time were clear markers of its modernity. Steamship companies boasted of their vessels' tonnage and luxurious facilities but also of their speed. Sailing ships in the mid-nineteenth century had typically taken two to three months to reach England from Australia; by 1900, steamers were completing the same voyage in four to eight weeks.[24] In the mid-1930s, the miracle of air travel was mainly its reduction of travel time. When feminist playwright Marguerite Dale became the first Australian woman to take a commercial air flight to London in September 1935, the story of her trip ran in *The British Australian and New Zealander* as well as *The Sydney Morning Herald*. Despite the fact that planes then flew only during daylight hours and passengers slept on land overnight, the stunning thing was that, as Dale reported, "In twelve days we had travelled thirteen thousand miles, in six different aeroplanes, through ten countries."[25]

The steamship as signifier of modernity was also produced by the development of the thoroughly modern cultural ritual of the dockside farewell, a ritual that Australians may have been fonder of than other cultures because of the greater significance of the voyage as connection to Britain and Europe on the other side of the world.[26] Photographs (another manifestation of modernity) of the dockside farewell became cultural icons of the voyage to England, both in personal and family photograph albums and in the social pages of Australian newspapers and magazines, where groups (usually featuring women) all dressed in their best were juxtaposed with photos of the ship pulling away from the dock, while hundreds of paper streamers formed a spectacular last tangible connection between the departing passengers and their well-wishers.[27]

But perhaps the most powerful icon of modernity was the Australian woman

[23] Mortlock Library of South Australia, PRG 127/6, Helen Mayo Papers, Biographical Notes, 5.

[24] Inglis, "Going Home," 106; Mitchell Library, A. G. Stephens Papers, ML MSS 4937/ 22 (30), Louise Mack scrapbook, 31 (September 21, 1901), "Impressions of Travel [For *The Bulletin*]"; "When Suzie Went Steerage: The Adventures of a Solitary Australian Girl on a World-Tramp," *The New Idea* (March 6, 1911): 217.

[25] ". . . and on to LONDON: Marguerite Dale Completes Her Description of Her Flight From Australia," *Sydney Morning Herald Women's Supplement* (October 24, 1935): 7.

[26] On the study of travel as culturally related to ritual, as well as performance and mythology, see William W. Stowe, *Going Abroad: European Travel in Nineteenth-Century American Culture* (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 21–22; and Paul Fussell, *Abroad: British Literary Traveling between the Wars* (New York, 1980), 208–09.

[27] For example, the columns of captioned photographs of dockside farewells called "P. & O. Portraits," in *The Home* 10 (April 2, 1929) and (May 1, 1929).

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This photograph by Sam Hood was taken at Pyrmont, in Port Said, April 7, 1928. Titled "Farewelling Friends," it captures the cultural ritual of the dockside farewell. From the Hood Collection, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, courtesy of the Library Council of New South Wales, Australia.

herself, traveling to London, as Thea Proctor represented her on the cover of the Australian magazine *The Home*. Proctor's design illustrated *The Home*'s "Travel Number" on October 1, 1929, and spoke volumes on contemporary cultural assumptions about women traveling. The representative woman of Proctor's design sits nonchalantly on her suitcase emblazoned with "London," her svelte figure clad in a short (knee-length), close-fitting coat with fur collar and cuffs, her made-up face topped with a very snug cloche hat, and her long legs elegantly displayed. The woman's backdrop is a map of the Indian Ocean area, she herself obscures much of the Indian subcontinent, and her hatbox sits in front of Madagascar (see cover illustration). The Australian woman departing for London appears stylish and independent, indeed, mapped on to the Indian Ocean as she is, in more ways than one a woman of the world. Australian women's sense of their own modernity and urbanity as travelers was an ingredient in their assuredness that, within an empire in which imperial control was justified partly through the possession and distribution of industrial technology, they could lay claim to the status of colonizers despite their own colonialness.[28]

[28] In a slightly different way, Inderpal Grewal has argued that upper-class and upper-caste Indian subjects of the empire also understood their access to travel as a marker of their modernity as well as signifying agency and education. Grewal, *Home and Harem*, esp. 15, 135, 137.

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If the technology of travel, travel itself, and the Australian woman traveler all represented modernity, at the same time travel was understood as a marker of bourgeois status, of belonging to a privileged cultural elite. In fact, as Alice Grant Rosman made clear with her reference to "these days of cheap travelling," in the period I am considering the voyage to England was within the financial reach of many who had little capital. As Paul Fussell argues, the success of late twentieth-century tourism in paradoxically industrializing travel and aligning it with wealth and luxury is likely to blind us to the fact that in an earlier period it was quite possible to travel without much money.[29] No doubt the most extreme example of an Australian woman getting to England cheaply was "Jane," who in 1928 dressed in "boy's clothes" and stowed away on a cargo ship tied up at the Port Lincoln wharf. When three days later she emerged from the wheat in the hold, she was permitted to work the rest of her way to England as cabin "boy."[30] But abundant evidence exists that many of the women who made the trip did so on the basis of hard-earned savings and fully expected to work once they got there.[31] The fact that traveling on a budget was a common characteristic for Australian women bound for England is reflected in the titles of two magazine serials proffering travel stories mixed with travel tips. In early to mid-1911, *The New Idea* ran the series "When Suzie Went Steerage: The Adventures of a Solitary Australian Girl on a World-Tramp," which was followed in late 1911 and early 1912 by "The Travels of Economical Emily" in *Everylady's Journal*.[32] Artists, musicians, and students in various fields could obtain traveling scholarships that paid their fare to England, and by the 1930s a few women doctors (probably headed for further training) worked their way as the requisite ship's surgeon.[33]

Yet, while affordable, travel nevertheless stood for economic and cultural privilege. In part, this was due to obvious practical reasons: one did have to have *some* savings or capital to be able to pay the fare, and taking the voyage itself meant four to eight weeks of leisure on the ship. There were equally obvious reasons why travel could be associated with wealth: it was possible to travel in luxury, and many of those who went were indeed from the moneyed classes. And, as described above, advertisements for ocean liners, especially the most expensive ones, extolled their technological amenities and comforts. It was common knowledge, too, that most ships offered different classes of berth. The usual arrangement was that the ship was divided between first-class or first-saloon passengers and other inferior classes

[29] Fussell, *Abroad*, 71–72.

[30] *The British Australian and New Zealander* (May 3, 1928): 21.

[31] Mary Brennan, one of the women who went during World War I from a combination of imperial loyalty and a desire to travel, and who made munitions and worked on the land, was from a very poor family. She paid for her ticket out of her savings from working as a hotel maid and waitress mostly in remote mining towns. Elaine McKenna, ed., *Better Than Dancing: The Wandering Years of a Young Australian, Mary Brennan* (Richmond, Vic., 1987).

[32] "When Suzie Went Steerage," *The New Idea* (March 6, 1911): 217–18; (April 6, 1911): 305–06; (May 6, 1911): 399–401; (June 6, 1911): 12–13; "The Travels of Economical Emily," *Everylady's Journal* (August 6, 1911): 136–37; (September 6, 1911): 200–01, 207; (November 6, 1911): 328–29, 335; (January 6, 1912): 8, 11; (February 6, 1912): 78–79. "Emily" was in fact Alice Grant Rosman, and no doubt "Suzie" was also a writer supporting her travels with her pen.

[33] For example, the triennial Travelling Scholarship given by the National Gallery Schools, Melbourne, to an Australian artist to go to London for further training was consistently awarded to women artists between 1905 and 1935. *Art in Australia*, 3d ser., no. 61 (November 1935): 38. Steamship companies also provided "scholarships" of free passages.

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(or sometimes only one), variously denoted as second class, second saloon, third class, and steerage, although there were some "one-class" ships (which meant all second or third class). Class distinctions were keenly observed on board. Journalist and poet Louise Mack, in the novel she based on her own voyage to London in 1901, lampooned shipboard class distinctions: "The First Class, which always represents Fashion, gives a Ball, and doesn't invite the Second Class. The Second Class, which invariably represents Intellect, gives a Party, and hangs up the notice of it in *Greek*. The First Class doesn't know Greek. It comes, and looks at the notice, and goes away baffled."[34] As Mack makes clear, there was more than one way in which class status was associated with traveling: if the second class was not wealthy like first-class passengers, it could include writers, artists, students, and others who were professionally and culturally at least potential members of the middle classes. Thus even some of those who could barely afford the trip (like Mack herself) added to the social cachet Australians associated with the voyage. The elaboration of bourgeois status by Australians bound for England may well have been a response to the fact that, even if they were not fully conscious of it, white colonials were often seen by metropolitan Europe as "*parvenus*, cultural incompetents . . . and indeed 'fictive' Europeans."[35]

But more significant for my purposes than class differences among women voyagers themselves were the ways in which class relationships mediated passengers' interactions with colonized people at the ports of call. Fussell suggests that, particularly in the cash nexus between European travelers and the locals of poor countries they visited, early twentieth-century travel can be seen as a nostalgic attempt to recreate the class relations of a vanished "pastoral" era. Travelers turned themselves into modern-day "plutocrats" in patronizing and employing the villagers or peasants, who were mostly grateful to be paid for their services.[36] While Fussell's argument about nostalgia for an older aristocratic order may be apt for English travelers in southern Europe, relations across the cash nexus in the context of colonies and territories of the empire are more instructive for seeing the connections between the class structures of capitalism and the racial hierarchies of colonialism, although, as Mary Louise Pratt points out, the "dynamics of power and appropriation" between travelers and the native people about whom they write are comparable in the two contexts.[37]

When Australian voyagers went ashore at Colombo or Durban or any of the other ports en route, their interactions with local people were almost entirely with vendors of goods or services or employees of hotels and restaurants. Even before disembarking, they encountered vendors in small boats eager to sell fruit or souvenirs. On shore, they hired rickshaw "drivers" and dealt with merchants at a great variety of stalls and shops, as well as waiters or other hotel staff when they stayed in hotels overnight. Australians' interactions with local vendors and employees were structured by axes of difference that included race, class, sex, and colonizer/colonized. Within such a matrix of inextricable and mutually constitutive

[34] Louise Mack, *An Australian Girl in London* (London, 1902), 16.
[35] Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, N.C., 1995), 102.
[36] Fussell, *Abroad*, 210.
[37] Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, 10.

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factors of difference, it is difficult to single out the operation of just one, that of class. But it is clear that class difference *was* one of the interwoven factors at work and that women drew on established behavior of the middle class regarding the poor in their actions at Colombo, for example, and their descriptions of it. Well-traveled feminist activist Bessie Rischbieth's description of her day in Colombo in April 1913 reflects the existence of imperial organizations through which middle-class women's philanthropic mission was pursued, although in her case an organization that opposed imperial Christian evangelizing: "At Colombo I put in a quiet day. Went to the Galle Face Hotel for a room for the day, & then went & called on Mrs. Higgins of the [Theosophical Society] Centre & stayed to 'tiffin' with them. It was so interesting going over the school again dear little Buddhist girls[.] I had quite a lovely time with her."[38] While issues of class are embedded in Rischbieth's account, Stella Bowen, in her later recollection of her impressions of poverty in Colombo, states explicitly that it was issues of suffering and social injustice that struck her forcefully at the time, and only in retrospect (she implies a matter of years) did she understand the simultaneous implication of imperialism and colonialism. When in early 1914, she sailed from Adelaide to London to study art and see the world, Bowen stopped at Colombo: "I saw the unimaginable squalor of the native quarter, the crawling heaps of brown limbs, the begging babies, the sickness. I admired the skill, industry and soft-voiced charm of the Hindu tailor who offered to copy your favourite suit in twenty-four hours for a pittance. All this is the Empire, I told myself, and no criticism of it entered into my mind. Not then."[39] Bowen's admission of her lack of awareness, of her failure to identify the role of colonialism in the production of suffering is unusual, perhaps partly the result of her recollections being recorded in her memoir later in life (in the late 1930s or perhaps 1940).

WILLFUL UNAWARENESS OF THE OPPRESSIONS OF COLONIALISM did not, however, mean that Australians were ignorant of the enormous reaches and complexity of the British Empire. On the contrary, knowledge of the empire and its component parts was expected of all well-educated Australians. Indeed, it was such a marker of education that in 1938 a question on the New South Wales statewide high-school Intermediate examination was, "Describe carefully the scenery, nationalities, and types of trade commodities likely to be met with on a sea trip from Sydney to Naples via Singapore, Colombo and the Suez Canal."[40] Australians en route to England were well aware that they were privileged to have the chance to see exotic points of the empire that their friends and neighbors would also want to see; the lore of the

[38] National Library of Australia, MS 2004/1/5, Bessie Rischbieth Papers, letter to her sister Olive from R.M.S. *Otranto*, April 7, 1913.

[39] Stella Bowen, *Drawn from Life* (1941; rpt. edn., London, 1984), 31. While Bowen was exceptional in her retrospective recognition of colonialism's oppressiveness, she was not alone in her indictment of the suffering of the poor in Colombo or other ports of call: other Australian women at various times also noted poverty and illness, with varying tones of moral condemnation (over personal hygiene, for example) or political outrage.

[40] Richard White, "Overseas," in Bill Gammage and Peter Spearritt, eds., *Australians: 1938* (Broadway, NSW, 1987), 439.

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most common route had such currency among the privileged and the well-educated that the premier hotels in Colombo, the Grand Oriental Hotel, the Galle Face, and the hotel at Mt. Lavinia, were well known to Australians. Even by the turn of the century, Colombo was a well-trodden tourist site: as Louise Mack noted in her fictionalized account of her 1901 voyage, "Everybody does the same thing. At Mount Lavinia we meet our ship's people in hundreds."[41]

When Winifred James sailed for London from Melbourne in 1905, she, too, quite shrewdly turned her voyage to account by writing a fictionalized version of it as she went and incorporating it into her first book, *Bachelor Betty*, aimed at a popular audience and an instant success when published in London in 1907.[42] Her detailed narrative showed that Australian women en route to London quickly learned much about the interconnectedness of different points of the empire. Betty, the narrator, describes the other passengers with whom she shared the voyage, especially at mealtimes:

> At the table next to mine sit . . . a Ceylon tea-planter returning after eight months in Australia, a Sydney girl on a visit to Colombo, and another bound for Cairo to stay with her brother, who is doctor to the Khedive; two very nice nurses, one the matron of a big hospital in New South Wales, and the other a sister who went through the war in South Africa and has travelled pretty well everywhere; . . . and a cheery little Australian whose sister-in-law married a cricketer and afterwards became a countess.
>
> Lower down is a table of uneaten missionaries and their wives . . . But mine! It is absorbing, entrancing, epoch-making. There is never a dull moment or an expected one . . .
>
> I sit at the head. On the right is a woman who is going to Manchester to join her sister in a milliner's shop. Next her is a Bradford man who has been for years up in the North of Queensland pearl fishing. He has also picked up some opals. On his feet he wears brown canvas shoes, on his back a khaki jacket, and on his hands samples of the pearls he has fished and the opals he has digged. In between the courses he and the milliner hold hands on the table. Opposite, the pearl fisher's brother . . .
>
> Further along, Flora MacTavish and Donald Loch Lomond, the Scottish entertainers, converse together in a foreign tongue, occasionally translating that the conversation may become general . . . The last two to make up the company are a pantomime actress . . . and a silent, dark-browed man who is going to England to study for the Presbyterian ministry, but in the meantime is spending half his time drinking with the actress, and the other half strapped down in his berth.[43]

Thus the voyage exposed Australian subjects of the British Empire not only to multiple imperial sites but also to firsthand evidence of its dimensions, its commercial, religious, military, and cultural aspects, and the constant movement among all of them. This witnessing of constant movement may well have problematized Australians' sense of, to use Inderpal Grewal's phrase, "stable unitary identities of nation," as indeed their own voyages indicate the symbiotic relation-

[41] Mack, *Australian Girl*, 26. On knowledge of India and Ceylon in Australia, see Beverley Kingston, "The Taste of India," *Australian Cultural History* 9 (1990): 36–48.

[42] See articles about James, "Out in Panama with William," *Everylady's Journal* (June 6, 1924): 424; and "To Be or Not to Be British?" *The Home* 14 (June 1, 1933): 24.

[43] Winifred James, *Bachelor Betty* (London, 1907), 14–16.

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ship between imperial and national identities, even though the centrality of imperial connections was always apparent.[44]

Significantly, at least some women discovered that it was not only white subjects of the empire who enjoyed the privileges of mobility and educational possibilities within and beyond it. The author of *Everylady's Journal*'s 1930–1931 series "My Dream Trip Comes True" recounted that, when her ship left Colombo, her fellow passengers now included "a few Cingalese, young men for the most part, going home to complete their education at one of the Universities." It is especially telling that, seemingly casually and in passing, this writer construes the Cingalese men's voyages as "going home," just as hers was. Presumably, this usage was not the outcome of their having employed this phrase in conversation but of her projecting her own emotional-imperial relationship to England onto them. This telling usage indicates that, to the writer, because these young men were well educated and bound for an English university, their class positioning overrode their race and thus fixed their imperial-national identity: if you were a well-educated and at least middle-class subject of the empire, then England must be "home" to you.[45] Besides the young Cingalese men, her new fellow passengers also included "several Indians," one a professor of psychology from a university in Bengal on his way to France and another an "interesting Indian, quite handsome and debonair, [who] was on his way to the Chicago University to complete a dental course." The serial writer reported her conversations with these two Indian men at length. She had discussions with the professor about the occult, mysticism, and education (both religious and secular) among Indians. With the "handsome and debonair" man, she learned why studying dentistry at Chicago was a better option than studying it in England, which she had assumed "set the standard of the world in such things." After summarizing these conversations, she observed, "It is interesting to learn that the educated Indian considers his colour due to climatic conditions. This point had never struck me before, until I spoke to two or three men, whom I thought were half-caste—they were so brown. I was amazed to find they were English, going home after five or six years on the sugar plantations; so possibly there might be something to this theory after all."[46] The writer manages, in this short discussion, to suggest at once that the theory of skin color as product of climate was put to her by one of the Indian passengers, that she herself thought of it as a consequence of talking to dark-skinned Englishmen, and that it was a theory she had long heard of and previously rejected. These rhetorical moves suggest her awareness that readers might well find the theory unacceptable, or at least controversial, but the overall effect of the discussion is one of persuading the reader of its plausibility. The combined effect of advancing this theory—with its implication of racial difference as socially and culturally constructed and therefore in some sense not real—and even-handedly describing both the young Cingalese students and the Englishmen from the sugar plantations as "going home" is to assert the imperial equivalence of

[44] Grewal, *Home and Harem*, 3.

[45] On the complex meanings of "home" in relation to Indian travelers, see Grewal, *Home and Harem*, esp. chap. 4. John Western discusses the ambiguity of the term "home" in *A Passage to England: Barbadian Londoners Speak of Home* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1992).

[46] "My Dream Trip Comes True: The Experiences and Adventures of an Australian Woman Journalist on Sea and Land," *Everylady's Journal* (January 1, 1931): 14.

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all who can claim at least respectable or bourgeois class status. But it is noteworthy, too, that the writer, traveling with a woman friend, seems to move at her ease and without comment or excuse among English, Indian, and Cingalese men, enjoying conversations equally with all of them, without regard to either racial barriers or gender prohibitions.

For Australian passengers, learning more about the empire, its constituent parts and the interconnections among them, was in part a process of learning specific dimensions to Australia's location within the empire. On board ship, they discovered, if they were not already aware of them, details of Australia's economic contributions to the empire, such as Winifred James's story about the pearl fishing and opal mining in which the Bradford man had engaged, commercial and recreational connections like the Ceylon tea-planter who had spent eight months in Australia, religious connections such as those embodied by the "uneaten missionaries" and the "dark-browed man" headed to England to study for the Presbyterian ministry, and the existence of an empire-wide entertainment circuit, whose participants included the likes of Flora MacTavish and Donald Loch Lomond. James's glancing reference to cricket in *Bachelor Betty* (through the Australian whose sister-in-law married a cricketer) drew on popular sporting aspects of imperial culture and identity: Australians' valorization of cricket was a self-conscious double assertion of belonging to the empire and of their own skills at the sport. Thus when Australian passengers en route to Britain played cricket as a highly favored deck sport, they were not only passing the time during long days at sea, they were also celebrating their perspective that Australia was, in Louise Mack's words, "The Land of Cricketers."[47] Another of James's glancing references is even more indicative of Australia's location within the empire: her mention of the nursing sister "who went through the war in South Africa" invokes Australia's involvement in the Boer War, when Australian colonial expeditionary forces sailed to South Africa to fight on behalf of imperial interests there and a few Australian women served as nurses.

Throughout the early decades of the twentieth century, Australia's involvement in imperial wars heightened the significance of the voyage to Britain. If the Boer War lent special meaning to calling at Durban and Cape Town, from 1914 onward Australia's role in World War I added new layers of meaning to sailing through the Suez Canal and landing in Egypt. In the eastern Mediterranean especially, following the April 1915 landing of Australian troops on the Gallipoli peninsula, proximity to Gallipoli became charged with patriotic significance; that disastrous defeat by the Turks was represented as the birthplace of Australian nationhood. Letters written after the war speak to continuing military-imperial associations. Feminist suffragist activist Vida Goldstein, who had already been to England in 1911 as a guest lecturer of the Women's Social and Political Union, in 1919 sailed for England partly to attend the international women's peace conference in Switzerland. She wrote back to Australia, passing through the Suez Canal:

> At day light a few of us were up & as we saw Australian soldiers watching our ship gliding through the canal, we sent out ringing "Coo-ees," which were answered most joyously. The

[47] Mack, *Australian Girl*, 17–19.

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exchange of greetings brought out half-awake soldiers from their tents, & passengers from their cabins, & for the rest of the day there was keen excitement as we saw more & more of our men on the banks of the canal, on the "Sardinia," homeward bound & anchored almost alongside us at Port Said & in the town itself where we spoke to several men stationed there who had not spoken to Australian women for four years . . .

There was great excitement as we passed quite close to the "Sardinia" & exchanged goodbyes with our soldiers. I called out "Are you glad to be going home?" You should have heard the roars of delight from hundreds of throats! From the decks hundreds of handkerchiefs were waved, & from every porthole there waved everything wavable handkerchiefs, towels, shirts, puttees, & even plates! We had a very homesick feeling as the cheering died away in the distance, & the last wave was waved from those "on the way home."[48]

Goldstein's characterization of the Australian soldiers on board the *Sardinia* as "on the way home" points to the ambiguity of the word "home" for an Australian headed to England, an ambiguity that the war itself may well have reinforced by strengthening the nationalistic meaning in the term, thus straining the assumption that the voyage from Australia to England began at one part of "home" and ended at the other, with the two parts conjoined by shared racial and cultural identity. Moreover, the emotionalism she describes of the exchanges between passengers headed for England and soldiers returning "home" suggests the power of the mutual establishment of Australian identity (especially through the Australian bush-call "coo-ee") in the exoticized albeit imperially controlled region of the Suez Canal. Goldstein's own apparent affectionate identification with these Australian soldiers ("our men") is rendered all the more powerful in light of her own destination, the international women's peace conference. The military-imperial markers that Australian women found significant were not limited to the Suez Canal in the aftermath of World War I: letter and diary writers also commented, for example, on the powerful impression that Gibraltar made on them, whether they sailed by it or stopped there, signifying British naval power in the Mediterranean and imperial strength more generally.

Australians knew much, of course, about the operations and the history of imperial power before they embarked. For my purposes in considering how the voyage to England, and the crash course in imperial race relations in other colonies that it constituted, shaped their own racialized subjectivities, it is perhaps most significant that all Australians were cognizant of the repression bordering on genocide of the Aborigines. Australians bound for England must have known (albeit to varying extents) that, since Europeans had claimed the continent in 1788, Aborigines had suffered terribly from European diseases, from loss of their land, and from warfare conducted on various levels, even though perhaps many Australians did not know that by 1900 the Aboriginal population had declined possibly by as much as 80 to 90 percent.[49] By the turn of the twentieth century,

[48] Fawcett Library, Vida Goldstein Papers, 7/VDG Box 67, VDG6 Manifold Book—Melb-Lond 1919, 40–41, 43.

[49] Luke Trainor, *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1994), 82. On the history of Aboriginal-white relations in Australia, see Henry Reynolds, *The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia* (Ringwood, Vic., 1982); and Gordon Briscoe, "Aboriginal Australian

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Aboriginal people sustained traditional livelihoods only in areas remote from white settlement. Those who survived within the parameters of white-settled areas were contained on reserves, on land not considered valuable, or were in the employ of white pastoralists and farmers, or were the wards of missionaries. Aborigines were excluded from the category of citizens under the constitution when Australia became a federation in 1901; they were denied voting rights and excluded from the national census. The White Australia policy, embodied in colonial legislation beginning in 1888 and culminating in the federal 1901 Australian Immigration Restriction Act, was designed to curb the immigration of Chinese people especially, as well as other Asians and Pacific Islanders; it was driven by eugenicist fears and worries about internal economic competition. But this assertion that "Australians" were white, a cornerstone of national identity as it was elaborated in the debates leading up to federation and promulgated by the first national parliament, made clear the official subjugation of Aborigines.[50]

Because most Australians lived in coastal and near-coastal cities and towns, from which Aborigines had been mostly removed, especially in the densely colonized southeastern states, Aborigines did not figure largely in the consciousness of most Australians bound for England in the early twentieth century. Even though Australia itself was a colonizing power in relation to Papua (New Guinea) and the peoples of Melanesia, when confronted with racial hierarchies in other British colonies, Australians usually failed to reflect on Australian race relations or draw any comparisons. One exception to this rule occurs in the *Billabong* series of novels for older children, written by Mary Grant Bruce in the first three decades of the century, about three teenagers who live on a sheep station in Victoria. *From Billabong to London* is set during World War I and tells the story of the Billabong family's voyage to London in order for nineteen-year-old Jim and his mate Wally to enlist there. Jim's father and sister Norah accompany the soon-to-be soldiers, and as their ship is pulling into Durban harbor Norah exclaims over her first sight of "Kaffirs," a group of laborers on the wharf. She is excited to see them, she explains to the ship's doctor, because "it's so queer to me to be in a country where there are coloured people everywhere. I can't help feeling excited." The doctor, who is English, asks her if she has seen Aborigines, and she explains that, although she has, "There are not so very many left now, you know, especially in Victoria; they are dying out fast, and the remaining ones are principally kept in their special settlements. And I never remember enough of them to make it seem that they were really the people of the country." The doctor expresses pity for the Aborigines, to which Jim responds disgustedly: "They're a most unpleasant crowd—the lowest, I believe, in the scale of civilisation. Useless, shifty, lazy, thieving—you can't trust many of them. They will steal, and they won't work." In comparison, the doctor, who is positioned as the expert on "Kaffirs" because of his repeated stops in Africa,

Identity: The Historiography of Relations between Indigenous Ethnic Groups and Other Australians, 1788 to 1988," *History Workshop* 36 (Autumn 1993): 133–61.

[50] On the history of the White Australia policy and of Aborigines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Geoffrey Bolton, gen. ed., *The Oxford History of Australia*, Vol. 3: Beverley Kingston, *1860–1900, Glad, Confident Morning* (Melbourne, 1988); Vol. 4: Stuart Macintyre, *1901–1942, The Succeeding Age* (Melbourne, 1986); and Patricia Grimshaw, Marilyn Lake, Ann McGrath, and Marian Quartly, *Creating a Nation* (Ringwood, Vic., 1994), esp. chaps. 6, 8, 12.

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admits that "Kaffirs" will "work well enough" but contends that "Big animals—that's all they are," as he proceeds to toss pennies and halfpennies onto the wharf in order to produce a scene of the African laborers falling over each other to claim the coins.[51]

If most Australians did not draw comparisons between the colonial racial hierarchy they took for granted in Australia and those they witnessed at other colonies, the phraseology they employed to describe what they saw immediately indicates that they invoked the privileges of being white in an imperial hierarchy of color. In their letters home, their diaries, and their fictionalized accounts of their own voyages, Australian women used the term "coolies" for all native laborers regardless of whether they were describing Colombo, Bombay, Aden, or Port Said.[52] Racist subscriptions included the taxonomy of peoples in various ports, with a consensus of opinion that, in Dr. Vera Scantlebury Brown's words, referring to Port Said (and presumably in comparison with Colombo and Aden), "As we have come up, the black people have ascended in the scale of humanity but although more intelligent they are not so picturesque."[53]

It is probably no surprise that, in complete disregard of geography, after having sailed thousands of miles both west and north, Australian women would arrive in Colombo and exclaim over the magic and charm of "The East." Louise Mack's version of this reaction describes waking up in Colombo one morning: "I sit up in my berth and look through my porthole and see a foreign sail cut clear against a misty rose and onyx sky; a tall, brown, curving sail leaning above a low, brown, dhow, and in the dhow a black man guiding his craft. The East! the East! the East! That is my first glimpse of the East! How it thrills! how it stuns!"[54] Mack's reaction to Colombo expresses the mysticism ascribed to colonized cultures by orientalist discourses, which assumed the metropolitan Western European perspective of the globe.[55]

For Vida Goldstein, such mysticism could not compensate for the greater appeal of the Occident. In 1919, her ship's stop in Bombay extended to ten days while part of the ship was converted from troop to passenger accommodation, during which time she and her traveling companion Cecilia John, contrary to advice and to the other passengers, freely visited the "native quarters." Goldstein used the opportunity to inform herself about, and to write back to Australia about the growth of, the Indian passive resistance movement led by Gandhi in the wake of the Rowlatt Acts, which

[51] Mary Grant Bruce, *From Billabong to London* (London and Melbourne, [1915]), 145–47. Bruce herself sojourned and worked in London, sailing there in 1913.

[52] For James's "Betty," at least one group of "coolies" was a spectacle to be "snapshotted." *Bachelor Betty*, 34. In another example of reducing non-Anglo-Saxons into an undifferentiated Other, E. Carpenter, in London for postgraduate medical research in 1933, wrote: "I had a lovely trip over on the *Orama*; the ports of call were most interesting, Colombo, Aden, Suez and Naples with chattering natives everywhere." *News Sheet of the Women's College* . . . [University of Sydney], no. 2 (1933). I am grateful to Ros Pesman for her suggestion to look at women's college newsletters.

[53] University of Melbourne Archives, Vera Scantlebury Brown Papers, Diary letters 1917–July 1918, A1, 1.

[54] Mack, *Australian Girl*, 20–21. In 1928, twenty-one-year-old kindergarten teacher Hope (Macindoe) McPhee had a similar reaction, even farther west and north on an excursion she took from the boat, to her first sight of Cairo: "Out of the barren desert we suddenly viewed the great city of Cairo with its dooms [*sic*] & spires—The East!!" Hope (Macindoe) McPhee's journal, "Wanderings in Wonderland," entry for September 22–23, 1928. Courtesy Jan Harper, Melbourne.

[55] The foundational analysis of this topic is, of course, Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978). For a feminist analysis of the multiplicity of orientalisms, see Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991).

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Hope (Macindoe) McPhee, a kindergarten teacher from Sydney, shown in Port Said in 1928, while her ship, the *Moldavia*, docked there on the way to London. Courtesy of Jan Harper.

extended the colonial government's wartime executive powers in order to crush opposition. Despite her unusual political acumen and interest in the passive resistance movement, on the eve of departure from Bombay she noted: "we shall be glad to have our faces turned towards Europe. We have enjoyed this glimpse of India immensely, but the call of the West silences almost completely that of the East."[56] Because imperialist and orientalist assumptions were so imbricated in white Australians' (like Europeans') world views, such a statement is not surprising even coming from Goldstein, nor is it surprising that Australian women interchangeably described Colombo as "the Orient" as well as "the East." Perhaps more surprising, though, is that in 1911 Alice Grant Rosman described Durban as "a town of Oriental and tropic beauty."[57] Calling South Asian and even African port cities "the East" and "the Orient" constituted one cultural marker of Australian women's identification with the imperial

[56] Fawcett Library, Vida Goldstein Papers, 7/VDG Box 67, VDG6 Manifold Book—Melb-Lond trip 1919, 26.

[57] Rosman, "Travels of Economical Emily," *Everylady's Journal* (August 6, 1911): 137.

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master race, the metropolitan country and the metropolitan culture, an identification central to their understanding of their own whiteness.

AN EXPERIENCE RECOMMENDED AS ESSENTIAL for the passenger-tourist in both Colombo and Durban was to ride in a rickshaw. It was an activity that provoked strong reactions, reactions that provide us with evidence of Australian women's thoughts and feelings about the mutually constitutive workings of race and class in these colonial contexts. For Louise Mack in Colombo, the experience was transcendentally sublime:

> The first ride in a rickshaw is a tremendous sensation. You feel like a queen. You own the whole world. You have a *man*—a flesh-and-blood man—running in harness between the shafts of your tall, black perambulator with two big wheels, and a hood that goes up and down. Off he tears. His rate is desperately swift. He is so thin that you fear he will break in pieces, that you will be arrested for cruelty to dumb animals. Bones stick out of his shoulders, elbows, knees and feet. He is a very highly-polished trotter. His skin catches the sun on it and shines like a looking-glass. Through the warm electric air you dash. Your spirits go up, and up, and up. You try to remember Sydney. How far, far away it seems! Its trams and 'buses and trains and wide, white streets seem to exist only in a dream . . . [Y]ou have changed your identity. All responsibilities vanish down the scented street. A great hand seems to slap you back into the primeval gaiety of a simple savage.[58]

But others were far more critical of the practice and more earnest about their feelings of guilt. In contrast to Mack's joyous delight in her own transformation into a queen enjoying the services of an animal-subject, Stella Bowen reported that she "felt miserably apolog[e]tic to the slim brown creature who padded along between the shafts."[59] Unlike the fragile-looking rickshaw men in Colombo, rickshaw pullers in Durban were apparently spectacular, the Zulu men in the shafts often being tall and highly decorated, wearing brightly colored and embroidered clothes, bangles, paint, and, most dramatic, headdresses consisting of bullock horns, quills, pampas grass, and feathers.[60] Most Australians who visited Durban engaged a Zulu rickshaw puller at least once and seem to have found the experience exciting. Kathleen Fitzpatrick, however, in 1926 on her way to England, where she would study at Oxford, found that she and her family "did not enjoy our one ride," which she attributed to the fact that, "coming . . . from a society more egalitarian than that of South Africa, it seemed terrible to us that one human being should use another as horse-power."[61]

While these reactions range from delight to condemnation, each shows that the writer was well aware that the axes of class and race had placed her in a position of power over the rickshaw man. Louise Mack's image of having been "slapped back" into a "simple savage" suggests that the pleasure she took in the experience could only be explained by being in a state of savagery; to be able to openly enjoy having

[58] Mack, *Australian Girl*, 23–24.
[59] Bowen, *Drawn from Life*, 31.
[60] Descriptions of Zulu rickshaw pullers are in Katharine Susannah Prichard, *Child of the Hurricane: An Autobiography* (London, 1964), 112; Bruce, *From Billabong to London*, 148–53; and Kathleen Fitzpatrick, *Solid Bluestone Foundations: Memories of an Australian Girlhood* (Ringwood, Vic., 1986), 182, and photo opposite 103.
[61] Fitzpatrick, *Solid Bluestone Foundations*, 182.

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that much power over another human being required a lower racial or evolutionary stage. Yet she also employs the image of being a queen, of occupying the highest social rank available to a woman; thus the combined metaphorical effect is of her white racial identity being effaced at the same time as she is elevated to royalty. One possible interpretation is that, while being white entails privileges such as rickshaws, its responsibilities supposedly preclude overt enjoyment of racial power. All three writers draw on images of animals—"trotter," "creature," and "horse"—suggesting that the degradation to the rickshaw puller is so severe that it goes beyond differences of race and class to that of species, human versus animal. It is as though, in the context of exoticized colonialism (as opposed to the colonialism to which they are inured), the workings of race and class are not easily recognized but rather are distorted or exacerbated.

While negotiating axes of class and race within the precarious and constant construction of colonialism, women passengers also negotiated their own gendered subject positions. Because historically and culturally, travel has been defined as a male prerogative,[62] a paramount gendered aspect of traveling, especially for the many women who were alone or with other women, was a sense of breaking through bounds, of liberation, even for those whose gender transgression was less dramatic than that of "Jane" who stowed away. Annie Duncan, who sailed for England in 1893 and was to become a pioneering woman factory inspector in both England and Australia, left her role as her sister's domestic assistant partly because her sister no longer needed her, partly because she wanted to see her brother in London, and partly because, having passed the age of thirty, she believed that she was now beyond marriage prospects and in some sense her life was her own to make. In a tone of exhilaration that contrasted with her demeanor on leaving her sister, she later recorded in her memoir: "After a day or two, when well away from the Australian coast, we got into smooth water, and had no more rough seas till we got to the Bay of Biscay, and there began for me the passion for travel that still possesses me."[63] Duncan exemplifies the fact that travel abroad for women often could only be attained if and when they were free of domestic, familial obligations.[64] Existing alongside women's perceptions of travel as liberating, however, at least prior to World War I, was a cultural attitude described by writer Katharine

[62] A major reason for this masculinist assumption is that, as Robin Gerster argued persuasively, there is a profound link in Western culture between travel writing and narratives of war that can be traced back to Homer and *The Iliad*. Gerster, "Occidental Tourists: The 'Ugly Australian' in Vietnam War Narrative," in Peter Pierce, *et al.*, eds., *Vietnam Days: Australia and the Impact of Vietnam* (Ringwood, Vic., 1991). Fussell makes the connection between war and travel apparent in *Abroad*, esp. 3–15; also on the connections between war and tourism, especially for Australians, see Richard White, "Sun, Sand and Syphilis: Australian Soldiers and the Orient; Egypt 1914," *Australian Perceptions of Asia: Australian Cultural History* 9 (1990): 49–64. Several feminist scholars have been at pains to show the constructedness of assumptions that travel is a male prerogative, such as Bonnie Frederick and Susan H. McLeod, eds., *Women and the Journey: The Female Travel Experience* (Pullman, Wash., 1993); and Robin Lucas and Clare Forster, eds., *Wilder Shores: Women's Travel Stories of Australia and Beyond* (St. Lucia, Qld., 1992). Sue Rowley has argued that in late nineteenth-century Australian cultural representations of the bush, while the metaphor of the journey carried crucial nationalist assumptions, women were represented only as occupying domestic space or embodying departure and return and were thus excluded from the national public arena. Rowley, "The Journey's End: Women's Mobility and Confinement," *Australian Cultural History* 10 (1991): 69–83.

[63] Mortlock Library of South Australia, PRG 532/6, Annie Duncan Papers, Book 2.

[64] Ros Pesman captures the importance of this freedom in her title *Duty Free*.

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Susannah Prichard: "a young woman, travelling alone, was not considered quite respectable."[65] There were differing opinions whether young women (and no doubt it depended on age) ought to be chaperoned, and indeed at least some were chaperoned, especially before 1914.

When they toured the ports of call, women traveling alone were usually accompanied by other passengers because, it was believed, white women wandering on their own were exposing themselves to sexual danger. Annie Duncan set off to see Port Said with a group of other passengers, but when she and another woman "turned into a side-street to go to a shop for something[,] Mr. Simpson chased us, quite agitated: 'on no account were we to leave the party—we never knew what might happen to us in a place like Port Said.'"[66] Port Said was notorious among passengers as the most "wicked" of the ports of call (presumably at least in part because prostitution was more overt there than at other ports, although Australian men had access to brothels in Colombo and probably elsewhere[67]), but such strictures about women staying with groups of passenger-tourists applied at other ports, too. The only account I have come across in which an Australian woman on her own ran into trouble is that of Prichard's first return trip to Australia, in 1909, when she defied advice not to go sightseeing by herself in Bombay and was threatened by the carriage driver she hired, who ignored her directions to the Towers of Silence and instead took her to "a congested native quarter" where he stopped and demanded more money while she was mauled by beggars. She escaped unharmed and was sternly lectured by her ship's captain the next day.[68] In contrast to this one incident, which did not include sexual danger, and despite all the fear for women's safety on land, there *are* recurrent accounts of sexual harassment on board ship, often at the hands of the ship's officers but also by male passengers.[69]

Women's testimonies of sexual harassment on shipboard stand in marked contrast to their representation as sexually vulnerable tourists at the ports of call. Whereas ships' officers and male passengers warned women that colonized men threatened sexual and moral danger, accounts of voyages suggest that the danger came not so much from subordinated men on land as from powerful and well-placed men at sea. Yet the inversion of represented danger and real harassment was facilitated by the complex question of women's sexual agency. At least one writer blamed women themselves for the sexual harassment to which they were subject on ships, because of "that worship of brass buttons that unfortunately characterises so many feminine travellers."[70] In the contemporary fiction and other literature on women and sea travel, as well as in women's accounts of their own

[65] Prichard, *Child of the Hurricane*, 116.

[66] Mortlock Library of South Australia, PRG 532/6, Annie Duncan Papers, Book 2.

[67] For example, artist Norman Lindsay sketched nude models procured for him by financier George Meudell from a brothel in Colombo, when they were en route to England in 1909. Ross McMullin, *Will Dyson: Cartoonist, Etcher and Australia's Finest War Artist* (London, 1984), 57.

[68] Prichard, *Child of the Hurricane*, 154–57.

[69] The author of "When Suzie Went Steerage" described sexual harassment by ships' officers as a common problem for women traveling alone. *The New Idea* (April 6, 1911): 306. In 1898, Australian-born Maisie Smith, twenty years old and returning to Australia after being educated in England, despite being chaperoned, was persistently harassed by the ship's purser. Joan Kyffin Willington, ed., *Maisie: Her Life, Her Loves, Her Letters, 1898 to 1902* (Kent Town, South Australia, 1992).

[70] "When Suzie Went Steerage," *The New Idea* (April 6, 1911): 306.

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voyages, there is a pervasive trope of the shipboard romance, in which women play roles as sexual or romantic actors and the ship's officers are sometimes the sexually or romantically pursued.[71] It is probably relevant to women's being cast as sexual-romantic actors that, among passengers, women were often more numerous than men; according to Richard White, in 1938 there were about three women for every man in the twenties age group, and the disparity was greatest on ships bound for England.[72] In fact, there is plenty of evidence that women considered themselves sexual subjects and took the initiative in shipboard flirtations and romances, some of which ended in marriage.[73]

In a dramatic transgression of the assumption that, while women could be romantic or sexual actors on board, on land they were to be protected by white men, and in contradiction of the powerful prohibition against sexual relations between white women and men of color, Winifred James writes of her fictionalized persona being sexually attracted to a "rickshaw boy." In her 1907 novel, "Betty" and another woman passenger engage rickshaws to take them on a ride to some of the Colombo sights and arrive finally at the famous Cinnamon Gardens.

> Then all at once the air becomes heavy and sweet with spicy odours. The sweating coolies stop and carefully lower the rickshaw shafts to the ground. They walk away to the bushes, and plucking some branches bring them to us and thrust them into our hands, bruising the leaves as they offer them. We are in the cinnamon gardens. And as the thieving, lying rickshaw boy, with only a short life before him by reason of his profession, pushes his bruised flowers into my hands and says softly, "Laydee, you take," a sudden savage longing for love and beauty comes over me, a glimpse of power and freedom, a desire for completion. And it is all in the magic of that wonderful voice that is half-lover, half-slave, and wholly-entreating child.[74]

James was not the only one to identify the Cinnamon Gardens as a sensuous place,[75] but "Betty's" unapologetic and seemingly inconsequential admission of powerful sexual desire aroused by the rickshaw "boy" is a striking assertion of female sexual subjectivity. Various scholars have identified the cultural link between travel and sexuality, but Eric Leed, Paul Fussell, and others assumed that the sexual actor is always male and that women are always sexual objects (although men can be sexual objects, too, for other men).[76] Ronald Hyam's study of empire and sexuality is written entirely from a

[71] Examples of shipboard romance stories include the short story "The Ways of a Woman" by Winifred James, *The British-Australasian* (June 30, 1910): 30–31; and "Are Women Less Loving on Liners? Being the Intimate Confessions of a Deck-Comber on the High Seas," by Caleb Mortimer, *The Home* 9 (October 1, 1928): 29, 70.

[72] White, "Overseas," 441.

[73] Maisie Smith described women taking the initiative in flirtations on her voyage in 1898. Willington, *Maisie*. Actress and writer Mary Marlowe recalled in *That Fragile Hour: An Autobiography* (North Ryde, NSW, 1990) how, on her 1910 voyage to England with two actress friends, her two friends both fell in love, one with the ship's doctor and the other with a "Gibson man," and married upon reaching England. Marlowe described these shipboard romances in greater detail in her fictionalized account *Kangaroos in King's Land: Being the Adventures of Four Australian Girls in England* (London, 1917).

[74] James, *Bachelor Betty*, 27.

[75] Maisie Smith told her mother in a letter that the Cinnamon Gardens were so beautiful that "if there had been a suitable man about I would not have answered for the consequences (this is a joke)." Willington, *Maisie*, 27.

[76] Eric J. Leed, *The Mind of the Traveler: From Gilgamesh to Global Tourism* (New York, 1991), esp. 113–17; Fussell, *Abroad*, *passim* but esp. 113–16.

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masculinist perspective.[77] Even feminist scholars have assumed that colonial sexual relations, particularly those associated with traveling, are always predicated on male sexual prerogatives. Rana Kabbani, who seeks to highlight the sexual dimensions of orientalist travel narratives, assumed that the writers of such narratives are always men and that women could only be "token travellers."[78] Winifred James's story here is an extraordinary contraversion of such assumptions. She suggests that the Australian woman traveler could take a position not only of power in terms of class and race (in whatever distorted or exacerbated form) but also of sexual subjectivity, indeed of sexual power, because, although she does not act on it, Betty is drawing sexual pleasure from the "thieving, lying rickshaw boy, with only a short life before him." It is perhaps significant that, almost immediately following her encounter with the rickshaw "boy," Betty condemns racism and colonialism at length: "Think of the overwhelming insolence of it all! We—a latter-day people with a pretty taste for thievery—have successfully filched their garden from these children of the sun, moon, and stars . . . And having stolen their paradise, we have turned them into servants and behaved to them as if they were dogs."[79]

Yet later in the same text, Betty suggests the ease with which an Australian woman could, even in such a short visit, assume the perspective of one of the longer-term colonizers:

> From Lady Hawley's we went on to the Garden Club, where all that is beautiful and manly and blue-blooded in Colombo meets, when the sun goes down, to play tennis and drink tea, and say divers things to and of each other . . . The verandah and balcony of the club-house were full of girls in muslin frocks and shady hats, and men in flannels. Through the lighted windows you could see the waiters moving about with trays of glasses . . . There was that lovely sense of brooding peace that comes with the dying away of day, with the stillness only broken by soft laughter and the tinkle of spoons and cups and saucers. If only things could always be beautiful and serene and gentle like that.[80]

Betty fails to acknowledge the contradiction between enjoying this—the social center of privileged white society in Colombo—and her own earlier condemnation of colonialism. Indeed, her infatuation with the pleasures and privileges of colonialism for the colonizers is such that her last thought as her ship pulls out is, "Good-bye, you dear, lovely, beautiful place. I will come back to you again some day."[81] In this last telling moment, her condemnation of colonialism is erased and her identification with the white colonizers is complete. Betty's behavior and reactions to Colombo exemplify the ambivalence that Homi Bhabha has argued is central to colonial discourses that construct "'otherness' . . . [as] at once an object

[77] Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience* (Manchester, 1990).

[78] Rana Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986), 7 and chap. 3. Analyses that are more informed by feminist theory but make similar assumptions include Blunt, *Travel, Gender and Imperialism*, 28, 36; and David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration* (Durham, N.C., 1993), chap. 11. Susan Morgan argues that while women's travel narratives are not "more innocent or less imperializing than men's," women do not write in tropes of sexual domination. Morgan, *Place Matters*, 17.

[79] James, *Bachelor Betty*, 28.

[80] James, *Bachelor Betty*, 37.

[81] James, *Bachelor Betty*, 38.

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of desire and derision."[82] On the one hand, she recognizes the humanity of the colonized people sufficiently to rail against the injustice of colonialism, and even to be sexually attracted to a colonized man, and on the other she ignores that same humanity in the process of enjoying the privileges of colonialism and asserting her own identity as part of the white elite.

While James's image of an Australian woman taking sexual pleasure from a rickshaw "boy" is admittedly extraordinary, it can be seen as perhaps the most dramatic example of many in these accounts of Australian women's articulation of their whiteness in specific colonial contexts. James's assertion of Betty's sexual desire, in contravention of the racialized sexual codes of the South Asian colonial context, which Jenny Sharpe has shown were greatly exacerbated in the later nineteenth century, which E. M. Forster was to sensationalize in 1924, and which resembled codes elaborated in colonial Australia,[83] demonstrates that it was possible for an Australian woman to assert her racial identity as overriding her sex. William W. Stowe has argued that a characteristic of the genre of nineteenth-century travel writing is its polyvocality, in which authors mix generic styles in the one text and move around between feminine and masculine voices, a mobility of particular significance to women writers.[84] While this suggests that James may well have been drawing on an established tradition in positioning her narrator as a masculinized sexual actor in her reaction to the rickshaw "boy," it has also been suggested by feminist scholars such as Alison Blunt and Katherine Frank that, at least in some colonial contexts, white women's race transcended their sexual and gender identities at moments when they were addressed and treated as white men.[85] James may well have thought it permissible for Betty to express this reaction (and after all, the passage does not include the word sex) because her temporary identity as a colonizer in Colombo allowed her the enjoyment of power. This temporary identity was ambiguous in its gendered meanings (she might not walk around alone because she was a white woman, but she held power over the rickshaw "boy" that she presents as sexual, a masculinized position), but it clearly centered on her racial identity as a (privileged) white person. The evidence provided by James and Louise Mack in her evocation of the thrill of riding in a rickshaw contradicts, for example, Sara Mills's argument that women travel writers in colonial situations were "unable to adopt the imperialist voice with the ease with which male writers did," and that even though women partially struggled against "discourses of femininity," those discourses nevertheless rendered them "counter-hegemonic voices within colonial discourse."[86] I would argue, in contrast, that James and Mack in their fictionalized

[82] Homi K. Bhabha, "The Other Question . . . : The Stereotype and Colonial Discourse," *Screen* 24, no. 6 (1983): 19.

[83] Jenny Sharpe, *Allegories of Empire: The Figure of Woman in the Colonial Text* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1993); E. M. Forster, *A Passage to India* (New York, 1924). For an insightful analysis of the sexual vulnerability of a white woman to Aboriginal men as a foundational Australian myth, see Kay Schaffer, "Colonizing Gender in Colonial Australia: The Eliza Fraser Story," in Alison Blunt and Gillian Rose, eds., *Writing Women and Space: Colonial and Postcolonial Geographies* (New York, 1994), 101–20.

[84] Stowe, *Going Abroad*, 106–24.

[85] Blunt, *Travel, Gender and Imperialism*, 105; Katherine Frank, "Voyages Out: Nineteenth-Century Women Travelers in Africa," in Janet Sharistanian, ed., *Gender, Ideology and Action: Historical Perspectives on Women's Public Lives* (Westport, Conn., 1986), 71–72. Birkett makes a similar point in *Spinsters Abroad*, 116.

[86] Mills, *Discourses of Difference*, 3, 22–23. Reina Lewis argues along similar lines to Mills when she

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accounts show that at least some white Australian women in these contexts centrally identified themselves as among the colonial elite, and that their voices, while not fixed, express imperial authority with considerable ease.

As various scholars argue, whiteness can be read as the assertion of privilege, power, and historically specific, gender and class-related cultural identity in a racially hierarchical social system.[87] Within this field of meaning, Australian women's recognition of their own culturally defined modernity and urbanity, their identification of Australia as integrally involved in imperial military and commercial enterprises, their assumption of privileged class status in relation to poorer people in their own society as well as colonized people both in Australia and at the ports of call, and their enjoyment or use of racially marked privileges such as rickshaws can all be seen as elements in the articulation of their own whiteness. In the context of eugenicist racial discourses elaborated from the late nineteenth century onward, Australians' evolving constructions of whiteness were most prominently crystallized in the White Australia policy. Despite her concern about the living conditions of the native people whom she had observed, Vida Goldstein drew these conclusions in 1911:

> I left Colombo believing more firmly than ever in the wisdom of a White Australia. At this stage in our civilisation the black and white cannot dwell together without both deteriorating—in spite of American experience. The coloured man takes all the vices of the white man, and the white man becomes dehumanised. He is so accustomed to being waited on hand and foot that he never does a thing for himself when he can get a coloured man to do it, and he is so full of contempt for the coloured man that he sees everything out of focus, and his tendency is to live only for himself and in himself.[88]

Goldstein here identifies dehumanizing and exploitative dimensions to colonial society in Ceylon and sees white people as corrupted by it. Yet, in supporting the White Australia policy and ignoring its implications, both for the Asians to whom it applied and who already constituted a minority population in Australia and for Aborigines whose elision from citizenship the term "White Australia" made clear, Goldstein is acceding to the privileges of whiteness. The fact that she identifies racially structured societies as existing in Ceylon and America but not Australia is connected to her being from Melbourne: she had probably never seen Aboriginal people working as employees or servants of white people as they did in pastoral areas. That she seems unaware of the coexistence of black and white in Australia is not surprising, given urban white Australians' low level of consciousness of the plight of Aboriginal people. Australian women who embarked for England from the 1890s onward must have known something of the White Australia policy and therefore, at some level, understood that as Australian subjects and citizens they were enjoying privileges of whiteness denied to Asian people and, of course, to Aborigines. The significance of their accounts of their

writes that exploring "women's representation of the Orient will allow us to undercut the mastery" of the Western viewer's position. Lewis, *Gendering Orientalism*, 15.

[87] Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 8, 11, 100, 105. Useful definitions of whiteness are given by Ruth Frankenberg in "Growing Up White," 53–54; and in her book *White Women, Race Matters*, esp. 1, 2, 6; and Roediger, *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness*, esp. 12–13. Another useful book is Vron Ware, *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History* (London, 1992).

[88] *Woman Voter* (April 1911), quoted in Janette M. Bomford, *That Dangerous and Persuasive Woman: Vida Goldstein* (Carlton, Vic., 1993), 105.

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voyages to England and their interactions with colonized people at the ports of call is that they articulated the meanings of that whiteness in relation to both Australia and the larger context of the British Empire.

BY DRAWING especially on the accounts of two Australian feminists, Winifred James and Vida Goldstein, I have attempted to explore how even women who condemned some aspects of colonialism still acceded to its privileges and the privileges of whiteness. Antoinette Burton has demonstrated powerfully how Victorian and Edwardian British feminists furthered their own political cause by claiming to speak for Indian women.[89] Identifying Australian women's articulation of colonial whiteness allows us to see another historically important process of the elaboration and deployment of racial privilege. If we are to grasp the heterogeneity and hybridity of the imperial metropolis itself (as well as other imperial locations), we need to consider the ways in which colonial visitors and residents constructed and represented their own imperial status, the ways in which they articulated, to use Reina Lewis's phrase, their "contradictory positionalities."[90] James's and Goldstein's reactions to Colombo reveal that even the one to two-day coaling stops made by their steamships provided women with opportunities for observation of and, to a slight degree, participation in unfamiliar, racially ordered colonial society.

As a writer who lived and worked in London for decades, James underscores Paul Gilroy's injunction that we need to pay more attention to insider/outsiders and illustrates my claim for the significance of looking at white women from the dominions as examples of historical subjects whose positioning marks the contradictions inherent to colonialism. James was a principal actor in the fight for the right of women married to foreigners to retain British nationality. She married an American citizen in 1913 and was divorced from him in 1927. Living back in London from the early 1920s, she became increasingly incensed by the loss of her British national-imperial status and joined the feminist struggle over this issue in the early 1930s. In 1933, she refused any longer to register as an alien, claiming that she was prepared to show the world "a British woman being sent to jail for loyalty to her country,"[91] and the Home Office finally agreed to exempt women in her situation from registration.[92] But this was not the first time James had assertively conflated British imperial and Australian national identity. In *Bachelor Betty*, her protagonist engaged in a heated argument with an American woman in London about the British monarchy, which she strongly defended, and the American woman questioned her place as an Australian to defend it. Trying to explain the heat with which she replied to the American, Betty comments: "I am the most peace-loving creature alive, but when some one comes along and accuses me of

[89] Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994).

[90] Lewis, *Gendering Orientalism*, 238. An important study of colonialism in the imperial metropolis is Antoinette Burton, *At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late-Victorian Britain* (Berkeley, forthcoming).

[91] "Miss Winifred James Recovers Her Nationality," *The British Australian and New Zealander* (July 25, 1935): 19.

[92] In November 1933, the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act was amended such that British women married to aliens could keep their nationality. 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 49. For details of this episode in a longer feminist struggle and the legislative changes, see *The Times* (February 4, 1933): 7 col. g; (June 24, 1933): 8 col. d; (June 28, 1933): 8 col. b; (July 5, 1933): 7 cols. a–b; (November 10, 1933): 7 col. d.

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being an outsider and a hanger-on, and a snob into the bargain, I, as an integral part of the Empire, feel it a sacred duty to hit out."[93] Betty's anger indicates the strength of her own identification as an insider of the British empire and her resentment that being Australian could mean being seen as an outsider. Moreover, her claim to be "an integral part of the Empire" is an instructive one in light of her condemnation of the injustices of colonialism in Colombo. What James suggests here is the acceptance of the existence, even by those who questioned some aspects, of colonialism and of the privileges of whiteness. Winifred James provides one answer to Ann Stoler's question about what investments white women had in racism: insisting that as an Australian woman Betty was "an integral part of the Empire," James signaled her acceptance of her own implication within the colonial system in its multiple facets, in order to accept its privileges and to maximize her own positioning in British society.

If we are to appreciate fully the ways in which colonialism was imbricated within the metropolis itself during the decades when the British Empire was at its largest and most powerful (as opposed to only in the wake of World War II, as has often been assumed), we need not only to know of the Australian and other dominion and colonial women and men of all ethnicities who were temporary or permanent residents there. We need also to see the connections among the settler colonies or dominions and the other colonies, and to consider the complicity of dominion subjects in the colonial system. Australians going "home" witnessed variegated aspects of colonialism and participated in the privileges of being white colonizers, often privileges that were new even for people inured to the domination of black indigenous inhabitants. The ways in which women from the dominions, themselves partially outsiders in the imperial metropolis and simultaneously facing subordination as women within the colonial hierarchy, understood their own whiteness constitute a factor that we need to make visible in the complicated historical pattern of the racialized and gendered hierarchy of British colonialism.[94]

[93] James, *Bachelor Betty*, 147.

[94] A recent articulation of the need to examine the complexity of relational positionings within hierarchical systems is Susan Stanford Friedman, "Beyond White and Other: Relationality and Narratives of Race in Feminist Discourse," *Signs* 21 (Autumn 1995): 1–49.

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Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900–1945

PRASENJIT DUARA

SINCE THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY, globalization, which has been driven principally by capitalism, has been channeled principally through nation-states.[1] But there have also been potential and real tensions between globalization and the nation-state, because the sovereignty of the latter has been based on limited territorial control. In this essay, I wish to explore the way in which nationalist ideologies sought to contain and, indeed, domesticate a variety of transnational phenomena in East Asia that potentially ran counter to the sovereign interests of the nation-state in the first half of the twentieth century.

I prefer the more specific term "transnational" over "global" to describe these particular phenomena, first, because they are by no means always global in scope. These phenomena are people's lived realities or ideological constructions that transgress, though they do not always subvert, the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. Secondly, whereas global forces are often products of capitalism, these phenomena may predate both modern capitalism and the division of the globe into isomorphic, territorial nation-states. Thus they include people who once occupied a liminal or transcultural space—such as the peripheral peoples of the vast frontier zones of, or the émigrés from, the old empires—and who still do not readily fit into the core narratives of nation-states. I should caution, however, that the essay is not about such people themselves but the efforts of the nation-state to contain, domesticate, and deploy them for its own purposes.

This kind of tension between nationalism on the one hand and transnational and globalizing forces on the other, in much of East Asia and more broadly in the

Thanks are due to many people in several places where this essay was delivered and reshaped during 1996. These include the Institute for Global Studies at Johns Hopkins University, the Center for East Asian Studies at Indiana University, the Center for Chinese Studies at Berkeley, the Comparative Study of Social Transformations at Ann Arbor, and the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research at Amsterdam and Keio University in Tokyo. I am also grateful to the anonymous readers and the editors of the *AHR* for their advice and encouragement. The essay represents a provisional synthesis of work I have been doing over the last several years. Consequently, there are unavoidable references to my own published and unpublished work. The thrust of this work explores the relationship between nationalism and transnational forces in twentieth-century East Asia. In particular, I examine the interface between Chinese and Japanese discourses of the modern, especially regarding the authenticity of tradition and civilization, of woman, of the primitive, and of the locality or village. This interface in turn becomes a site to observe the transnational production of the "national" itself.

[1] By globalization, I refer to the circulation of capital, labor, culture, and information that has tended to accelerate, extend its reach, and grow in volume since at least the eighteenth century.

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non-Western world, may well have been a unique moment in world history, although its legacy is certainly with us today. This period—which I will call the era of "high nationalism" (despite the simultaneous growth of transnationalism)—begins in the early years of the twentieth century, when modern nationalism gained legitimacy in China and many other parts of the colonial and semi-colonial world, and extends until the 1980s. One might say that the global and transnational forces unleashed by capitalism *before* this era were channeled and regulated by the imperialism of early capitalist nations.[2] The end of this period is more difficult to determine, but in China it coincided roughly with the reforms and the "opening" launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978; more generally, it can be traced to the collapse of socialistic or autarkic nationalism that took place through the 1980s in large nation-states like the Soviet Union and India. Although nationalism by no means disappeared in this era, its resistance to transnational capital and culture weakened, and its form changed so considerably that one set of authors calls the nation-state in this new era the "deterritorialized nation."[3]

The idea of a deterritorialized nation is in many ways the precise antithesis of the formal conception of the nation-state in the global system of nation-states that first emerged around the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe and flourished during "high nationalism." Sovereignty in this system resided only in territorially limited states, and such a conception was necessary to the system as a whole. Sovereignty, as the principle that a territorial state invoked to defend itself against external attacks, was legitimate and necessary, even to critics of this idea.[4] The sovereignty of the territorial nation-state in modern Europe was thought to be built on the "common ground of identical citizenship . . . The state embraces all men by its territorial nature. It is universal because it is the one compulsory form of association."[5] To be sure, Harold Laski, a profound critic of the notion of sovereignty, leveled this criticism against the manipulation of the idea of expanding the prerogative of the state *within* domestic or national politics. But, curiously enough, while for Laski the class stratification of national society belied the universalist pretension of state sovereignty, this critique did not affect the legitimacy of the sovereign territorial state in the external sphere of international relations.[6]

Defenders of the notion, such as F. H. Hinsley, see an intimate connection between sovereignty in its internal and external senses, arguing that just as citizen

[2] In China during the period before "high nationalism," the ruling Manchu or Qing dynasty (1644–1911) came increasingly under the financial control of the European imperial powers, from the Opium War of 1840 until it fell in the nationalist republican revolution of 1911. The imperial powers also took over the administration of significant parts of many treaty ports, such as Shanghai or Canton, and gained considerable power over many of the Qing imperial frontier zones, such as Yunnan (French), Tibet (British), and Manchuria (Russian and Japanese). Thus these areas were subjected to considerable multicultural influence.

[3] Linda Basch, N. G. Schiller, and C. S. Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (Luxembourg, 1994), 267–92. According to Basch, *et al.*, deterritorialized nations are ones in which national governments count on the loyalty, wealth, and influence of their expatriates for national ends. In certain small nations like Grenada, these expatriates make up a larger number than the population at home. See esp. chap. 8.

[4] Harold J. Laski, *The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays* (1921; Freeport, N.Y., 1968), 26–28. See also F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty* (Cambridge, 1986), 176.

[5] Laski, *Foundations of Sovereignty*, 26–27; Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, 176.

[6] Laski, *Foundations of Sovereignty*, 27–28.

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and community exercise political and ethical restraints on the modern sovereign state, so, too, does the inter-state system historically limit the absolute sovereignty of the state externally. Moreover, Hinsley argued that the idea of internal sovereignty founded on political society and identical citizenship is prior to external sovereignty, which is dependent on it.[7] From my perspective, by the period of "high nationalism," the sovereignty of the nation-state in the inter-state system had, at least doctrinally, become significantly dependent on the internal idea of "identical citizenship within the territory," or civic nationalism. Causally, however, the experience of nation-states like China and others during this period suggests that the possibility, if not guarantee, of "identical citizenship" was perhaps also necessitated by the nation-state's prior claim of territorial sovereignty, particularly over territories inhabited by racially or culturally dissimilar peoples (as we shall see below). Thus territorial nationalism embedded in the notion of sovereignty was not simply an evolutionary outcome of national history but represented, crudely speaking, a promise, however compromised or disingenuous, of citizenship and its rights to those transcultural peoples in the vast peripheries. This may be the best way to understand the policy of the People's Republic of China of extending privileges to ethnic minorities.

Yet, if this form of territorial nationalism became necessary in principle, recent scholarship on nationalism tells us that there is no nation-state or nationalism in the world that relies solely on this "civic nationalism." All nationalisms employ either more exclusive or wider narratives of historical community, based on common race, language, or culture, to create an affective identification of the people with the nation. The problem with territorial nationalism is that, while it is the only acceptable expression of sovereignty in the modern world, it is an inadequate basis of identification within the nation-state. Thus the modern nation-state and nationalists have to appropriate a variety of historical, non-territorial, and often incommensurate conceptions of political community to try to "make" the territorial nation racially and/or culturally cohesive.[8] Transnational phenomena become both obstacles and opportunities in this project.

At the same time, the language of "appropriation" captures only one side of this political process. The imagery of "common citizenship within the territory" is inadequate because nationalism most often seeks its ultimate value and justification beyond its territorial figuration. Despite its blustering self-confidence, nationalist ideology has never been fully comfortable as a self-contained, self-justifying, and self-glorifying ideology. Even Nazi Germany drew its rationale from a civilizational narrative of a transcendent, aesthetic, racialist ideal.[9] Among those narratives that exceeded the territorial nation—or "geobody," as Thongchai Winnichakul has named it—were, of course, those that celebrated imperialism in the name of a

[7] F. H. Hinsley, "The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations between States," in W. J. Stankiewicz, ed., *In Defense of Sovereignty* (New York, 1969), 279.

[8] This dynamic between historical conceptions (of race, religion, culture, etc.), often tied up with practices of everyday life, and the new territorial conception is a more complex way of grasping the relationship of nationalism and history than recently popularized notions of "invented" or "imagined" histories. Although the powerful new territorial form will try to channel these historical engines toward its own goals, as this article will try to show, these histories can also exceed it.

[9] See Etienne Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," in Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London, 1991), 37–67.

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higher civilization or as the destiny of a superior race but also those that celebrated a transnational ideal.[10] Rising almost simultaneously with nationalism as a global ideology in the late nineteenth century were various transnational ideologies such as pan-Europeanism, pan-Asianism, and later pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, and the like.

IN CHINA, TRANSNATIONAL IDEOLOGIES began to make their appearance at the same time that modern nationalism began to take hold at the turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, nationalism was often justified as a stage on the way to a universalist ideal. There were at least two types of transnationalism: modern, radical, utopian ideologies of anarchism and communism (which tended to move away from a transnationalism to an internationalism celebrating the comity of homologous, but separate, nation-states) and another trend, which I shall identify as a "redemptive transnationalism." I shall deal in this article only with the second, even though there are many interesting issues that relate it to leftist utopian thought. Although they identified themselves as basically modern, the advocates of this latter type of transnational ideology sought to locate themselves as inheritors of the tradition of Confucian and/or Buddhist universalism. There were several variants of redemptive transnationalism, but most were identifiable with groups of modern, urban, elite-led, though often popularly based, associations.

These associations include in their numbers the Morality Society, the Dao Yuan (Society of the Way) and its partner, the Hongwanzihui or Red Swastika Society, the Tongshanshe or the Fellowship of Goodness, the Zailijiao (The Teaching of the Abiding Principle), the Shijie Zongjiao Datonghui (Society for the Great Unity of World Religions, first organized in Sichuan in 1915 as the Wushanshe), and the Yiguandao (Way of Pervading Unity), among many others. Some of these, such as the Fellowship of Goodness, claimed a following of 30 million in 1929,[11] and the Red Swastika Society, a following of 7 to 10 million in 1937.[12] While these claims are likely to be exaggerated, nonetheless, Japanese sources of the time believed that they commanded very significant followings in several parts of the country.

The great majority of these societies were premised on an East versus West polarity, where the West represented science and material culture and the East or East Asian civilizations represented the hope for spiritual and moral regeneration of the world. These societies, most of which were established or which flourished at the time of World War I, sought to bring peace and morality to a world devastated by war and greed by supplementing the material civilization of the West with the spiritual civilization of the East. Their spiritual solution came in the form of a religious universalism in which all major religions of the world—Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity—embodied the same universal spirituality. Their redemptive message drew on a rich vein of late imperial gentry

[10] Thongchai Winnichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu, 1994).

[11] Suemitsu Takayoshi, *Shina no himitsu kessha to jizen kessha* [China's secret societies and charitable societies] (Dalian, 1932), 252.

[12] Takizawa Toshihirō, *Shūkyō chōsa shiryo* [Materials from the survey of religions], Vol. 3: *Minkan shinyō chōsa hōkokusho* [Report on the survey of popular beliefs] (Xinjing, 1937), 67.

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syncretism (*sanjiaoheyi*), which first gained popularity in the late Ming period of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This movement, which merged Confucian precepts with Daoist and Buddhist teachings, was inspired by philosopher and statesman Wang Yangming's commitment to the self-transformation of ordinary people and urged moral engagement and the extinguishing of worldly desires.[13]

In the twentieth century, these syncretic societies came to resemble other modern religious and morality societies all over the world. They were organized with charters and bylaws, armed with a strong this-worldly orientation and a modern rhetoric of global redemption. Perhaps their participation in a modern discourse is revealed most clearly by their allegiance to that most fundamentally modern discourse: evolutionism, or the linear History of Progress. Many of their arguments and propositions were framed by this discourse of evolutionary history, although the scope of this history was not confined to the nation. They argued that human evolution (*jinhua*) would stall and turn even more destructive if the present trend toward hedonistic materialism (exemplified by the West) was not countered by moral and spiritual regeneration.[14] Thus their spiritualism was dedicated to restoring humanity's evolution to perfection.

The modern spiritualism of these societies encoded a universalizing impulse that sought to transcend national boundaries in search of the ultimate moral and spiritual community. Thus, while the red swastika of the society with that name could and should be understood in Buddhist terms, it was also modeled on—an Eastern equivalent of—the Red Cross Society.[15] Many of these societies were committed to benevolent works and philanthropy (*cishan shiye*), including traditional charities such as soup kitchens and poorhouses, and also modern hospitals, schools, and contributions to relief works. In these efforts, there was an insistent urge to break through national barriers. Thus, for instance, the Hongwanzihui, which had branches in Paris, London, and Tokyo and had professors of Esperanto among its members, contributed substantially not only to relief works in China but also to the relief for the Tokyo earthquake and natural disasters in the Soviet Union.[16]

Consider the role of one such redemptive society, the Morality Society (*Daodehui*). This organization had a strongly syncretic religious and moral character and a salvationist rhetoric that was universal in scope. It argued that morality alone gave meaning to the universe, and it was the morality of the East that would save the universe from the materialism and destructiveness of the West.[17] The society was founded in Shandong in 1918, and the philosopher Kang Youwei served as its president in the 1920s until he died in 1927.[18] Kang Youwei was perhaps the most

[13] Chow Kai-wing, *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classics, and Lineage Discourse* (Stanford, Calif., 1994), 21–25.

[14] Wanguo Daodehui Manzhouguo zonghui bianjike [General Editorial Department of the Manzhouguo Universal Morality Society], ed., *Manzhouguo Daodehui nianjian* [Yearbook of the Manzhouguo Morality Society] (Xinjing, 1934), 4: 1, hereafter, *MDNJ*. See also Takizawa, *Minkan*, 67.

[15] Suemitsu, *Shina no himitsu*, 354.

[16] Suemitsu, *Shina no himitsu*, 292–305.

[17] Manzhouguo Daodehui bianjike [Manzhouguo Morality Society editorial department], ed., *Disanjie Manzhouguo Daodehui daode jiangxi yulu* [Oral Records of Morality Seminars of the Third Manzhouguo Morality Society] (Xinjing, 1936), pt. 3: 1, hereafter, *ORMS*.

[18] *MDNJ*, 1: 1.

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prominent name associated with the philosophy of "redemptive transnationalism." Kang's philosophy became widely known because of his leadership of the ill-fated 100 Days Reform movement of 1898, which was quashed by the imperial court; Kang and his associates were forced to live in exile until the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in the republican revolution of 1911.

Kang's philosophy developed out of the New Text school of Confucian thought, which believed that political action must adapt to the needs of a given time. He was thus able to argue for modern institutions, and ultimately even for a modern nation-state, while remaining within a universalist Confucian perspective. For Kang, the ultimate significance of the nation-building project arose from its self-transcendence in the universalist utopia, *Datong*, where there would be no barriers of class, gender, culture, and nations.[19] It was a utopia inspired by Confucian ideals of universal love, but it also represented a "transcendent universalization of Confucian values."[20] Like the early twentieth-century rural reformer Liang Shuming, Kang saw himself as the Confucian sage, the transmitter of the Way, the agency whereby the ancient and universal truths of the world will be revealed. The *Datong* philosophy of Kang Youwei harmonized well with the transnational and salvationist impulses of the society.

How did the Chinese nation-state respond to these societies? The Kuomintang (KMT) government (1927–1949) regarded all the redemptive societies, as it did the Morality Society, with extreme hostility and banned them.[21] In some ways, it was an ironic move, because the KMT espoused a similarly dualistic, redemptive modernity, as we shall see below. But, significantly, the source of the spiritual mission that would enable it to redeem the world lay specifically in China. The KMT declared its opposition to these societies because it claimed that they were riven by superstitions and dominated by local bullies and warlords. Behind this rhetoric, however, lay a strategic representation of modern religion and national tradition. In this strategy, the KMT produced a realm of legitimate spiritualism into which it incorporated modern, licensed religions and designated them as part of China's *national* tradition. Obversely, many popular religious traditions were condemned as superstition and banned—in part at least, to uproot the historical, political power of religious heterodoxy.[22] In the view of the KMT, it was bad enough that the transnational spiritualism of the redemptive societies transgressed the national boundaries of spiritualism that it had devised, but the KMT also suspected that these societies promoted a politics of counter-nationalism. Certainly the cultural bonds of the redemptive societies to similar Japanese societies left them open to these attacks.

Despite the feverish development of nationalism in Japan, the Meiji period (1868–1914) was not wanting in its own redemptive pan-Asian movements that both

[19] K'ang Yu-wei, *Ta T'ung Shu: The One World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei*, Laurence G. Thompson, trans. (London, 1958).

[20] Jerome B. Grieder, *Intellectuals and the State in Modern China* (New York, 1981), 265.

[21] Ōtani Komme, *Shūkyō chōsa shiryo* [Materials from the survey of religions], Vol. 2: *Kirin, Kento, Binko, kakusho shūkyō chōsa hōkoku* [Report on religious surveys of the various provinces of Jilin, Jiandao, and Binjiang] (Xinjing, 1937), 69, 123. See also Suemitsu, *Shina no himitsu*, 251, 255.

[22] Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, 1995), chap. 3.

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fed and resisted the nascent imperialism of that nation.[23] Among imperial powers, Japan was in some ways unusual because it did not distinguish itself racially and culturally from most of those it colonized. Japanese pan-Asianism thus dramatized the uncontainability of the nation whose narrative of History shuttled between an impulse to regard its empire in East Asia as its cultural womb, and thus to assimilate its subjects as citizens of the Japanese imperial nation itself, and the equally powerful drive to distinguish itself from its "backward" Asian colonies, which were not viewed as capable of attaining modern civilization.[24] Japanese narratives of the nation, which appeared to have been so rigorously internalized by its citizens through various disciplinary regimes, were, in fact, caught between the search for roots beyond the national territory—first in northeast Asia, then East Asia, and finally Asia as a whole—and an anxious desire to belong to the civilized, Western world. In both cases, the nation sought its fullest meaning beyond itself.

Redemptive societies in Japan similar to those in China, such as the Shibunkai, offering Confucianism and Shinto as the spiritual alternative to excessive materialism and individualism, began to grow in strength from the 1920s, particularly as economic conditions worsened and social unrest grew. Asiatic moral systems emphasizing ethical responsibilities were celebrated as alternatives to capitalism and Marxism—both Western doctrines.[25] By the 1930s, the redemptive rhetoric of elite Japanese Confucian societies and the right-wing nationalists and militarists began not only to come together but also to be assimilated in an active political and educational program by the Japanese government.[26] But the most systematic and sustained effort to formulate a redemptive pan-Asianism was undertaken by the young officers and intellectuals in the Kwantung army in Manzhouguo.

Manzhouguo was the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria that existed between 1932 and 1945. The Morality Society flourished in Manzhouguo because of state patronage of its activities and those of similar organizations. Thus it was that the Manzhouguo state, the real power behind which was the Japanese military, had at its disposal an ideology and language of transnationalism with which to forge an alliance with the redeemers of modernity in northeast China. The most important doctrine of statist pan-Asianism was the "kingly way," or *wangdao*, a Confucian historical notion of rulership based on moral example that was contrasted to the hegemonic way, or *badao*. About six years before the establishment of Manzhouguo, none other than Sun Yat-sen had urged the Japanese to pursue the kingly way in contrast to the Western imperialist nations, which persisted in the immoral hegemonic path. Sun's advocacy had now been appropriated by the Manzhouguo state.

The message of the kingly way, or moral and spiritual salvation of the world by the East, was one that well suited the world view of the leaders of the Morality Society, who were the successors of the old gentry elite. The Morality Society was

[23] Bunso Hashikawa, "Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Co-Prosperity," in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, N.J., 1980), 331–41.

[24] Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993).

[25] Warren H. Smith, Jr., *Confucianism in Modern Japan: A Study of Conservatism in Japan's Intellectual History* (Tokyo, 1959), 123–26.

[26] Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan,* 154–56.

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perhaps the most elite Chinese organization among all such societies in Manzhouguo. Its membership and officeholders boasted top officials, merchants, and landowners of Manzhouguo society from the major cities to the subcounty townships. Through its propaganda activities in schools, in lectures, in spreading vernacular commentaries of classical morality, in establishing popular enlightenment societies to "reform popular customs and rectify the people's minds and hearts," the society propounded a strong rhetoric of reaching out to all—the rich and poor, men and women.[27] By 1934, the 312 branches of the Manzhouguo society operated 235 "righteous" or "virtuous" schools, 226 lecture halls, and 124 clinics.[28]

While the Manzhouguo regime advocated modernization and, indeed, carried out one of the most comprehensive modernization programs in Asia outside of Japan, its pan-Asianism was designed to restrict significantly the penetration of "Western" moral, cultural, and political ideas into society. One of the most important means through which both the Manzhouguo state and the Morality Society sought to restrict westernization was by the disciplining of the family and gender roles within the family. It promoted the representation of a new family: pure, selfless, and committed to the moral regeneration of the world by adherence to the "kingly way." In this project, women became the principal vehicles of the new morality. As repositories of all that was good and essential in East Asian traditions, women's bodies and minds became the site for a discourse of self-sacrifice, righteousness, and moral regeneration. The figure of woman, though mediated by much complexity, came to stand for Eastern purity and cultural inviolability.[29]

A look into some of the personal narratives of the Chinese women lecturers of this society reveals some of the motives, practical and spiritual, that led them to the Morality Society. A recurrent theme is the importance of the Buddhist faith in their lives and the way in which the Morality Society, which demanded a commitment to public service to the point of self-sacrifice, had opened up this path of service to the world for women. For the first time, said one woman, women could, like men, devote themselves to the social good. Once a woman had satisfactorily served the in-laws, it was incumbent in the next phase to serve the world, in accordance with Buddhist teachings.[30] Mrs. Chen, as reported in the oral records of the Morality Seminars of the society, emphasizes not only the value of self-sacrifice that women had cultivated in the home but also how these values could purify the world once women began to engage in public service.[31] This same woman later revealed the different ways in which her parents were good people and the way in which she could be a morally pure person. Her parents were good people of a village or a county; she saw herself as a good citizen of the nation and the world.[32] To be sure, such declarations were often mixed in with instrumental goals and also served the regime's purposes. Nonetheless, the commitment to the older Buddhist ideal of striving for universal salvation—which had a curiously liberating effect because it

[27] *MDNJ*, 2: 36–42; 4: 117, 118; 8: 22–23.
[28] *MDNJ*, 1: 21.
[29] Prasenjit Duara, "Of Authenticity and Woman: Personal Narratives of Middle-Class Women in China," unpub. ms., 1995.
[30] *ORMS*, 4: 134–35.
[31] *ORMS*, 4: 181.
[32] *ORMS*, 4: 227–28.

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only now became possible for women to pursue this idea outside the home—was an unmistakable element in the self-perception of these women.

Just as Western nations acknowledged their indebtedness, indeed, parentage to a civilization—Greece, Rome, the Enlightenment—so, too, pan-Asianism and its redemptive transnationalism provided a parallel source of civilizational authority. The greater presence of this civilizational authority in the discourses of the tradition-oriented elites in East Asian societies enabled these groups to critique both the nation-state and the particular notion of modernity to which the former was tied. As it turned out, redemptive transnationalism in this era was rejected first by the Chinese Nationalist government and then pressed into service by Japanese militarists and imperialists. It is perhaps the general condition that transnational entities and ideologies, which almost by definition lack defensive political organizations, will, when possible, be appropriated by states and militaries for their own purposes. Next, I will consider the way in which Chinese nationalists in the KMT sought to deploy transnational ideas for national ends. I will also show that in more complex and ironic ways, national states, too, are dependent on transnational identities and formations for their coherence.

TRANSNATIONAL IMAGININGS were not the exclusive domain of the redemptive societies. Despite its committed nationalism, at some levels, KMT ideology also drew on transnational sources of authority to endow the nation with higher meaning. Thus ideologists like Chen Lifu, leader of the powerful CC clique and education minister in the KMT government after 1937, argued that the Chinese spiritual tradition had evolved parallel to the Western material tradition. Once the two became fused in the Chinese republic, history could be propelled into civilizational perfection, to be embodied in the universal *Datong*, or the Great Unity.[33] But perhaps the most significant pronouncement on the transnational ideals and roots of the Chinese nation was made by Sun Yat-sen himself in a 1924 speech to Japanese merchants in Kobe months before his death. It is of particular interest not only because of its foundational character but because it mirrors the very intertwining of race and civilization that Western imperialism had itself employed to suppress the emergence of modern nations in the colonized world.

In the speech, called "Da Yaxiyazhuyi," or "Great Asianism," Sun invoked the monumental significance of Japan's victories over Western imperialism, first in overcoming the unequal treaties some thirty years before and, most important, in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. He narrated a personal testimony to the impact of this victory: he was in a ship crossing the Suez Canal soon after the victory when some locals enthusiastically mistook him for a Japanese. Even after discovering their mistake, however, they continued to celebrate their solidarity with him against the imperialist powers. In the speech, Sun developed the theme of a racial or color war against the white race, for whom (he cites in English) "blood is thicker than water," which is why the British were saddened by Russia's defeat despite their

[33] Chen Lifu, *Xin shenghuo yu minsheng shiguan* [New Life and the Minsheng conception of history], in *Geming Wenxian*, Vol. 68: *Xin shenghuo yundong shiliao* (Taibei, 1976), 133.

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political alliance with the Japanese.[34] The theme of common colored-ness (*yousede minzu*) among the oppressed Asians is braided with and finally yields to another unity: common culture and cultural resistance. When the 900 million Asians realize that the culture of the West has been arbitrarily imposed on them and that they, too, have a powerful and independent culture and philosophy, they will put up an unyielding resistance.[35]

From this point in the text, Sun discussed the notion of the Asian kingly way (exemplified by the Chinese imperium) versus the hegemonic way of the West. To illustrate the effectiveness of the morally based *wangdao*, he cited the example of Nepal, which continued to pay tribute to imperial China despite the precipitous decline of China's political power in the nineteenth century, while the politically powerful British, on the other hand, were compelled to subsidize the Nepalese monarchy to retain the flow of Gurkhas into the British army. Rather than analyze the situation in terms of the maintenance of the balance of power, Sun chose to interpret it as a moral lesson in Asian nurturance of ethical values.[36] Toward the end of the speech, Sun returned his attention to Japan, where he predicted an apocalyptic culture war between the forces representing the aggressive militarism of the West and the moral pacifism of the East and urged his listeners to strengthen the forces of peace in their nation.[37]

We may pause to reflect on the fateful irony that it was precisely the notions of *wangdao* and Eastern culture that the enemies of Chinese nationalism in Japan and Manchuria also sought to deploy. But lest we think it was only appropriated by imperialists, there is evidence that, as alternatives to westernized modernity, these notions had considerable popularity in China. Thus, apart from redemptive societies, secret societies and peasant rebels continued to use the rhetoric of universalism and pan-Asianism. In particular, they used it to oppose the modern nationalism of the KMT and others, who they believed were bent on uprooting their cultural and material world.[38]

Before going on to examine the ways in which the nation-state sought to use Sun's pan-Asianism, I want to examine the manner in which Sun constructed pan-Asianism discursively. In his formulation, the territorially delimited notion of Asia is symmetrical with Europe (or East with West), the racial or physical attribute of color contrasts with whiteness, and the superior Asian civilization based on morality and spirituality forms the perfect counterpart to European material civilization. In this mirror image, the nation derives its strength from a return to its wider territorial, racial, and cultural roots. Whence this discursive construction and how does it function? Race, civilization, and territory had provided the bases of both imperialism and nationalism in the non-Western world in the early twentieth century. The particular matrix of these ingredients in this period took the form of Social Darwinism.

Social Darwinism justified colonial intrusions by arguing that the imperial races

[34] Sun Yat-sen, "Da Yaxiyazhuyi" [Great Asianism], in *Xinyaxiya* 1.1 (1930): 2–7.
[35] Sun, "Da Yaxiyazhuyi," 4.
[36] Sun, "Da Yaxiyazhuyi," 5.
[37] Sun, "Da Yaxiyazhuyi," 7.
[38] Mitani Takeshi, "Kōhoku minshu bōdō (senkyūhaku nijūkyū nen) ni tsuite" [Concerning the popular riot of 1929 in Jiangbei], in *Hitotsubashi Ronsō* 83, no. 3 (1979): 137–57.

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with territorially sovereign states possessed a superior, enlightened civilization or History. This configuration justified conquest of inferior races with no History or national territory, and colonial apparatuses of knowledge worked to reproduce this sociology. Non-Western nationalism, at least in East Asia, was produced within the general terms of this Social Darwinist configuration. Nationalist elites in these societies responded by formulating the present or desired territorial nation as the subject or agent of History to which belonged the entire past that had occurred on this delimited but maximized surface. In the ideal of self-contained nationalism, which Sun's party had once advocated, the territorial nation was to be perfectly coextensive with a homogeneous community (race) and a common culture, so that this sleek body moving in Historical time could be perfectly poised to lunge successfully into the future.[39] New nations were thus produced in the matrix of the old discourse. Sun's formulation of pan-Asianism developed in great part within the same matrix; but where in nationalism, race and culture are locked into the nation-state, here they remain unbounded by the territorial state. At one level, we could say that pan-Asianism responded more directly to the discursive conditions that produced nationalism: transnational imperialism. It sought to address problems and anxieties that nationalism could not resolve within its own bounds.

In late 1930, the new journal *Xinyaxiya* (New Asia) was founded by the KMT thinker Dai Jitao to fulfill Sun's ideals of pan-Asianism. The mission of the journal proclaimed that it sought to address the problem of nation-building in relation to both the border question and the liberation of the nations of the East. "In order to reconstruct China it is necessary to develop China's border areas; in order to liberate the nationalities [*minzu*] of Zhonghua [China composed of the Han and other minorities], it is necessary to liberate the nationalities of the East alike."[40] One of the central concerns of the journal was to promote measures to stabilize and secure the vast border regions of the republic, which constituted almost two-thirds of the territorial surface of China and included Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, and the southwest. Populated as they were until recently by non-Han peoples, political resistance to the Republic of 1912 had been experienced in almost all of these areas.

The border question dramatized a classic problem of modern nationalism. In positing the nation as an evolving unity, national Histories project the "geobody" into the past. The Chinese nation-state was no exception and claimed sovereignty over peoples in these lands despite the fact that the modern notion of sovereignty was irrelevant to the relationship between the Chinese imperial center and these local polities. The peoples in these regions had multiple and overlapping relations with several polities in the region including the imperial Chinese state. Moreover, their perception of the imperial Chinese state differed greatly from modern understandings of the sovereign territorial state. As the Mongols seeking independence from the impending republic in 1911 declared, their relationship with the Qing empire was one with their fellow Central Asian Manchus, not with the Han Chinese of Kitad (the Mongol name for Han China). They believed that they were

[39] Duara, *Rescuing History*, chap. 1.
[40] *Xinyaxiya* 1.1 (1930), preface.

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at the same level as the Han Chinese within the empire, and, now that the empire had dissolved, each should go its own way.[41]

It was precisely in response to this kind of problem, which worsened with the virulent anti-Manchu racialist nationalism of the period until 1912, that the new Republic of 1912 was declared to be the Republic of the Five Races or Nationalities, thus establishing the juridical notion of equal membership in the territorial nation. But such declarations seemed hollow, as they were accompanied by increasing Han settlement of the border areas. If anything, tensions between the local peoples and Han settlers, soldiers, administrators, and merchants in these regions appeared to have been exacerbated during the republic.[42]

Thus territorial nationalism, despite its promise, could not by itself resolve the problem of political resistance by the "minorities," as these transcultural peoples came to be called. Pan-Asianism, on the other hand, could provide an alternative basis for solidarity with the non-Han. By emphasizing a strongly culturalist and weakly racialist (colored peoples versus whites) basis for solidarity, ironically, pan-Asianism could be mobilized to secure national solidarity. This is, I believe, the only way to understand the journal *Xinyaxiya*'s mission of deliberately juxtaposing the liberation of the minorities with that of Eastern nationalities. However, an example below reveals that it is not enough to see nationalism as simply appropriating transnational ideas. Just as critically, nationalism reveals its own insufficiency when it depends on transnationalism not only to resolve certain problems but also to establish its raison d'être.

An essay in the journal *Xinyaxiya* entitled "The Evolution of Asian Culture and Its New Opportunity," while not very reliable for its scholarship, provides an instance of this mutual dependency. The author, Zhang Zhenzhi, traced the origins of world culture to mountainous regions and plateaus, specifically to the Pamir Plateau in Central Asia. He declared that three of the four oldest cultures of the world were Asian (Chinese, Indian, and Mesopotamian), while the fourth, Egyptian, had close ties to Asia. Zhang next cited the older philosophies of Asian, and specifically Chinese, civilizations and their great inventions as signs of the early Asian superiority that made possible the modern age in world history. Lamentably, in the last thousand years or so, Asian civilizations declined and had been overtaken by the Europeans. He located this decline within a sociology of "natural" and "cultural" races. The natural races are barbaric peoples whose blood is relatively unmixed, whose physical stature is robust, and whose spirit is courageous and fierce. The cultural peoples belong to old cultures with mixed blood, are literary rather than martial, and are without the spirit of the naturals. They cannot avoid decline. All Europeans are of the natural type, but, notably, they also have civilization. The weakness of Asian cultures is revealed in the thought of their philosophers, Confucius, Mencius, and the Buddha, which is deep but unpractical and otherworldly. Thus society became monkish and dilettantish. In China, the Han people were conquered by the natural, barbaric Mongols and Manchus raised in the

[41] Tatsuo Nakami, "A Protest against the Concept of the 'Middle Kingdom': The Mongols and the 1911 Revolution," in Eto Shinkichi, *et al.*, eds., *The 1911 Revolution in China* (Tokyo, 1984), 146–47.

[42] Ma Hongtian, "Kaifa xibei shi jiejue Zhongguo shehui minsheng wentide genben fangfa" [Opening up the northwest is a basic means of solving the problem of livelihood in Chinese society], *Xinyaxiya* 1.1 (1930): 37–39.

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wilderness. The Han were pushed south to the Yangzi River and from there still further south to the Pearl River. Thus the land of the origins of Chinese culture in the Yellow River basin was transformed into a desolate wilderness.[43]

Reviving Asian culture, according to Zhang, depends on the ability to absorb the new world culture on the foundations of the old Asian culture.[44] Indeed, this absorption cannot be seen as a surrender to the West since the West itself is harvesting the yield grown multifold from the seeds and sprouts of Asian culture, the originator and early leader of world civilization. This circular motif of the return of greatness to its origins is elaborated much more fully in a remarkable subnarrative in which the fate of the Chinese nation becomes inextricably linked to revival of Asian greatness. Only the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen can lead Asia's revival. This is because Sun came from Guangdong (the Pearl River delta), which is historically the meeting point of Asia and the West. Both the eastern and western routes to China from the West enter through Guangdong. At the same time, because the Han people were pushed south by barbarians, Guangdong became the southernmost foothold of these people. This synthesis of East and West could be glimpsed in the nineteenth-century Taiping rebels from the south, who espoused Christianity but did not understand the true meaning of modern revolution. Only Sun understood both ancient China's civilization and modern revolution. Thus Sun urges us to study Western science, not its politics or philosophy. Once we do so and revive ancient Asiatic culture, we can catch up with the West. And only when this new harmonization of the old and the new circles back from the Pearl River to the Yangzi to the northwest and from there to the Pamir Plateau will world civilization find its final settling place and be perfected.[45]

There is no question that this rather fanciful historical narrative secures the role of the Chinese nation as the savior of Asian and, indeed, world civilization. It recalls the way in which Sun himself equated Asiatic values principally with *wangdao*, a Confucian category, which leaves us with no doubt as to the center of Asiatic culture and is an expression of how national histories coopt transnational ideals. And yet the need felt to build this role within the framework of Asian culture should not be dismissed. The tale of the hero who returns a culture to its original greatness endows greatness to the hero, but only on the condition that the culture itself is great. The hero and the culture he revives empower each other. Note here how China figures as an intermediary, both as historical agent—since the hero is Chinese, agency is transmitted through synecdoche—and as object of agency, the fallen culture that the hero will first have to uplift before going on to the ultimate task of reviving Asia. Thus the tale cannot be viewed as simply a nationalist appropriation, because the authorizing function of the wider culture has itself to be explained.

[43] Zhang Zhenzhi, "Yaxiya wenhuade bianhua yu qi xinshengji" [The evolution of Asian culture and its new chance], *Xinyaxiya* 1.1 (1930): 81–86.
[44] Zhang, "Yaxiya wenhua," 87.
[45] Zhang, "Yaxiya wenhua," 89.

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WE HAVE SEEN HOW IMPERIALISTS AND THE NATION-STATE rejected, required, and commandeered the ideology of transnationalism. Here I will explore how Chinese transnational communities—a lived reality of transnationalism—negotiated the claims of loyalty made by nationalist ideology upon them. I will consider the phenomenon of overseas or migrant Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and America in the early twentieth century, when modern Chinese nationalists first recognized their significance to the nation-building project. In the period from 1900 to 1911, three groups of Chinese nationalists—the imperial Manchu state itself, the constitutional reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and the revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen—made extensive efforts to raise contributions and investments among the increasingly wealthy Chinese overseas for projects within or related to China.

In the emergent ideology of the nation-state system, the territorial conception of the sovereign nation-state could not include the Chinese overseas in the political community. (The notion of extraterritoriality and dual citizenship were exceptional provisions that confirmed the rule.) On the other hand, it was precisely the discourses of race and culture—pressed (and fitted) into the service of the territorial nation but always exceeding it—that provided the grounds for nationalists to appeal to these overseas communities. The nationalists made their appeals to the Chinese overseas on the grounds of older, pre-national or non-territorial discourses of community such as Confucian culturalism or Han racism. These older discourses were now recast as historical narratives that stressed rootedness and belonging to the territorial nation-state.

The problem for the nationalists, however, was twofold: first, they themselves were deeply divided as to what China or Chineseness meant; second, while they assumed that they were appealing to a Chineseness, they were, in effect, building a conception of Chineseness among people who, to the extent that they had it at all, had a very different sense of it. I want to show how these primordialist narratives of belonging and rootedness, with deep rifts within them, were used in an uphill battle against dispersion and division, deracination and deculturation, localization and globalization among the Chinese overseas. Yet, in some ways, such narratives also succeeded in cultivating a vague, contextual, and ambivalent yearning for a Chineseness that reminds us of the "national" in "transnational."

Emigrants from China often organized themselves as several simultaneously different communities: as linguistic groups such as Cantonese *bendi*, Hakka, Chaozhou, and Hokkien, which were mostly mutually incomprehensible; as surname groups; as territorial or native-place communities; as secretive versus public associations; and as class-differentiated groups, among others.[46] An individual might have belonged to several of these communities, thus crossing some perme-

[46] Eve Armentrout Ma, *Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution* (Honolulu, 1990), 7–29; Maurice Freedman, "Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in Nineteenth Century Singapore," in Freedman, *The Study of Chinese Society*, G. William Skinner, intro. (Stanford, Calif., 1979); Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur, 1976), 4–15, 286–89. I have recently published a fuller version of this discussion on overseas Chinese, "Nationalists among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900–1911," in *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Chinese Transnationalism*, Aihwa Ong and D. Nonnini, eds. (New York, 1997), 39–60.

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able boundaries while encountering other harder boundaries. At the same time, emigrant communities were also differentiated by how they perceived their boundaries with the surrounding communities and cultures—often depending on the nature of the indigenous or colonial polity and racial division of labor.[47] Thus Chinese in Thailand tended to assimilate with local Thais (or exhibit a biculturalism), Peranakans in Indonesia to remain aloof from the local culture, and Chinese in the Philippines to emerge as a *mestizo* group halfway between the above two.[48] Chinese Christians in North America[49] or Malaccan Babas and other Straits-born Chinese who intermarried with local Malays and later became Anglicized had different and changing attitudes from those more recently arrived (*xinke*) from China.[50] If we imagine a baseline scenario of these communities before the arrival of mainland nationalist forces, it would be this image of multi-strandedness and shifting boundaries. The activists sought to transform these mobile, transnational lives into a Chineseness that eliminated or reduced internal boundaries on the one hand and hardened the boundaries between Chinese and non-Chinese on the other. From this period, these emigrants who had had no single name for themselves came to be known as *huaqiao*, or sojourning Chinese.

When nationalist organizers, especially revolutionary republicans, arrived in the early 1900s in Southeast Asia and the Americas, they were appalled by this absence of a Chineseness among the "Chinese." Revolutionary leader Hu Hanmin, who was sent to organize Chinese overseas for the revolutionary cause in 1908,[51] was struck by two developments: the extent to which many overseas Chinese had lost their Chinese identity and the extent to which those who remained Chinese were under the spell of imperial Confucian culture. The amazement or grief about the loss of Chineseness among overseas Chinese is a recurrent theme among revolutionaries and indexes the rapidity with which the idea of national loyalty had become naturalized or de-historicized among them. Hu reported that many overseas Chinese from Fujian would find it strange if he asked them their Chinese names.[52] Another revolutionary, Lu Hun, complained that when asked for their origin, those Chinese residing in Java would reply that they were Javanese, those in Singapore, Singaporeans, etc.[53] Moreover, Hu found them greedy for the honors and titles of the imperial state. Such was the extent of their identification with the imperial Confucian orientation that the only way to identify them as Chinese was by the queue that they sported—a sign, in fact, of submission to the Manchus in China! While Hu, on the one hand, decried their lack of a modern republican sensibility, he was thankful that the queue at least continued to identify them as Chinese. Note the predicament Hu found himself in with his subsequent comment that he would

[47] Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native* (London, 1977), 75–76, 85–89.
[48] Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1965), 30–36; Poh-ping Lee, *Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur, 1978), 4–5.
[49] Ma, *Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns*, 21–22, 36.
[50] Freedman, "Immigrants and Associations," 63–64.
[51] Hu Hanmin, "Nanyang yu Zhongguo geming" [Nanyang and the Chinese revolution, part 1], in *Xinyaxiya* 1.5 (1931): 6–11.
[52] Hu, "Nanyang yu Zhongguo geming" [part 2], *Xinyaxiya* 1.6 (1931): 6.
[53] Lu Hun, "Xu" [Preface to Xihuang], *Minbao* 25 (1910): 3981.

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have them cut off their queues after they had been made sufficiently Chinese (*zhongguohuale*).[54]

Consider the revolutionary Xihuang Zhengyin's influential history of the overseas Chinese in Nanyang, published in the republican journal *Minbao* in 1910. The author and Lu Hun, who wrote a preface framing the text tightly, lamented the loss of Chinese identity among the overseas Chinese and sought the origins and history of overseas Chinese settlement in order to rally Chinese people both within and outside China to resist the Manchus. Xihuang developed two intertwined narratives that addressed two dimensions of a Social Darwinian nationalism. The first is the narrative of the *huaqiao* as the last loyalists of the Han race who resisted the two principal barbarian invaders, the Mongols and the Manchus. The text dwells at length on the resistance by the southerners led by Koxinga against the Manchus. These Ming loyalists finally fled to Southeast Asia, where they were persecuted by the Dutch colonialists in active collusion with the Manchus.[55]

If the first narrative deplores the victimization of loyalist heros by foreigners, both barbarian conquerors of China and Western colonialists, the second narrative seeks to remind the *huaqiao* of their glorious role as pioneering colonizers. Xihuang wrote that, geographically, Nanyang had been China's southern screen of defense; historically, it had been China's territory (*lingtu*) for thousands of years; and finally, it had been a place of colonial settlement for no less than 7 million (*sic*) Han people. But, despite their great numbers, the *huaqiao* succumbed to the tyranny of a small number of Europeans and Americans.[56] Central to this narrative are the reigns of the Hongwu and Yongle emperors, the first two Ming emperors who conducted the great maritime expeditions across the Indian Ocean, revived Han power in Southeast Asia, and reestablished colonial settlements there. The Ming represented the culmination of an early and interrupted history of Chinese colonization of Nanyang; it was a time when settlers in Nanyang after ninety years of Mongol rule were once again able to see the light of day.[57] By their great enterprise of colonizing distant lands (*yuanluo*), these two emperors are "the great men of national imperialism in world history," comparable not only to the founders of the Han and Tang dynasties but to Columbus, Magellan, and others.[58] Indeed, according to Lu Hun, Nanyang had been China's new America for centuries.[59] As for the settlers, Xihuang recounted the stories of the great pioneers who ruled Southeast Asian states, and concluded that, despite all odds, these settlers continued the legacy of the Ming. They conquered the "savages," reclaimed land, and dominated commerce; the greatness of their civilizing purpose—evidenced by their support for education—was unmatched. In conclusion, he quoted Theodore Roosevelt to the effect that the Chinese, with their adventurous and enterprising

[54] Hu, "Nanyang," 1.6 (1931): 7.
[55] Xihuang Zhengyin, "Nanyang huaqiao shilue" [A brief history of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia], *Minbao* 25 (1910): 4002–10.
[56] Xihuang, "Nanyang huaqiao shilue," 3986–87.
[57] Xihuang, "Nanyang huaqiao shilue," 3994–96.
[58] Xihuang, "Nanyang huaqiao shilue," 4110.
[59] Lu Hun, "Xu," 3981.

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character, were most capable of developing the barbarians (*kaipi caolai zhi renmin*).[60]

The two narratives are joined together causally: the reason that the *huaqiao* were not able to defend these southern lands from the Western colonizers was not because they were deficient in any way. It was because they had been denied any support or encouragement from the Qing government, and worse, they had been vilified, sabotaged, and persecuted by it. Colonial expansion by the Europeans was only made possible by the support of each of their states, Portuguese, Dutch, or British. The present condition of the *huaqiao* was the consequence of despotic rule by an alien race.[61] Thus to restore the Han to their pristine greatness in the progress of world History toward which the *huaqiao* had made such great contributions, it was incumbent upon all Chinese to overthrow the Manchus. The image of Chineseness that the revolutionaries offered the Chinese transnationals was one associated not with high cultural traditions but with newly discovered Enlightenment values of adventurousness, enterprise, and expansionism. The narrative of national greatness focused on Han racial superiority over primitive peoples unlimited by territorial boundaries.

For all their discursive ingenuity, the revolutionaries were unable to generate support from more than a very small segment of the populace until 1911. One of the more sympathetic accounts of the republican efforts indicates that, even at the time of the 1911 revolution, no more than 0.3 to 0.5 percent of the Chinese transnational population in Singapore and Malaya supported the revolutionary parties.[62] During this period, the Qing imperial state as well as the constitutional reformers were more successful in gaining the attention of the Chinese overseas. Both employed the older Confucian cultural narrative of community, through which they tried to channel the emigrants' loyalties to the new territorial nation.

Although the Qing state was initially hostile to those who left the imperial realm and, at best, indifferent to the fate of the Chinese overseas, by the late nineteenth century, when it began to try to participate in the nation-state system, it quickly recognized the advantages that Chinese overseas could bring. They could be useful to the nation-building effort because of their technical knowledge, as spies, and ultimately for their wealth, which could be tapped for both investment and revenue purposes. The imperial state couched its nationalism in the model of Confucian gentry culturalism. For many of the Nanyang Chinese who came from modest merchant or would-be merchant backgrounds, this model had more appeal than the one the revolutionaries offered. In late imperial China, merchants had emerged as among the most persistent emulators and patrons of literati culture and ritual, especially in peripheral, "barbarian" regions such as Yunnan and Guangxi.[63] Despite undoubted differences, the cultural pattern established by the emigrating or sojourning merchant continued to have some force in Southeast Asia. While the

[60] Xihuang, "Nanyang huaqiao shilue," 4112.
[61] Xihuang, "Nanyang huaqiao shilue," 4111.
[62] Yen, *Overseas Chinese*, 263. Support for republicanism had to await the establishment of a republican administration in 1911 and especially 1927, when the KMT regime promoted the spread of (Mandarin) Chinese schools across Southeast Asia.
[63] Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven, Conn., 1987).

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political power of colonial regimes and the social ties with the local communities did exercise a pull on these merchants, the blockages or limits—in particular, the racial boundaries laid by colonial rulers—on these same pull factors, the continuing links with Chinese communities and families, and, from the late nineteenth century, the unexpected attention from the imperial establishment in China made this civilizational model of Chineseness very attractive to the merchant community.

From the 1890s until the republican revolution in 1911, the Qing regime sold countless brevet ranks and titles to eager buyers. After 1907, those who invested over 2,000 yuan in a modern enterprise in China received the first rank.[64] Titles were also purchased for three generations of ancestors, and ranked Chinese transnationals could don "dynastic costumes" when receiving Qing delegates and celebrating imperial holidays.[65] The popularity of these imperial symbols must be understood in the context of a larger effort, indeed, campaign, by the imperial Confucian establishment to instill Confucian virtues among the overseas Chinese in Asia. Literary and charitable gentry-style societies, Confucian temple-building, the teaching of the imperial maxims in community centers, among other activities, were financed by local merchants, directed by imported scholar-officials, and often sponsored by local consulates. The idea was not only to wean overseas Chinese away from both Malay-ization and westernization (Islam and Christianity) by introducing an upper-class or gentry model of Chineseness but also, by the late 1900s, to compete effectively with the narratives of both the reformers and the revolutionaries.[66]

The last group of nationalists to appeal to the Chinese overseas were the constitutional reformers, who were also more successful than the revolutionaries, even though they did not possess the Qing regime's political advantage of being rulers. The same reformer and philosopher who was later to head the Morality Society, Kang Youwei, was able to formulate a vision and program of modernity within the framework of Confucian civilization and constitutional monarchy (*xujun gonghe*). During his years of exile from China in the 1900s after the failure of the 1898 reforms, his vision was embodied in the Baohuanghui (The Society to Protect the Emperor), which had many chapters all over Nanyang and America. The focus on the emperor—especially on a constitutional emperor who also stood for change—as symbolic of Chinese civilization gave Kang a political advantage at the time among Chinese transnationals. He could appeal to the monarchism or prestige of the imperial state and the symbols of that ideology in a way that was not available to the revolutionaries, and yet still promote reform. On the other hand, the reformers—who were not in power—were not constrained in the way that the imperial state was; it sought to graft a modern nationalism onto an older discourse of civilization and was thus limited in how far it could reform itself without losing power. In their synthesis of the necessity of the old and the new, the reformers were able to attract those merchants, would-be merchants, and others drawn to the

[64] Zhuang Guotu, *Zhongguo fengjian zhengfu de huaqiao zhengce* [The policies of China's feudal governments toward overseas Chinese] (Xiamen, 1989), 257–58.

[65] Zhuang, *Zhongguo fengjian*, 255–57.

[66] Huang Jianchun, *WanQing XinMa huaqiao dui guojia rentongzhi yanjiu* [Studies of overseas Chinese attitudes in Singapore and Malaya towards national identity in the late Qing] (Taipei, 1993), 273–81.

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imperial Confucian model, while appealing to the changing consciousness of those people who were, despite or perhaps because of Chinese nationalist education, becoming more aware of the necessity of change.

The reformists, especially the Baohuanghui in America, also incorporated an economic vision of China and Chinese people that appealed to the interests of the Chinese transnationals. The economic wing of the Baohuanghui, the Commercial Corporation, sponsored investment ventures in China, America, Canada, Mexico, as well as in Southeast Asia.[67] Thus at least until the end of the decade, the reformers offered a vision of gradualist modernity, in which Chinese moral and cultural values were commensurate with an elitist constitutional polity and expanding capitalism. One might say that this vision of modernity could be associated with the gentry-merchant elites in China who were the force behind the movement for provincial constitutional assemblies in the 1900s and the proliferation of philanthropic, "redemptive" societies in republican China. It is hardly a coincidence that Kang Youwei was the key figure in both of these milieux. Although during the first half of the twentieth century, this vision of modernity was frustrated in China by warfare and obscured by revolutionary narratives of modernity—first, of the republicans and then of the May 4th movement—in some ways, the vision or model, if not the activists themselves, had greater staying power among the Chinese transnationals, whose merchants and would-be gentry-merchant elites were more influential in the communities. Indeed, this vision may be the most proximate ancestor of the phenomenon called "Confucian capitalism" in the Pacific Rim today. Because of both economic and ideological imperatives, this vision was suffused with transnational urges.

Finally, let us briefly consider a text by Ou Qujia, called "New Guangdong," which elaborated for the Chinese overseas a narrative designed to appeal less to their purported national identity and more to their regional or provincial identity. Ou developed an argument for the independence of Guangdong, a region from which the overwhelming majority of overseas Chinese hailed, from an ingenious application of Social Darwinism. He advocated the independence of China's provinces so that the supposedly greater ties of intimacy within the province could promote a closer unity internally and a competitive drive with other provinces. Through such competition, the successful provinces could absorb the weak and China could ultimately become strong.

I believe the significance of this text emerges from its tacit acknowledgement of the indeterminacy of political loyalty. Ou was not overly anxious about the chances of eventual unity. To critics who pointed out that his plan would do the work for the imperialists by getting the Chinese to slice the Chinese melon themselves, he responded that when a people voluntarily seceded, it was easier for them to reestablish a federated unity on the model of a German federation and thus better protect the unity of the polity (*dayitong*).[68] The issue of Chinese national unity provided a kind of ultimate framework, a distant, deferred horizon—a deferral with

[67] Jung-pang Lo, ed., with a translation, *K'ang Yu-wei: A Biography and a Symposium* (Tucson, Ariz., 1967), 195.

[68] Qujia Ou, "Xin Guangdong" [New Guangdong], in Zhang Yufa, ed., *Wan Qing geming wenxue* (1902; rpt. edn., 1971), 46–48.

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which many Chinese transnationals presumably felt comfortable. The narrative of racial community sanctioned a flexible framework of territorial belonging to locality and region that was indifferent to the territorial loyalties demanded by the nation-state. In such ways, the text revealed the insufficiency of the nationalist model for communities of transnationals with multiple identities pulled as much by global forces as by their need for a sense of home, which was itself quite elastic.

WHEN NATIONALISTS DEPLOYED THEIR NARRATIVES to nationalize transnationals, they revealed the constructedness of nationalist ideology that had to be taken apart in order to separate out the narratives of race, culture, and native place from their "natural" belonging in the territorial nation-state. This deconstruction is revealed not only by the fact that competing narratives of different nationalists emphasized one sort of primordiality against another but also by the fact that race and culture produced nations that were very differently contoured from the territorially sovereign nation. To be sure, older Chinese narratives of race and culture did possess a cultural geography with a center and peripheries, such as the notion of *zhongyuan* (central plain) or the concentric spheres of inner and outer realms, but neither was territorially delimited or unchanging.

In relation to Chinese transnationals, nationalists first engaged these transterritorial discourses to establish a bond. Next, they sought to turn the loyalties of these forgetful "sojourners" back to the geobody by appropriating or inflecting these older discourses of race and culture to create sentiments of rootedness in the new territorial entity. Doubtless, these narratives of primordiality needed to press into service not only fragments of memory, such as anti-Manchuism or native-place ties, but also contemporary aspirations, such as association with imperial prestige or secure returns on investment. Be that as it may, nationalist ideology developed a strategy that would both deploy and overcome its own transnationality.

My case studies reveal that national and imperialist states occasionally succeeded in this two-part strategy of "domesticating" transnationality, whether by enlisting pan-Asianism to incorporate peripheral peoples into the geobody and colonized peoples into the empire or by employing Han racialism and Confucian culturalism among Chinese transnationals. But, in each of these cases, the self-confident closure of the territorial nation was repeatedly deferred. Perhaps because nations are congenitally and discursively so bound up with transnational race and culture, they frequently seek their sources of authority in these discourses, even as the source of their sovereignty continues to lie in the inter-state system's principle of territorial citizenship.

Thus, while territorial nationalism needs the discourses of race and culture for its own adequacy, it is not fully capable of containing them within itself. These discourses can also produce feelings of belonging to the historical communities they once defined or they can irrigate the imagining of new, deterritorialized communities. Since the end of high nationalism in Asia in the 1980s, the rationale for territorial nationalism has begun to weaken under the onslaught of a reinvigorated transnational capitalism, and we are beginning to hear about the emergence of

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"deterritorialized nations." Certainly the emergent narrative of Greater China, made up of Han Chinese all over the world, has strong material underpinnings, given the enormous capital investments that Chinese transnationals have made in China. This narrative assimilates many rhetorical figures we encountered in the early part of the century regarding the Han racial community, Confucian capitalism, redemptive modernity, moralistic states, cultural inviolability, and intra-Asian historical networks, among others. Indeed, it is as if these culturally authoritative stories were liberated from the supplementary role they were forced to play within the scaffolding of territorial nationalism.

Today, it is hardly among the Chinese alone that we can see the power of other historical forces that had been obscured by the dominant political form (of territorial nationalism). Everywhere, administrators, merchants, and intellectuals are trying to patch together creative, workable identities from older regional or non-territorial ideologies and networks in response to this latest turn of capitalist globalization. To an outsider, it seems clear that European union would not have a chance without a strongly developed historical consciousness of Europeanness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Indeed, it was from the earlier European construction of Asia as its "other" that Japan derived its very conception of "Asia" in the nineteenth century (although it had a clear awareness of the "Eastern sea," or *tōyō*).[69] By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan had already developed a discourse of a primordial Asiatic civilization, which it needed both for purposes of domination and for self-completion. Although the geography and politics of contemporary Japanese pan-Asianism, fueled by a non-militarist capitalism, is significantly different from its pre-war counterpart, the figure of Asia as a deeply meaningful mirror appears to have been indelibly inscribed in modern Japanese consciousness. Others, like the Indian government, emulating the Chinese model, are trying to mobilize the long history of trade and cultural networks around the Indian Ocean and beyond to reach out to the Non-resident Indians, or NRIs. Perhaps just as significant is the formulation of the deterritorialized Hindu nation by transnational and diasporic groups that have been quietly spreading their influence beyond the Indian Ocean core since early in the century.

Thus, to be sure, the deterritorialized nation is not necessarily dissimilar in structure to the territorial nation. It may, after all, also be a bounded, exclusive community sustained by an active distinction between self and other; only its territorial boundaries need be replaced by the hard cultural boundaries of, say, Han-ness or Hinduness. On the other hand, the forces of globalization are such that it may be difficult to sustain boundaries of such—or any—kind. Whatever the effects of the deterritorialized nation, it is likely to place the territorially sovereign nation in a painful predicament. The devaluation of the geobody entailed by the new racial or cultural nation will mean that its ideal of "common citizenship" becomes less and less meaningful to the different peoples of its inner frontiers.

[69] See Yamamuro Shinichi, "Ajia ninshiki no kijiku" [The axes of perceiving Asia], in Furuya Tetsuo, ed., *Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki* [Modern Japan's perceptions of Asia] (Kyoto, 1993), 3–5.

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Hong Kong: The Critical Phase, 1945–1949

WM. ROGER LOUIS

THE HONG KONG HANDOVER AT MIDNIGHT, June 30, 1997, closed the last major chapter in the history of British imperialism. Although there are remnants of empire such as Gibraltar and the Falklands, there are no more significant British dependencies. Hong Kong itself holds a unique place in the history of the British Empire, not merely because of its astonishing economic success. As a possession acquired in 1842 by the Treaty of Nanking (with the tip of the Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters Island annexed in 1860, and with leased territories added in 1898), it enjoyed a formal status as a Crown Colony, but it lacked, until recently, certain distinguishing characteristics of the era of British colonial rule that could be found in almost all other principal colonial territories: the development of a nationalist movement and the advance toward self-government. "Hong Kong Man," as he came to be known, was a phenomenon of the 1980s—especially of the end of the decade, when the men and women of Hong Kong were galvanized into acute political consciousness by the June 4, 1989, Beijing Massacre.[1] The people of Hong Kong thus acquired a sense of identity and, in the early 1990s, a certain amount of democratization. The new era that has begun in 1997, however, poses a question that had confronted them at a similar time of uncertainty in 1949: how long can it last?

Everything, now as then, depends on China. Therein lies the particular way in which the history of Hong Kong as a part of the British Empire can be best

I am grateful to Christopher Patten, governor of Hong Kong 1992–1997, for allowing me access to Hong Kong Secretariat records not in the public domain. I also wish to express my appreciation to the archivist, Simon F. K. Chu, and the staff of the Government Records Service. The Secretariat records appear in the notes without an archival prefix number but with the original Secretariat file number, for example HK Secretariat 5/1162/465 [1162 = Chinese affairs]. Documents at the Hong Kong Government Records Service bear an archival prefix, for example HKRS 41. All Colonial Office (CO), Foreign Office (FO), Cabinet Office (CAB), Defence (DEFE), and Prime Minister's Office (PREM) records refer to documents at the Public Record Office, London. I have also studied the relevant files in the Australian Archives, Canberra (hereafter, AA), and the National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington (hereafter, NZ). The Post Files of the U.S. Consul in Hong Kong (Record Group 84, China, Hong Kong Consulate General, 1946–1949, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland) are abbreviated as USSD HK. I wish to thank John Cell, Ronald Hyam, and Warren Kimball for critiques of my argument. On the Chinese dimension of the article, I am especially indebted to Jonathan Spence and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker as well as my colleagues at the University of Texas, William Braisted and Edward Rhoads, who gave me valuable advice and provided me with translations from some of the historical literature in Chinese. I am grateful above all to my colleague at St. Antony's College, Oxford, Dr. Steve Yui-Sang Tsang, for discussion of all aspects of the subject.

[1] "Hong Kong Man" is the phrase coined and given currency by the anthropologist Hugh D. R. Baker, "Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man," *China Quarterly* 95 (September 1983): 469–79.

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understood. Hong Kong today possesses, as much as ever, the characteristics of the China port system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to the fall of Shanghai in 1941 (or, in an extended sense, 1949). Under the formula of "one country, two systems" devised in 1984 as the basis for the transfer, Hong Kong is subject to its own law. Despite the reversion to China, it is not any easier for Chinese nationals to visit or settle there. No revenues are sent to Beijing. The territory retains its own currency and judicial system. No one knows how long the present system will last, but that was also true of one of the turning points in Hong Kong's modern history, October 15, 1949, when Chinese Communist troops arrived in Canton. Two days later, they halted at the northern border of the British colony. They did not, as was feared, take Hong Kong at bayonet point, in part perhaps because the British had resolutely decided to defend the colony. What were the British calculations in reaching the decision to hold fast? That became one of my two critical questions in the course of my research.

If Hong Kong continued to function as a port of entry into China, it nevertheless possessed a colonial administration that would have been recognized instantly as "British," just as the colonial regimes in Malaya, Ceylon, Nigeria, or Jamaica would have been at any time up to independence.[2] Hong Kong was also a colonial autocracy. In its power to tax and to administer justice, in its police force and in the defense of its frontiers, Hong Kong had all the attributes of the "colonial state."[3] It was, however, a nascent city-state rather than a nation-state. Therein lay my second question. After the reoccupation at the end of World War II, the British briefly contemplated launching Hong Kong on a course that might have given the colony a national identity much earlier than the 1980s and might have secured the status of independence within the Commonwealth. Hong Kong might have become an independent city-state analogous to Singapore. What inspired that vision in the years after 1945 and why did it fade?[4]

The perspective on Hong Kong differs dramatically, it would seem, from the Chinese to the British, but there is one British insight into the Chinese attitude that helps to establish the historical background. In late 1945, the head of the China Department at the Foreign Office, George Kitson, proposed that Hong Kong be

[2] This interpretation should be compared with the one put forward by John Darwin, who argues that the formal status of Hong Kong as a Crown Colony has obscured the informal nature of the treaty port, with "informal empire" thus masquerading as "formal empire." John Darwin, "Hong Kong in British Decolonisation," in Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot, eds., *Hong Kong's Transitions, 1842–1997* (London, 1997), 30.

[3] For the idea of the "colonial state," see esp. Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, Conn., 1994), reviewed by the present author in the *AHR* 101 (October 1996): 1257–58.

[4] The point of departure for the postwar years is Steve Yui-Sang Tsang, *Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945–1952* (Oxford, 1988). See also Lanxin Xiang, *Recasting the Imperial Far East: Britain and America in China, 1945–1950* (Armonk, N.Y., 1995); James T. H. Tang, "From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat: Britain's Postwar China Policy and the Decolonization of Hong Kong," *Modern Asian Studies* 28 (1994): 317–37; Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British American Relations, 1949–1958* (Kent State, Ohio, 1994); and Zhong-ping Feng, *The British Government's China Policy 1945–1950* (Keele, 1994). For background, other important works include Norman Miners, *Hong Kong under Imperial Rule, 1912–1941* (Oxford, 1987); Aron Shai, *Britain and China, 1941–47* (London, 1984); and Edmund K. S. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924–31* (Hong Kong, 1991). The standard and reliable reference work is G. B. Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong, 1958, rev. edn., 1973).

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returned to China as a gesture of friendship in the new postwar era. As will be seen, the suggestion encountered a ringing rejection, but Kitson had a shrewd sense of the way the Chinese regarded the British position in Hong Kong. He was an old China hand who knew the Chinese languages and admired Chinese art and literature. He had begun his career in Beijing in 1922 and had risen through the ranks of the China service to consul in Shanghai in 1939. He believed that the British needed to establish "moral leadership" and to demonstrate to "left-wing opponents of British imperialism" that the old system of exploitation was dead. The restoration of Hong Kong would not merely prove that the British had a change of heart but might also avert confrontation over the territory. In arguing the case, Kitson developed what became known in British official circles as the "Isle of Wight analogy," which carried a powerful historical parallel:

> The Chinese feelings towards Hong Kong can perhaps be most easily described by using the Isle of Wight analogy. Supposing the Chinese had taken the island against our will 100 years ago and covered it with pagodas, etc., and developed it by means which they had invented and we had not learned to use, doing all this for their own purposes, although talking a great deal about the material advantages to the United Kingdom, and all the time emphasising the value of this haven of good government, a protection against insecurity, in the Isle of Wight.
>
> Even if they had created a heaven on earth in that small island we should have only one feeling about it. We should want it back.[5]

The Chinese undeniably felt the same way about Hong Kong.[6] *The Economist* expressed this proposition in a slightly different way: "Chinese memories are almost as long as Irish."[7]

The questions how and when the Chinese would attempt to get the island back remained contentious. For example, Sir Alexander Grantham, governor of Hong Kong from 1947 to 1957, believed that the British might hold their own against the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) but that if China were brought under Communist control, "then it will be only a matter of time before some kind of rendition campaign is started."[8] It is therefore important to clarify, as further prelude to the

[5] George Kitson, Memorandum, "The Future of Hong Kong," February 28, 1946, FO 371/53632.

[6] Steve Tsang, *Hong Kong: An Appointment with China* (London, 1997), 57–60. In general excellence, Tsang's work is in a class by itself among the books on Hong Kong published in the run up to the handover. It is based on Chinese as well as English sources and, among other virtues, has a comprehensive bibliographical list of articles and books in Chinese. Jung-Fang Tsai, *Hong Kong in Chinese History* (New York, 1993), is useful for background from the Chinese perspective. For a discussion of recent books on Hong Kong, see the anonymous review "All Change in Hong Kong," *Economist* (April 19, 1997), review section, 3–4; Jonathan Mirsky, "Looking Forward, Looking Back," *The Times* (June 26, 1997); and Brian Hook, "Was There Another Way Out?" *Times Literary Supplement* (July 18, 1997): 28–29.

[7] March 6, 1948.

[8] Alexander Grantham to Arthur Creech Jones (Secretary of State for Colonies), Top Secret, LM [Loose Minute] D31/49, May 3, 1949, FO 371/75780. In the same month, Communist documents seized in Hong Kong revealed that the Chinese Communists "are aiming at a quick military solution of the civil war . . . Foreign trade is to be conducted, without foreigners as much as possible, since to rely on foreigners is a relic of imperialism." C. B. B. Heathcote-Smith, Minute, Secret, May 10, 1949, HK Secretariat 6/3571/48. Most British officials nevertheless doubted whether Communist forces could constitute a threat against Hong Kong in the immediate future. The consul general in Canton, G. F. Tyrrell, wrote for example in 1948, "I daresay we shall see no actual fighting in this part of the world at all." Tyrrell to D. M. MacDougall (Colonial Secretary in the Hong Kong administration), Confidential, December 3, 1948, HK Secretariat 5/1400/47. The U.S. consul general in Hong Kong also reported that Communist forces were "not sufficiently well organized" to carry out a concerted action

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British side of the story, the views of Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the Kuomintang and of Mao Zedong as the leader of the revolutionary Chinese Communist movement.

It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to consider Chiang Kai-shek's crumbling position at the end of World War II, but it should be pointed out that, when the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the Chinese Nationalists had crack troops from two separate corps only 300 miles from Hong Kong.[9] They could muster a combined strength of 60,000 men, many of whom had been trained and equipped by the Americans. General Albert Wedemeyer, Chiang's American chief of staff, supported Nationalist aims and opposed British plans for reoccupation. He planned to use those troops to attack the Japanese in the Canton–Hong Kong region in November 1945. But the sudden end of the war forced Chiang to decide on priorities. As will be discussed later, the British managed to secure American support for the reoccupation of Hong Kong. Chiang could have seen a humiliating setback in the Anglo-American collusion on Hong Kong, but he aimed to secure international recognition of China as a leading power in the post–World War II era. British as well as American support was essential for China's high place in the new United Nations organization. There was, furthermore, an even more compelling reason why Chiang decided not to act. The Communists had an effective guerrilla force in the vicinity of Hong Kong known as the East River Column. A Nationalist advance against the British might have precipitated a showdown with the Communists over Hong Kong. Chiang had more important priorities. If he were to reestablish control over northern China, he needed to redeploy troops as quickly as possible along the railway lines and in the large urban and industrial areas to the north. Hong Kong would have to wait. Chiang thus took the line that the issue of Hong Kong would be resolved according to international treaties and in the context of amiable relations with the British.

Mao did not recognize the legitimacy of British claims to Hong Kong. He refused to be bound in any way by the "unequal treaties" concluded in the nineteenth century. Like Chiang, he had much more pressing priorities than Hong Kong. According to a British journalist in 1946, Mao's thoughts seemed far removed from the issue of Hong Kong's future:

> I am not interested in Hong Kong; the Communist Party is not interested in Hong Kong, it has never been the subject of any discussion amongst us. Perhaps ten, twenty or thirty years hence we may ask for a discussion regarding its return, but my attitude is that so long as your [British] officials do not maltreat Chinese subjects in Hong Kong, and so long as Chinese are not treated as inferior to others in the matter of taxation and a voice in the Government, I am not interested in Hong Kong, and will certainly not allow it to be a bone of contention between your country and mine.[10]

against Hong Kong. Raymond P. Ludden to Lewis Clark, Secret, October 19, 1948, USSD HK, Box 6, File 800. I am grateful to David Fado for his assistance in the National Archives.

[9] For the general military situation, see esp. E. R. Hooton, *The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War 1936–49* (London, 1991), chap. 7.

[10] Tsang, *Appointment with China*, 69, which should be compared with Xiang, *Recasting the Imperial Far East*, 101.

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As long as the British remained neutral in the Chinese civil war, Mao would not pursue the issue of Hong Kong. By not recognizing the legitimacy of British claims, he would continue to hold the initiative. Mao, in short, espoused a "middle kingdom" view of world politics in which China proper was much more important than the peripheral or border areas. Foreign countries such as Britain, the United States, and even the Soviet Union seemed comparatively remote. Mao and his successors were content to let Hong Kong provide the People's Republic of China with technology, capital investment, and eventually with one-third of its foreign exchange earnings as well as critical financial services. Mao held a representative Chinese outlook that had ramifications extending to the handover in July 1997.[11]

ON THE BASIS OF THE HONG KONG ARCHIVES, I have been able to study the local perspective of British policy and the evolution of British aims in the critical years immediately following World War II. In the course of my research in the Hong Kong Secretariat records, I became more aware than ever of how problems of the present influence interpretations of the past. In the case of Hong Kong, there is a danger in reading the history of the 1940s as one might that of a later period. I had to remind myself to keep an open mind and to see where the evidence might lead me. I was not aware at the beginning of my excursion into the Secretariat archives how closely the issue of defending Hong Kong in 1949 would be linked to other questions, perhaps more interesting ones. What kind of society were the British attempting to create? Should the people of Hong Kong be encouraged to develop a British allegiance?

Given the wide interest in Hong Kong's fate during the past year, the value of looking closely at an earlier period of analogous crisis might seem self-evident. In view of the present debate on methodology in the American historical profession, however, it seems worthwhile to explain why I think it important to recover the past in a way that may be regarded by some as unfashionable. Obviously, there is much that can be said in favor of looking at the same period from a cultural, economic, or demographic perspective. During the fall of Shanghai, the British believed that they were witnessing in Hong Kong a demographic as well as an economic revolution that would have profound consequences for the people of the colony and perhaps for the British Empire. I hope that some of the issues I raise in the course

[11] Problems of the present often influence the interpretation of the past. When the archives become accessible, they may reveal that the British, not the Chinese, triggered the set of events leading to the transfer of the territory in 1997. According to this controversial interpretation, related here in its barest bones, the British had their own reasons for wanting to terminate their administration in Hong Kong, not least being the responsibility for 6.2 million people. British anxiety greatly increased after the Tiananmen Square repression in June 1989. This is a plausible argument that must be taken seriously until evidence proves to the contrary. And another British view of mythical proportion must also be questioned. The British took as an article of faith that the Chinese had always objected to the democratization of Hong Kong because of fear that it might fortify the pro-democracy movement in China. The Chinese certainly did object to the moves toward representative government in Hong Kong introduced by Governor Patten, but the projection of the Chinese attitude of the 1990s into previous decades is anachronistic. This has a direct bearing on the argument of this article. There is little or no evidence that the Communists ever protested against the proposed democratization of Hong Kong in the 1940s. Tsang, *Appointment with China*, 117, independently makes the same point about democratization.

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of this article will be pursued by other historians, not least those assisted by such disciplines as anthropology and sociology who will relate the history of Hong Kong in its totality. I offer as an equally valid perspective a narrative of events based on archival material that emphasizes the unspoken assumptions of an elite ruling in Hong Kong and another making decisions on Hong Kong in London.

Perhaps the principles on which the present article is based may encourage a broader view in the sense of making historical topics intelligible to a general audience. This is hardly the place for an elaborate declaration that the historical profession faces an ever-increasing danger of specialized writing, of historians writing for other historians rather than for a wider public, but I am nevertheless glad to make that statement briefly in the context of Hong Kong because the issues are far reaching. The themes pursue the Chinese Communist Revolution, the response of British imperialism, and the part played in the historical process by individuals—in this case, two postwar governors of Hong Kong. These were two individuals who were passionately committed to the people of Hong Kong but who reached diametrically opposed conclusions. The outcome of the story in 1997 can be directly traced to the legacy of the second postwar governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, and thus to some extent vindicates the focus on personalities.

By using the word "story," I take the opportunity to affirm the virtues of narrative history in the tradition of my supervisor at Oxford, A. J. P. Taylor, who championed the principle that narrative history is the best history because it reaches a wide audience and because implicit analysis enhances rather than diminishes the argument. To my mind, narrative history can be as analytical and sophisticated as any other type of history. If it succeeds, it does so because it reaches toward a higher level of generalization. What is important, it seems to me, is the conscious decision to be as fair-minded as possible, to pursue one's research as fully as one can, to develop an argument, to avoid jargon, and to write as clearly and precisely as possible. What matters in the end is not how one is described as a historian but the presentation of a clearly written and closely reasoned case based on a careful examination of the evidence.

I was happy to see from one of the assessments of this article in the peer-review process that the reader thought the latter part of it resembled a thriller. I took that comment to mean the essay is readable despite its thematic complexity and levels of argument. Perhaps there has been a slight shift in the general attitude toward narrative history, which has been unpopular in some quarters in the last three decades. I believe the attacks on narrative history have helped to reinvigorate its method by exposing the simplistic chronicling of trivial events and the reductionist description of individuals as if they were marionettes. Just as Edward Said's assault on "Orientalism" jolted historians of the Middle East and elsewhere to reexamine their assumptions, so those challenging conventional history have helped to reform it.

Victor Kiernan, the historian of European imperialism, once described archives as possessing "a subtly intoxicating atmosphere." I agree that archival research and historical detective work can be an exhilarating experience. I have spent thirty-seven consecutive summers at the Public Record Office. Part of the problem of studying Hong Kong in the postwar period is that many of the records have been

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withheld or for other reasons are missing. Before going to Hong Kong, I had in hand extensive lists of Hong Kong Secretariat file numbers that I had collected from Colonial Office records in London. About one-half of the records I attempted to trace in Hong Kong do not appear in the Hong Kong Secretariat's registry, and many of the so-called "Loose Minutes," often containing sensitive and secret information, appear to have been lost without a trace in Hong Kong, but they often appear in the archives in London. A reasonably comprehensive set of records can be found in the various Colonial Office series at the Public Record Office, but even in London about one-fourth of the critical documents, by my estimate, are missing or have been withheld. Some copies of both Colonial Office documents and Hong Kong Secretariat documents found their way into Foreign Office files, especially for the years 1945–1949. I learned a good deal from investigating records in remote channels (for example, letters from the governor of Hong Kong forwarded to the ambassador in Nanjing in Foreign Office files) and gained insight from documents sometimes written long after the event but based on antecedent official files.[12] By using the various sets of documents together, especially the Hong Kong Secretariat records, Colonial Office files, and Foreign Office files, and by studying the relevant Colonial Office series up to the mid-1960s (the latest material available), a fairly complete British record for the 1945–1949 period can be established.

THERE WERE TWO GOVERNORS in the period under consideration, Sir Mark Young, 1946–1947, and Sir Alexander Grantham, 1947–1957. Both exerted a lasting influence, but, since the former was in office for only a year and the latter for a decade, the comparison might seem odd were it not for the legacy of political reform that Young left to Grantham. Young succeeded in committing the Colonial Office to the principle of municipal self-government. He believed that Hong Kong could eventually develop a British identity as a city-state within the British Empire and Commonwealth. Grantham, by contrast, thought that the Chinese cultural affinity and the proximity of the colony to China would prevent the development of a British allegiance, but he was bound to some extent by the commitment his predecessor made. Although there were other important differences between the two governors, Grantham summed up the overriding principle of British policy: Britain must maintain "friendly relations with whatever government is in power in China" but should never make concessions merely for the sake of concessions—in other words, never appease for the sake of appeasement but resist when possible and give way only when necessary.[13] Hong Kong, in Grantham's robust view, could be effectively defended, despite military opinion to the contrary.[14]

[12] It should also be mentioned that the Arthur Creech Jones Papers at Rhodes House, Oxford, contain official records as well as private papers not found elsewhere. Creech Jones was secretary of state for the colonies, 1947–1950.

[13] Grantham to CO, No. 372, Secret, April 11, 1950, CO 537/6045. Grantham's general views emerge clearly in his memoir, Alexander Grantham, *Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong* (Hong Kong, 1965).

[14] Naval and military commanders in Hong Kong at the end of World War II reported that the colony was "considered undefendable against a serious attack by a major power in occupation of the Mainland of China." Hong Kong Defence Plan, Top Secret, No. 58/2, December 24, 1945, FO

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There was a certain continuity of high policy in the period 1945–1949, although earlier, during the wartime years, the status of Hong Kong had been fiercely debated between the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London. The axiom of holding Hong Kong within the empire yet remaining on terms as friendly as possible with China subsequently became refined when the British, over time, in the words of a later governor, came "to know our enemy rather better."[15] In the process of getting to know the enemy more intimately, however, British views were transformed. Until late 1947, it was the Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai-shek that seemed to menace the British presence in Hong Kong.[16] Since 1927, the British had pursued a course of conciliation with Chinese nationalism as represented by the Kuomintang. After 1949, the British attempted to apply the same principle to the new Communist regime. But there have remained puzzling questions. How did the British official mind perceive the connection or interaction between local problems in Hong Kong, regional issues concerning Britain and China, and Hong Kong in the setting of the Cold War in the late 1940s? Why did the British overrate the power and influence of the Kuomintang? How would the British respond, in the words of the head of the Hong Kong Department in the Colonial Office, to "the hordes of Chinese refugees" after the collapse of the Nationalist government?[17] What were the changing assumptions about the nature of Communist power and the implications for Hong Kong? How is it that the British in some ways found the Chinese Communists more accommodating than the Kuomintang on the issue of Hong Kong? What were the relative weights in the triangular process of shaping British policy in the Hong Kong Secretariat, the Colonial Office, and the Foreign Office? What were the sources of information or the intelligence network on which the British relied? To what extent

371/53629. (This is an example of a vital document that appears neither in the Hong Kong registry nor, it would appear, in the CO files.) The air defense of Hong Kong seemed to pose singular problems: "[D]emobilized and disgruntled young air crews of any nationality may easily be tempted by love of adventure coupled with a promise of high emoluments. Soldiers of fortune of this category are capable of introducing an element of leadership, skill and courage into an air force of poor quality . . . it is [therefore] considered that defensive air forces in Hong Kong should be designed to be slightly stronger than is necessary for defence against local air forces." Hong Kong Defence Plan. For the interwar background of Hong Kong in the evolution of British strategic plans, see Christopher M. Bell, " 'Our Most Exposed Outpost': Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921–1941," *Journal of Military History* 60 (January 1996): 61–88. For postwar defense issues, see Malcolm H. Murfett, *In Jeopardy: The Royal Navy and British Far Eastern Defence Policy 1945–1951* (Oxford, 1995).

[15] R. B. Black to Secretary of State, No. 130, Secret, January 21, 1959, CO 1030/590. For the decade of the 1950s, see esp. Steve Tsang, "Strategy for Survival: The Cold War and Hong Kong's Policy towards Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Activities in the 1950s," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25 (May 1997): 294–317.

[16] My judgment on late 1947 as the turning point is based on the records of the Hong Kong Secretariat. After the resumption of civil war in 1946, there were many comments speculating on the outcome; but the basic shift in view about the ultimate enemy began to take place in late 1947, when, for example, the political adviser (adviser on foreign affairs) wrote of "the not impossible event of the Chinese Communists gaining control of China." He concluded, not unreasonably, "I do not think a Communist Government in China would be at all well-disposed towards Hong Kong." Heathcote-Smith, December 13, 1947, HK Secretariat 1/1166/47C.

[17] J. B. Sidebotham to Grantham, Secret, May 14, 1948, HK Secretariat 54436/48. Grantham used the conventional figure of 600,000 Chinese refugees who fled to Hong Kong in 1949–1950. When the crisis approached, the Hong Kong administration estimated that the colony could accommodate 4,800 British subjects evacuating Shanghai and that "one camp to accommodate 240 persons could be erected every 48 hours by working continuously day and night." MacDougall to Sidebotham, Top Secret, December 30, 1948; and J. L. Hayward, Minute, February 11, 1949, HK Secretariat 5/1400/47 TS.

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did the personality or influence of the governor in Hong Kong make a difference? In short, what do the archival sources reveal about Hong Kong's survival as a British colony in the critical phase 1945–1949?

In answering those questions, it is useful to bear in mind the problems of the wartime period following the Japanese seizure of the colony in 1941 as well as of the decade of the 1950s, when officials occasionally reflected on the crisis of the late 1940s. In the 1940s, as at any time, certain demographic, geographic, and economic facts had to be borne in mind. The population of Hong Kong at the time of the British reoccupation in 1945 was 800,000, of which 97 percent was and remained Chinese.[18] In 1946, the population increased to over 1 million. The colony consisted of the island of Hong Kong (35.5 square miles), the peninsula of Kowloon on the mainland opposite the island (3.25 square miles), and the New Territories (355 square miles), running north from Kowloon for about 20 miles, and a number of islands. The frontier with China extended about 20 miles across a neck of land dividing the colony from the mainland. There was no marked geographical feature to form a natural frontier. Until 1950, the Chinese and others in Hong Kong moved more or less freely to the adjoining Chinese province of Guangdong and vice versa. Transient laborers provided a vital part of the Hong Kong work force. The governor in the immediate postwar period, Young, commented on one of the adverse effects of the fluctuating population: "The geographical position of ... Hong Kong inevitably makes for a transient population subject to great influxes of the least desirable classes in times of economic and political trouble in China."[19]

Britain held the island of Hong Kong and the tip of the Kowloon peninsula in absolute sovereignty. The New Territories had been leased, rather than annexed, from the Chinese in 1898, for a period of ninety-nine years. The expiration date was thus 1997. The terminal date applied only to the leased territories, which constituted, however, 90 percent of Hong Kong's total area. It was therefore inconceivable that the terminal date would not apply to the territory as a whole. The colony had become inseparable administratively. Even assuming that the British might continue to hold Hong Kong island and the lower part of Kowloon, they would be dependent on China for water and food. To the Hong Kong government and the Colonial Office in 1945, there thus existed a unique situation. Here was a colony with an established timetable for the end of British rule. Relinquishing it to China seemed to most British observers to be inevitable. But there were important exceptions, notably Young.

Grantham later reflected in his memoirs that Shanghai had been "a great cosmopolitan centre" and that Hong Kong in comparison was "a small village."[20]

[18] On the situation in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation, there is a vivid description in the Hong Kong Archives in an account called "Food and Fuel Position," October 1945, HKRS 41/1/547/7410/45: "The Japanese left no appreciable stocks of ... food. Peanut oil, fish, beef, vegetables, sugar and salt all are in seriously short supply ... As to firewood, Hong Kong is living off floors and doors."

[19] Mark Young to Secretary of State, No. 255, Secret, February 7, 1947, FO 371/63387.

[20] Grantham also remarked that the expatriates in Hong Kong in the pre-war period possessed the same racial arrogance and claims to privilege as in Shanghai. Such attitudes died hard, but by 1947 Grantham could say that there was a "marked decline" in the arrogance that had been typical of expatriates in Shanghai; by 1965, he could claim that "the age of the 'blimps' is over." Grantham, *Via Ports*, 104.

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Before 1941, the total trade and investment in Shanghai was ten times that in Hong Kong. After 1949, however, Hong Kong became the heir to Shanghai.[21] Refugees from the civil war infused the colony with energy and wealth. Grantham summed up the critical development in the aftermath of Communist victory: "the refugees from the North . . . brought with them some refugee capital, many new techniques and a commercial shrewdness and determination superior even to that of the native Cantonese."[22] Most of the refugees had no place else to go. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* commented on their plight: "Passport and visa difficulties make their further travel practically impossible. Thus Hongkong, for better or worse, has become their home and new place of commercial and industrial venture."[23] Hong Kong's economic resilience had roots in the necessity for the refugees to start a new life.

In 1949, Hong Kong was on the verge of rapid economic growth and industrialization, but the climate of business opinion at the time was uncertain. In view of the civil war, no one knew what the future would hold. A visitor from Shanghai writing in February 1949 in the *China Weekly Review*, however, was generally optimistic:

> [T]here is undoubted prosperity . . . Real wages have increased an estimated 25 percent as compared with pre-war, the building trades are booming, and the high prices for food have benefited the farmer . . . There is no dearth of fine motor cars, fine food, and good things in the shops; and if business is actually at middling levels, the men of business are most certainly enjoying their indifferent prosperity.
>
> With all the present tensions, Hongkong presents a welcome freedom from the hovering clouds of suspicion, distrust and star chamber proceedings met with elsewhere [notably in Shanghai].[24]

Business opinion may have been jittery, if optimistic, but the period up to 1949 and beyond reveals substantial commercial and industrial expansion. Hong Kong was a member of the sterling bloc, that is, its currency was based on the pound sterling, but it was also a free port with an open market for U.S. dollars. The total value of trade reached the level (in Hong Kong Dollars) of HKD 2.767 billion in 1947, which increased in the next year by 32 percent to HKD 3.2 billion—almost double the 1946 level of HKD 1.7 billion and nearly triple the 1940 figure of HKD 1.375 billion. The figure for 1949 was HKD 5.069 billion, and for 1950 HKD 7.503 billion—a 66 percent increase above the 1948 level.[25]

It is important to note the contemporary British assessments of Hong Kong's value. *The Economist* commented in September 1949 that most British merchants in China "are probably going to be ruined" and that "this reduction of our stake in China is occurring at a time when the problems presented by our export trade and

[21] For the Shanghai connection, see Nicholas R. Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution of the 1920s* (Hanover, N.H., 1991), which begins: "Seventy years ago, Shanghai occupied a position very much like that of Hongkong today" (xi). See also esp. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *Policing Shanghai 1927–1937* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995). For the later period, another useful recent book is Maochun Yu, *The O.S.S. in China: Prelude to Cold War* (New Haven, Conn., 1990).

[22] Grantham to Secretary of State, LM 210/54, Confidential, December 22, 1954, CO 1030/292. For the Hong Kong Secretariat's assessment of problems of immigration since 1947, see HK Secretariat 1/1166/47C.

[23] January 19, 1949.

[24] February 19, 1949.

[25] Tsang, *Democracy Shelved*, 78, 141.

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the balance of payments are graver than ever before in our history."[26] The estimates of Britain's loss of assets in China from 1949 vary from a high of £1 billion in Shanghai alone to a low of £125 million for all of China. The loss of £200–300 million worth of assets is the conventional figure.[27] Nevertheless, the low figure of £125 million is useful as a point of comparison because British investments in Hong Kong in 1949 were assessed at the value of £156 million. As a point of reference, the figure of £125 million is useful for another reason. The value of Britain's share of oil in the Middle East fell into the same category as did that of trade and commerce in China. Hong Kong was frequently described as one of the empire's largest cities and the largest entrepôt in Asia. After World War II, the refinery at Abadan in Iran was the largest of its kind in the world. In the British government, the Ministry of Fuel and Power estimated that the replacement of the British plant at Abadan would cost £120 million—"not much less than the estimated cost of retooling and modernising the coal industry in this country."[28] Hong Kong thus stood up to comparison as one of Britain's most valuable assets.

AT THE HEIGHT OF THE WARTIME STRUGGLE IN 1942, the British government had considered whether cession of the colony to China might not be more effective sooner rather than later. With the same motive that inspired the British to offer postwar Dominion status to India in return for Indian support of the war effort, the Foreign Office held that a return of Hong Kong to the Chinese would help to forge an alliance between the British and the Kuomintang. According to this line of argument, which was developed in the aftermath of the fall of Singapore, Hong Kong could already be regarded as a lost cause. The gesture of cession would demonstrate to the Americans that the British were not fighting the war for the reactionary purposes of preserving the British Empire.[29] The proposal had a long pedigree. As early as World War I, the British minister to China, Sir John Jordan, had argued that Hong Kong should be returned as part of the peace settlement, thereby helping the British to come to terms with ascendant Chinese nationalism.[30] During the interwar period, Sir John Pratt, the principal authority on China at the Foreign Office, had continued to press the case on grounds that Britain could retain by treaty the advantages of trade and commerce without the provocation of a territorial enclave.[31] After the outbreak of fighting between China and Japan in 1937, the prospect of holding the colony for another half century probably seemed increasingly remote. After the surrender of Hong Kong and the fall of Singapore a few years later, it certainly did.

In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Hong Kong in December 1941, the

[26] September 24, 1949.

[27] See Aron Shai, "Imperialism Imprisoned: The Closure of British Firms in the People's Republic of China," *English Historical Review* 114 (1989): 88. Wenguang Shao, *China, Britain and Businessmen: Political and Commercial Relations, 1949–57* (London, 1991), is also an exceptionally useful work.

[28] Quoted in W. R. Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East* (Oxford, 1984), 55.

[29] For the broader background in Anglo-American discussions, see Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945* (London, 1978).

[30] This is one of the themes of W. R. Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939* (Oxford, 1971).

[31] See Sir John Pratt, *War and Politics in China* (London, 1943).

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Foreign Office pursued the logic of relinquishing the colony for the sake of friendly Anglo-Chinese relations.[32] The British, already powerless against the Japanese, would be equally impotent against resurgent Chinese nationalism as represented by the Kuomintang, especially if Chiang Kai-shek were supported by the United States.[33] In mid-1942, the Colonial Office reluctantly agreed that Hong Kong might be ceded as part of a postwar settlement. But by mid-1945, the assessment of the Hong Kong issue had shifted. By then, it was clear that the reassertion of Nationalist authority in China would be possible only with American military as well as political support. Hong Kong became an issue of contention between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. The president made it clear that the British, in his view, upheld an antiquated colonial system and that the restoration of Hong Kong would help to bolster Chiang Kai-shek's China as one of the "four policemen" (along with Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States) of the postwar order. Churchill made it equally clear that he would not yield Hong Kong and that he regarded Nationalist China as a puppet of the United States.[34] In this instance, Churchill held the upper hand. By early 1945, a sea change had taken place in the American security plans, plans that became policy after Roosevelt's death in April.[35] Instead of insisting on the liquidation of the British Empire, the United States increasingly saw advantages in sustaining an ally that held critical bases and colonies with strategic resources throughout the world.[36] The U.S. government, without abnegating its historic role as intermediary between the forces of European imperialism and emerging Asian nationalism, now tended, not always (as in the case of Palestine) but generally, to support the British. President Harry Truman at the end of the Pacific war agreed to the Japanese surrender of Hong Kong to British forces.[37] On August 30, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt reestablished British control over Hong Kong with the cruiser *Swiftsure*, the battleship *Anson*, two aircraft carriers, eight destroyers, and eight submarines.[38]

The British reoccupation of Hong Kong and other Asian dependencies including Malaya took place under the umbrella of American military supremacy following the defeat of Japan. So also did Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to reassert control over

[32] The wartime debate about the future of Hong Kong can be traced in CO 825/38/20; CO 825/42/B15; FO 371/31671; FO 371/35824; FO 371/41657; FO 371/46251; FO 371/46257; FO 371/46259; and FO 371/53629. See Lau Kit-ching Chan, "The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941–1945)," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 2 (1973–74): 56–78; and, by the same author, "The United States and the Question of Hong Kong, 1941–1945," *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 19 (1979): 1–20.

[33] For example: "Americans who have no special knowledge of the Far East naturally know and care very little about Hong Kong . . . [I]f at any time the question of the future of Hong Kong were raised in the United States it is pretty certain that the American public, taking a sentimental view of China, and being generally critical of colonial rule, would side against Great Britain and with China." "American Opinion regarding Hong Kong," FO Memorandum, August 7, 1943, FO 371/35824.

[34] The most recent comprehensive analysis of these questions is by Warren F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, N.J., 1991), chap. 7.

[35] For the shift in American policy from the dominance of the "trusteeship" idea to that of security, see W. R. Louis, *Imperialism at Bay* (Oxford, 1977).

[36] See W. R. Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22 (September 1994).

[37] See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: The Far East, China* (Washington, D.C., 1949), 7: 509.

[38] For the events of the surrender and its aftermath in Hong Kong, see esp. Louis Allen, *The End of the War in Asia* (London, 1976), 251–54.

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China. Hong Kong was in comparison a minor issue. By late 1945, 100,000 Nationalist troops had passed through Hong Kong for deployment in the north. According to the commander of British troops in the China theater, Major-General L. C. Hayes, "[O]ne was left with an impression that the Chinese have not only accepted without rancour our return to Hong Kong but are even relieved to find us there ready to lend a helping hand in any way we can."[39] Chiang took the expedient view that Hong Kong was Chinese territory merely under temporary British administration. In the meantime, Nationalist troops, using transportation facilities of the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy, managed temporarily to secure key cities and most railway lines in eastern and northern China. But Communist troops occupied much of the hinterland in the north and in Manchuria. Such was the shadow of the Chinese civil war over Hong Kong.

The military administration lasted some eight months from the end of the Pacific war, after which Sir Mark Young resumed a broken governorship. In his earlier tour of duty, he had arrived in Hong Kong from service as Tanganyika's governor only a few months before the Japanese invasion in December 1941.[40] On Christmas Day, he became the first governor ever to surrender a Crown Colony, but he had personified the Churchillian spirit of resistance in its East Asian manifestation with his message before the fall of Hong Kong: "Fight on. Hold fast for King and Empire. God bless you all in this your finest hour."[41] Young had been educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge. By no means an intellectual, he was a stern and rather autocratic personality who nevertheless exuded good will. He was respected by the British community in Hong Kong as a natural leader. A contemporary recalled that he was "very authoritarian" and "intimidating."[42] He could also be charming and persuasive.[43] Despite Foreign Office qualms that his reincarnation as governor would signify a continuation of the old imperial system, he again took control of the civil administration in May 1946. His tenure lasted only until July of the next year, but it is significant for the present analysis because of the way he dealt with the Kuomintang in Hong Kong and because of his attempt to democratize the Hong Kong government. Had he remained governor more than a mere year, he might have set Hong Kong on the course toward responsible or representative government, which might in turn have changed not merely the colony's subsequent political evolution but its relationship with China.

Young vigorously proposed constitutional reform as a means of preventing the absorption of the colony by China. It is important to grasp the motive behind his scheme as well as the reaction to it in London, especially in the Foreign Office but also in the Colonial Office. Officials in the Colonial Office, with one important

[39] L. C. Hayes to G. A. Wallinger (Chunking), November 26, 1945, FO 371/46259.

[40] After a brief internment at the Peninsula Hotel in Hong Kong, Young spent the rest of the war as a prisoner of war in Manchuria. The continuity in the civil administration had been maintained by Franklin Gimson (Colonial Secretary), who with great courage and discipline provided leadership of the British prisoners of war at Stanley Camp, Hong Kong. The Foreign Office even in 1942 had recognized in Gimson a man of exceptional character. See L. H. Foulds, Minute, October 7, 1942, FO 371/31671. Gimson later became governor of Singapore.

[41] Quoted in Jan Morris, *Hong Kong: Epilogue to an Empire* (1988; Harmondsworth, 1993), 246. Morris's book is a popular but informed and perceptive account.

[42] Tsang, *Democracy Shelved*, 196.

[43] For example, see his minutes and letters in the Legislative Council files, HK Secretariat 5/1136/49.

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exception, tended to defer to the governor. The exception was N. L. Mayle, the head of the Hong Kong Department, who by virtue of his position was able to brake the speed with which Young hoped to move. Mayle appears to have had grave doubts about the Chinese capacity for representative government. Various officials in the Foreign Office in a more sophisticated vein implied that Young's proposal would have the opposite of the intended effect. Would not the introduction of democracy in a China port merely provoke the Chinese government? The Chinese, whether Nationalist or Communist, might well tolerate an enclave administered by Britain, but how would they respond to a grand design to hold Hong Kong in the British Empire and Commonwealth by popular consent? Especially in the Foreign Office, Hong Kong was viewed against the wider background of Anglo-Chinese relations. British measures of self-government would be interpreted as an attempt to install a collaborative and permanently hostile regime.[44] The evidence on this point is often more implicit than explicit, but there was an underlying pattern in the British response, especially in the Foreign Office, where Hong Kong was regarded as a China port involving intricate complications with China. Naturally enough, the Colonial Office, wary of China in a different way, viewed Hong Kong much more as a British colonial dependency and was more sympathetic toward measures of self-government.

Young's instinctive response to the question of Hong Kong's future was in line with traditional Colonial Office policy throughout the world of introducing representative government in gradual stages. Colonial subjects were allowed step by step to manage their own affairs. Young's formative years in the Colonial Service had been in Ceylon. He had also served in Sierra Leone, Palestine, Barbados, and Trinidad, in addition to Tanganyika. The weight of his administrative experience led him to apply the same lessons of constitutional progress that he had experienced elsewhere, especially in Ceylon, and even perhaps to think of the Chinese of Hong Kong as an "advanced people," in Young's phrase, like the Sinhalese of Ceylon, who would develop a British allegiance. Young in fact did not know much about the Chinese. Shortly after his arrival in Hong Kong in 1941, he was interned by the Japanese. Grantham, by contrast, had begun his career in Hong Kong and had served there from 1922 to 1935.[45] Grantham held much more of a Foreign Office than a Colonial Office viewpoint and believed that Hong Kong was essentially a Chinese port.[46] He certainly did not think that the Hong Kong Chinese would ever develop a British allegiance. They would merely be content to prosper under British rule. At the time, Grantham's assessment seemed realistic enough. Indeed, it was not until late in the day, the 1980s, that the Chinese of the colony truly began to develop a "Hong Kong identity." On the other hand, Young's plan for democrati-

[44] This is the interpretation cogently argued by N. J. Miners, "Plans for Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1946–52," *China Quarterly* 107 (September 1986): 463–82. "Communist China could live with a colony ruled by British administrators but would not long have tolerated one which offered opportunities for its political opponents to attain power" (482).

[45] The contrast between the two governors is developed fully in Tsang, *Democracy Shelved*, chap. 7.

[46] Grantham held such emphatic views on the subject of Hong Kong and China that one can only wonder whether CO officials assessing his credentials at the time of his appointment as governor took his outlook into account. The decision itself appears to have been determined mainly by Grantham's administrative record as one of the outstanding colonial civil servants of his generation.

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zation, had it been successful, might have promoted a similar sense of identity at an earlier stage.

To understand the question of British aims, and Young's specific motives, a word on the constitutional background is necessary. Hong Kong was a Crown Colony. The principle of Crown Colony rule was that the colony was responsible to the imperial authority in London, not to representatives either appointed or elected. Hong Kong was ruled by a Legislative Council, which was presided over by the governor. It consisted of official members (officers of the colonial government) and unofficial members (appointed by the governor). There was also an Executive Council, which was a policymaking body more or less the equivalent of the British Cabinet, again with official and unofficial members. Young wanted to leave this system intact but at a lower level to establish a municipal council that would be constituted on a representative basis. The Legislative Council would continue to consist of "loyal British subjects," but the municipal council would be elected on a popular franchise.[47] In British constitutional parlance, this was a form of dyarchy, or parallel government, which had been developed in India. The British administration would continue to control such vital functions of government as finance and security, but the creation of a municipal council would allow the inhabitants of Hong Kong a fuller share in the management of their own affairs, as they already had, for example, in the rather restricted area of management of municipal sanitation.[48]

Young believed in the gradual process of "the transfer of responsibility" as he had experienced it in Ceylon. In his own words, Hong Kong needed "to develop an active sense of citizenship and to become capable of openly expressing and giving practical effect to the general desire of its inhabitants [if it were] to remain under British rule and to resist absorption by China."[49] Part of Young's plan reflected British colonial policy dating back to the lessons learned from the American Revolution: by giving colonial subjects a voice in their own affairs, they would be coopted as collaborators in the imperial system. Nationalists would be conciliated before they turned into anti-British extremists. In Hong Kong, however, there was good reason to doubt whether Young's application of conventional wisdom would apply to a population that was almost entirely Chinese. Young himself admitted that there were dilemmas virtually beyond solution. He rejected out of hand the idea that the members of the new municipal council should be restricted to the British. But what would be the proportion of the Chinese representation? What would prevent the Kuomintang from penetrating the municipal council and subverting it into an instrument for incorporation with China?[50] Young's answer to the question of possible subversion was as follows: "There can be no shadow of a doubt that Chinese political parties would seek to use the Municipal Council for

[47] Young to Creech Jones, No. 255, Secret, February 7, 1947, FO 371/63387.

[48] "Whatever its constitutional backwardness in other respects," John Darwin has written, "Hong Kong recognised the principle of no sanitation without representation." Darwin, "Hong Kong in British Decolonisation," 20.

[49] Young to Secretary of State, Confidential, October 22, 1946, CO 537/1651. See the illuminating and useful editorial comment by Frederick Madden and John Darwin, eds., *The Dependent Empire, 1900–1948: Colonies, Protectorates, and Mandates—Select Documents on the Constitutional History of the British Empire and Commonwealth* (Westport, Conn., 1994), 7: 389–93.

[50] These issues are raised in Young to Secretary of State, February 7, 1947, FO 371/63387.

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their own ends. It is consequently most necessary . . . that the constitution should be framed as to preclude the possibility of the Council concerning itself with political matters, particularly in relation to the future status of the Colony."[51] In other words, in matters of political importance, the colonial administration would remain an autocracy.

Young's plan for constitutional reform met with resistance, for different reasons, in the Colonial Office and Foreign Office, though in Hong Kong itself the general response had been apathetic. A small number of politically articulate Chinese supported the plan, but there was an element that feared the influence of the Kuomintang and corrupt politics at the municipal level. At the Colonial Office, the proposal encountered a host of objections, not least from the secretary of state himself, Arthur Creech Jones, who disliked the plan for a municipal council and thought that the Legislative Council itself ought to be democratized.[52] In essence, he proposed as an alternative the gradual creation of a ministerial government, a miniature of the Westminster system. Creech Jones had the reputation of having his heart in the right place but also, at least on occasion, of connecting his mind to his political instincts in a fuzzy sort of way. He was capable of sustained and creative thought, but on Hong Kong his proposals did not cohere. Perhaps he was too preoccupied with the problem of Palestine, which in 1947 was all-consuming. In any event, Young brought the full weight of the Hong Kong Secretariat into play and secured the acquiescence of the Colonial Office in the plan for a municipal council. This was a watershed. Once committed to the plan, neither the Colonial Office nor Young's successor could disavow it. Young's scheme to liberalize the constitution by broadening the franchise for the election of the municipal council was made public in July 1947.

The plan's critics, whose voices became more articulate with the passing of time, perceived a danger in the cultivation of Hong Kong nationalism, or what Young referred to as a sense of identity.[53] Nothing would provoke Chinese reaction more quickly than an attempt by the British to create a sense of separatism or something equivalent to a city-state that would reject the eventual reabsorption of Hong Kong into China. Britain could continue to rule in Hong Kong only with the acquiescence of the power controlling China, whether Nationalist or Communist. Young proposed to travel a different road, which might eventually have led to confrontation. The inaction of the British government, brought about mainly by Young's successor, Grantham, shaped the course for the next four decades. Grantham held the counter-assumption that Hong Kong would revert to China in 1997 and would not become a self-governing British city-state within the Commonwealth. His view in the long run proved to be accurate. Despite minor constitutional adjustments made by Grantham himself, and by successive governors, Hong Kong remained decidedly unrepresentative until the last years of the British administration.

[51] Young to Secretary of State, Confidential, October 22, 1946, CO 537/1651.

[52] See, for example, his minutes in CO 537/1651 and also the revealing file in the Creech Jones Papers, Box 57.

[53] For the complicated evolution of British views on democratization into the 1970s and later, see Tsang, *Appointment with China*, esp. 117, and above n. 11. For an FO summary of the proposals for constitutional reform, see N. C. C. Trench, Minute, December 18, 1950, FO 371/92213; for the Hong Kong administration's views, Secretariat to CO, November 7, 1950, HK Secretariat 5/1136/49.

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The basic criticism of the Young plan to which Young himself had no effective riposte was that a democratically elected municipal council might fall under the control of the Kuomintang. In the immediate postwar years, as has been noted, the Hong Kong Secretariat continued to regard the Kuomintang as the principal enemy. It represented not merely the ruling party in China; Chiang Kai-shek also offered an alternative to the British administration in Hong Kong. It is now clear that the Hong Kong administration greatly exaggerated Chiang's effectiveness, agility, and general guile, and that a considerable amount of the inflated significance can be traced to the writings of the official designated as the expert on China, the acting secretary for Chinese affairs, Thomas Megarry. The key adviser on Chinese politics and culture, Megarry held the position equivalent to "Oriental secretary" in other parts of the world. He possessed a reductionist and lively intellect, perceiving a gigantic conspiracy on the part of the Kuomintang. He believed that Chiang's influence in Hong Kong had significantly increased during the wartime period of Japanese occupation. Operating in unoccupied China, the Kuomintang had secured "a foothold in the Colony" by enlisting men of the Triad societies, or criminal gangs—"underground desperadoes," as the British called them—to carry on subversive activities against the Japanese. The British administration attempted to counter the lingering underground influence of the Kuomintang "by buying off the Triad bands," but there remained a larger philosophical and cultural problem: "The Kuomintang has always put the education of Chinese youth in its political tenets, which of course are those of its founder Dr. Sun Yat Sen, in the forefront of its programme of propaganda. It is estimated that in Hong Kong the party has some thirty-five private schools under its influence."[54] The Kuomintang, according to Megarry's analysis, attempted to intimidate and control by "systematic blackmail" the Hong Kong newspapers and to dominate the seamen's unions: "The method is to support individual unions in disputes as to wages and labour conditions."[55]

Chiang Kai-shek would have been extremely pleased if the Kuomintang's influence had been anywhere near as great as that described in British secret reports, specifically in Megarry's. The exaggerated quality of the political reporting of the Hong Kong Secretariat at this time would not have been so significant had it not been for the governor's relative lack of knowledge of Hong Kong and China. Young relied on Megarry, whose reports in turn caused alarm in the Colonial Office, in part because of lack of expertise on China. With only a few exceptions, officials in the Colonial Office generally knew less about Hong Kong than any other dependency.[56] The Colonial Office was thus deficient in the vital function of

[54] Megarry, Memorandum, November 27, 1946, CO 537/1658.

[55] Megarry, Memorandum, November 27, 1946. For labor conditions, see the extensive report by C. K. Hawkins, the Labour officer in the Hong Kong administration, June 10, 1947, CO 537/2188. The views of Hawkins are useful among other reasons as a corrective to those of Megarry. So also are the minutes throughout the HK Secretariat files of D. M. MacDougall, the colonial secretary (equivalent more or less to the permanent undersecretary in the Colonial Office). MacDougall was the mandarin of the colonial administration, a man of wide knowledge of China, sympathy with Chinese sensitivities, and clear judgment. Nevertheless, on the subject of Chinese political aims, Megarry's views carried weight.

[56] One notable exception was (Sir) Sydney Caine, who had served in Hong Kong as financial secretary before World War II and who became the foremost economic adviser in the Colonial Office

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intelligence. There was a certain corrective by the Foreign Office, but in general Colonial Office views on Chinese politics up to the end of the Young administration in May 1947 were paranoid and distorted.

Publicly, the Hong Kong administration consistently aimed at doing nothing that would dignify or inflate the significance of the Kuomintang in the eyes of Hong Kong Chinese. Young wrote in March 1947 at the end of his tenure that it was important to keep all public recognition of Kuomintang officials at a distance, as if they were "not a matter of great importance to this Government."[57] Young's successor, Grantham, pursued the same tactic. "The policy I have consistently followed since my arrival [in July 1947] in the Colony," Grantham wrote, "has been to refrain studiously from anything which will give the Kuomintang 'face' in the eyes of the Chinese population."[58] Grantham, like his predecessor, was determined to prevent the Kuomintang from creating, in Megarry's words, "an 'imperium in imperio' . . . undermin[ing] the foundations of our administration."[59] Grantham, however, often used public rhetoric that disguised his actual views. He held a much more realistic assessment of the influence of the Kuomintang than did his predecessor and, most assuredly, than did Megarry. Grantham did not believe that the leaders of the Kuomintang (as distinct from local functionaries) wished to destabilize Hong Kong or that Chiang had plans for a campaign of immediate retrocession. Grantham correctly judged that Chiang was occupied with more pressing issues.

Grantham once remarked that he faced two problems as governor. The first was the tradition of the British community in Hong Kong to defer to him as an almost God-like figure. The other was the opposite tendency of the Colonial Office to regard him as a subdepartment. There is little if any evidence that the deference to his position caused Grantham any distress, but he emphatically resented his treatment by the Colonial Office. He held that Hong Kong would have been much better off if it had been under Foreign Office rather than Colonial Office jurisdiction. In Grantham's view, Hong Kong from beginning to end should always have been viewed as part of China, and thus relations with China were always paramount, not issues of the legislative or municipal councils. With a deft use of the technique of the blind eye, whereby he ignored or manipulated the Colonial Office bureaucracy, Grantham often got his way. He had a buccaneer streak in his personality but was also outgoing and friendly. Having spent his formative years in the colony, he moved easily in Hong Kong business circles. He was consistently sensitive to charges that the Europeans in Hong Kong were reactionaries and that the Hong Kong administration was an autocracy. For example, he wrote later, in

after the war. (He eventually became director of the London School of Economics.) In general, the career pattern of officers in the Colonial Service did not produce, as in the Foreign Office, "old China hands." For the Foreign Office, China was a major concern; for the Colonial Office, Hong Kong was an exotic though lucrative appendage.

[57] Young to Secretary of State, No. 13, Top Secret, April 17, 1947, FO 371/63388.

[58] Grantham to Secretary of State, No. 19, Top Secret, May 28, 1948, HK Secretariat 5/1162/46.

[59] Megarry, Memorandum, November 27, 1946, CO 537/1658. Megarry waxed almost lyrical on the danger of the Kuomintang: the British must be vigilant "to secure that this Party shall not . . . manoeuvre an unilateral resumption of the territory and meanwhile batten on its wealth and bend the populace to its will by methods of subtle intimidation."

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1954: "It is quite untrue to think of Hong Kong, as she is not infrequently represented, either as a happy hunting ground for dubious commercial adventurers who are only too ready to play China's game so long as their own interests benefit thereby, or as a reactionary quasi-Police State where exotic liberalism soon withers in the mid-day sun."[60]

By virtue of his ten-year tenure (1947–1957), Grantham acquired in modern British colonial history one of the longest service records as governor of a single colony. During this time, he witnessed the fall of the Nationalist government at the capital of Nanjing, the expulsion of the British community from Shanghai, the British recognition of the People's Republic, and the Korean War. Toward the end of his term, he was able to draw a comparison between the events of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the revolution he had witnessed in China.[61] For the history of Hong Kong, he is significant for the part he played in the stabilization of relations between the colony and the People's Republic, but that outcome was by no means obvious when he took charge in July 1947 against the background of the Chinese civil war.[62]

Grantham was at ease not merely with the merchants of Hong Kong, Chinese as well as British, but also with some of the generals and leading political figures of Nationalist China. His principal point of contact was with T. V. Soong (the brother of Madame Chiang Kai-shek), who had served as one of Chiang's principal ministers and was appointed governor of the neighboring Guangdong province in October 1947. With a political touch that enabled him to form alliances with unlikely figures, Grantham became an ally of sorts with Soong. It was Soong who took the initiative, pointing out to Grantham that the Communists as a common enemy eclipsed the historic enmity between the Kuomintang and the British. Soong urged cooperation in such matters as police intelligence in Canton and Hong Kong. The British, he remarked to Grantham on one occasion, "would not wish one of her Colonies to be used as a base for subversive activities against a friendly power."[63] At another time, Soong commented: "I would like you to discuss with my men how Hongkong can assist us in return. You must realise that in helping us you are helping yourselves, because if the Communists come here God help Hongkong."[64] Such conversations laid the basis for limited but significant cooperation between the chief inspector of police and officers in the Special Branch or security service in Hong Kong and their counterparts in Canton. Grantham himself during his first year made three visits to China, one of them to confer with Chiang Kai-shek.[65] Visits by members of Grantham's staff included that of the political adviser (equivalent to a minister of foreign affairs) to Nanjing and Shanghai, and of the

[60] Grantham to Secretary of State, LM 210/54, Confidential, December 22, 1954, CO 1030/292.

[61] "The world conscience which has recently been roused by the plight of about 100,000 refugees from Hungary might well be awakened to the situation of five to six times that number who fled into Hong Kong in 1949–50." Grantham to Secretary of State, December 23, 1956, CO 1030/384.

[62] On Britain and the Chinese civil war, see esp. James Tuck-Hong Tang, *Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China, 1949–54* (London, 1992); and Brian Porter, *Britain and the Rise of Communist China* (London, 1967).

[63] Grantham to N. L. Mayle, Personal and Confidential, November 22, 1947, HKRS 41/9/5701/47.

[64] Grantham to Secretary of State, Secret, July 7, 1948, HK Secretariat 1276/45.

[65] "I came away with the impression that the Generalissimo was surrounded by a court that cut him off from knowledge of the real state of affairs in China." Grantham, *Via Ports*, 129.

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financial secretary to confer with officials of the Central Bank of China. In a short period of time, the governor created the equivalent of an intelligence network at every level of administration and invigorated the Colonial Service, not least by impressing on cadet officers "the importance of a knowledge of Chinese."[66]

Although Grantham by nature was dynamic, gregarious, and slightly pugnacious, his decision to improve relations with the Nationalist Chinese expressed not so much his activist temperament as his calculated assessment of a shift in priorities in the Kuomintang. He had no intention of creating a special relationship. He merely judged that the Chinese Nationalists were now attempting to bring the British, and the Americans, into an alliance against the Communists. He wrote in May 1948 on how the local presence of the Kuomintang represented larger political trends: "In political matters the Kuomintang in Hong Kong has concentrated on an anti-Communist line. Its chief aim has been to present the menace of Communism in such a way as to rally British and American feeling in support of the Nanking regime." Grantham was certain that the conflict in China was connected in one way or another with the crisis in Europe and with the hardening of attitudes of both the British and the Americans toward the Soviet Union. Within the local compass of Hong Kong, the energies of those who sympathized with the Kuomintang had been redirected: "So long as the present civil strife continues in China, the energies of the local [Kuomintang] Party are more likely to be concentrated towards counter-acting Communist propaganda and boosting Nanking than towards embarrassing this [Hong Kong] Government."[67]

In widening their contacts with the Nationalist Chinese, the British expected neither the Kuomintang to change their political philosophy nor the Chinese to base their actions on anything other than political calculation. "It is common knowledge," Grantham wrote in early 1948, "that this Colony has gone to great lengths to co-operate with China since the reoccupation, without receiving any recognition or thanks."[68] The Chinese might well have made the same observation about the British, whose attitude toward the Kuomintang may have been less severe or suspicious than earlier, but it was certainly based on the same principle of self-interest. At this time, however, the British began to believe that collaboration with the Nationalists would in any event have a short life. In January 1948, Grantham concluded on the basis of conversations with Nationalist military leaders that the civil war would spread to South China within three months.[69] Some months

[66] Grantham to Secretary of State, No. 190, Confidential, August 3, 1948, HKRS 41/9/5701/47.

[67] Grantham to Secretary of State, No. 19, Top Secret, May 28, 1948, HK Secretariat 5/1162/46. There was nevertheless one major incident that continued to strain Kuomintang–Hong Kong relations. In late 1947, the Hong Kong police evicted the residents of the Kowloon Walled City, a small compound of six acres in the Kowloon peninsula over which the Chinese continued to claim sovereignty. In the view of the Hong Kong administration, the "Walled City" (the "walls" had long been razed) was a health menace and a haven for criminals, but, after the police fired on squatters, Chinese protesters in Canton burned down the British Consulate in January 1948. The circumstances of an international incident deriving from "squatters and criminals" occupying a congested plot of land, the legal title of which was obscure, led to unending exasperation in the Hong Kong Secretariat and inspired a piece of doggerel: "I saw a City stone-wall bound, / A little one that can't be found. / It wasn't there again today, / I wish that it would go away." HK Secretariat 1/1166/47.

[68] Grantham to Secretary of State, January 17, 1948, FO 371/69577.

[69] Grantham to British Ambassador in Nanking, No. 4, Secret, January 16, 1948, HK Secretariat 3/1167/47.

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later, he commented to T. V. Soong that "it was really a race against time, whether he [Soong] could solidify South China before there was a break-up in the North."[70] By mid-1948, the answer had become obvious. Grantham reported Soong in July as saying "that the National Government is slowly disintegrating."[71] Soong believed that Chiang Kai-shek was still "the only man in China" who could save the situation, but the British took Soong's remark merely as another example of the accumulating and overwhelming evidence that the Nationalist position was now hopeless.

THE THRUST OF MY INTERPRETATION SO FAR has been that the complex and sometimes subtle interaction between the governor of Hong Kong, the Colonial Office, and the Foreign Office determined the overall policy of the British government. On many matters, the governor often had his way. The government in London, not surprisingly, deferred to local expertise on financial, defense, and political issues unique to Hong Kong. The question of constitutional reform and representative government is a case in point. Young achieved a victory in favor of his scheme for broadening the franchise and electing a municipal government because of his command of the situation in Hong Kong and his tenacity in pursuing the issue in London. Grantham succeeded in reversing course through a combination of evasive action and a commitment to a different sort of constitutional reform. He had a different set of priorities. He upheld the principle of the Legislative Council and believed that the Hong Kong version of it might be made more representative in minor ways. But he also believed that Hong Kong, a port and a part of China, could never support the Westminster model in the same way that colonial policy had evolved earlier in his career in Jamaica, Nigeria, and even Fiji. (None of those territories, it should be added, were foremost in the movement toward self-government during Grantham's years of service.) On the other hand, Grantham was concerned, in the words of his constitutional adviser, not to make Hong Kong's Legislative Council a "laughing stock."[72] Grantham introduced minor reforms to prove that he was not retrograde, and it is significant that, building on the design of his predecessor, he acquired the reputation of a forward-looking governor. On the whole, however, he was "very much inclined," as he later wrote in 1951, "to agree with the F.O." and to put constitutional reform "in cold storage."[73] Perhaps it was a blessing in disguise for the British, at the time and later, that Grantham sabotaged Young's project of democratization and the fostering of a British allegiance in a city-state that was to be an integral part of the Empire and Commonwealth. Assuming it was even possible, would the achievement of Young's

[70] Grantham to Mayle, Secret, April 5, 1948, HKRS 41/9/5701/47.

[71] Grantham to Sidebotham, Secret, August 2, 1948, enclosing a note on talk with Soong of July 31, 1948, CO 537/3326.

[72] W. J. Carrie, Minute, August 24, 1950, HK Secretariat 5/1136/49.

[73] Grantham, Minute, January 14, 1951; and Grantham to J. J. Paskin, Secret, February 12, 1952, HK Secretariat 5/1136/49. In 1950, Grantham had visited London and conducted extensive discussions with officials in the Colonial Office and Foreign Office. See, for example, the important notes dated July 4, 1950, in Ronald Hyam, ed., *British Documents on the End of Empire: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951*, 4 vols. (London, 1992), 2: no. 172.

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purpose have been countenanced by the People's Republic? Grantham, for one, thought not.[74]

On the issue of the critical year 1949 and the fate of Hong Kong, one might be tempted to believe that here, too, the governor realized his goal of prodding the British government into defending the colony. It was Grantham who challenged London to prove that the British had the willpower not to scuttle. On this as on other issues, however, there was a discrepancy between Grantham's public pronouncements, his advice to the Colonial Office, and his own assessment. He was less alarmed at the prospect of a Communist takeover than were many of his contemporaries, and his public statements as well as his admonitions to the British government appear to have been made with the motive of reassuring the British community in Hong Kong. The key decisions, however, were made in London, where the governor's influence, and indeed that of the Colonial Office, played only a minor part.

To understand the decisions made on Hong Kong in 1949, one must look to the upper reaches of the Labour government, particularly to Clement Attlee, the prime minister, and Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary. Bevin dominated all discussions on foreign affairs and to a large extent colonial matters when they impinged on foreign policy. He attempted on all issues to work in concert with Attlee, who, Bevin noted, was "deeply involved" in the issue of Hong Kong because of the ongoing economic review of defense commitments.[75] Usually, but not always, Attlee followed Bevin's lead. Tough-minded, efficient, and succinct to the point of abruptness, Attlee held independent views and sometimes did not trust Bevin's judgment, as, for example, on the question of India. He had to be persuaded that Bevin had devoted his mind to a problem and had integrated it into what they both regarded as the basic philosophy of the Labour government. On the question of Hong Kong, the prime minister and foreign secretary saw eye to eye. When the two of them linked up with another minister, in this case A. V. Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty until December 1946, then minister of defense), it was usually an unbreakable combination.

Since 1946, Bevin had followed the Hong Kong issue only sporadically. When it did command his attention, he usually concurred in the views of the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Orme Sargent, an official who in a sense personified the postwar consensus on the lessons of the 1930s. In 1946, Sargent and

[74] The Chinese side remains a matter of speculation. As has been mentioned previously (note 11 above), Mao Zedong did not venture a view one way or another about the proposed democratization of Hong Kong. Indeed, he and Chou En-lai (Foreign Minister) were not only vague on the subject but seemed to have, not surprisingly, only a rudimentary knowledge of the British colonial system in which colonies progressed through stages of self-government to achieve Dominion status or independence within the Commonwealth. There can be no doubt, however, that Young and Grantham recognized the alternative goals of keeping Hong Kong within the empire or anticipating its eventual return to China. As the issue developed in later decades, it was a reasonable assumption that the Chinese would have objected on strongest terms to Hong Kong becoming an independent city-state within the Commonwealth. See Tsang, *Appointment with China*, which draws on Chinese sources and offers a slightly different interpretation (117–19).

[75] Bevin, Minute, *ca.* March 19, 1946, FO 371/53632. Attlee, who himself was minister of defense (as well as prime minister) until December 1946, used the Defence Committee of the Cabinet as the executive arm of the Cabinet to discuss such issues. See, for example, CAB 131/1. On Bevin, see Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945–1951* (London, 1983), esp. 720.

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Bevin were provoked by George Kitson's "Isle of Wight analogy" and the proposal to hand over Hong Kong to China as a gesture of friendship. Sargent wrote that it would be "a complete delusion" to believe that concessions in Hong Kong would "buy Chinese good will."[76] In words that summed up one side of the controversy over Hong Kong's future, he continued: "The fact is that if we do abandon any part of our present position in Hong Kong, including the New Territories, it will be either because we have no longer the physical means (military and financial) to maintain our position or because we anticipate that sooner or later the Chinese Government will be able to hold us to ransom by paralysing our trade and administration in Hong Kong."[77] Bevin noted, "I agree with Sargent," thus closing, not quite forever but almost, the protracted wartime debate whether or not Hong Kong ought to be returned to the Chinese.[78] Bevin did not, however, suggest at this stage anything other than a negative, defensive stance whereby the British would do nothing and say nothing about the status of Hong Kong. For the next two years, the Colonial Office, in response to requests from Governor Grantham for a more assertive public statement, importuned the Foreign Office but with the same result.[79] As a Foreign Office official summed it up, "The Colonial Office have pressed at intervals since 1946 for an authoritative statement on the Colony's future and we have advised the Secretary of State to resist."[80] In the judgment of the Foreign Office, it was best to let the issue lie dormant.

With public interest roused because of deteriorating conditions in China, the Foreign Office in the summer of 1948 faced parliamentary inquiries about the future of Hong Kong. The assistant undersecretary supervising Far Eastern affairs, Michael Wright, wrote: "Our object is to retain Hong Kong for as long as we can, but we have to face the fact that it is in the power of the Chinese whether by boycott or otherwise to render our position in Hong Kong untenable." He therefore advised that the issue should be kept as quiet as possible by persuading members of Parliament to withdraw questions about the future of the colony: "This seems to be a classic case of the wisdom of letting sleeping dogs lie."[81] Sargent held a much more aggressive view, in part because of the moral to be drawn from the story of appeasement in the late 1930s. He, too, wanted to avoid public debate, but if it

[76] Sargent, Minute, March 19, 1946, FO 371/53632. Two years earlier, G. F. Hudson, one of the leading British historians advising the Foreign Office on East Asia during the war, had written: "we should get no gratitude from China for a unilateral 'gesture' of rendition. But it is important that the rendition, if it is to be made, should be made on principle as recognition of China's services to the cause of the United Nations [i.e., the wartime alliance], and not on grounds of geographical and ethnic claims by China; otherwise it would serve as a precedent for Gibraltar." Hudson, Minute, July 10, 1944, FO 371/41657. Hudson was a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. His books included *The Far East in World Politics* (London, 1937).

[77] Sargent, Minute, March 19, 1946, FO 371/53632.

[78] For later reassessments of Britain's position in Hong Kong and the resumption of the debate, see Tsang, *Appointment with China*, chaps. 4–5.

[79] For the debate in the Colonial Office and Grantham's assertion that the Chinese in Hong Kong believed that "in a showdown" the British would "desert the Colony," see CO 537/3702, particularly the minute by Sidebotham, June 11, 1948. See also minutes in HK Secretariat 1/1166/47C.

[80] Peter Scarlett (head of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office), Minute, June 8, 1948, FO 371/69582A. For the corresponding debate in the Colonial Office, see CO 537/3702.

[81] Michael Wright, Minute, June 8, 1948, FO 371/69582A. For similar American estimates of deteriorating conditions in China, based on intelligence reports on "incompetence, corruption and lack of popular support" of the Nationalist government, see Nanking to Washington, No. 701, Secret, April 27, 1948, USSD HK, File 800, Box 7.

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proved to be necessary, then the Foreign Office should concur with the Colonial Office and make it clear to the world that Hong Kong was and would remain British: "If we once begin to hedge and qualify we shall not only demoralise our friends in Hong Kong—not to mention the British officials there—but we shall also encourage the Chinese hot-heads to start an agitation in the hope of pushing us still further down the slope of appeasement."[82] On this occasion, Bevin did not follow the advice of the permanent undersecretary. Bevin was watching the course of the Chinese civil war, in which he wished to stay as neutral as possible. He did not want to stir up either side on the issue of Hong Kong. His temperament did not allow him to leave things to chance, but he moved with caution. He would go no further than agree to an announcement in Parliament on July 7, 1948, that the British government anticipated no change in the status of Hong Kong.

In mid-1948, the Colonial Office was swept into the mainstream of debate, though with the colonial secretary as a junior partner to the foreign secretary. Creech Jones stood in the shadow of Bevin. "Creech," as he was known in Labour circles, had long regarded himself as a lieutenant to Bevin in the Labour movement, and the relationship continued in the affairs of the Labour government. The colonial secretary thus resisted pressure from the governor and from within the Colonial Office to make a strong statement that the British would hold their own in Hong Kong.[83] He wanted to avoid confrontation in Cabinet discussions, in which Bevin would predominate. "I do not relish a decision against us," Creech Jones wrote to his staff.[84] He concurred in Bevin's view that the colony might be held if the British could keep on as good terms as possible with the Communists yet convince them that Hong Kong could not be taken without stiff resistance.

The mood in the Colonial Office was somber, indeed, alarmist, as revealed especially in the reaction of officials to a newspaper report entitled "War Threat to Helpless Hong Kong." The author was Patrick O'Donovan, a columnist respected in the Colonial Office for balanced views. O'Donovan wrote in December 1948 that the British in Hong Kong seemed to be "tiptoeing between two extremes." In a passage that was underscored in ink in the Colonial Office, the article stated:

> Certainly the administration's task is delicate. There are more than 1,500,000 Chinese in the colony, and a few thousand Britishers, Portuguese, Eurasians and Indians. *Only a few hundred Chinese feel any profound loyalty to the Crown* [CO emphasis].
>
> The last war demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of the island. The present garrison is scarcely sufficient to maintain law and order. The island could be crippled instantly by a Communist-called general strike.[85]

[82] Sargent, Minute, June 8, 1948, FO 371/69582A.

[83] There was one prominent exception to the consensus in the Colonial Office that Hong Kong should be held. Sir Charles Jeffries, the constitutional authority, believed Hong Kong to be so exceptional that it should be administered by Britain as a "free city" under "a special trusteeship." See Jeffries, Memorandum, May 25, 1949, Creech Jones Papers, Box 57, file 1. This was the last flicker of the old wartime controversy whether or not Hong Kong ought to be returned to China, perhaps with UN trusteeship as an intermediary stage. Some members of the Cabinet found this solution attractive, at least as a fall-back position. Bevin resisted it though did not entirely rule it out. See Hyam, *British Documents on the End of Empire*, 2: no. 170.

[84] Creech Jones, Minute, June 22, 1948, CO 537/3702.

[85] Patrick O'Donovan, December 2, 1948, in CO 537/3702. O'Donovan was the special correspondent of the *Daily Post* in Hong Kong.

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On the sentence about loyalty, one Colonial Office official commented: "One of the few press articles I have seen which really faces the hard facts."[86]

The "hard facts" were much more ambiguous. Grantham did not believe that the Chinese who now took down portraits of Chiang Kai-shek would be any more inclined to espouse the cause of communism or that underlying Chinese sympathies in Hong Kong would change in any way. He thought that the Chinese population of Hong Kong favored British rule, though he kept a close eye out for subversive elements within the administration, especially in the police.[87] Grantham knew that the Communists in the past had not attempted to destabilize Hong Kong, and he believed that they probably would not do so in the immediate future. He was far less concerned with ideological issues than were officials in the Colonial Office and Foreign Office. To Grantham, what mattered was the efficiency and discipline of the Communists. They had to be persuaded that it would be in their own interest not to interfere in Hong Kong. He made aggressive public statements, but his purpose was to steady the Europeans as well as the Chinese in Hong Kong and to demonstrate that the British would not desert them. At the same time, he feared that the Labour government might indeed abandon the colony; thus his demands for a statement that the British would hold Hong Kong come what may. In the spring of 1949, he increasingly argued that such a public reassurance was imperative, especially in view of the disastrous *Amethyst* incident.[88]

In April 1949, Chinese Communist troops had opened fire and grounded a British gunboat, H.M.S. *Amethyst*, on its way up the Yangzi River from Shanghai to Nanjing. The captain, Lieutenant Commander B. M. Skinner, died of injuries. Rescue attempts by the Royal Navy proved futile. The Communists held the *Amethyst* captive until late July, when it managed to escape by night down river under the command of an assistant naval attaché at the British Embassy in Nanjing, Lieutenant Commandeer J. S. Kerans. The *Amethyst* broke free from the coast and sailed to Hong Kong, where the crew received a tumultuous, jubilant reception. In England, the press and public regarded the escape as a daring act of bravery, but in fact the *Amethyst* episode had humiliated the navy. Far from the anticommunist victory depicted in the newspapers, a British ship had been held hostage for over a hundred days and had only managed to escape under cover of darkness. It was during the time of the *Amethyst* captivity that the Cabinet made the critical decisions on Hong Kong. There was a prevailing sense of anger and frustration. (One is reminded of the statement by Winston Churchill in the 1920s, "Punishing China is like flogging a jelly fish.") Grantham described the mounting anxiety in Hong Kong in May 1949: "[T]he public reaction here to the crossing of the Yangtze, the fall of Nanking, and the forthcoming fall of Shanghai . . . have had a profound effect on public opinion." The attack on the *Amethyst* had "gravely aggravated" an already troubled public mood.[89]

[86] Minute, December 6, 1948, CO 537/3702.

[87] See the intelligence assessment in Chiefs of Staff (49) 12, January 7, 1949, DEFE 5/13, which reported Grantham's view that "Chinese members of the Police Force cannot be regarded as wholly reliable."

[88] See Malcolm H. Murfett, *Hostage on the Yangtze: Britain, China, and the "Amethyst" Crisis of 1949* (Annapolis, Md., 1991).

[89] Grantham to Creech Jones, Top Secret, May 3, 1949, FO 371/75780. The dispatch provoked a

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In the forefront of official deliberation was the impression conveyed by the governor that Hong Kong must now batten down and prepare against a possible Communist onslaught. Grantham, as has been seen, was in fact less alarmist than the Colonial Office, but his measured rhetoric was effective. Would the British government now at last issue a determined and vigorous statement that the colony would be held at any cost? Would such a declaration rouse the United States to support the British position in Hong Kong? According to a report drawn up on the basis of intelligence sources in Hong Kong in early 1949, the Communists in the colony itself were quiescent, but in view of the crumbling Nationalist position the British would have to anticipate an attack:

> It still remains the policy of the Communists in Hong Kong to lie low and to avoid a head-on collision with the administration which would hamper their more overt activities . . . How long this policy will be maintained depends entirely on circumstances, but, as the Communist advance South of the Yangtze develops, a change to a more active attitude of hostility may be anticipated, and at any moment a decision by the Communist higher command to turn to the direct offensive [might also be anticipated].
>
> This would mean strikes internally and possibly guerrilla or direct military attack externally.[90]

The attack might not come in the immediate future, but the British would have to prepare for it. Grantham wrote in May 1949: "Since the beginning, last summer, of the Chinese Communist armies' sweeping successes, there has been a growing though for the most part latent uneasiness, both in European and in Chinese circles here, about the future of this Colony." He made it clear publicly that he detected an infirmity of will on the part of the British government. Unless a committed and determined attitude were struck, public morale would be undermined and the colony lost before it could be saved. "The events of 1941, when the Hong Kong . . . defence [was] undertaken with an inadequate regular garrison, are freely recalled." The matter was of utmost gravity. "It is being said that neither British prestige nor British military strength is any longer adequate to safeguard British interests in the Far East." Did Britain have the "will" to defend Hong Kong?[91]

With the sweep of the Communist armies southward, the issue now rose to the highest levels of the British government.[92] In the context of Bevin's China policy, Attlee took the initiative in the Cabinet. The prime minister worked closely with the defense minister, A. V. Alexander, the Labour government's stalwart on issues of defense. Steady, slow, and sound, the former First Lord of the Admiralty moved

comment in the Foreign Office on Grantham's "bellicose" attitude. P. D. Coates, Minute, May 14, 1949, FO 371/75780.

[90] "Report on Communist Activities in Hong Kong," in Grantham to Secretary of State, Secret, February 23, 1949, FO 371/75779. For a comparable American intelligence report on the "overwhelmingly more capable and powerful" Communist position and corresponding danger to Hong Kong, see Nanking to Washington, No. 11, Secret, April 1, 1949, USSD HK, Box 10, File 350.2.

[91] Grantham to Secretary of State, Top Secret, May 3, 1949, FO 371/75780.

[92] For an acute comment, written before the release of archival material but informed by private papers, see D. C. Watt, "Britain and the Cold War in the Far East, 1945–58," in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Tokyo, 1977), 99–100; see also Feng, *British Government's China Policy*, 117–22. There is a brief but comprehensive analysis of the problem by Hyam in the introduction to *British Documents on the End of Empire*, 1: liii–liv.

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through the waters of the Far Eastern crisis with thoroughness and balanced judgment. He shared assumptions about the nature of Chinese Communism that were representative of members of the Labour government in the late 1940s.[93] Attlee, Bevin, and Alexander all believed that the Chinese Communists adhered to the philosophy of "Marxist Leninism," that they were aligned with the Soviet Union, and that the collapse of Hong Kong would lead to the fall of Malaya and the general British position in Southeast Asia.[94]

Attlee made the key statement defining British policy to the Cabinet on May 26, 1949. In the meeting itself, there was powerful dissent. Sir Stafford Cripps, the chancellor of the Exchequer, thought that Hong Kong ought to be abandoned, principally on grounds of economy but also because, like others, he believed holding it to be untenable: internal subversion combined with external pressure had created a situation similar to that in Berlin but without any guarantee of American or, for that matter, Commonwealth support. Most members of the Cabinet regarded Cripps's argument as defeatist. Attlee skillfully marshaled a consensus by urging on his colleagues the proposition that "failure to meet this threat to the security of Hong Kong would damage very seriously British prestige throughout the Far East and South-East Asia." He rested his case on the necessity to resist aggression. In the course of the discussion, three significant points emerged that he found most persuasive: "Practical evidence of our determination to defend Hong Kong would have important consequences. First, it might well deter the Communist forces from making a direct attack on the Colony. Secondly, it would rally to our side the wavering elements among the local population and would substantially reduce the threat to internal security. Thirdly, it would strengthen the anti-Communist front throughout South-East Asia." The Cabinet discussion struck a note that echoed the lessons of appeasement and formed part of the emerging domino theory: "The maintenance of our trading position in Hong Kong was doubtless important; but even more important at the present time was the political question whether we must not somewhere make a stand against Communist encroachment in East Asia. If we failed to make this stand in Hong Kong, should we not find it much harder to make it elsewhere in South-East Asia?"[95] The argument for the British holding fast can be summed up in Attlee's statement that

[93] The extensive minutes of Guy Burgess on the theory of Communism and the issue of Hong Kong are of interest in this regard. Burgess appears to have been at pains to depict "the rigid and essential orthodoxy of Chinese Communist policy" (Minute, August 5, 1949, FO 371/75749), a view that coincided with that of Bevin and others. No one reading Burgess's minutes would have anticipated, in my judgment, his later defection to the Soviet Union.

[94] As almost in a litany, Attlee explained in a telegram to the Australian prime minister: "Leaders of Chinese Communist Party are orthodox Marxist Leninists and there is no doubt that their present strongly pro-Soviet policy constitutes serious threat to our political and economic interests not only in China but also in South East Asia." Attlee to J. B. Chifley, Top Secret, August 20, 1949, AA 3318/1, L49/3/1/22/1. On the views of the Hong Kong Secretariat on the theory of Communism, in HK Secretariat 21/3571/49, see, for example, G. A. Aldington, Minute, January 23, 1952.

[95] Cabinet Minutes (49) 38, May 26, 1949, CAB 128/15; this and other important documents are reproduced by Hyam, *British Documents on the End of Empire*, 2: nos. 164–72. For the background of Attlee's decision, see PREM 8/945, esp. Norman Brook, Minutes, May 12 and 19, 1949. For the Foreign Office view at this time, see the minutes by Bevin's principal adviser on East Asia, (Sir) Esler Dening, FO 371/75754, esp. his comment of May 13, 1949. Dening and others hoped that China might become "another Yugoslavia" and thus more amenable to the British position in Hong Kong. See esp. his further minute of August 16, 1949, FO 371/75766.

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"the whole common front against Communism in Siam, Burma and Malay[a] was likely to crumble unless the peoples of those countries were convinced of our determination and ability to resist this threat to Hong Kong."[96]

The extent of the commitment to defend Hong Kong remained debatable. Alexander had stated in the House of Commons on May 5, 1949, that Britain would strengthen the garrison in the colony, but the statement, though robust, was studiously vague. What would be the extent of the British reinforcement? How could the United States be drawn in to support the British cause? On the other hand, would not American support alienate the Chinese Communists still further? Could Australia and New Zealand be persuaded to contribute troops, ships, and aircraft? What of morale within Hong Kong? Could the colony be expected to defend itself? Alexander and Creech Jones debated the appointment of a military governor to replace Grantham.[97] Should there in any event be a unified command structure?

To answer those questions, Alexander left on June 2 for a marathon trip to the Far East, arriving in Hong Kong four days later. He conferred with the governor and the military authorities, examining from all angles the central question: how far could Hong Kong be defended by its own forces and how much reinforcement would be necessary? The minister of defense aimed to convince the governor that there needed to be a unified command structure in which the commander-in-chief could take immediate and effective action. Alexander explained the rationale: "[T]he rapid advance of the Chinese Communist Forces made it imperative to ensure that any military or security measures could be taken without delays, which would go far to render them ineffective, and might lead to disaster in circumstances which would gravely affect the whole of the position in South-East Asia."[98] After a sleepless night during which Grantham pondered the consequences of relinquishing part of his virtual dictatorship, he agreed to the creation of a new post of commander-in-chief. (Grantham nevertheless reserved the right of appeal.) There was one further major point of friction. In other colonies, notably Malaya, immigration controls and such security measures as the registration of all inhabitants had proved to be the first steps toward effective internal security. Grantham believed that similar measures in Hong Kong would stifle trade and "kill off the corpse," in other words the colony itself, which would suffer a slow if not a quick death and make the defense more difficult because of the opposition that registration would arouse among the Chinese. Alexander in effect wanted to close the border. "We should lose all our trade with China," Grantham remarked.[99] On this point, the governor held his ground, even though frontier controls were subsequently introduced in May 1950 to reduce the number of immigrants.

[96] Cabinet Minutes (49) 38, May 26, 1949, CAB 128/15. For the parallel between China 1945–1949 and Vietnam 1961–1965, see the sustained argument by Ernest R. May, *The Truman Administration and China, 1945–1949* (Philadelphia, 1975).

[97] See "Disadvantages of Replacing the Civil Governor by a Service Governor," Memorandum, Creech Jones Papers, Box 57, file 1, n.d. [probably May 1949], in which the Colonial Office successfully argued that replacing Grantham "might well be interpreted as indicating that we regard an external attack on the Colony as inevitable. This would be bad for the morale of the population of Hong Kong and moreover might make an external attack more likely."

[98] Alexander, Memorandum, Top Secret, June 17, 1949, C.P. (49) 134, CAB 129/35; CO 537/4838.

[99] Grantham to Secretary of State, No. 579, Top Secret, June 14, 1949, CO 537/4838.

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Alexander formed a high opinion of the governor, but he found the British business community in Hong Kong to be far less admirable, especially on the issue of defense: "The business people want the best of both worlds. They want adequate defence provided for their interests and persons, but nothing said about it, and to go on making money, indifferent to the questions of principle which arise . . . Yet no successful defence of Hong Kong can be conducted which does not have regard to the dominating position of the trading interests in the Colony."[100] Alexander deferred to Grantham's judgment that the British community "would be willing to play their part," yet Grantham himself was skeptical regarding how long Hong Kong business firms would sustain financial losses before urging a compromise peace with the Communists.[101] In general, Alexander concluded that Hong Kong had the capacity to demonstrate "our will to resist aggression and . . . the onward rush of communism in South-East Asia."[102] Grantham believed that, with reinforcements, Hong Kong's position could be held "indefinitely."[103]

Attlee and Alexander thought that the Australians and New Zealanders might see it in their own interest to contribute to the defense of the colony, perhaps with a battalion of troops, an aircraft carrier, and naval forces directly from Australia, perhaps by shifting a squadron of Mustang fighter planes from Japan, perhaps by naval support from New Zealand. The New Zealand prime minister, Peter Fraser, immediately volunteered the modest support of three frigates.[104] The Australian Labor government of J. B. Chifley, however, declined the invitation, in the belief that Hong Kong would prove impossible to defend and that British action might lead to "full-scale war" in China.[105] The British had held rather extravagant hopes for Australian support, which now had to be extracted from slender British

[100] Alexander, Memorandum, June 17, 1949.

[101] Grantham to Secretary of State, June 14, 1949.

[102] Alexander, Memorandum, June 17, 1949.

[103] Grantham to Secretary of State, June 14, 1949. Grantham and others, including the military planners, made this assessment assuming that the Soviet Union would not intervene. In the event of "appreciable Russian help," Hong Kong would be "indefensible." See the extensive estimate by Commanders-in-Chief, Far East, Top Secret Guard ["Guard" signified not for American eyes], October 7, 1949, COS (49) 330, DEFE 5/16.

[104] The developments on the New Zealand side can be traced in the file on Hong Kong NZ AAEG 950/389A (300/3/1), see esp. Fraser's full exposition of the problem in Peter Fraser to J. B. Chifley, Top Secret and Personal, No. 77, June 15, 1949. See Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Auckland, 1992), 1: 37–38, for New Zealand's "first peacetime defence commitment in South-East Asia." I am grateful to Dr. McGibbon for his assistance in the New Zealand National Archives. For the reaction of other Commonwealth countries, esp. India but also Canada, see Hyam, *British Documents on the End of Empire*, 1: nos. 166–69.

[105] Chifley to Attlee, No. 85, Top Secret Personal, June 15, 1949, AA 3318/1, L 49/3/1/22/1. H. V. Evatt, the attorney general and minister for external affairs, played the key part in the Australian refusal. Evatt criticized both Britain and the United States as well as the Soviet Union for sustaining tensions in the Cold War. From the British perspective (and the American), he aimed to establish Australia as the successor to the British in the Pacific region. Evatt had been in London in the spring of 1949 and led the British to believe that Australian support for Hong Kong would be forthcoming. On his return to Australia, however, he reversed himself. In any event, his refusal to support the British was in line with Chifley's disinclination. There is a valuable contemporary analysis of the sequence of these events by the New Zealand permanent secretary for external affairs, A. D. McIntosh, Memorandum, June 16, 1949, NZ AAEG 950/389A (300/3/1). See David Lee, *Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy* (Canberra, 1995), 103–04; and Christopher Waters, *The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s* (Melbourne, 1995), 183–88; see also E. M. Andrews, *Australia and China: The Ambiguous Relationship* (Melbourne, 1985), 135–38. For Hong Kong in British–Australian–New Zealand strategic planning, W. David McIntyre,

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resources. Depending on how one juggled the statistics, the reinforcement of Hong Kong might reduce the home defense of the British Isles to a single infantry brigade. In any case, it would involve the transfer of engineer and signal forces from Germany as well as a Royal Marines Commando brigade and an armored regiment from the Middle East.[106] In the event, troop strength in Hong Kong increased from a few thousand to well over a division, including a Gurka regiment, and by the autumn of 1949 there were some 30,000 troops supported by tanks, land-based fighter aircraft, and a substantial naval unit, including an aircraft carrier.[107] The scale of mobilization thus compared in significant measure with that of Palestine, where a year previously the British had been armed to the teeth with 100,000 troops, one soldier for every city block in Jerusalem.

In the process of reinforcement, Hong Kong acquired a status in the Cold War comparable to that of Berlin in resisting Communist expansion. Although the blockade against Berlin had been lifted, the danger persisted. Attlee informed the Commonwealth prime ministers in September 1949 in a clipped and urgent telegram: "In some respects situation is similar to that which faced us—and to some extent still faces us—in Berlin. Just as we cannot foresee with certainty how future of Berlin will develop but are convinced of necessity of remaining there, so we are impelled to remain in Hong Kong without any clear indication of extent or duration of military commitments involved. In both cases the threat of Russian and Communist expansionism necessitates holding what we have and not withdrawing." Hong Kong was therefore one of the principal pillars of Western defense that might fall in Asia.

> For political and strategical reasons we cannot permit South East Asia to be dominated by Communism, and from an economic point of view it would be a disaster if the area were cut off from rest of the world. Any weakening before Communists in Hong Kong would be regarded by peoples of South East Asia as beginning of a general retreat and they would immediately turn their thoughts towards making terms with the new power of Communism.[108]

The significance of Hong Kong was thus defined in highest terms of the Cold War.

The Americans proved receptive to the argument that the colony should be held, but they did not commit themselves. In September 1949, the foreign secretary met with the American secretary of state, Dean Acheson. Previously lukewarm, Acheson now became more sympathetic to the plight of Hong Kong. The British record of the meeting includes the following exchange:

Background to the Anzus Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945–55 (Basingstoke, 1995), esp. 118, 141–42, 176. I am indebted to Dr. David Lee for his help in the Australian Archives.

[106] See, for example, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff, JP (49) 50 (Final), May 17, 1949, DEFE 6/9.

[107] Against which the Chinese Communists might marshal some 65 warships (including 7 destroyers and 15 gunboats) and 250 aircraft "of all types." The naval vessels and aircraft had been seized mainly from the Nationalists. The Chinese Communist army was estimated at 2.25 million. These estimates were passed on to the Pacific Dominions, for example A. N. Snelling to Fraser, Top Secret, June 28, 1949, NZ AAEG 950/389A (300/3/1).

[108] Attlee to U.K. High Commissioners, Telegram, No. 326, Top Secret, September 7, 1949, CO 537/4805.

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Mr. Bevin said . . . if there was aggression against Hong Kong, this would be resisted with all available forces . . . The authorities [in Hong Kong] were now confident of their ability to face armed aggression, economic blockade or subversive activities from within.

Mr. Acheson said he thought the policy described by Mr. Bevin was a sound and reasonable one, which should receive the support of the United States Government.[109]

In a discussion ranging over Southeast Asia and India as well as Japan and China, Bevin and Acheson in fact did not give sustained attention to the problem of Hong Kong. It appears that Bevin aimed to secure general American endorsement for the British stand but to leave it at that. The military consequences, on which the U.S. Navy would have had substantial comment, were not discussed. Even though Acheson accepted Bevin's line of argument, the British did not receive an American military guarantee. After the outbreak of the Korean War, however, President Truman in June 1950 ordered the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits.[110] The proximity of the 7th Fleet, the British believed, acted as a deterrent against possible Chinese moves on Hong Kong.[111]

Partly because of inflated British rhetoric, Hong Kong from 1949 became known as "the Berlin of the East." But to those who gave close thought to the proposition, it was ironic. To the governor of Hong Kong, at least, the purpose was precisely the opposite. Hong Kong needed to be defended but not become a center of ongoing crisis.[112] Economic prosperity would depend on keeping the colony on peaceful terms with China and at the same time redirecting Hong Kong's trade and industry toward the West. A prosperous Hong Kong might benefit both China and Britain. In the long run, this proved to be the Communist view as well. At the time, Bevin calculated on the basis of intelligence reports from Hong Kong and elsewhere that Communist forces in 1949 were too disorganized to attempt a concerted effort against the colony. Whatever the short-term motive, Communist troops stopped at the northern border on October 17, 1949, and did not attempt to move further.

One might reflect that Hong Kong as "the Berlin of the East" did not suit the purpose of Attlee or Bevin any more than it did the governor of Hong Kong. Bevin's China policy finally crystallized in the summer and autumn of 1949. It had two purposes. The first was to demonstrate to the Chinese Communists that the seizure of Hong Kong would not only be a costly venture but would destroy a commercial and industrial entrepôt that otherwise might benefit China's own economy. In Grantham's words, "all they would get would be an empty shell."[113] The other aim was to keep on good terms with the People's Republic by according recognition as

[109] Record of meeting, Top Secret, September 13, 1949, CO 537/4805. For the U.S. account, see Dean Acheson, Memorandum, September 13, 1949, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, 9: 81–85, which confirms that Acheson used the phrase "sound and reasonable."

[110] See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950* (New York, 1983), 23–24, and the detailed discussion of source material in the notes, 216–18. See also Edwin W. Martin, *Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China* (Lexington, Ky., 1986), chap. 25.

[111] See, for example, Sir Robert Black to Sir Hilton Poynton (Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office), Top Secret and Personal, October 30, 1962, CO 1030/1300.

[112] This interpretation is successfully argued in Tsang, "Cold War and Hong Kong's Policy towards Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Activities in the 1950s," but it should be compared with Feng, *British Government's China Policy*, which upholds the view that the British sustained Hong Kong as an outpost in the Cold War.

[113] Grantham, *Via Ports*, 172.

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soon as possible and thus reducing the danger, so it was hoped, of British commercial firms being taken over or expelled from the mainland. British recognition took place in January 1950 despite the chasm in outlook that existed between the United States and Britain.[114] Although the British succeeded in holding Hong Kong, recognition of the People's Republic did not prevent the gradual squeezing out of British firms from China by 1954.[115]

IT IS NOW CLOSE TO HALF A CENTURY since the British made the critical decision to defend Hong Kong, and one can contemplate the wider significance on the basis of the archival evidence that extends to the 1960s. What do the British records reveal about Chinese motivation and intent? Reflecting on events of 1949, Sir Robert (Robin) Black, Grantham's successor, wrote a decade later that "there has been no [Chinese] suggestion of an intention to 'liberate' Hong Kong at an early date." Black was governor from 1958 to 1962. His contemporaries respected his gift for political analysis, and his judgment is thus a matter of some interest. He believed that Grantham had set the course necessary for the colony's survival by being bold yet giving way when necessary, by being firm yet taking care not to provoke.[116] Black acknowledged that, however firm might be the British stand, it was the American 7th Fleet that acted as the immediate deterrent. The People's Republic did not seize the colony in part because "an attack upon Hong Kong might precipitate a war with the United States."[117] But he also believed that the Chinese, by using a variety of tactics, could eventually have overcome the danger posed by the American forces had they calculated it to be in their national interest. As a Chinese priority, Hong Kong fell well below those of Tibet and Taiwan.[118] But there were further reasons. The economic value of Hong Kong to the People's Republic was of obvious importance: "The Chinese Government derives advantage both from the foreign exchange which it earns here and from the financial facilities available here."[119] Beyond that were two powerful and overriding calculations that caused Beijing, on the whole, to remain silent.

The first was the Chinese assessment, so the British believed, that the issue of Hong Kong should be kept between China and Britain and not become a

[114] See esp. Ritchie Ovendale, "Britain, the United States and the Recognition of Communist China," *Historical Journal* 26, no. 1 (1983): 139–58; Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust*, chap. 2; and Martin, *Divided Counsel*, part 2.

[115] See Aron Shai, "Imperialism Imprisoned: The Closure of British Firms in the People's Republic of China," *English Historical Review* 104 (1989); I have also benefited from reading the draft chapter on China by Jürgen Osterhammel in the *Oxford History of the British Empire* (vol. 4, in progress), which concludes: "At least symbolically, with the removal in 1954 of Jardine Matheson & Co., the old agency house of opium trade times, an epoch had ended."

[116] Black to Secretary of State, Secret, January 21, 1959, CO 1030/590.

[117] Black to Secretary of State, January 21, 1959.

[118] For example, see L. H. Lamb (Peking) to C. H. Johnston, Confidential, June 17, 1952, HK Secretariat 26/4841/52, for the view that the Chinese "recovery" of Hong Kong would come after the "liberation" of Tibet and Taiwan. It was the Taiwan problem that preoccupied the Hong Kong Secretariat because of the presence of Kuomintang "personages" in Hong Kong who were "merely trying to keep a back-door open to help them save their skins when the Communists invade Formosa." J. F. Nicoll (Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong) to Secretary of State, Top Secret, No. 23, July 17, 1950, HK Secretariat 5/1162/46.

[119] Black to Secretary of State, Secret, January 21, 1959, CO 1030/590.

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confrontation involving the United Nations. "China, no less than Britain, would deplore United Nations' sponsorship and initiative for a change of the status of Hong Kong."[120] From the Chinese vantage point, there was nothing to be gained from the internationalization of the issue and much to be said in favor of keeping Hong Kong a purely bilateral matter beyond the competence of the UN. The second calculation concerned, in Black's phrase, China's "undaunted sense of time." The British presence in Hong Kong had a terminal date of July 1997. "There are no explanations," Black wrote, for China's "failure to press her claims on Hong Kong hitherto, other than a conviction that time will not derogate from those claims and an assessment that her immediate interests counsel restraint. It is on this slim thread that the stability and, indeed, the security of Hong Kong depend." Black made one final observation that endorsed his predecessor's lack of enthusiasm for broadening the franchise and democratizing Hong Kong: "[T]here has been no substantial or sustained movement towards self-determination and self-government in Hong Kong . . . There is emphatically no emotional popular support for such a course." He rejected out of hand Governor Young's plan for the creation of a city-state with a British allegiance.[121] In Black's judgment, as in Grantham's, as long as the British did not attempt to create in Hong Kong a separate political identity and an independent city-state, the People's Republic would tolerate the temporary existence of a British administration.

[120] Black to Poynton, Top Secret and Personal, October 30, 1962, CO 1030/1300.

[121] "People who have, from time to time, advocated such a course have been generally dismissed as unrealistic, irrational or disingenuous." Black to Poynton, October 30, 1962.

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Review Essay

Writing the Yugoslav Wars: English-Language Books on Bosnia (1992–1996) and the Challenges of Analyzing Contemporary History

SARAH A. KENT

ON JUNE 10, 1996, THE EDITORS OF THE *New York Times* opened a month-long public forum on the World Wide Web that consisted of a photojournalistic essay by Gilles Peress and twelve topics related to the war in Bosnia, ranging from "U.S. Interests, U.S. Achievements" (hosted by Madeleine Albright) to "Healing and Reconciliation" (hosted by Erwin Staub) (www.nytimes.com). The result was a "flame war," primarily between pro-Croat and pro-Serb respondents, that moved to the Web from other sites on the Internet. Initially, participants directed their energy to arguments on specific issues and to attacks on particular hosts. Christiane Amanpour, whose forum bore the unfortunate title "Have We Learned Nothing from History?" was criticized not only for her own reporting but also for an alleged anti-Serbian bias throughout the U.S. media; within ten days, a few of the participants had worked their way around to insinuations about her personal life. Amanpour and Albright, who was similarly criticized, wisely did not respond to the charges, and some participants then turned to mutually rancorous attacks. On June 22, for example, one participant lapsed into epithet with "Ušuti, ofucana fitmijo!" (Shut your trap, you mangy slut) after a series of increasingly sharp exchanges with another, and other gratuitous personal attacks followed. Other participants who wished to see a serious forum on Bosnia develop began debating the line between freedom of speech and permissible censorship.

That the site descended into a flame war is hardly surprising since it followed on the heels of the five years of actual war that has consumed parts of the former Yugoslavia. Few area experts—whether scholars, journalists, diplomats, or humanitarian aid workers—actively participated in the forum, and some nonspecialists seeking information to help guide them through the issues quickly became discouraged. The difficulties with level of discourse on the web site also underscore the reality that understanding Bosnia poses challenges much like those presented by other major complex and controversial contemporary events, such as the recent struggles in South Africa, the continuing conflicts in Northern Ireland, and the ongoing battles in the Middle East. Each of those conflicts has produced a body of contemporary analysis much like the works under review here. Like Bosnia, each is complicated and yet each also demands historical understanding and interpretation.

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The challenge for historians is how to employ the distinctive analytical tools of our discipline to evaluate the basically ahistorical body of work on a current event.

Since the outbreak of the conflict in 1991, authors who have written on the former Yugoslavia have essentially sought to distribute responsibility for the demise of that state, and certainly developments after Tito's death provide a broad field for the assigning of blame. The increasing economic troubles and hyperinflation that undercut the Yugoslav standard of living in the 1980s progressively damaged as well the Yugoslav identity that emerged from the Communist imposition of "Brotherhood and Unity" in the period after World War II. Ever-greater competition for shrinking resources gave rise to a sharper articulation of various parochial interests, which manifested itself in disagreements among the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia. Since each of the republics had one dominant nationality, the articulation of regional grievances easily mutated into an articulation of national grievances. The exception was Bosnia and Hercegovina, in which Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims, composed the largest but not the dominant group, since Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats together outnumbered them.

One approach to explaining the demise of the former Yugoslavia emerges directly out of the context of regional and national conflict: which republic or group of individuals bears the greatest responsibility for the destruction of the state?[1] Although the articulation of Serbian grievances in the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1986 and Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević's subsequent use of Serbian dissatisfaction helped undermine consensus within the former Yugoslavia and powerfully contributed to eventual constitutional collapse, the Serb leadership was not operating in a political vacuum, nor were Serbs alone in being adversely affected by the worsening economic situation. The Slovene leadership, especially when Janez Drnovšek headed the Yugoslav presidency, began increasingly to express the demands of Slovenes who resented their profits being siphoned off to support the economically weaker republics, while the rise of Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian Democratic Union brought a resurgence of Croatian national sentiment—and resentment—to the fore.

Among scholars, the increasing complexity of arguments that attribute blame has given rise to broader contextualization of the destruction of Yugoslavia.[2] The fall of communism in 1989 and 1990 may have ended the Cold War, but it also increased global instability and made international crisis to some degree systemic as economies faltered in their transition from socialism to capitalism. Although few post-communist societies have descended into extreme communal violence, the

[1] Three of the better books on the former Yugoslavia written by non-scholars are Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences* (New York, 1995); Branka Magaš, *Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up, 1980–92* (London, 1993); and Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York, 1996), which is also available in video form from the Discovery Channel.

[2] Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C., 1995), deals with the destruction of Yugoslavia in the context of international crises. Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, 2d edn. (Boulder, Colo., 1996), emphasizes the disintegration of a unified political elite in the dissolution of the country. Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, 1996), approaches the issue from a more sociological perspective. Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis, 1994), uses a Social-Democratic perspective to frame the examination of nationalism.

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Yugoslav conflict is, arguably, in part the legacy of communism, if only because the failure of communism eventually meant that the Yugoslav identity was no longer imaginable even for the post–World War II generations that were schooled in the ideology of Brotherhood and Unity. This progressive fragmentation of a unified political elite and its replacement by elites that reflected parochial interests also raises the larger question of the dubious role of nationalism in the post-communist world, where it can function both as an important element in reconstructing the state and as the genesis of pathological relations with neighboring—and, in the context of the former Yugoslavia, closely related—peoples.

This burgeoning literature on the demise of the former Yugoslavia, which has been usefully reviewed by Gale Stokes, Dennison Rusinow, and John Lampe in their article "Instant History,"[3] thus expresses a disparate set of authors' concerns and theoretical orientations. As Stokes, Lampe, and Rusinow make clear, however, much of the literature that has appeared on the former Yugoslavia generally lacks a formal theoretical framework. This is particularly true of the literature on Bosnia, which has been written primarily by non-scholars. The wide array of English-language materials on Bosnia published by commercial and university presses has left many of those interested in gaining a better understanding of the conflict confused about what book or books can be read with greatest profit. That nonspecialists seek a consensus view about this important conflict is understandable but at the moment unrealistic. Bosnia has confounded the international community and raised crucial questions about existing instruments for conflict resolution. Specialists, moreover, have not achieved agreement because they are still arguing not only about interpretation but even about the facts. To dismiss these works as flawed and therefore not worth examining, however, is to ignore the fact that much of the current literature on Bosnia is the first round of primary sources, which require a different reading strategy than does secondary literature.

The purpose of this article is to survey English-language publications on Bosnia, so that potential readers are better equipped to select a book on a topic in which they are particularly interested, and to illustrate how historians can assess this distinctive type of primary source. My basic premise is that readers understand that they should not be seeking "the Truth," which at this point is an exercise best left to politicians (who purport to know it) and the Almighty (who, we hope, does). Many of the books discussed in this article contain inaccurate statements and factual errors about historical and contemporary events in Bosnia. More important, all of them contain partisan arguments, because no author who writes on such a burning contemporary issue lacks a distinct point of view. In addition, few authors present a Bosnian Serb or a Bosnian Croat side of the story, because the authors of most of these books view the attempt to create a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia at the expense of the unitary Bosnian state as the source of the first genocide attempted on European soil since 1945.[4]

A general reader's principal task in approaching these books, like those produced

[3] Gale Stokes, *et al.*, "Instant History: Understanding the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession," *Slavic Review* 55 (Spring 1996): 136–60.

[4] Misha Glenney, who has written *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, rev. edn. (New York, 1995), is one of the few authors who presents Serb positions with some sympathy.

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by similar contemporary conflicts, is therefore to develop a critical perspective—that is, to examine authorial intent, to reconstruct the context of the author's experiences, and to assess the strengths and weakness of an author's interpretation. To aid readers in this endeavor, the first section of this article considers some sensitive points from nationalist positions that have emerged in the debate about the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The world of radical nationalist thought is a hermetic one that outsiders can penetrate only with difficulty, but nationalist positions have to some degree framed the very way in which most outsiders think about the Bosnian conflict. Myths, propaganda, oversimplifications, and analogies are integral parts of most of the books that have been published on Bosnia, either as factors that inform authors' arguments or as issues authors wish to refute. Readers must therefore start with a basic understanding of some sources of disagreement before plunging into a specific interpretation of Bosnia.

The rest of the article presents the existing literature on Bosnia according to its basic genre. The second part deals with some general works on Bosnia published since 1992. Some of these books were in the process of being researched and written when Bosnia destabilized; most were written in response to the war. The third, fourth, and fifth sections of the article discuss, respectively, accounts written by English-language journalists, accounts of the siege by Sarajevans, and accounts by representatives of the international community. Although area specialists have roundly criticized many of these authors, readers should keep in mind that interpreting bias is always the principal challenge when reading primary sources. The final section discusses the literature on war crimes, whose tragic dimensions are still being determined at the International Tribunal on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia.

EVEN A CURSORY ACQUAINTANCE with twentieth-century totalitarianism makes any reader cautious about the invocation of history as a justification for contemporary politics. George Orwell's Winston Smith, after all, participated in the daily revision of Oceania's history in *1984*, and the Soviet state really did require owners of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* to paste in a lengthy article about the Bering Strait to cover up the article on the head of the secret service, Lavrentii Beria, after he became a non-person. The notion that states make use of myths comes as no shock to Americans in particular. The doctrine of Manifest Destiny was a fig leaf for what some are now calling the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans from a whole continent, and in the last fifteen years we have engaged in the so-called multicultural wars, mired in a debate that is partly about which history of the United States should be taught and for whom.

That politicians in a disintegrating country such as the former Yugoslavia invoked historical myths to help legitimize themselves and their emergent nations should therefore come as no surprise, for the story that a people tells itself is a powerful exercise in contemporary politics. Since 1990, for example, some Croats have been wont to make the claim in official publications and speeches that the Croats are one of the older peoples in Europe. Because the Croats migrated in the sixth and

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seventh centuries into an area that had been part of the Roman Empire, a moment's reflection will raise in most non-nationalist minds the question, "Just which peoples were not already in Europe when the Croats arrived?" One does not have to have read the commentaries of Julius Caesar or the works of Tacitus to know that the Romans fought the Germanic tribes (including Angles and Saxons), as well as Celts, Greeks, Dacians, and others, who all therefore predate the arrival of the Croats. Since at least some of the Croatian authors who make these claims are the products of a classical education and actually did read the Roman commentaries, the real issue is obviously not which is the oldest people in Europe. This historical conceit aims, rather, to legitimize the territorial claims of the Croatian nation—in this case, at the expense of Serbs, who migrated from elsewhere in the Balkans into territory that Croats consider theirs.

Sometimes, such historical claims have a legitimate basis. Consider, for example, the territory that radical Serb nationalists claim as part of a Greater Serbia. Many of those regions—Vojvodina, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Sandžak, and parts of Bosnia, for example—lay at some point within the boundaries of a Serbian state, and medieval Serbian orthodox monasteries show a long-term cultural and religious presence. Other areas such as eastern Slavonia and the Croatian Krajina have never been within the boundaries of a Serbian state but include in the populace inhabitants who identify themselves as ethnic Serbs, which is important in an international system founded on the idea of national self-determination. Using such arguments, Serbia in 1991 could indeed lay claim to such territories. Unfortunately, Serbia's claim was not an exclusive one, for similar and equally weighty arguments could be made for the inclusion of some of the same territories into a Greater Croatia or into a unitary Bosnian state.

The tendency resulting from such competing and contradictory claims is to use all criteria—ethnicity, culture, religion, linguistics, and history—to set a maximalist program that is essentially one-sided and unprincipled because the same criteria are not applied equally to all parties concerned. For example, Serb nationalists can argue for the annexation of parts of Bosnia on the basis of national self-determination, but they would then have to renounce their claims on areas such as Kosovo, which was the historic center of the medieval Serbian state but today is 90 percent Albanian. Because the Milošević regime came to power in part with the help of radical Serb nationalists from Kosovo, it is hardly likely to do so. The policy of ethnic cleansing is one logical, if extreme, result of these maximalist programs because it supports the primacy of the principle of national self-determination in establishing the validity of territorial claims. Of course, the elimination by force of the physical presence of competitors and even their cultural monuments is also an open admission that these exclusive claims are weak ones.

To shore up these arguments and to enable ethnic cleansing, extreme nationalist rhetoric combines historical oversimplifications, ethnic stereotypes, and often a liberal amount of disinformation to create a prism that refracts reality. In July 1992, for example, the Belgrade journalist Dragoljub Radanov wrote:

> When we arrived [in Bosnia], we heard that the day before [Bosnian Serb forces] had caught a group of [Muslims] who roasted four boys on a grill, somewhere near Kotor Varoš. They

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grilled them and even put a megaphone up to them, so that their screams would be heard far and wide. They chain prisoners to minarets and poke their eyes out in front of microphones. Now there are no more minarets, no mosques, either; they have been destroyed, some of them have disappeared without a trace. In every attack the minaret is the first thing to be destroyed, for the Muslims spread out in lines around the minaret. As soon as someone with a weapon falls, others take up the weapon and go on, go on and on. They use their wives and children as protective shields. They are in a holy war.[5]

Four Serbian boys may well have been killed near Kotor Varoš in July 1992, but in this particularly gruesome piece of propaganda the alleged murder of the boys, made more grisly by the implied cannibalism, functions as a trope to galvanize the Serbian community to commit violence against Muslims, who are collectively inscribed as a fanatical juggernaut on *jihad*. Note as well that the passage implies Muslims are themselves to blame for the destruction of their mosques.

Rather than feel superior to people subjected to such propaganda, those outside Bosnia should recognize that the major difference between us is one of degree, because myths and propaganda disseminated by the media do not always manipulate people to commit acts of bloodthirstiness. But politicians can deliberately create and effectively manipulate national paranoia by means of mass media. As Miloš Vasić, another Belgrade journalist, stated: "You must imagine a United States with every little TV station everywhere taking exactly the same editorial line—a line dictated by David Duke. You too would have war in five years."[6] Rhetoric about the former Yugoslavia has, unfortunately, latched onto the concept of "primitive tribal peoples." Take, for example, an excerpt from the historical section of journalist Michael Nicholson's narrative:

> The ferocity of the Balkan peoples has at times been so primitive that anthropologists have likened them to the Amazon's Yanomamo, one of the world's most savage and primitive tribes. Up until the turn of the present century . . . there were still reports from the Balkans of decapitated enemy heads presented as trophies on silver plates at victory dinners . . . Apologists blame such savagery on the Ottoman Turks, . . . but the history books show it as a land of murder and revenge before the Turks arrived and long after they departed.[7]

Certainly, the Carnegie report of 1913 depicted the nastier side of human nature that was displayed in this century's Balkan Wars (1912–1913), but the inhabitants of the Balkans are not peculiarly savage and primitive in a historical sense.[8] Decades before the Turks defeated Prince Lazar at Kosovo Polje in 1389, England and France began the Hundred Years' War, which included the martyrdom of Joan of Arc among other atrocities, and, at the height of *pax ottomanica* in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europe was engaged in such bloodlettings as the French wars of religion and the Thirty Years' War. To argue that "savage" and "civilized"

[5] The article appeared June 28, 1992, in the journal *Epoha*, thus coinciding with the defeat at Kosovo Polje in 1389 and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Cited in Alexandra Stiglmayer, "The War in the Former Yugoslavia," in her edited collection *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Marion Faber, trans. (Lincoln, Neb., 1994), 21.

[6] Quoted in Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (Washington Square, N.Y., 1994), 252.

[7] Michael Nicholson, *Natasha's Story* (London, 1993), 16. Note the absence of footnotes to history books in the original text.

[8] Reprinted as *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect* (Washington, D.C., 1993).

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are antipodes that eternally separate the Balkans from Europe is to rely on historical oversimplifications, ethnic stereotypes, and disinformation. Some Western politicians have, however, used such historical myths from the media not to mobilize people but to immobilize them.

Another common, though more sophisticated, way that some commentators on the former Yugoslavia misuse history is through analogy—most commonly, comparisons between Nazi Germany and Serbia. German ethnopsychiatrist Paul Parin, for example, writes, "When Slobodan Milošević, a banker educated in the West, worked his way up to Serbian party strongman, his rise was similar to Hitler's in the Weimar Republic."[9] Leaving aside the factual error about where Milošević was educated, his career is utterly unlike Adolf Hitler's. Even though both men did indeed play the radical nationalist card, Hitler seized control of the state by means of a party that was initially on the revolutionary Radical Right fringe in Weimar Germany, whereas Milošević was a member of the ruling League of Communists of Serbia. Such inaccurate use of evidence undermines the reader's confidence in the interpretation because the author wants to imply that Serbia is a fascist state without taking the trouble to prove it.

The distortions that are the most difficult to identify are, of course, the ones that play on a nation's fears, myths, and prejudices. Until the Dayton Accords, the early 1990s debate in the United States about intervention in the Balkans had little to do with Bosnia but much to do with the legacy of Vietnam. Admittedly, Bosnian territory is ideal for guerrilla warfare, but to claim that "we can't win a war in that terrain" is to ignore the fact that the purpose of intervention was not to win a war but to prevent the unrestrained use of what had been the fourth largest army in Europe against unarmed or poorly armed civilians. The wisdom and consequences of recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia in 1992, especially without the intention of militarily enforcing that decision, are indeed subjects for debate, but to call that recognition "premature" is to invoke the patronizing rhetoric of colonialism. Finally, despite the fact that in June 1992 downed U.S. pilot Scott O'Grady had to eat bugs to survive, he was not considered primitive—he was inscribed as clever and resourceful. Why then do "the television shots of desperate, wretched, disheveled people with wild eyes absolutely coincide with the Balkan stereotype[?] [Why then does] no one ask how it is that many of these desperate people have a decent command of the English language"?[10]

Just categorizing the Bosnian conflict was and still is a disputed issue. From the point of view of the Muslim-led government and its supporters, this was not a civil war but a war of aggression that was directed from the Republic of Serbia, which armed and supplied the Bosnian Serb side. From the point of view of the Bosnian Serb and Serb governments, this was a civil war that began in the state of the former Yugoslavia. Historians may be able to wait until the dust settles to select a name, but contemporaries do not have the same luxury. Thus, when Janine di Giovanni wrote, "the war [was] quickly described in the West as a civil war, although anyone

[9] Paul Parin, "Open Wounds: Ethnopsychoanalytic Reflections on the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia," in Stiglmayer, *Mass Rape*, 45. "Ethnopsychiatry" is a field that attempts to temper the universal claims of psychiatry with particular cultures of ethnic groups.

[10] Dubravka Ugrešić, *Have a Nice Day: From the Balkan War to the American Dream* (New York, 1995), 110.

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who watched the bombardment of Sarajevo knew that it was a war of aggression," she was inevitably making a partisan statement, but so were those who described the conflict as a civil war.[11] This dispute over names has legal ramifications as well, for the recognition of Bosnia in April 1992 internationalized the conflict and opened up the possibility of indictments for war crimes committed between two sovereign states.

Probably the single most misleading oversimplification to which those outside Bosnia are prone is to think of "the Serbs," "the Croats," and "the Muslims." In part, such labels are used to organize the elements of a complex situation and to avoid more precise but cumbersome language—"the Milošević regime," "the Muslim-led government," or "the policies of Tudjman." But extensive use of national collectives suppresses the information that members of these ethnic groups still express a variety of opinions: not all Serbs support Milošević, as the demonstrations during the winter of 1996–1997 in Belgrade show; some Croats bitterly resent the Hercegovinian lobby in Croatia, which has pushed for the annexation of the Croatian parastate of Herceg-Bosna; and, under the provocation of war and increasing hardships, the commitment of some Bosnian Muslims to a tolerant, multinational, and multicultural Bosnia has waned. In the final analysis, by thinking in terms of "the Serbs," "the Croats," and "the Muslims," outsiders fall victim to a mythical rhetoric of compact, easily identifiable, monolithic national communities and forget that the reality of national identity is and always has been more fluid and complex.[12]

ALTHOUGH BALKAN SPECIALISTS WERE WELL VERSED in the history of Yugoslavia, knowledge of the area was otherwise limited at the beginning of the war. In 1991, those who had studied European history or politics at some point in their secondary or college education probably knew that a Serb nationalist assassinated the heir apparent of the Habsburg Empire in 1914, which was the immediate cause of World War I, and that Tito led the Communist Partisans to victory in World War II. The assassination at Sarajevo, however, was often presented in the classroom without significant reference to the Eastern Question, which is its appropriate historical context, and many Americans did not realize that Yugoslavia after 1948 was not part of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. This general lack of knowledge made arguments that events in the former Yugoslavia were the result of "ancient tribal rivalries" seem credible—especially since the area had indeed witnessed extreme communal violence during the Balkan Wars and World War II.

The four histories of Bosnia that have appeared since 1992 are not based on

[11] Janine di Giovanni, *The Quick and the Dead: Under Siege in Sarajevo* (London, 1994), 1.

[12] As Tomislav Z. Longinović recently wrote, "Ivo Andrić [the Nobel Prize–winning author] was born to a Serbian family that had been converted to Roman Catholicism and grew up speaking the *ijekavski* [Croatian] variant of Serbo-Croatian. His first poems were written in the same variant, but when he moved to Belgrade in the 1920s, he started writing his prose in the *ekavski* [or Serbian] variant used in Serbia proper. In addition to this vacillation between his Serbian national identity and Croatian religious affiliation, he devoted most of his writings to the lives of Bosnian Muslims . . . To choose one identity over the other presupposed a loss of the other one." See Longinović, "Bosnian Cultural Identity in the Works of Ivo Andrić," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Ivo Andrić Revisited: The Bridge Still Stands* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995), 136.

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archival research but seek instead to summarize that history in its Balkan context.[13] Robert Donia and John Fine, whose book *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* is the most straightforward of these accounts, emphasize the traditions of multiculturalism that typified the area historically, whereas Noel Malcolm gives greater detail in *Bosnia: A Short History* on the origin and development of Bosnian institutions and national identities among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Francine Friedman in *The Bosnian Muslims* and the authors of the essays edited by Mark Pinson, *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, concentrate on demonstrating the unique historical identity of the Bosnian Muslim community. To varying degrees, these authors agree that the Bosnian state has historical legitimacy, that peaceful coexistence, not conflict, typified multicultural Bosnia historically, and that communal violence is the product of the modern period. All emphasize as well the tragic position of Bosnian Muslims, native south Slavs who converted to Islam after the Ottoman conquest in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries but who in the modern period found themselves claimed as apostate Croats and Serbs. Although these books have been criticized with some justification for a presentist agenda, the authors all openly acknowledge that they wrote these syntheses with the goal of debunking what they see as the inaccurate representations of Bosnian Muslims that have emerged in the debate about the demise of Yugoslavia. The strength of their arguments in support of a multicultural Bosnia is thus in part a corrective to Serbian propaganda that Bosnia was not and never had been a successful multicultural society, which was echoed in the West in the false generalization that "they have been killing each other for centuries."

Although synthetic histories will eventually be superseded by other accounts less immediately responsive to the war in Bosnia, one that will become a classic is Tone Bringa's study of a Muslim-Croat village in the late 1980s. Since the Communist regime viewed investigation of parochial national identity with suspicion and only reluctantly permitted anthropologists to conduct village research in any part of the country, Bringa proposed examining the impact of modernization on rural women. Her real interest, however, centered on the issue of Bosnian Muslim identity, and the result is a traditional ethnography, researched before rumor of war, that presents the intersection of gender, religion, and identity in institutional structures and social customs in a genuinely multicultural village in central Bosnia. Furthermore, her work usefully clarifies how what is generally perceived in the West as a religious group can identify itself as a nation. What Bringa does not and cannot do in her ethnography is illuminate the sources of war, "for the simple reason that . . . this war has been orchestrated from places where the people I lived and worked among were not represented, and where their voices were not heard."[14] Interestingly, Bringa's own inability to comprehend the rising communal violence in central Bosnia in 1992 led her to accept an offer from Granada TV to return to the site of

[13] Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Jr., *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York, 1994); Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*; Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation* (Boulder, Colo., 1996); and Mark Pinson, ed., *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historical Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).

[14] Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton, N.J., 1995), 8.

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her field research and investigate the response of peasants to war. The result was the award-winning documentary *We Are All Neighbors* (1994).[15]

In addition to such academic works, the war in Bosnia spurred the publication of collections of essays to illuminate particular aspects of the conflict for a more popular audience. In *The Black Book on Bosnia*, editor Nader Mousavizadeh selected articles and editorials from the back issues of *The New Republic*, which has provided continuous commentary on Bosnia since the exposure of the concentration camps there in 1992. The first section of the book, "The Legacy of the Balkans," offers some stimulating commentaries by such senior scholars in the East European field as István Deák and Aleksa Djilas, who highlight the Bosnian conflict in the larger history of former Yugoslavia. The second section contains shorter, journalistic pieces that document the tragedy of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and direct the reader's attention to nearby areas of instability—Kosovo, Macedonia, and Croatia. The third section dissects the diplomatic and political failure to achieve earlier intervention and culminates with an imagined speech penned by policymaker Zbigniew Brzezinski, who condemns Western inaction as "a moral and political calamity of historical proportions."[16] This theme is reinforced in the final section, which reprints editorials published between August 1992 and November 1995.

This Time We Knew, a collection of thought-provoking articles edited by Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović, is unified around the theme of why Western governments and their citizens failed to prevent genocide. One set of authors—Brad K. Blitz on the United States, Daniele Conversi on Britain, and Daniel Kofman on Israel—traces the influence of entrenched political interests that supported containment of the conflict in Bosnia, which dovetailed with the interests of the Serbian lobby. The result was what Conversi calls the "moral relativism" of denial, which was "a blueprint for genocide." Michael N. Barnett, on the other hand, raises sobering questions about the UN's future role in conflict resolution. He recasts this "moral relativism" as the "politics of indifference," which he attributes not to a lack of knowledge about the perpetration of war crimes but rather to entrenched bureaucratic interests that did not want to risk another failed peacekeeping mission such as that during 1994–1995 in Somalia. The central goal of the book, however, is not just a sharp critique of diplomats, bureaucrats, and even journalists; rather, the authors "raise directly the uncomfortable question of whether there is any relationship between the degree or extent of public information and practical or moral engagement by those who receive it, [for] the butchering of innocent people in Bosnia has gone on under the watchful gaze of the West. *This time, we know*."[17]

[15] Disappearing World series, Granada Television International; available from Films Incorporated.
[16] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "After Srebrenica," in Nader Mousavizadeh, ed., *The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of Appeasement* (New York, 1996), 154.
[17] Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović, "Introduction," *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia* (New York, 1996), 7. The italics are in the original.

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BETWEEN 1992 AND 1996, BOSNIA RECEIVED MASSIVE ATTENTION from the Western media. Hundreds of journalists from many countries rotated in to cover a war in which they, too, became targets. Some openly acknowledged the eagerness with which many reporters—at least initially—embraced assignment to Bosnia; others were shaken by the high number of journalists who were killed or maimed while covering the siege of Sarajevo. Although buffered by expense accounts and the opportunity to leave the city periodically, journalists were also subjected while there to the squalid conditions of a capital that was without public services for much of the siege. In addition, many had little prior knowledge either of Yugoslavia or of the local languages, which made them dependent on local guides and translators. Forays into the countryside outside the capital, which required numerous press passes from local combatants and international agencies, exposed journalists to even greater danger and harassment in the patchwork of Serb, Croat, and government-held territory. Even for veteran war correspondents, Bosnia proved to be a conflict with a dangerous lack of rules.

Despite frequent mention of flak jackets and bullet-riddled cars, the English-language journalists who have published books on Bosnia are generally not trying to romanticize their profession or engage in self-aggrandizement. Most are post–World War II baby boomers who believed that, after the Holocaust, renewed genocide in Europe was unimaginable. In Bosnia, they were as profoundly shaken by the degree of violence directed against civilians as they were moved by the individual stories of tragedy and courage that were everywhere noticeable. Although they were trained to maintain objectivity and neutrality, what happened in Bosnia seemed to transcend the importance of professional distance from the subject of their story. In the introduction to *Slaughterhouse*, one of the most impassioned and angry accounts of the war, David Rieff admits that reporters got too involved with the story, but "it is hard to be dispassionate about ethnic cleansing and mass murder."[18] Some of the book-length accounts are thus deeply marked by the subjectivity of bearing witness.

Like Rieff, many journalists believed that, if they could just get the story out, public outrage would force governments to intervene to stop the slaughter. But the tragedies of Bosnia are indeed multiple. Journalists got the story out, and the mass media was littered with stories of civilian abuse: Roy Gutman, a reporter for *New York Newsday*, won a Pulitzer Prize for exposing the existence of concentration camps run by Bosnian Serb forces and collected his articles in *Witness to Genocide* (1993); other reporters followed his footsteps tracking ethnic cleansing and documenting the siege of Sarajevo. These reports had only a limited effect, however. In the months following the exposure of a concentration camp at Omarska, diplomats endlessly negotiated and many cease-fires failed, but little was done that directly addressed the widespread violation of human rights in Bosnia. As Rieff concluded, "In retrospect, I should have known better than to believe in the power of unarmed truth."[19]

One result of this campaign to bring the story of Bosnia to the attention of the world was the accusation that Western reporting was unfair to the Bosnian Serbs.

[18] David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (New York, 1995), 9.
[19] Rieff, *Slaughterhouse*, 10.

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The *Guardians*' Ed Vulliamy directly addresses this question in the acknowledgements of *Seasons in Hell*, an early book-length account on the war in Bosnia:

> For some reason, the instinct to stand by democratic Europe's basic principles was to be considered "pro-Muslim" in Bosnia, and the principles were sunk beneath what people shrugged off as "the realities on the ground" or some bizarre requirement that we remain "objective" over the most appalling racialist violence. There is no attempt [in this book] to be objective towards the perpetrators of Bosnia's ethnic carnage or those who appease them.[20]

Vulliamy correctly categorizes his account as neither objective nor neutral, for he deliberately uses the subjectivity of his own anger as a prism to make readers confront the brutality that civilians faced in this war. His narrative, however, is not essentially anti-Serbian; it is essentially based on a moral position that the world should not tolerate the perpetration of systematic war crimes. He is, of course, specifically critical of Bosnian Serb forces and, in 1993, of Bosnian Croat forces because those are the groups he sees engaging in widespread abuse of civilians.

Most journalists' narratives are also essentially pro-Bosnian, not pro-Muslim. One of the central arguments used to try to galvanize Western opinion was that Bosnia was a just cause because the Izetbegović government promoted the same values that are cherished in Western countries: multiculturalism, religious and civic tolerance, and a belief in citizenship based on the rights of the individual. One presentation of such themes is *Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper under Siege*, in which National Public Radio's Tom Gjelten demonstrates multiculturalism by tracing the common commitment of Serb, Croat, and Muslim journalists to publishing their newspaper, *Oslobodjenje*, under the hardships of the siege. Although Gjelten certainly is unsympathetic to the Bosnian Serb nationalists who transformed Sarajevo into what others have called "the largest concentration camp in the world," the book cannot be categorized as anti-Serbian because some of the journalists he highlights in the narrative are Serbs—most notably, Belgrade-born Gordana Knežević, who fought vigorously for an editorial policy that supported the Muslim-led government.[21]

By examining the impact of the war on professional journalists, Gjelten raises thought-provoking issues about the role of journalism and the meaning of democratization as Bosnia emerges from communism and slides into war. In addition, Sarajevo under siege was not a static but a dynamic environment caught in a downward spiral, which Gjelten usefully underscores by interweaving discussion of international events, debates on editorial policy, and presentation of journalists' daily lives over time. Furthermore, his sparing use of the first-person

[20] Ed Vulliamy, *Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War* (New York, 1994), xi. Vulliamy's book belongs to the genre of reports from the front, which are prone to factual error since they are usually written in haste. In addition, such books have a relatively short shelf-life because they are always quickly overtaken by later events. These characteristics lead Gale Stokes *et al.* to categorize the book as "a pot boiler." For an assessment that tempers criticism of the errors with an appreciation of Vulliamy's contributions, see Tom Gjelten's review in the *Washington Post* (October 9, 1994).

[21] Tom Gjelten, *Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper under Siege* (New York, 1995). The concentration camp phrase turns up in a number of accounts of the siege. See, for example, Anna Cataldi, ed., *Letters from Sarajevo: Voices of a Besieged City* (Shaftesbury, Dorset, 1994), 77–78; and Zlatko Dizdarević, *Sarajevo: A War Journal*, Anselm Hollo, trans. (New York, 1993), 20.

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narrative makes this account one of the more humane presentations of Bosnians because he is primarily telling their story, not his own, and his book is populated not by refugees expelled from their homes but by journalists employed in Sarajevo who face increasingly agonizing choices in their personal and professional lives.

The *Philadelphia Inquirer*'s Barbara Demick also highlights Bosnians in *Logavina Street*, which "is a six-block-long history lesson. To know Logavina Street is to know Sarajevo, to understand what this city once was and what it has become."[22] By organizing the book around a neighborhood, Demick leads her readers through the daily lives of a broad, multi-ethnic cross-section that encompasses rich and poor, local and refugee, professional and nonprofessional, old and young. Like many reporters, Demick concentrates on the heroism and inventiveness of Sarajevans, who illegally siphon electricity from official buildings, create cakes with dried biscuits from U.S. Army surplus dating back to the Vietnam War, defend their buildings from attack early on by pouring boiling water on Serbian soldiers, and commute to the front lines to defend the city. Unlike authors who published books earlier, Demick is able to comment on the deepening sense of betrayal that Sarajevans felt: "after $1.6 billion had been spent on the UN peacekeeping troops and $700 million on UNHCR, after four years of the activities of 150 NGOs and the death of 3 percent of the city's population, Sarajevans grasped what should have been obvious long before: [under the terms of the Dayton Accords] they were not going to win the war."[23]

That Bosnia also took its toll on the journalists who covered it can be seen in Peter Maass's *Love Thy Neighbor*. Learnedly quoting the Nobel Prize–winning novelist Ivo Andrić in the first chapter, Maass sets out to write an account of the sources and consequences of communal violence in Bosnia. In the course of this first-person narrative, readers are taken on an interesting journey that reveals much about the way journalists actually covered the war. We find out which hotels in Zagreb journalists used, how much a satellite uplink from Sarajevo cost, how journalists got in and out of Sarajevo, and what problems they encountered in arranging for translators and gasoline. After 272 pages, however, Maass confesses, "In the course of writing this book, many friends have asked me what it is about, and I have had a hard time coming up with a precise answer. It is about many things, about war, about Bosnia, about politics and hatred and demagogues and heroes and cowards and me and. . . . It is about many things."[24] Actually, this book is primarily about one thing: the truly painful situation of Peter Maass, an informed, intelligent, if somewhat facile journalist who does not understand the violence, is powerless to stop it, but is forced to witness it. He realizes the terrifying absurdity of interviewing detainees in the Omarska concentration camp as Bosnian Serb guards stand by, and in one of the worst scenes in the book he turns his back on a Bosnian Serb

[22] Barbara Demick, *Logavina Street: Life and Death in a Sarajevo Neighborhood* (Kansas City, 1996), 3.

[23] Demick, *Logavina Street*, 166. The Bosnian Ministry of Public Health estimated that 10,000 civilians, or 2.8 percent, out of the pre-war population had been killed by the end of 1995. Demick's estimation of losses among the 240 families on Logavina Street is that 14 out of 700 people, or 2.0 percent, were killed (p. 5).

[24] Peter Maass, *Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War* (New York, 1996), 273. The ellipses appear in the original text.

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commander preparing to shoot a Muslim "because it was the prudent thing to do. [But] was it much different from the Serbs who prudently kept quiet as their Bosnian neighbors were shot or packed off to prison camps?"[25] Understandably, Maass's conclusions in this book are more apocalyptic than well reasoned because this war threatened to compromise not just his journalistic objectivity but his personal integrity as well. In April 1993, he refused further assignment in Bosnia.

David Rieff's *Slaughterhouse* provides a more comprehensive statement on Western media coverage of the war in Bosnia. Although Rieff admits that journalists suffered from the "conceit" that they could mobilize public opinion against the human rights violations in Bosnia, he rejects the accusation that journalists distorted the essential meaning of events through biased reporting: "In reality," he writes, "no slaughter was more scrupulously and ably covered."[26] What journalists initially failed to understand was that Western governments had agreed on containment, not intervention, as the only appropriate course of action once the conflict had broken out in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, he maintains that the journalists confronted a general and deliberate confusion about the meaning of objectivity. In his view, it was not journalists but representatives of the international community who fundamentally distorted events by maintaining, despite evidence to the contrary, that all parties in Bosnia were equally responsible. Rieff thus sees Bosnia as "the story of a defeat," not only for Bosnians, "who had right on their side," but also for the Western governments that collectively enabled genocide through their failure to intervene.

THAT MANY JOURNALISTS CAST BOSNIA IN MORAL TERMS derived directly from their personal and professional experience there. As can be seen in their accounts, they went outside the capital to cover news stories and saw the ghastly results of ethnic cleansing, which must have made the spirit of Sarajevans during the siege appear all the more remarkable. Although all major cities in Bosnia were multi-ethnic at the beginning of the war, Sarajevo was cosmopolitan: despite its minarets and seeming provincialism, it was the administrative center of Bosnia and home to Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and Jews, all of whom after World War II had intermarried there in greater numbers than elsewhere. Most important, Sarajevo had a thriving cultural life as well as a professional and intellectual elite whose members were sophisticated, urbane, well traveled, and well read. They are responsible for some of the most unforgettable images and stories that journalists sent out of Sarajevo during the siege—the Sarajevo string quartet playing in the ruins of the National Library, theater performances by candlelight, and art exhibitions. Although alone members of this elite could not keep Sarajevo functional, they did contribute by articulating Sarajevo's multicultural identity, a theme that made a deep impression on many of the foreign journalists.

Dževad Karahasan presents the most coherent definition of this identity in a series of literary essays, *Sarajevo, Exodus of a City*. Karahasan portrays Sarajevo as

[25] Maass, *Love Thy Neighbor*, 21.
[26] Rieff, *Slaughterhouse*, 223.

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a multicultural microcosm of "the world west of India" whose unique identity emerged in the dramatic interplay not within each of the city's four constituent communities but among the four communities. The war placed this identity under siege in two ways: first, extreme Serb nationalists tried to impose exclusive identities based inherently on conflict, not coexistence, between Serb and non-Serb; second, the international community tried to impose the exclusive identity of victim. In Karahasan's view, the Bosnian Serb troops that surrounded the city did not endanger multiculturalism in Sarajevo because Serbs continued to live in the city. What endangered multiculturalism in Sarajevo was the emigration of a large percentage of Sarajevo's Jewish population five hundred years after it had arrived as the victim of ethnic cleansing in the Spain of 1492. Ultimately, however, Karahasan believes that multiculturalism was undermined by Western politicians, who "deliberately give false names to things in order to . . . justify their own ineptness, forlornness, passiveness, and indecisiveness," and by their "people who are well off [and] not interested in the tragedies of other people."[27]

Whereas Karahasan wrote his lyrical and nostalgic monologue after escaping the siege to try to rally support for Bosnia in Europe, journalist Zlatko Dizdarević wrote newspaper articles at home to rally Bosnians. *Sarajevo: A War Journal*, which won the International prize from Reporters without Borders in 1993, collects his articles published in Sarajevo's *Oslobodjenje* and Split's *Slobodna Dalmacija* that describe life under the siege. "In Sarajevo, this morning, naturally, there's nothing new to report: a little electricity, no water, the usual deaths (ten or so), a carton of eggs (twenty-five German marks), a kilo of pork (fifteen marks)."[28] Daily routines contain cleaning up the shards of glass in the office from the shelling overnight, canceling appointments because friends are in the hospital having shrapnel removed, burying dead bodies under sniper fire, and cutting firewood from the city's parks. Dizdarević sometimes rails against the citizens of Sarajevo: how can our nation survive, he asks, if a father whose three-year-old daughter has been wounded thinks drinking a cup of coffee with the sniper would end the siege? But description of Sarajevans' lives is not the real point of this book. Its essential goal is to indict an impotent international community, which "through a combination of indifference . . . and organized support for [Serbian] nationalists" ignores that "we are witnessing a renascence of Nazism and Fascism, and no one is willing to call a halt to it."[29]

Dizdarević's second book, *Portraits of Sarajevo*, is less bitter, more lyrical, and therefore much harder to bear. These stories of Sarajevans, who "never wanted to be mythologized or immortalized [but who] wished to remain normal," show how the human spirit adapts and copes and sometimes even dies.[30] Readers meet the pre-war *bon vivant* Babo Tanović, a filmmaker who does not lose weight during the siege because he makes a deal with himself that every slice of bread is really a steak; Kasim and Amra, who generate electricity by riding their bicycles and pretend that they go, as they did before the war, to Serb-held Ilidža and back; graphic designers

[27] Dževad Karahasan, *Sarajevo, Exodus of a City*, Slobodan Drakulic, trans. (New York, 1994), 107. The false names include calling the conflict a civil war.
[28] Dizdarević, *Sarajevo: A War Journal*, 116.
[29] Dizdarević, *Sarajevo: A War Journal*, 7.
[30] Zlatko Dizdarević, *Portraits of Sarajevo* (New York, 1994), ix.

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who paraphrase Coca-Cola's slogan ("Enjoy Sara-Jevo") and joke about being sued by the multinational corporation; and a grandmother who reassures her grandson that she will not be killed if she walks in the middle of the street. ("I won't [be killed], my son, unfortunately I won't. I've been trying for months."[31]) The last of these poignant and deeply moving portraits is of Dizdarević's own father, who died on January 9, 1994, of "'natural causes' . . . 'They' spared his heart and head, but they took away something more precious: they robbed him of past, future, and present."[32]

Sarajevo Days, Sarajevo Nights combines a diary that philosophy teacher Elma Softić kept during the first year of the siege and a series of letters to intimate friends from 1993 to 1995. Rejecting the opportunity to flee the capital on the convoys organized by the Jewish Community Center, Softić is grimly determined to survive the siege "so that I can finally arrive at the zero point that will guarantee me the position of the objective observer who will at last be able to discern what humanity is."[33] In her text, which is interspersed in the American edition with contemporary headlines from major U.S. newspapers, she describes the drive to maintain some semblance of normality, from dressing as smartly as possible and wearing home-made make-up to purchasing fake flowers that are carefully wrapped in tissue paper as if they are real. Her angry outbursts are only occasional, and her meditations on the meaning of life in Sarajevo are both deeply personal and profound. During the shelling on New Year's Eve 1993, for example, she experiences the disorientation of a traumatic flashback to the first shelling of Sarajevo in 1992:

> I hear, finally, I hear a human voice: "Did you have a fright?" I nod . . . My beau, my friend and my love is kissing my hair. I open my eyes. Once again everything is in its place. The sound of conversation reaches me. The mortar explosions blend with the Fifth Symphony to create a music whose score no one will ever write.[34]

This account of the siege is compelling primarily because Softić never simply bears witness to the victimization of Sarajevans. Rather, amid the stark and primitive realities of the siege, she abjures self-pity and perceptively reflects on the subtle alterations in individuals for whom "war has become [a] lifestyle."[35]

Communication with the outside world became increasingly difficult after Bosnian Serb forces destroyed the central post office in Sarajevo in May 1992 and slowly strangled the city. After the telephone lines were cut, telecommunication became possible only through satellite connections and required not only money but also a sympathetic acquaintance in the government or the news agencies that maintained the uplinks. Despite having no postal service, Sarajevans continued to write to friends and family who lived abroad and gave the letters to humanitarian agencies and to journalists rotating out of the capital. Sometimes the letters were confiscated at checkpoints; sometimes they were destroyed. But some also reached their intended recipients, and Anna Cataldi, an Italian journalist who worked for UNICEF during the siege, brought the words of Sarajevans to public notice by

[31] Dizdarević, *Portraits of Sarajevo*, 102.
[32] Dizdarević, *Portraits of Sarajevo*, 132.
[33] Elma Softić, *Sarajevo Days, Sarajevo Nights*, Nada Conić, trans. (St. Paul, Minn., 1996), 83.
[34] Softić, *Sarajevo Days*, 124.
[35] Softić, *Sarajevo Days*, 113.

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publishing *Letters from Sarajevo* (1994). These private communications between friends draw the reader into shared memories from before the war, gratitude that children have escaped the city, and reports of mutual friends who have died. Pavle, who ties his hair back with one of his absent wife's hair ribbons, writes love letters; Lada, a bored teenager, laments the lack of beer and pizza and vacation; Amra sends birthday greetings to her friend Laura, whose response is written five days after Amra's death. These letters generally mute the grim and dangerous aspects of life because their authors wrote not to worry their loved ones but to overcome isolation.

The *Sarajevo Survival Guide*, compiled by a group of independent intellectuals, is a sort of Michelin travel guide to life during the siege. Potential visitors are warned to bring pills to purify the water, arrive prepared to sleep in basements, and wear "sports clothes, for they are warmer, more comfortable and enable you to run quicker."[36] The authors even include recipes: Cheese à la Olga Finci takes 4 demitasses of milk powder (from the black market), 1 demitasse of oil (from humanitarian aid), 1 demitasse of boiled water, one-half demitasse of vinegar, and 1 small spoon of garlic powder (gift from a friend), which should be mixed together "with a plastic spoon . . . found in the USA lunch package."[37] Garden snails are a local delicacy. In place of the usual descriptions of historical and architectural triumphs that the tourist must see, this guidebook has eloquent photographs: the ruins of the National Library, built by the Austrians after the occupation of 1878 in Moorish style and destroyed in May 1992; Communist-era housing blocks gutted by shelling and fire; Sarajevans standing in line for bread and water; broken eyeglasses and keys lying on a blood-stained street. What is most surprising about this book is that it is not more trenchant and bitter.

Probably the best known of the accounts from Bosnia is *Zlata's Diary: A Child's Life in Sarajevo*. The diary achieved publication as a result of a UNICEF initiative to make the plight of children in Sarajevo more visible (which it did), but the media hype comparing Zlata Filipović to Anne Frank did the book a disservice. As Christopher Lehmann-Haupt bad-temperedly put it, "her situation lacks the dramatic shape of Anne Frank's story . . . if only because we know from the introduction . . . that the author and her parents will end up escaping to the safety of Paris."[38] Readers—especially those of us who also started diaries under the influence of Anne Frank—should forgive an eleven-year-old in a country on the verge of war for doing the same; we, after all, had the good fortune not to have those diaries published. And Zlata does remarkably well. Her vision is not analytical or profound, but she observes those around her and describes what she sees and feels. Beginning in October 1991, when her father is called into the police reserves for the first time, she tracks the war as it moves closer and then engulfs Sarajevo. She describes the alteration in family routines, revels when she can go outside, and records the lack of electricity, her parents' weight loss, birthday

[36] *Sarajevo Survival Guide* ([Sarajevo], 1993), 51.
[37] *Sarajevo Survival Guide*, 22.
[38] Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, "From Sarajevo, the Diary of Another Young Girl," *New York Times* (February 28, 1994).

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celebrations, and her bird's death. Zlata's charm is that she remains so normal in such abnormal conditions.[39]

That the main genre to come out of Sarajevo during the siege was the fragment—literary essays, newspaper articles, letters sent abroad, and diary entries—itself symbolizes the impact of the siege on people's lives. The grinding daily routine of survival made sustained commentary difficult. Although feeling abandoned by a world that seemed determined to keep them alive only for a sniper's bullet, Sarajevans stubbornly hung on. As Dizdarević puts it, "The people here are bitter but honest. Since they're honest, they must be crazy. And since they're crazy they think a fight with the absurd is possible."[40] Sarajevans believed that the fight was inescapable because of the unwillingness of the international community to recognize a war of aggression that daily claimed lives. The members of the international community who tried to resolve the Bosnian crisis, however, believed themselves not so much unwilling as unable to break the deadlock. Unlike Sarajevans, therefore, their main literary form is the memoir, a sustained argument to show that they really did their best to ameliorate and resolve the situation.

AS THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA IMPLODED between 1989 and 1991, the attention of most Western governments was directed elsewhere. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 had an immense and disorienting influence on Europe: not only was the path to German reunification thereby opened but the withdrawal of the Red Army from the bloc countries also brought Eastern Europe back into the sphere of the West European nations and the United States. In addition, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 jeopardized oil supplies and prices, creating a powerful basis for concerted diplomatic and military action that culminated in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yugoslavia, which had received much diplomatic attention as a rogue Communist state since 1948, suddenly seemed less important. The Bush administration wanted the European Community to handle the problem; the European Community, however, was facing its own difficulties in achieving its next step in unification. The Gulf War had barely ended when the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) began its unsuccessful assault on Slovenia at the end of June 1991.

Although in retrospect the patterns of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in 1992 can also be seen in Croatia, the causes of the war in Croatia in 1991 were not clear-cut to the outside world. Serbs had raised barricades in parts of the Krajina and disrupted the flow of tourist traffic in August 1990, but the non-Communist government of President Franjo Tudjman that had been elected in April 1990 was openly and, some argued, provocatively nationalistic. The international community decided that this domestic matter could be contained, and in September 1991 the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on all parts of the former Yugoslavia. This embargo gave the military advantage to the JNA, and, when a cease-fire was signed

[39] Zlata Filipović, *Zlata's Diary: A Child's Life in Sarajevo* (New York, 1994). Two American children's books on Bosnia are Diane Yancey, *Life in War-Torn Bosnia* (San Diego, Calif., 1996), and Edward R. Ricciuti, *War in Yugoslavia: The Breakup of a Nation* (London, 1993). Ricciuti's book contains a number of inaccuracies; Yancey's book, which is for older children, presents a better picture of the war, including much attention to the issues of refugee life, trauma, and humanitarian aid.

[40] Dizdarević, *Sarajevo: A War Journal*, 109.

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in late 1991, one-third of Croatia's territory was in the hands of the JNA and Serbian paramilitary groups. In an attempt to defuse the situation, the UN Security Council approved the replacement of JNA troops with an international peacekeeping force known as UNPROFOR, whose command headquarters was to be in ethnically heterogeneous Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, who commanded Sector Sarajevo when Bosnia destabilized in April 1992, wrote *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo* in 1993. Its notoriety derives in large part from his claims that the Bosnian Muslim government and its newly formed army may have targeted its own civilians in what was called the breadline massacre in May 1992 to gain international sympathy for their cause. For the Muslim-led government and its supporters, MacKenzie's accusation was part of a general pattern in which they claimed that his alleged impartiality was but a sham for a pro-Serb position. Western journalists, who have generally concluded that MacKenzie had no basis for his claim, have good professional reasons to dislike unfounded statements from official sources.[41] MacKenzie, of course, wrote these memoirs for the very purpose of defending himself and his actions in Bosnia. This book can only be read in the context of that controversy.

In the first part of the memoir, MacKenzie presents his conclusions about UN peacekeeping missions in general, for Bosnia was not his first mission but his ninth. He states in the introduction that he had no records from any of the first eight missions but constructed the first section of the book on the basis of memory alone. The result is a narrative that includes a description of the basic goal of the particular mission, anecdotes about events in his life, and a statement about the lessons he learned for future peacekeeping. Some of what he remembers is quite interesting; much of what he remembers consists of the inconsequential detail that fills most lives. Overall, he presents himself as a soldier's soldier—good-humored, practical, concerned about good military leadership, and aware of the negative effects of boredom. He sees the role of the UN as an impartial force whose goal is not to understand a situation but to keep two sides apart.

MacKenzie himself was critical of the peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia because, although UNPROFOR's mandate was for Croatia, the force was to be headquartered in Bosnia, where the political situation had been destabilizing. In his view, "The drafters of the UN charter knew what they were doing back in 1945 when they precluded the UN from becoming involved in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. But, unfortunately, nationhood and civil war came to Bosnia-Herzegovina after we had already established our headquarters in Sarajevo."[42] The concept of "internal affairs of sovereign nations" is one that hardly seems applicable to the time and place, but it is easy to forget just how confusing events were during the first year after Yugoslavia fell apart. Two republics (Slovenia and Croatia) had seceded from an internationally recognized sovereign nation (Yugoslavia). By the time the UN established its headquarters in Sarajevo in March

[41] For comments on MacKenzie from Western journalists, see Gjelten, *Sarajevo Daily*, 117–21; Maass, *Love Thy Neighbor*, 29–32; Rieff, *Slaughterhouse*, 152, 218–19. See as well Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing"* (College Station, Tex., 1995), 114–15, 148–53; and Brad K. Blitz, in Cushman and Meštrović, *This Time We Knew*, 201.

[42] Lewis MacKenzie, *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo* (Vancouver, B.C., 1993), xvii.

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1992, Slovenia and Croatia were internationally recognized; Bosnia was not. The UN therefore established its headquarters in one sovereign nation (Yugoslavia) to go on a peacekeeping mission in another (Croatia). That situation persisted after Bosnian recognition in April, of course, but one sovereign state (Bosnia) then found the army of another sovereign state (Yugoslavia) on its territory. Perhaps most significant of all was the fact that the UN was establishing itself in Bosnia with the help of the Yugoslav National Army, which was perfectly logical when the UN base for the peacekeeping mission was on what was recognized as Yugoslav territory; after April 6, however, the JNA was no longer the army of the host nation.

That the situation was confusing will not, of course, make hindsight any more palatable, and some textual evidence from the memoir indicates that MacKenzie essentially did hold Bosnian government forces, and not the JNA, responsible for the violent confrontation.[43] He thought Izetbegović's refusal to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs a grave error, and Izetbegović clearly did not fully control Bosnian government troops at the beginning of the war. MacKenzie continually expresses fears that the UN's actions will be unfairly misconstrued, but, interestingly, nowhere in the memoir does he mention making a formal visit to the Izetbegović government before or after Bosnia's recognition, which would seem an important component of an argument about impartiality. But, whatever a reader concludes about the reliability of MacKenzie's account and his responsibility in the destabilization in Sarajevo, it is important to remember that he was sent to Bosnia on a mission that he did not design.

Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict presents an examination of UNPROFOR from the perspective of Lt.-Col. Bob Stewart, a BRITFOR commander who came to enjoy great popularity in Britain. Stewart arrived in Bosnia believing that Kosovo and Vojvodina were still autonomous, that Bosnia had been witness to mass murder for centuries, that all parties in Bosnia were equally guilty, and that each side would kill its own so the others could be blamed. His approach at Bosnian checkpoints was that "a lot of bombast, noise, and aggression often paid dividends."[44] As Stewart settled into the problems of establishing his unit in central Bosnia to protect convoys of humanitarian aid, however, his actions went far beyond making sure the twisting and narrow Bosnian roads could bear the weight of the trucks. Interpreting his mandate broadly in the belief that any action he undertook to ensure the convoys' safety was defensible, he established a network of liaison officers, whose primary responsibilities included intelligence gathering and cultivating local networks. He established contact with all three sides, and he saw journalists as a helpful presence. He transported civilians, if necessary, and he even

[43] For example, in a chapter entitled "Damned If We Do," MacKenzie claims that on April 20 and 21 "the actions of the Bosnian Territorial Defence Force [TDF] throughout the new nation are beginning to have serious repercussions in Sarajevo . . . The JNA was retaliating [for TDF attacks] by shelling Sarajevo." Although the TDF did indeed take action against the JNA, its responsibility for initiating the conflict is much less clear. MacKenzie himself records other events that may have contributed in no small way to TDF actions: the JNA seized control of Sarajevo airport overnight on April 6; JNA units shelled Sarajevo on April 10; and "on or about April 12" the TDF "blockaded barracks, occupied depots, and attacked JNA soldiers and their families." To suggest that the JNA was simply retaliating for Bosnian Muslim provocation and did not actively participate in the destabilization of Bosnia seems wrong on the basis of MacKenzie's own description.

[44] Bob Stewart, *Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict* (London, 1993), 70.

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arranged rugby matches with the local Muslim and Croat clubs. And, when 20,000 displaced people crossed into his territory after the fall of Jajce, he comments, "What was most upsetting of all was the fact the people walking or riding in the cars looked so much like our own families."[45]

Stewart and his team were unable to prevent the military destabilization of central Bosnia before the end of their tour, which was due in part to the expulsion of a large number of refugees from many parts of Serb-held Bosnia. This altered the proportions of Croats and Muslims in government-held territory. His angry accusation in a taped BBC interview that the Croats burned the Muslim village of Ahmići certainly did not help his image of impartiality with the Croats, even though in the memoir he accuses the Muslims of committing atrocities as well.[46] Stewart attributes such actions to a state of "civil war" and popular ignorance of the Geneva conventions, and these factors were all largely out of his control. What was within his control was to offer constructive criticism of the UN operation, which he describes as suffering from a vague mandate, unclear rules of engagement, and a murky chain of command. Although he confesses that he liked the independence to interpret his mandate broadly, the very fact that he could do so revealed that the UN had "no strategic concept with detailed objectives."[47]

Michèle Mercier's *Crimes without Punishment* is an insider's account of the dilemmas that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) faced in providing humanitarian aid. Mercier argues that the ICRC performed well in the Slovenian and Croatian phases of the war but encountered significant difficulties in the Bosnian phase. Part of the problem was that the ICRC became active in the former Yugoslavia only with the fall of communism in 1990, which meant that its in-country networks were vulnerable at the beginning of hostilities. In addition, after the death of a Red Cross worker in May 1992, the ICRC decided to suspend its presence in Bosnia temporarily, which Mercier admits had negative consequences. As a result, no international humanitarian agency was present to observe, let alone ameliorate, the suffering of civilians during the worst phase of ethnic cleansing in the opening months of the war. In addition, even after its return to Bosnia in July 1992, the ICRC had lost momentum and visibility, which damaged the effectiveness of its dedicated workers.

Mercier sees Bosnia as a harbinger of other conflicts in the near future in which civilians become the prime military targets. Although she reaffirms the ICRC's stance of neutrality, objectivity, and impartiality as the only guarantee of the rights of all victims, she recognizes that Bosnia also challenged the ICRC's role in international conflict. The use of UNPROFOR to protect convoys militarized humanitarian aid and called into question the impartiality of all humanitarian organizations. In Mercier's view, the central conclusion to be drawn from the ICRC's experience in Bosnia is that, unable or unwilling to address themselves to their rightful tasks, politicians increasingly "appropriated and then misused the humanitarian vocabulary and then methods," thereby transforming humanitarian

[45] Stewart, *Broken Lives*, 88.
[46] Stewart, *Broken Lives*, chap. 16 and 309–10. See Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*, 126, who agrees that Bosnian Croat forces did commit atrocities in Ahmići.
[47] Stewart, *Broken Lives*, 325.

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aid into a fig leaf to conceal the lack of concerted political and military action. Thus, although agencies such as the ICRC demonstrated considerable success in the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia, the failure of political will to resolve the causes of the conflict ultimately undermined the achievement.[48]

As military personnel and humanitarian aid workers coped with the local realities, diplomats were engaged in the international peace process. In *Balkan Odyssey*, David Owen, the co-chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, has recorded in considerable detail his role in attempting to end the conflict in Bosnia. Owen makes clear that the Western foreign policy establishment did not consider military intervention in the former Yugoslavia a viable option in 1992 and even deemed air strikes dangerous because of the potential retaliation against humanitarian aid workers on the ground and even the possible "massacre of Muslims in camps." The only solution, from Owen's point of view, was therefore a "negotiated settlement" that had to include in the discussions the Bosnian Serbs, "the people who can make a difference in our pursuit of a lasting settlement."[49]

Although Owen records at length his reactions to the various leaders with whom he negotiated, his overall judgment about the Balkan participants in the peace process is unflattering: "Never before in over thirty years of public life had I had to operate in such a climate of dishonour, propaganda, and dissembling. Many of the people with whom I have had to deal in the former Yugoslavia were literally strangers to the truth." He blames this perfidy in part on communism and in part on "a tradition of solving problems through armed conflict."[50] Owen more systematically counters his detractors in the West, who, he believes, unfairly judged the negotiations and caused the ultimate rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. He angrily attacks the accusation that the peace plan, which proposed the creation of cantons under the control of a designated majority group, helped create the Croat-Muslim war of 1993. But Owen reserves special condemnation for the Clinton administration, which encouraged Bosnian Muslims to reject the plan without offering them any concrete military help. In Owen's view, therefore, it was the pusillanimous policy from Washington that resulted in "prolonging the war [for two years, which] meant prolonging the Serbs' ethnic cleansing, prolonging the casualties of the war."[51]

ALTHOUGH, IN RETROSPECT, EVENTS IN CROATIA also fit the general pattern of systematic aggression against civilians, only in Bosnia did the nature and widespread practice of civilian abuse become a primary concern, because ethnic cleansing was so clearly one-sided in the initial months of the war in Bosnia. The attention of the journalists was at first riveted on civilian suffering in Sarajevo, which came under bombardment in April, but on July 9, 1992, Roy Gutman

[48] Michèle Mercier, *Crimes without Punishment: Humanitarian Action in Former Yugoslavia* (London, 1995), French edn. 1994.
[49] David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York, 1995), 13, 101.
[50] Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 1, 3.
[51] Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 365.

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received a telephone call from a Muslim leader in Banja Luka who claimed, "They are shipping Muslim people through Banja Luka in cattle cars."[52] Gutman's exposure of detention camps maintained by Bosnian Serb forces brought ethnic cleansing to newspaper headlines and magazine covers throughout the world in August 1992, but even journalists experienced a sense of disbelief that such massive suffering could be occurring in a European country. As an increasing number of refugees made their way out of Serb-held territory, their horrifying tales indicated widespread human rights abuses.

Although the world was stunned by the pictures from concentration camps such as Omarska, the serial and mass rape of Muslim and Croat women is among the most shocking allegations that have come out of Bosnia. Radovan Karadžić, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, challenged "the whole world to prove the existence of a . . . single case of organized rape."[53] The human rights agencies obliged—and with more than a single case. As the preponderance of evidence made it increasingly difficult to deny the occurrence of mass rape in Bosnia, the Bosnia Serb line claimed that all parties had behaved equally reprehensibly and that the biased world ignored abused Serbian women. Human rights agencies reject the claim that at the beginning of the war all sides behaved in equally reprehensible ways, but they have indeed documented that Serbian women have been raped also.[54]

One of the principal demands of human rights agencies such as Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International has been for clear and accurate documentation, in the belief that unsubstantiated and inflated statistics might obscure the systematic nature of the abuse, which is the basis on which a case for genocide can be made. The two volumes on human rights abuses published by Helsinki Watch reflect this caution. The first volume, which was published in August 1992, stated, "In sum, the extent of the violence and the fact that it is targeted along ethnic/religious lines *raises the question* of whether genocide is taking place."[55] By the time the second volume appeared in April 1993, the systematic pattern of abuse was clear: "What is taking place in Bosnia-Hercegovina is attempted genocide—the extermination of a people in whole or in part because of their race, religion or ethnicity." The outbreak of hostilities between Croat and Muslim forces widened the scope of accusation because abuses were being committed on all sides, but "the chief offenders have been the Serbian military and paramilitary forces."[56]

The second volume of the Helsinki Watch report was structured to demonstrate the systematic nature of the human rights violations. Unlike the first volume, which organized the documentation according to specific abuses, the second volume subdivided Bosnia geographically and then attributed specific abuses to specific military forces.[57] Although patterns of ethnic cleansing varied from locale to locale,

[52] Roy Gutman, *Witness to Genocide: The 1993 Pulitzer Prize-winning Dispatches on the "Ethnic Cleansing" of Bosnia* (New York, 1993), vii.

[53] Quoted in Stiglmayer, *Mass Rape*, 163.

[54] See Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina* (New York, 1993), 2: 228–34. In addition to Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International, any number of organizations (including the United Nations, the European Union, and the U.S. State Department) have documented abuse in Bosnia.

[55] Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes*, 1: 1, italics added.

[56] Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes*, 2: 2, 2: 7.

[57] In northwestern Bosnia, only abuses by Serbian forces are listed because Helsinki Watch had no documentation of abuse by Muslim or Croat forces, which were not active in the area. In southwestern

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analysis of the actions committed by Bosnian Serb forces revealed in most cases coordination between the Bosnian Serb army and various paramilitary groups: for example, regular military units bombarded towns, but paramilitary groups frequently moved in first to terrorize the local population. These early stages often saw mass rape and what has come to be called "eliticide," that is, the elimination of local professionals who were potential leaders of resistance. As one displaced person said, "Only the working class lived. People who knew how to read and write were taken away every day. No teachers survived."[58] Members of the Bosnian Serb army, who arrived later, were less prone to commit acts of violence against civilians. Mop-up operations included such actions as loyalty oaths, seizure of property, internment, and deportation. This division of labor made official responsibility for looting, torture, mass rape, and mass murder deniable.

Human rights agencies and journalists face the same dilemma in publishing the testimony of the survivors of abuse that readers face in examining it: the witnesses have been dehumanized by forcible removal from their home environments, and all that appears to define them is their victimization. Feminists in particular have been concerned about the potential misuse of the testimony of brutalized women for pornographic purposes, especially given rumored black-market distribution of videotapes of actual rapes. The human rights documentation is and should be unpleasant reading, but much of it is also a way to rehumanize the survivors, who directly and indirectly yield information about their pre-war lives. In describing looting, for example, witnesses frequently list the household items that were taken—television sets, radios, computers, and VCRs—things found in readers' homes as well. Displaced people who voluntarily fled to camps such as Trnopolje seeking protection sometimes arrived in cars and on tractors. Some female witnesses reveal that they were left behind to tend property while their military-age husbands fled to safety, which shows that mass rape was an unexpected crime. Survivors also describe family relationships, friendships, and professions. In short, the testimony reveals that the ethnically cleansed are not "primitive" people who existed outside the structures of modern material or social culture.

Journalist and poet Rezak Hukanović, who survived the camps at Omarska and Manjača, relates his experiences in *The Tenth Circle of Hell: A Memoir of Life in the Death Camps of Bosnia*. In comparison with the older, more developed survivor literature that has emerged out of the Holocaust, Hukanović's short book initially appears to be a modest contribution that tells his overwhelming tale in a straightforward and simple manner. He begins with the round-up of Muslim men in Prijedor and builds chapter by chapter through transport to Omarska and the brutalization of his fellow inmates to the crescendo of his own near-death at the

and central Bosnia, however, the report includes abuses by Croatian forces (abuses in detention, rape, hostage-holding, assassination, unlawful searches and seizures, and arbitrary dismissal from employment), by Muslim forces (abuses in detention), abuses by Croatian and Muslim forces (forced displacement, pillaging and destruction of villages and cultural objects, and attacks on aid convoys), and by Serbian forces (forced displacement, summary executions, and indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force).

[58] Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes*, 2: 147. That the paramilitary units knew who belonged to the local Muslim or Croat elite was due to information that frequently came from the local Bosnian Serb groups. Testimony also often includes mention of local Bosnian Serbs who helped victims.

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hands of sadistic guards. Despite its apparent simplicity, this moving narrative is really quite extraordinary. Written and originally published within months of the author's release, the book reveals both the immediacy and the depth of the trauma sustained, for Hukanović dissociates himself from the narrative by writing in the third person.[59] In addition, bearing witness, which is essentially a reenactment of the brutalization and physical displacement that diminish and damage identity, demands moral condemnation of atrocity, and the narrator, Djemo, ends his story with the resounding curse, "Lord, may you never forgive them!" Unfortunately, bearing witness does not necessarily heal the wounds, and, in the last two pages of this poignant book, Hukanović the survivor emerges to ask the question, "*And what next?*"[60]

The first book to concentrate specifically on the brutalization of women was *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, a series of essays collected by the German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer.[61] The centerpiece of the collection is Stiglmayer's own eighty-page essay based on interviews that she and the American journalist George Rodrigue conducted in Bosnia. Like the human rights documentation, Stiglmayer bases her account heavily on case studies backed up with testimony from individual survivors, who are Muslim, Serb, and Croat. What is perhaps most unusual about this essay is the inclusion of excerpts from the interviews that Rodrigue conducted with three accused rapists in a Sarajevo jail.[62] The book contains as well essays by attorneys such as Catherine MacKinnon and Rhonda Copelon, descriptions of psychoanalytical perspectives on the war by practicing psychiatrists such as Paul Parin and Vera Folnegovic-Smalc, and general reactions to mass rape by internationally known feminists such as Susan Brownmiller, Cynthia Enloe, and Helke Sander.

The disagreements that emerge among the authors, which pose some dilemmas for international feminism, are perhaps what is most interesting about this collection. One such issue is the overall meaning of mass rape in Bosnia. Susan Brownmiller, for example, writes, "Alas for women, there is nothing unprecedented about mass rape in war," and then proceeds to recite the twentieth-century litany: Belgium, 1914, Nanking, 1937, Germany, 1945, Bangladesh, 1971, and now Bosnia.[63] Brownmiller's book *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (1975), which is the basis of such statements, was a seminal study that opened a new field of investigation in women's studies. In the last twenty years, however, scholars have

[59] Hukanović wrote in the third person "because he felt, at the time, that the brutal events he endured—as well as the complicit behavior of former friends and neighbors he witnessed—must have been happening to someone else." "Translator's Note," in Rezak Hukanović, *The Tenth Circle of Hell: A Memoir of Life in the Death Camps of Bosnia*, Colleen London and Midhat Ridjanović, trans. (New York, 1996), xii.

[60] Hukanović, *Tenth Circle of Hell*, 163. Scientific works on the psychological traumas sustained in Bosnia are just beginning to be published; see, for example, S. M. Weine, *et al.*, "Psychiatric Consequences of 'Ethnic Cleansing': Clinical Reassessments and Trauma Testimonies of Newly Resettled Bosnian Refugees," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 152 (1995): 536–42.

[61] Stiglmayer, *Mass Rape*. Another book—*Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia* (Minneapolis, 1996)—tries to use the methodology of postmodernist feminist literary criticism to deal with mass rape. Unfortunately, this book takes well-intentioned Beverly Allen too far beyond her academic competence in Italian literature.

[62] One of the accused, Borislav Herak, later repudiated his testimony.

[63] Susan Brownmiller, "Making Female Bodies the Battlefield," in Stiglmayer, *Mass Rape*, 181.

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refined the broad strokes of her thesis. Other essayists in the Stiglmayer book question whether the mass rape that followed in the wake of the Red Army is really the same as mass rape in Bosnia because Soviet soldiers raped not just German women but also women of other nationalities, including Jewish women who had been interned in concentration camps. From the point of view of the women, both are clearly war crimes, but the different motivations of the perpetrators and the attitudes of official institutions may distinguish mass rape, as committed by the Red Army, from genocidal rape, as committed in Bosnia.

Such questions, depressing though they may be, are consequential. If all mass rapes in this century are held equivalent, then one can optimistically conclude, as does Cynthia Enloe in the last essay in Stiglmayer's book, that we are on "the threshold of a significant breakthrough in the international politics of violence against women."[64] If, however, we compare and contrast the incidences of mass rape in the twentieth century, a darker picture emerges: we see a movement from brutalized Belgian women, who were used by British propagandists during World War I but whose rape was not ordered by the German High Command,[65] to the rape of women chosen both for gender and ethnicity and attacked by systematic governmental policy. Unfortunately, the latter interpretation fits more cleanly with the ever-worsening treatment of civilian populations in the twentieth century. That the tribunal at the Hague has determined to treat rape in Bosnia as a specific war crime may therefore be a breakthrough in international law but hardly a cause for optimism for international feminism.

Another source of disagreement among some of the authors in the collection is a group of difficult issues in regards to Serbian women. The human rights agencies agree that women of all national groups in Bosnia, including Serbs, have been brutalized and that the motivation of the perpetrators of these crimes is similar. The central question from a legal point of view concerns the involvement of the military and the government in condoning systematic rape. The human rights agencies have concluded that such cases can be made against some members of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces but that the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo did not condone such actions. Redress for some brutalized Serbian women may therefore be handled not at the Hague but through civil cases in Bosnian courts. Serbian women may thus be doubly victimized, which would seem to earn them the sympathy and support of the international feminist community.

In her contribution to the collection, Helke Sander raises several issues that pose fundamental challenges to this question:

> Despite propaganda and serious disinformation, Serbian women are capable of knowing, they do know, that their country (Serbia)—however serious the Croatian provocations might once have been—has instigated a war of aggression against Croatia. Even a nationalistic and uninformed Bosnian Serb woman can know that if her husband belongs to the Chetniks, to

[64] Cynthia Enloe, "Have the Bosnian Rapes Opened a New Era of Feminist Consciousness," in Stiglmayer, *Mass Rape*, 219.

[65] On British propaganda in World War I, see Trevor Wilson, "Lord Bryce's Investigation into Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914–15," *Journal of Contemporary History* 14 (1979): 369–83.

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Arkan's or Seselj's people, or to the volunteers from Serbia, he is with almost 100 percent certainty a multiple rapist.[66]

If we ignore the histrionic tone of the passage, we are left with the chilling, if unsubstantiated, accusation that Serbian women are complicit in mass rape in Bosnia. At the same time, however, Sander includes impressionistic statistics that domestic abuse in Croatia and Serbia has risen 100 percent since the war began, which poses other questions about the brutalization of female civilians *within* an ethnic community as part of the general pattern of communal violence.[67]

One of the issues that lies at the heart of the Bosnian conflict is how perpetrators can be motivated to commit sustained brutalization of their victims. Michael A. Sells's *The Bridge Betrayed* locates the origins of genocide in what he terms religious nationalism.[68] Sells, a Serb-American who teaches at Haverford College, aims to restore religious difference and the religious sources of historical myths as crucial elements in the construction of national identity. Invoking the theme of the Passion, Sells discusses the nineteenth-century transformation of Prince Lazar, from the Serb commander who fell in defeat at Kosovo Polje in 1389 to a Christ figure symbolizing the martyrdom of the Serb nation doomed to five hundred years under the Turkish yoke. Subsequent historical myths—that true Slavs must be Christian and that only cowards betrayed Christianity by converting to Islam—became deeply embedded in Serbian nationalist thought, which permitted the dehumanization of Muslims. The political reactivation of these myths in the 1980s depended in part on the emphasis of Serbian victimization at the hands of the Ustase during World War II and in part on Albanian Muslim resistance to Serbian domination in Kosovo in the 1980s. Sells includes as well an analysis of the revival of the cult of Mary at Medjugorje, which permitted the construction of a martyred Croatian nation. He ends his book with the Western myths of Orientalism and Balkanism to depict the "masks of complicity" that prevented timely intervention to halt genocide.

Norman Cigar's *Genocide in Bosnia* seeks in part to demonstrate that ethnic cleansing was not an unintentional by-product of the war in Bosnia but its essential goal. Cigar, a Croat-American who teaches at Quantico, begins with the general political situation in Yugoslavia and traces growing Serbian nationalism through popular magazines, literary works, and scholarly monographs published in the 1980s, which collectively laid the groundwork for the mythical inscription of Muslims as a fanatical Other that endangered Serbs' existence in contemporary Yugoslavia as it had victimized Serbs in history. Modeling his book on Holocaust studies, Cigar systematically works his way through the basic questions derived from

[66] Helke Sander, "Prologue," in Stiglmayer, *Mass Rape*, xix.

[67] Sander, "Prologue," xx. Other survivor testimony raises similar issues. One refugee from Foča, for example, reported on propaganda from Radio Foča that claimed that Serbian women would be required to bear seven children apiece; cited in Ibrahim Kajan, "Is This Not Genocide?" in Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, *Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan War* (Stony Creek, Conn., 1993), 89. Testimony also makes mention of violence committed against male members of the same ethnic community to force the commission of violence, although this issue (like the issue of male rape) is usually muted in discussion of ethnic cleansing.

[68] Michael A. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley, Calif., 1996). A summary of Sells's argument can be found in his essay in the collection *Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia*, G. Scott Davis, ed. (New York, 1996), which seeks to examine ethical and legal issues in the Bosnian conflict from an interdisciplinary perspective.

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that discipline: How were Serbs manipulated to commit acts of violence? What systematic patterns can be detected in ethnic cleansing? Did Muslims themselves contribute to their victimization?[69] Cigar ends the first part of the book by considering the various kinds of denial that typified the Serbian, the Muslim, and the international communities.

The second half of the book is devoted to an analytical postmortem of Western diplomacy, which made "the worst of a bad situation." Despite the real achievement of delivering humanitarian aid during the war, Western diplomacy fundamentally failed because it was grounded in indecision and in the insistence on political and diplomatic solutions rather than military ones. Cigar rejects the argument that arming Bosnian government forces early in the war would have worsened the situation and points out that *not* arming them enabled the "spin-off" genocide of Muslims by Croats as well as rising intolerance within the Muslim community. Those two developments indicate the potential spread of genocidal politics to rump Yugoslavia, which still contains significant minorities in Vojvodina and Kosovo. Cigar ends the book with the specter of global "copycat genocide," which ultimately endangers Western polities as well, for they may become characterized by their "willingness, however reluctant, to accept genocide as part of a [normal] political process."[70]

As the debate over Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Germany, Germans, and the Holocaust* (1996) clearly demonstrates, Americans and Europeans are still arguing passionately about a war that ended half a century ago. Readers therefore should not approach publications on a contemporary event such as the conflict in Bosnia expecting consensus. We are at the beginning of a long process of figuring out not only what has happened but also what those events mean, and works that fall under the categories outlined in this article will continue to appear. One of the first to be released in the United States in 1997 was *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime*, a journalistic reconstruction of events that led to the massacre of Muslim men in a so-called safe haven as UN troops looked on.[71] In addition, books on other topics such as the refugee problem,[72] the International War Crimes

[69] On the issue of Muslim responsibility for their own victimization, Cigar concludes that the only action Muslims could have taken was to arm themselves earlier, which probably would merely have hastened the beginning of the war. Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*, 38–46 and *passim*.

[70] Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*, 200.

[71] Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime* (London, 1996); the American edition was released in 1997.

[72] Julie Mertus, *et al.*, eds., has collected statements from refugees from all parts of the former Yugoslavia in *The Suitcase: Refugee Voices from Bosnia and Croatia* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997); and the Belgrade-based organization Women in Black has published *Sjećam se = I Remember: Writings by Bosnian Women Refugees*, Fran Peavey, U.S. ed. (San Francisco, 1996). These two works supplement the earlier *Children of Atlantis: Voices from the Former Yugoslavia*, Zdenko Lesić, ed. (Budapest, 1995), which reproduces the autobiographical statements from student financial aid applications to the Open Society Institute. Other older books of interest are Christopher Merrill, *The Old Bridge: The Third Balkan War and the Age of the Refugee* (Minneapolis, 1995); UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees, 1995: The Political Origins of Communal Violence* (Oxford, 1995); Human Rights Watch, *Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence* (New Haven, Conn., 1995).

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Tribunal,[73] and the shortcomings of international crisis resolution[74] will appear in increasing numbers and help refine the debate.

The worst that could happen is that, amid the welter of controversy, nonspecialists read none of the books on Bosnia because they are all "biased," even though that is always the nature of primary sources. The nearer we are to the unfolding of an event, the harder it is to determine which witnesses best represent what historians will eventually identify as the dominant trends. Journalists who reported on the siege of Sarajevo were rarely neutral and sometimes not even objective, particularly in the early days of the Bosnian conflict, but, whatever the tone of their reporting, what is often forgotten is that Sarajevo really was under siege and the civilians who lived in the capital really did suffer. That piece of the story got told early and sometimes well, and, in the telling, journalists raised important questions such as whether professional objectivity must be neutral and whether impartiality cannot in itself be biased.

For historians, especially those of us who specialize in modern history, Bosnia takes us to the heart of some of the most problematic aspects of our discipline. As a recent exchange in the *Slavic Review* demonstrates, contemporary events in Bosnia have raised anew discussion of the role of moral judgment in scholarship, the uses and consequences of the rhetoric of genocide, and the issue of collective guilt.[75] When, as Robert M. Hayden asks, do we judge forcible movement of people to be a population transfer and when is it genocide? Is the logical outcome of the idea of the nation-state the partition of multi-ethnic territories, which—if permitted—can be achieved with minimal violence? On the other hand, as Carol S. Lilly asks, to what extent do members of a national group bear collective responsibility for acts of violence committed in their name, especially when they continue to support those leaders politically? Are genocide and partition two sides of the same coin, or can we imagine other alternatives that move toward civil society, as Susan Woodward indicates? In one sense, Bosnia leaves us at the end of the century with the same question it posed at the beginning: How do we explain Gavrilo Princip, when he is one person's national hero and another person's terrorist?

Distressing as the tragedy in Bosnia has been, the issues that have come to light there are important because they transcend the Balkans. Many parts of the globe have experienced the construction of mutually intolerant national identities, repressive political movements, and extended periods of extreme communal

[73] Francis A. Boyle, Bosnia's general agent at the International Court, has released *The Bosnian People Charge Genocide: Proceedings at the International Court of Justice concerning Bosnia v. Serbia on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (Northampton, Mass., 1996), which contains the foundation documents for the case on genocide. Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf have written the two-volume *Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis* (Irving-on-Hudson, N.Y., 1995).

[74] To date, much of this discussion about the failure of international institutions and conflict resolution has occurred in journal articles. One book-length publication from the policy-making community is Leo Tindemans, *et al.*, *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans* (Washington, D.C., 1996).

[75] The discussion on Bosnia was printed in the Spring 1996 *Slavic Review*. The central paper under discussion was Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers" (727–48); the responses were Carol S. Lilly, "Amoral Realism or Immoral Obfuscation" (749–54); Susan Woodward, "Genocide or Partition: Two Faces of the Same Coin?" (755–61); and Paul Wallace, "The Costs of Partition in Europe: A South Asian Perspective" (762–66). The discussion concluded with Hayden's response (767–78).

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violence. If we think of Bosnia in the context of Chechnya, Rwanda, Zaire, and Cambodia, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that massive abuse of civilian populations during periods of political disorder is increasingly the norm. The dominant Western response is generally to avoid military intervention and to send humanitarian aid, but, increasingly, humanitarian aid organizations find themselves unable to meet the need because they cannot address the root causes. As Christopher Merrill wrote of the Balkans, "Caring for refugees has become 'one of the growth industries of the 1990s.' It is, however, an industry in crisis."[76]

Bosnia disconcerts us in large part because, after the fall of communism, we thought we had "won" and achieved at long last the "end of history." But, of course, history does not end. History also does not teach us clear lessons and never has. What history provides for us is a method of analysis that contextualizes debate. To promote the idea that we can at this point know "the Truth" about Bosnia is a conceit because we do not live outside the historical process. We have, however, drunk our morning coffee and fixed our nightly dinners to reports on Bosnia, and we have all therefore been witness to events there. Clearly, no one—not journalists, not scholars, not diplomats, not politicians—has had effective solutions, and all are necessarily partisan about one of the most significant events in our times. But, as specialists continue to argue with passion as they must, general readers should keep in mind what the prince told the blind men: "The elephant is a very large animal. Its side is like a wall. Its trunk is like a snake. Its tusks are like spears. Its legs are like trees. Its ears are like fans. And its tail is like a rope. So you all are right. But each of you [is] all wrong too. For each of you touched only one part of the elephant."[77]

[76] Merrill, *Old Bridge*, 8.
[77] *The Blind Men and the Elephant*, retold by Karen Backstein (New York, 1992).

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Reviews of Books

GENERAL

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER. *World Economic Primacy: 1500 to 1990*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. xiv, 269. $35.00.

Charles P. Kindleberger is a distinguished political economist as well as a leading economic historian. He has written excellent studies of *Europe's Postwar Growth* (1967), *American Business Abroad* (1969), *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (1973), and, more recently, his stimulating *A Financial History of Western Europe* (1984). His latest book is an analysis of the factors that propel one country to a position of superiority over others at some period of its history and an exploration of the reasons for the relative decline of a one-time world leader. In this effort, Kindleberger acknowledges a debt to the historical and geographical model of Fernand Braudel.

Kindleberger begins his history with the city-states of medieval and Renaissance Italy, particularly Venice, and proceeds to discuss Portugal and Spain during their imperial expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In northern Europe, the activities of Bruges, Antwerp, and seventeenth-century Holland receive attention. In these cases, he notes, there were long arcs of rise and decline. In the peculiar history of France, however, we are presented with a power that repeatedly challenged the economic dominance of a rival but never succeeded in attaining a genuine primacy for any considerable period. Kindleberger has explored British economic development in an earlier work, *Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1851–1950* (1964), and he writes about its period of primacy in the nineteenth century with a special authority.

Britain presents for Kindleberger "the classic example of the national life cycle" (p. 125): rapid growth, global economic primacy, and slow decline, which he compares to the individual life cycle of energetic youth, middle age, and senile rigidity. Here, as throughout, he explores not only the economic factors at play but the social forces. In the case of British decline, for example, he discusses the amateur tradition, notably the failure of the elite schools to offer a technical education, and what he calls "the penalty of the head start" (p. 141), which might be seen in England's reliance on outmoded machinery while its chief rivals, Germany and the United States, were taking advantage of a more productive technology.

Kindleberger surveys the complicated story of Germany's two twentieth-century pushes to achieve superiority, and he also addresses the economic achievements of both Germany and Japan in what he calls the golden age, the enormous economic expansion of the third quarter of the twentieth century. During this time, all the economies of the West expanded, and the United States achieved a previously unmatched primacy. Kindleberger's analysis of American rise and decline is well done. As to who will win the race to become the next primary world economic power, he is properly cautious. He sees the possibility of a return to American economic hegemony, a future primacy of Japan, Germany, or the European Community as a whole, or perhaps "a dark horse" like Australia, Brazil, or China. Kindleberger predicts only a "muddle" (p. 228).

Kindleberger fails to take notice of political economists of the past who have written on many of the issues he discusses. Presenting what he calls "the penalty of the head start," for instance, he makes no mention of Thorstein Veblen's classic discussion of "the penalty of the lead" in *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (1915). Similarly, the pregnant insights of David Hume, Josiah Tucker, David Ricardo, Friedrich List, and J. A. Hobson, among many others, receive no mention. Nor does Kindleberger do justice to the considerable literature produced by contemporaries or near contemporaries of each of the primacies of which he writes. But such an approach would make for a very different book. And what Kindleberger has accomplished is quite enough.

Kindleberger does not argue that any one or two factors explain why nations rise, decline, and fall but touches all bases. Although such a treatment may not make for the kind of exciting history that engages a wide popular readership, scholars will find it persuasive and useful. Indeed, this volume may serve as a convenient handbook of much recent scholarship on the subject. (Unfortunately, the index has many omissions, seriously impairing its effectiveness in this role.)

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Kindleberger deserves the gratitude of scholars for an insightful overview of an important question.

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HAROLD JAMES. *International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund and Oxford University Press, New York. 1996. Pp. xvi, 742. $45.00.

For scholars interested in the evolving global economy, this is an important volume. Harold James analyzes international monetary issues from the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, at which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were established, to the debt crises of the 1990s. Chapters consider the development, evolution, and demise of the Bretton Woods system, efforts to redesign the international monetary order, and problems associated with economic regionalism, developing nations, and centrally planned economies.

Although international trade has generally evolved toward a rules-based system, epitomized by the World Trade Organization, James argues that the international monetary system moved in the opposite direction, "away from rules and toward cooperation" (p. 586). Sensitive to the problems of unilateralism in the 1930s, Harry Dexter White, John Maynard Keynes, and other economic architects of the post–World War II international monetary order established a rules-based, universal, international system for maintaining fixed but adjustable exchange rates. After World War II, these arrangements initially proved unsuited to postwar conditions. Policy makers found it necessary to pursue key-currency stabilization, as was done in the 1920s, to create the preconditions for trade liberalization and currency convertibility. In time, Bretton Woods did prove helpful in promoting current-account liberalization among developed countries.

James blames resurgent nationalism and renewed capital movements for undercutting the Bretton Woods system during the 1970s. The founding generation had not envisaged free capital movements. As capital flows revived, national governments had more difficulty managing the system. Between 1971 and 1973, James contends, capital flows destroyed the par-value system. The United States was also responsible for the breakdown, James claims. Under Bretton Woods, one hegemonic nation (the United States) gained special privileges because of the preeminent role of its currency. During the administrations of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, the United States viewed the dollar "as a national resource to be manipulated for the sake of national advantage" (p. 591).

In criticizing American unilateralism, James seems insensitive to the systemic asymmetries that constrained American economic foreign policy during the Cold War and frustrated presidents from John F. Kennedy to Nixon. Concerned with promoting prosperity in the noncommunist world and containing the Soviet Union, the United States opened the American market to imports without obtaining meaningful reciprocity. Instead, major trading partners and allies such as Japan maintained protectionist trade barriers and resisted currency revaluations despite rapidly rising currency reserves. Such imbalances effectively shifted the burden of adjustment to American workers and producers and undercut political support for economic internationalism in the United States.

Some of the most fascinating commentary in this massive study concerns recent developments in Eastern Europe, where the IMF facilitated reform, and in the United States. James brands supply-side economics a "new policy fad" that "distorted the international distribution of growth and the whole international order" (p. 415). In the IMF and the Group of Seven, profound skepticism about budget estimates by the Reagan administration hampered effective cooperation.

Diplomatic historians may be more interested in documents James obtained from Soviet Foreign Ministry files about why Joseph Stalin's government chose not to join the Bretton Woods institutions after participating in the negotiations. During the last week of December 1945, Stalin apparently made the decision to hold back, hoping to use membership as a bargaining tool for foreign assistance.

James wrote this history under unusual conditions. He was selected by the IMF and was given full access to IMF archives and staff. An independent editorial committee of IMF insiders and prominent economists reviewed his work and proposed changes. The result is a book generally faithful to the technocratic perspective of the IMF. Frequent cartoons offer some respite from technical discussions of surveillance and conditionality. But James emphasizes economic issues and subordinates political differences. One will not learn much here about decisionmaking at the IMF. The editing exhibits a similar sensitivity to national concerns. Taiwan is repeatedly identified as "Taiwan Province of China," presumably to avoid antagonizing the Beijing regime. The war between Britain and Argentina is the "Malvinas/Falklands War."

In the final chapters, readers will encounter some institutional advocacy. Not surprisingly, James concludes that, in a market-driven global economy, international institutions such as the IMF have a major role to play in providing information, multilateral surveillance, and coordination. Such conclusions are compatible with the prevailing consensus among international economists and offficials of world financial institutions that economic development is associated with market liberalization and openness to trade and capital flows.

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MELVIN RICHTER. *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. vii, 204. $45.00.

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Melvin Richter has a dual agenda for this study: first, to acquaint the English-speaking reader with the German historiographical trend of the last thirty years known as *Begriffsgeschichte*, or the history of concepts; second, to advocate a similar direction for Anglo-American scholarship. Whatever comes of the project he advocates, the book stands on its own as an informative contribution to our understanding of the German movement. The major accomplishments of *Begriffsgeschichte* have not been narrative histories as such but lexicons, such as the seven-volume *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (1972–1994), edited by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck and the eleven-volume *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680–1820* (1985–1988), edited by Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt. The bulk of Richter's book is a discussion of these two works.

The methodological claims of *Begriffsgeschichte* are ambitious: to seek a level of historical analysis that synthesizes intellectual and social history without reducing one to the other. This is done by treating concepts as the basic unit, tracing their varied meanings and uses diachronically and synchronically, and showing how they serve as vessels both of tradition and of contestation among different sociopolitical groups. Koselleck, the leading formulator of such claims, takes pains to differentiate this approach from that of philology: concepts and words do not necessarily stand in a one-to-one relationship. For example, a single entry in the *Grundbegriffe* has the title "*Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse*."

Richter further seeks to differentiate *Begriffsgeschichte* from Arthur Lovejoy's history of ideas. This distinction is, to my mind, somewhat exaggerated, more apparent in methodological pronouncements than in actual execution. It is nevertheless instructive to compare the *Grundbegriffe* with the *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (1973–1974) edited by Philip P. Weiner. The range of the latter is much greater, with 311 articles covering nature, literary history, religion, philosophy, logic, and mathematics as well as politics and society; the former has 130 articles, covering political and social concepts exclusively. The depth of scholarship in the *Grundbegriffe* is much greater, however, making it an incomparable resource.

A further distinguishing feature of these lexicons is that they were conceived in response to a specific research question: to investigate with precision the origins of modernity. It is a guiding assumption of both works that this can be tracked in the changing uses of concepts during the period from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries, the "saddle period," in Koselleck's terminology. Thus, in the *Grundbegriffe*, classical and medieval uses of concepts are treated as background, and more recent usages are summarized in the final section of a given entry. Richter traces the genesis of this project to conservative postwar historians' encounter with Nazism and its defeat. The *Grundbegriffe* has been criticized for falling short of its aim of encompassing the social history of concepts. The *Handbuch* was intended to compensate for these shortcomings by exploring a wider range of sources. This joint Franco-German project provides materials for the study of *mentalité* during the period of the French Revolution.

Richter strengthens his case for the extension of the methods of *Begriffsgeschichte* to Anglo-American scholarship by devoting two chapters to the treatment of a single concept in each encyclopedia: that of domination (*Herrschaft*) in the *Grundbegriffe*, showing how Max Weber's translators would have benefitted from such a reference work, and that of *civilité* in the *Handbuch*. The penultimate chapter discusses the work of J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner in comparison to *Befriffsgeschichte*, showing how close and complementary the two approaches are. I only wish Richter had included an additional chapter of comparison with the work of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, which also bears obvious resemblances to the work of the Germans.

Such comparisons lead one to ponder the cultural significance of *Begriffsgeschichte*, particularly the preference for lexicons over any other organizing principle of inquiry, be it narrative or structural analysis, as a way of doing history. The implicit message is the same as that of postmodernism: the distrust of any overarching generalization and the valuation of the fragmentary. That said, the high level of scholarship in these fragments, as convincingly portrayed by Richter, renders the value of such an approach beyond dispute.

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CLAYTON ROBERTS. *The Logic of Historical Explanation*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1996. PP. xi, 320. Cloth $49.50, paper $17.95.

In an era when some historians tell us that the truth about history is that history does not tell the truth, it is refreshing to find a book such as this, which boldly asserts that history not only tells the truth but explains past events causally. Clayton Roberts's claims rest on an extensive knowledge of the philosophy of history in the analytic tradition and are supported by copious illustrations drawn from English history, chiefly of the seventeenth century.

Roberts asserts that historical explanation is based on covering laws; this is the claim Carl Hempel put forward in 1942. The fact that historians have generally rejected this view is due, Roberts argues, to its advocates' mistake in thinking that there were covering laws that explained macroevents such as revolutions, wars, and reformations. Roberts holds that there are no such macrolaws; large-scale events are rather explained by reconstructing in detail the events that led to them, the microevents that form the genetic history of the larger events. It is in explaining the connections among these microevents that covering laws are essential, for Roberts does hold that only the combination of laws and initial conditions can actually explain. This

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process of microanalysis he terms "colligation" (a use of the term different from that of many philosophers), and most of the book is devoted to an analysis of the varieties of colligation, the methods employed in it, and the reasoning involved.

Yet this elaborate system of causally linked events and conditions does not provide what one usually finds in historical works: narrative interpretations. "An interpretation," Roberts holds, is "an abbreviation of a complete explanation" (p. 246) that sets forth the most important causes of the event to be explained while omitting the rest. It is in narrative form because "narrative is the appropriate literary vehicle for colligation" (p. 35). Thus, Roberts sees the intricate genetic microanalysis of colligation as the form taken by the historian's research, the results of which are presented in abbreviated form in the published narrative.

But what are these covering laws used to explain microevents? As one reads through this book, it becomes clear that they are, as Roberts himself says, platitudes—the sorts of self-evident truisms that underlie everyday judgements about behavior. And even these, Roberts notes, are usually left implicit by historians, although the explanatory force of their accounts depends on them. If one is pleased to find so clear a recognition that attributions of causality require some generality in the explaining principles, one is also a bit let down to find the sort of principles Roberts thinks are actually employed.

Roberts is no fan of social science history and has little use for theories or models. Only in his discussion of action explanations, where he recognizes purposes as theoretical constructs hypothesized to explain behavior, does he turn to theory. And action explanations for him are still based on covering laws. Dray's rationality principle Roberts interprets as a "shortcut" to finding covering laws. Thus Roberts manages to make bedfellows of Hempel and Dray—a feat that one imagines would have appalled both.

This is a book about historical explanation. Roberts does not deal with epistemological issues. He is concerned with explaining historical change through event history; questions of the epistemological status of historical events are not raised. Hence Roberts does not see history as explaining data or evidence, but the events themselves. The emphasis on change tends to eclipse the equally important issue of constancy, which surely requires as much explanation as its opposite. In discussing the work of the Annales school, Roberts does refer to "structures"—persistent features—but his preference for change is clear in his charge that Fernand Braudel *et al.* have ignored the relation of structures to events and structural change. History for Roberts is chiefly the history of events (i.e. changes of state), and its method is the analysis of the causal links among microevents that produce macroevents.

Roberts has attempted to synthesize the views on historical explanation of philosophers in the analytic tradition and to show that his synthesis conforms to historical practice. The book will be useful to anyone interested in these issues. But it will not satisfy proponents of social science history, nor those who believe that more sophisticated models are necessary to account for change, rates of change, and absence of change over the course of historical time.

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WAI CHEE DIMOCK. *Residues of Justice: Literature, Law, Philosophy*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 278. $48.00.

Wai Chee Dimock's book will not appeal to the traditional historian. Disdainful of history as "a domain of full inscription" (p. 79), Dimock employs a cultural studies approach. Her work represents the best of that genre, proffering kaleidoscopic treatments of a wide range of works and phenomena and repeatedly delighting the reader with unanticipated shifts in sensibility and argument.

The book's ultimate concern is "justice" or, at least, its weaknesses as a foundational and universal conception. Confronting the western philosophical tradition from Aristotle to Rawls, Dimock challenges the assumption that, via justice, the world might somehow become generalizable, proportional, and commensurable. The search for justice, she asserts, "is very much an exercise in abstraction, and perhaps an exercise in reduction as well, stripping apparent differences to reveal an underlying order, an order intelligible, in the long run, perhaps only in quantitative terms" (p. 2).

Nowhere in the dominant image of "justice," Dimock says, is the multitude of unresolved and unresolvable matters. These mismatches, shortfalls and leftovers—"residues," in Dimock's language—expose the thinking and processes related to justice as flawed. If we could grasp this, "justice" would lose much of its ethical primacy and jurisdictional scope, ultimately becoming just one virtue in a family of virtues.

Dimock carries out her self-chosen intellectual mission in five relatively distinct chapters, each of which exposes the premise that the world can be understood in commensurate terms: punishment for crimes, damages for injury, benefits for desert. Especially intriguing is the chapter entitled "Luck and Love," in which Dimock underscores arbitrariness's "irreducible presence, its status as a conundrum (perhaps even a counterpoint) to our thinking about justice, about reason, and about the supposed coincidence or entailment between the two" (p. 100). She attempts nothing less than a constitutive theory of luck; that is, a consideration of the way luck establishes rather than merely confronts us.

When searching for guidance in her ambitious inquiries, Dimock turns most frequently and especially to the novel, which she dubs "this most sedimented of genres" (p. 19). Nineteenth-century American works are her favorites, and Herman Melville, Rebecca Harding Davis, Susan Warner, James Fenimore Cooper, William Dean Howells, and Kate Chopin all receive

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spirited treatment. These texts present "the idea of justice not as a formal universal, and not as an objective relation among things, but as a provisional dictate, an *incomplete* dictate, haunted always by what it fails to encompass" (p. 9). "Literary justice," in Dimock's terms, is a much needed corrective for justice as understood by the philosophers and legalists.

Dimock's work may be seen as a part of the wide-ranging law and literature movement that has emerged in the United States during the past decade. Half of the nation's law schools now offer courses or seminars in law and literature. Two law and literature journals are available, as are a score of law and literature anthologies, summaries, and overviews. Many of the scholars in this movement, only a handful of whom Dimock mentions, have reached similar conclusions about literature's ability to illustrate the gritty humanness and contradictory complexity of justice.

But this point having been made, Dimock's achievement remains. The law professors (and to a lesser extent English professors) active in the law and literature movement are not cultural studies scholars like Dimock. Most lack her boldness and interdisciplinary skills. Few would be ready or able, as she is in her final chapter, to scamper from the multifaceted modern critique of rights to Kate Chopin's *The Awakening*, to the groundbreaking Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel Warren article on privacy, to substantive due process of the Lochner era, and—whew—to *Plessy v. Ferguson*.

Dimock manifests both the idealist tendencies and the jargon-laden wordiness of cultural studies scholarship. At one point, for example, she announces plans to consider the language of rights "both as an inflected structure of meaning and as a vexed negotiation with a syntactic form" (p. 191). Yet, overall, her book is superb. It is best read not in conjunction with research but when one is relaxed and in the mood to be teased, provoked, and inspired.

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Alan J. Levine. *Race Relations within Western Expansion*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 1996. Pp. viii, 168. $49.95.

In his preface, Alan J. Levine explains that, although he is a specialist on the Cold War, he has written this work of synthesis to counter what he calls the bizarre racial discussion that, since the late 1970s, has become increasingly obsessive even as actual barriers have crumbled. He was already familiar, he reassures the reader, with the Holocaust, slavery in the Americas, the colonial empires, and other subjects covered in this volume.

The trouble with the book becomes apparent when one reads Levine's statement that the "history of most of sub-Saharan Africa over the last 2,000 years is one of the expansion of the Bantu-speaking Negroid farmers and herders from West Africa at the expense of other groups of different races who had remained in a hunting-and-gathering culture, the Pygmies and the Bushmen, who once held virtually all of central, eastern, and southern Africa" (p. 22). "Until recently," people whom he calls full-sized Negroids (not Pygmies) "inhabited only a narrow strip across Africa." All of them (full-sized Negroids as well as Pygmies) are said to have practiced human sacrifice and cannibalism. These statements are so strikingly at variance with what African historians have been writing for the past thirty-five years that one wonders what Levine can have been reading. A perusal of the bibliography turned up only one work on the history of the continent, John Thornton's *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World* (1992)—which contains nothing of the kind. Levine appears to have developed his views about African history unassisted.

Time and again, the reader can only gasp at the deftness with which the author disposes of complex, highly debatable issues. Did colonies pay? Without hesitation, Levine says they did not, overlooking the fine point that down to 1947 the Indian taxpayer paid the lion's share of the cost of the Indian Army, one of the largest standing forces in the world and the basis of British land power east of Suez. British rule, he adds, again without discussion, was completely beneficial to India. The bibliography lists only one relevant work, Christopher Hibbert's *The Great Mutiny* (1978). Medieval Europe was way ahead of the rest of the world technologically; although Levine cites Lynn White's important work, *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (1962), Joseph Needham appears to have labored in vain for half a century on his multi-volume *Science and Civilization in China (1954–)*. The slave trade was of negligible economic value to Britain, Levine states categorically, having been responsible for only 1.8 percent of the total capital investment at its height in the eighteenth century. Although this overly precise figure may actually be reasonable, it represents the profit from the *trade* in slaves alone, not from Britain's multifaceted commercial relations with the South Atlantic world economy. Britain could certainly have industrialized without the slave trade. If it had not developed exploitative relations with Asia and Africa, however, it would have had an entirely different sort of economy. Levine's bibliography contains virtually none of the relevant historiography on the subject, including books that would have supported him.

Levine's chapters on the Holocaust and American slavery are better informed. (Not that I would know, at least in any detail.) The colonization of the Americas and the Indian wars in North America, he insists, are a case of misplaced guilt: there were virtually no massacres and very few Indians killed. In this case, however, the author's rhetoric runs ahead of his sources. He cites approvingly a body count of 4,000 between 1789 and 1898. As his footnotes indicate, the standard authority is Robert Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West* (1984), whose estimate is 6,000 for the

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1865–1898 period (though of course the vast majority of deaths were from disease). According to Utley, the Indian frontier conflicts were a typical example of the nineteenth-century phenomenon the British called "small wars." Like Thomas Hobbes's description of the state of nature, they were nasty, brutish, and (unless the uncivilized people were silly enough to fight on against impossible odds) ordinarily short.

According to the publisher's blurb, this is Levine's fourth volume in the 1990s. Although I admire his energy and have some sympathy for people with the temerity to parachute onto unfamiliar battlefields, perhaps he might permit himself the luxury of taking a little more time.

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MARGARET S. CREIGHTON and LISA NORLING, editors. *Iron Men, Wooden Women: Gender and Seafaring in the Atlantic World, 1700–1920*. (Gender Relations in the American Experience.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996. Pp. xvi, 293. Cloth $45.00, paper $16.95.

It is hard to imagine a field of inquiry more open to feminist criticism than maritime history. Not only have its practitioners almost invariably taken the rough masculinity of seafaring for granted—a natural fact requiring no further investigation—but they have persistently ignored the role of women in seaport communities. This collection of essays on maritime society, mainly during the age of sail, attempts to remedy the oversight. Margaret S. Creighton and Lisa Norling state their purpose plainly: "When gender is added, how must the maritime experience be rewritten?" (p. xiii). Their edited volume does not provide an entirely effective answer, but it does at least point the way.

The book's ten essays can be grouped into four categories. The first, containing pieces by Marcus Rediker and Diane Dugaw, deals with women who did go to sea, either as pirates or in the navy. The second is composed of papers by Ruth Herndon, Norling, and Haskell Springer and considers the family context of maritime society: how the mariners' wives adapted to their husbands' seafaring careers, and how seafaring families managed to get by. The third category, including essays by Creighton, Jeffrey Bolster, and Laura Tabili, investigates the masculinity of the sailor's trade and the ways in which ideas about gender were employed by both mariners and their employers. The final grouping consists of two papers by literary scholars. Lillian Nayder delivers a feminist critique of Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* (1900), and Melody Graulich identifies a distinctly female vision of the sea in certain strands of American women's writing.

The collection does include some fine pieces. Norling's study of whaling wives in nineteenth-century New England is a fully believable account of the ways in which women whose husbands were away for three or four years at a time managed to deal with the problems of running households and raising families. Springer's reconstruction of "The Captain's Wife at Sea" from the personal accounts of shipmasters' wives who accompanied their husbands provides an interesting counterpart to Norling's study. Nayder and Tabili use different sources to explain in a similar way how power relations on board early twentieth-century British ships (those imagined by Conrad and those that really did comprise the merchant marine of the period) were described in sexual terms in order to make them seem more natural.

As a whole, however, the collection suffers from two real weaknesses. First, it contains several essays that, in spite of their individual virtues, do not clearly address the gendered nature of maritime history. Rediker's treatment of female pirates Anne Bonny and Mary Read, although interesting in itself, is essentially the story of two working-class rebels who happen to have been women. In the same way, Bolster's solid essay on African-American seamen deals effectively with race and class but not gender. Bolster makes much of black sailors' self-identification as seafaring *men*, yet surely their purpose was to distinguish themselves from boys, not women. Graulich's article on an American female-authored tradition of maritime fiction deals with gender directly enough but is almost wholly ahistorical. None of these papers is without interest, but they do not assist the reader interested in gender and history.

Second, the volume contains several papers whose essential message has already been delivered elsewhere. Creighton's article summarizes arguments that were made several years ago in her superb book, *Rites and Passages* (1995); Bolster's piece resembles closely the fine article that he published some time ago in the *Journal of American History* (1990). Rediker's essay is new in topic but not really in argument. This problem is endemic to such collections, which almost always take a long time to assemble and publish. Still, the reader has a right to expect new things in a new book, and there is too much in this book that is not new.

Such criticisms notwithstanding, the quality of the essays is certainly high, and to someone new in the field, they introduce the work of many important scholars in an engaging and readable way. Had the volume appeared five years earlier and focused more carefully on the historical treatment of gender and seafaring, however, it would have been a fresher and tighter effort.

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ULLA WIKANDER, ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, and JANE LEWIS, editors. *Protecting Women: Labor Legislation in Europe, the United States, and Australia, 1880–1920*. Assisted by JAN LAMBERTZ. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1995. Pp. viii, 379. Cloth $49.95, paper $19.95.

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Protective labor legislation for women is one of those accompaniments to industrialization that captures our intellectual curiosity: how can such laws, which seem to have emerged out of genuine concern to improve working conditions for women in sweatshops, also be so pernicious in their consequences? The rationale and effect of these laws, passed in the United States around the time of the Progressive Era, have been well-documented; "the basis of American protective legislation resided in women's capacity to become mothers," as Alice Kessler-Harris put it (p. 338). "Freedom of Contract" arguments limited the success of (gender neutral) labor regulation for adult males in the courts; women could be made the subject of legislation by defining them as weaker or in need of special protections because of their role as "mothers of the future generation." These laws contributed to a gender-segregated labor force and defined women primarily as mothers or potential mothers, not as workers, thereby reinforcing their economic dependence within the family, among other things.

This important collection brings together researchers working on protective labor legislation for women in eleven countries within a common framework, but preserves their separate focuses. Those of us familiar with the American course of development of protective labor legislation for women will find this set of essays especially intriguing, because it fills a major gap in our knowledge by revealing national differences in legislation, in which groups actively set the terms of debate, in political context, and in the specific economic turns that industrialization took within different nations.

There appears to have been an almost universal push to develop this sort of sex-specific labor legislation despite dissimilarities in industrialization, notions of appropriate state intervention, levels of trade union and socialist activism, participation of reform groups (male and female), and notions of women's place in industry and home. The first article, by Ulla Wikander, functions as a crossnational referent by examining the forums of several international women's congresses that debated legislation for women workers, starting with the Second International in 1889. This socialist convention passed resolutions favoring an eight-hour day for all workers, as well as a ban on nightwork. It (somewhat inconsistently) called for a ban on nightwork specifically for women and young workers under eighteen. Clara Zetkin argued that women's political equality hinged on their economic independence and that therefore socialists should reject any restrictions for women workers only (she was later to change her position to favor sex-specific legislation). This socialist congress contrasts with the Berlin conference on labor legislation called by Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890. The Kaiser favored reduced hours for women and children and thought that setting industrial standards internationally would serve to even out international competition among employers. He also wanted to one-up his chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, who favored social *insurance* primarily as a means to undercut worker discontent. This conference recommended limitations on women's work, especially nightwork, and gave nations a reference point for their own internal debates from then on. As the analyses of Greece by Efi Avdela and Sweden by Lynn Karlsson illustrate, the political interest in supporting "modern" views about women's condition led these nations to favor limitations recommended by international labor conferences, sometimes in spite of their irrelevance to industrial conditions within the country.

At another industrial congress held in Zurich in 1897, the Catholic workers organization clashed with socialists over whether women ought to be working in industry at all; the "future of the family" and the vision of women's place in it were at issue. Socialists argued that women's economic independence would strengthen family life as well as make women more class-conscious. Delegates agreed to resolutions supporting sex-specific measures that included an eight-hour day and a forty-four-hour week for women, eight weeks off around childbirth, and state-sponsored maternity allowances. Only one woman delegate, the French feminist Marie Bonnevial, "kept the flag of feminist demands waving" by supporting equal protections for men and women, for which she was ridiculed (p. 42).

The articles that follow consider each country separately, although the strands of these common international referents reappear. Each of the authors is conversant with the larger context and common themes, so that the separate contributions form a coherent, integrated whole without sacrificing the specificity of each national situation.

Switzerland, for example, had a different trajectory of protective legislation than England did, although they both industrialized rather early. In Switzerland, men demanded hours limits and prohibition of nightwork for all workers as early as the 1860s; they called the idea that adult men were able to protect themselves without legislation a "bad joke." The story here is how this "equal treatment" model and gender-neutral legislation were progressively eroded; as the political context shifted from canton-based to federal legislation, employers shifted to women-only restrictions. (This essay, by Regina Wecker, also provides extensive footnotes for those unfamiliar with the Swiss political structure.) The 1877 Factory Act incorporated gender differences and became the model that the Swiss put forth on the international level.

The role of social democratic political parties, as well as the position taken by bourgeois women's organizations, differed from one country to the next. Some favored an "equality" model while others opposed it, either for strategic reasons (that women-only laws would be an opening wedge for men's protection), or because they considered women inherently weaker or believed that their primary social contribution was not wage-earning but as "mothers of the future generation." These articles also distinguish between women-

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only laws that treat all women as similar, that is, as mothers or potential mothers, and laws that differentiate, as some countries' laws did, on the specific basis of marriage or family obligations.

Debates around nightwork prohibitions, even in Denmark (where no such provisions were ever passed), provide insights into the discourse about "how gender was conceived and demarcated," as Anna-Birte Raun put it (p. 212). A ten-hour day and no-nightwork law for women was introduced in Denmark in 1899, even though conditions in Denmark did not seem relevant to it. Bourgeois and working women's organizations organized meetings around the proposals; male trade union leaders (not women) supported the restrictions. They all supported paid maternity leaves. In Denmark, as in other countries including the United States, women printers were among the vocal opponents of no-nightwork for women, because they were skilled trades workers and would be put out of their jobs if they could not work at night.

In England, "freedom of contract" principles were difficult for working men to challenge; they favored protections for women and children, and argued for a family wage for men. This is one of the principal means by which women were relegated to the family sphere and a sex-segregated labor market reinforced. Nonetheless, as Jane Lewis and Sonya Rose point out, middle-class women in England united with female trade unionists in the 1870s to oppose protective laws for women only. By the 1890s, the debate had contracted to "women's nature and place" rather than their equal right to protection as workers.

In Germany, protective laws for women were virtually unopposed from the start, accepted by liberals, socialists, and feminists alike, albeit with different motivations. Employers did not oppose them either. The Gotha Program of 1895, following an all-male debate, demanded "prohibition of all women's work that is detrimental to health and morality" (p. 136). Socialists argued that protecting working women demonstrated their class consciousness in contrast to that of bourgeois women who opposed it. Different countries had differing views about the proper role of state intervention, and laissez-faire or freedom of contract arguments had varying degrees of effectiveness.

The final contribution, by Alice Kessler-Harris, traces the course of women-only legislation in the American context. These articles enable us to see that the constellation of forces that appeared in the United States was only one of a wide variety of possibilities. The main themes in one nation might appear as sub-motifs in another. The introduction states that "because protective legislation grew out of a variety of agendas, its passage appears to have been overdetermined" (p. 17); this is as far as the editors go toward generalization. They do not sacrifice the complexities of each national situation for overreaching generalizations.

The strengths of this collection arise out of the common framework of concerns coupled with each author's expertise in a specific nation's situation. With clarity and vision and sometimes wit, the essays detail the specific unfolding of state policies and the types of discourse that framed debate. They constitute a major contribution to our knowledge of the forces that have shaped women's condition from industrialization to the present.

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PATRICE MCDERMOTT. *Politics and Scholarship: Feminist Academic Journals and the Production of Knowledge*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1994. Pp. 197. Cloth $36.95, paper $13.95.

Long-established historical journals such as the *American Historical Review* now serve as venues for new research on gender. But it was feminist academic journals that first provided outlets for the new scholarship on women, publishing the work of some of most the preeminent scholars in the field of women's history. The history of these newer journals and their role in the institutionalization and legitimation of feminist scholarship is the subject of Patrice McDermott's book.

Aware of the controversial nature of her subject, McDermott is forthright in laying out her own perspective as a passionately engaged but intellectually detached observer of feminist knowledge and institutions. The tensions embedded in her stance are similar to those inherent in her subject. From the outset, editors and editorial boards sought to combine in these new journals the scholarly rigor and impartiality that is presumed to be the hallmark of academic discourse with the political commitment and concern for real-world consequences associated with an oppositional movement. The struggle to hold together these seeming incompatible but equally necessary imperatives is the heart of McDermott's study.

Drawing on a variety of sources—organizing documents, journal records, published histories, editors' personal papers, and interviews with founders, editors, and staff—McDermott traces the history of three major university-based journals: *Feminist Studies* (University of Maryland, College Park); *Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (University of Chicago); and *Frontiers* (University of Colorado). All three were created during the first half of the 1970s, when the feminist movement was flourishing and feminist publications modeled on those of the New Left were proliferating even though feminist scholars were, for the most part, marginal members of academia. Despite common origins and common efforts to combine feminist concerns and practices with the academic conventions and structures associated with scholarly publishing, the three journals differed markedly in their size, organization, resources, prestige, and relationship to the university world and to the wider women's movement.

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Feminist Studies began as a small, unaffiliated journal under collective leadership that sought to combine scholarly contributions and non-academic submissions that spoke directly to contempory feminist debates. With its publication of selected papers from the first annual Berkshire Conference on the History of Women, the journal gravitated toward academia, according to McDermott, and a new identity as the leading feminist publication of social history and materialist-feminist analysis. *Signs* quickly achieved institutional stability and academic credibility as a result of its ownership by the University of Chicago Press and the editorial leadership of Catherine R. Stimpson, who eschewed ideological particularity, collective editorial decision-making and job-sharing, and movement-oriented submissions. *Frontiers*, although university-based from the outset, continued mixing feminist scholarship with genres, styles, and content associated with grassroots feminist publications, ultimately forging its identity as a journal with regional and multicultural concerns associated with the new history of the American West.

McDermott's account of the evolution of these journals is augmented by discussion of how the political parameters of feminist scholarship were defined as editors and editorial boards wrestled with a variety of issues: how to define "feminist" as a criterion in manuscript selection, how to handle debates over female sexuality in a scholarly journal, how to assess the impact of poststructuralism, how to respond to the potential misuse of products of feminist scholarship, and how to deal with the implications of their own transformation from "gate-crashers" to gatekeepers. What her account makes clear is that charges that feminist scholarship is "politically correct" or adheres to a "party line" not only vastly oversimplify the relationship between politics and scholarship but also obscure the complex social process that produces and legitimates scholarly knowledge.

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Rudi C. Bleys. *The Geography of Perversion: Male-to-Male Sexual Behaviour outside the West and the Ethnographic Imagination, 1750–1918*. New York: New York University Press. 1995. Pp. vi, 328. $37.50.

European travelers, missionaries, explorers, soldiers, and others wrote widely about the sexual practices of the non-Western world. Researchers, including myself, have often relied on such material, although the accounts might well be biased. For example, most of the early reports on indigenous customs in the post-Columbus Americas played up sexual perversions, but as the populations became converted to Christianity, less attention was paid to sexual "otherness." Was it practices that changed radically, or was it the mindset of the observers?

Often, particularly in the case of Arabs and Islam, the Western observers seemed to find everything they feared (or secretly desired in sexual relationships) to be practiced. Even after the discourse on sodomitical practice among American Indian, Asian, and, to a lesser degree, Oceanic and sub-Saharan African cultures had exchanged the initial image of endemic sodomy for one of cross-gender minorities, that on Arab/or Muslim cultures persisted, perhaps reflecting just how threatened the West felt by Islam.

Same-sex male relationships, the focus of this book by Rudi C. Bleys, were used to explain such things as the "alleged cultural stagnation" of non-Western peoples. Many of those interested in justifying same-sex relationships also turned to hunting for instances of such relationships as positive and natural. Richard Burton's attempt to find male figures who were notably superior to the female in what might be called homoerotic sensibility furnishes an interesting example of the latter.

Bleys goes farther. He argues that the travel reports and early ethnographic accounts of cross-gender roles in the non-European world corroborated eighteenth-century constructions of a "sodomite" identity and nineteenth-century investigators looked to these same areas for their construction of a "third sex." Magnus Hirschfeld, for example, called for recognition of homosexuality as a separate identity and used cross-cultural studies to justify his conclusions. Regional differences and social, cultural, and or racial conditions were played down. Hirschfeld also overemphasized a cross-gendered construction that the data did not support. Each participant in the European debate over male same-sex relationships seemed to draw different conclusions from the ethnographic information, a not-unexpected result given that those who originally reported it had different agendas. One result of such disagreements, however, was realization of the need to try to put the study of human sexuality on a more "objective" or "scientific" basis, which was an important factor in the development of modern sex research. At the same time, a wide variety of writers used the ethnographic material to justify what Bleys called "homosexual affirmation," particularly in Germany and Great Britain, where the legal status of homosexual men was weak.

Interestingly, Bleys finds that much of the current postcolonial discourse on ethnic, cultural, and /or national identity rejects the earlier ethnographic data on same-sex male relationships as demonstrating Western insecurities and tends now to define male-to-male sexuality as "alien" to indigenous cultures. Homophobia, in a sense, has become a mark of rejection of Western colonialism, just as perhaps it was once a justification for Western missionaries and ethnographers.

Bleys's erudition is impressive. He gives appropriate attention to Dutch and similar sources usually neglected by Western scholars such as myself. He also pays more attention to some of the French writers than many have done. The book is well footnoted (at the

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end of each chapter) and has an extensive bibliography and a helpful index. It is, in short, a significant contribution to our understanding of homosexuality—or as Bleys says, same-sex male relationships, since homosexuality is essentially a nineteenth-century term with special meanings—and the ways in which Europeans (and Americans) used non-Western peoples both to explain and to justify themselves and their actions. It also emphasizes how the reconstruction of a "geography of perversion and desire" constitutes a historical case study of racialism, or what might also be called "otherness."

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THOMAS NEVILLE BONNER. *Becoming a Physician: Medical Education in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, 1750–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 412. $35.00.

It has not been widely appreciated that the methods used to train physicians in universities are not identical in all Western countries. Thomas Neville Bonner's book demonstrates the similarities and differences in the medical education offered in German, French, British, and American universities from the Enlightenment until World War II as well as the social, intellectual, economic, and political reasons for the differences. It would be difficult to summarize here Bonner's pioneering comparative study, which draws on a vast range of documents to reveal national differences in professional education. Such a summary, moreover, would deprive readers of the pleasure of following his arguments.

We can, however, examine the major theme implicit in Bonner's story: how to make "the best doctor." Most schools, and perhaps a large fraction of apprenticeship mentors, assumed that they were turning out exemplary physicians. But how could quality have been assessed centuries before the emergence of modern standardized tests and quality assurance techniques (even if both instruments remain imperfect)? For example, was mere adoption of the latest theory of disease causation and its correlative therapeutic implications sufficient evidence of quality? Was the possession of a university degree enough? Was a solid grounding in Greek and Latin necessary? How about the full range of the humanities? Were observations made by a large crowd of students, following a senior physician on hospital ward rounds, superior to those made when a group of three or four students examined a patient, under close faculty supervision, in a clinic or dispensary? Lectures were cheaper, but were they optimum pedagogic tools? Was postmortem examination of patients essential to the physician's professional success? Did students learn physiologic principles best when they were able to carry out their own experiments in the laboratory, or were the professor's classroom demonstrations sufficient to convey the lessons? What was the role of the diagnostic laboratory in the clinic or the classroom? Such questions recur—resound—throughout Bonner's book, as he shows how medical school professors answered them in the varied cultural contexts of the four countries he studied. Some of these questions have not yet been resolved, while from time to time others resurface and then disappear. (Not all medical schools, for example, complied with a recent report recommending inclusion of more courses in the humanities, while others are now dropping them in favor of molecular biology, although that subject has little relevance to the everyday practice of medicine.)

The fact of the matter is, of course, that before the first selective antibiotics began to appear in the 1930s, the techniques of internal medicine offered most patients little true benefit. In the absence of devastating epidemics of infections such as yellow fever, ninety-three to ninety-five percent of adult patients recovered to some extent, no matter how they were treated, as long as overall mortality rates were high and life expectancy was low, thanks only to the *vis medicatrix naturae* ("healing power of nature"), now known to lie within the immune and tissue repair systems. Thus, when choosing a healer, patients could not rely on data such as cure rates, which did not differ much among practitioners. They could assess a physician's quality only by his or her appearance, ability to soothe and calm, their fluency in Latin, their patients' social standing, and other characteristics that had little to do with professional skill. The apparent success of nonorthodox practitioners, and of outright quacks and charlatans, was based not on their ability to heal when regular medicine had failed—indeed, regular and irregular physicians had similar cure rates—but on the appeal of their fees to the pocketbook, a topic probably not included in the curricula of most regular medical schools.

Because Bonner has based his array of generalizations on his vast reading in many archives, his bibliography is a valuable resource; the index is not so useful. This book is not an "easy read," but it is an invaluable one that will be a standard for many years, especially for historians who need to view the medicine of any one country within its own or other cultural contexts. We have long seen the language of medicine as common to most Western countries; now we know that the methods of learning it could differ among nations.

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JEFFREY P. BAKER. *The Machine in the Nursery: Incubator Technology and the Origins of Newborn Intensive Care*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 247. $45.00.

Both medical historians and historians of technology will find much of interest in this well-researched, tightly argued, and clearly written monograph by Jeffrey P. Baker, a pediatrician with a Ph.D. in history.

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His intent is to explore and illuminate the interplay between social context and technology as it shapes the way physicians understand and treat their patients. To do this, Baker offers a case study of the development, adoption, and then temporary abandonment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century of the incubator as an effective therapeutic technology by physicians in France and the United States who were pioneering the as-yet-undefined field of neonatal medicine.

The transnational focus is central to Baker's purpose, for it allows him to illustrate and analyze what he terms the "interpretive flexibility" (p. 84) of technological artifacts, that is, the tendency of such artifacts to be assigned different meanings and functions by different groups operating in different social and cultural contexts. As this study makes abundantly clear, French and American physicians understood and employed incubator technology in fundamentally different ways. The former envisioned, developed, and used incubators primarily as warming devices and as adjuncts to maternal care; the latter conceived, designed, and sought to utilize them as machines capable of providing a scientifically controlled artificial environment, independent of the mother, that would protect the neonate from infection and support what was believed to be its compromised vitality. Providing an explanation for how and why these different conceptualizations and utilizations developed is one of the major tasks Baker sets for himself.

Baker completes that task convincingly but not neatly. An unapologetic social constructionist, he identifies and examines three interconnected contextual layers as shaping the ways French and American physicians understood and employed the incubator as a therapeutic technology for treating premature infants. The first of these layers encompasses large sociocultural configurations, and, in addressing it, Baker explores the comparative influence exerted by French concerns with population decline and maternalism, by American fascination with technological innovation and invention, and by American physicians' embrace of scientific idealism.

The second layer involves the different professional organization in the two countries in regard to responsibility for neonatal care. In France, such responsibility lay primarily with obstetricians; in the United States, it lay increasingly with pediatricians. As a consequence, French treatment of neonates at risk evolved as part of the prenatal, natal, and postparturant care of mothers, and doctors thus focused much of their attention on the dangers—especially posed by exposure to cold—faced in the first week or so after birth. Conversely, American treatment of at-risk neonates developed as part of a system of pediatric care designed to counter morbidity and mortality among older infants, and thus much of the attention was focused on creating an environment that reduced the risk of infection and enhanced general vitality.

This difference in focus was reinforced by the different institutional contexts—the third layer—in which neonatal medicine developed in the two countries. In France, it was the maternity hospital, with its emphasis on the social care of mother and infant. In the United States, it was the general hospital, organized around specific therapeutic intervention into the immediate health problems of the individual patient.

Baker is too good a historian and too experienced a physician to assign these contextual layers strict determinist agency or to reduce the early development of neonatal medicine to a conflict between pediatricians and obstetricians. For him, context serves as a framework, formative but loose enough to allow considerable variability in each of the two countries and between physicians. Similarly, he argues that pediatricians and obstetricians were involved in a three-way negotiation, mothers being the third party. The result is an explanation that, although not perfectly neat, is both intelligent and convincing.

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Brown University

SANDER L. GILMAN. *Picturing Health and Illness: Images of Identity and Difference*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1995. Pp. 200. $29.95.

Sander L. Gilman describes this book as a "series of historical narratives" about visual images of health and illness "from the perspective of a Jewish-American academic in the post-Shoah age of AIDS" (p. 173). He claims to "read" images "through my understanding of the historical settings I have reconstructed" (p. 173). These phrases describe appropriately the second through fifth chapters of the book, which interpret images of insanity, sexuality, reconstructive surgery on the nose, and Mark Twain on both foreign travel and anti-Semitism. The first chapter, on historiography, and the sixth, on "The Beautiful Body and AIDS," exceed the modesty of these claims, however.

Gilman justifies using a broad title for a narrow set of subjects by asserting that his evidence demonstrates the "easy association between the beautiful and the healthy, the ugly and the ill, and the inscription of these analogies into the medical and aesthetic cultures of the West" (p. 174). He offers engaging, often persuasive, readings of images and evokes sympathy for this generalization in chapters two through five.

The sixth and longest chapter reveals the limits of Gilman's way of deciding which images are representative of particular historical situations. He generalizes about the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in relation to the history of images of health and illness, using as evidence posters and a single photograph in a magazine advertisement. The posters were intended to persuade people to avoid behavior that put them at risk of HIV infection. They are official documents, commissioned and distributed by government agencies or by voluntary associations that receive most of their money from public agencies. William Helfand collected these posters from around the world for the National Library of Medicine, a unit of the National Institutes of Health.

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Gilman is partly correct to describe these images as products of a "sophisticated advertising culture." But he fails to analyze that culture and how it relates to the technology of official propaganda and, in representative democracies, to official aversion to public criticism. He accurately writes that these posters differed from "high art representations of AIDS during the same period" (p. 117) without saying how they differed or comparing both advertising and art to the considerable photojournalism of the epidemic. Moreover, he dismisses Benetton's advertisement as sensationalism by a company that he misleadingly identifies only as an exploiter of third world labor. To gain additional authority for his assertions, he claims that standard sources for the history of the AIDS epidemic support his "earlier work"; the sources he cites do not mention this work (pp. 115 n.3, 194).

In his introductory chapter, Gilman trivializes or distorts previous studies of visual images by historians of medicine. He accuses "most historians of medicine" of ignoring visual sources by comparing them with an undefined group he calls "cultural historians" (p. 11). Historians of medicine have actually made considerable use of visual sources in recent years, as have historians of several other professions, of politics, and of society. Gilman later contradicts his attack on historians of medicine, admitting that the German historiographic tradition, which has dominated scholarship in this century, "avoided the illustrated historical text" (p. 25). He also misreads a recent monograph advocating rigorous analysis of photographs of medicine, accusing its authors, Christopher Lawrence and myself, of asserting that photographs are a "privileged source" and that the "image and the reality are one" (p. 16). This is precisely the opposite of what we wrote.

Having dismissed his predecessors, Gilman credits himself with the commonplace insight that visual images are ambiguous (p. 19). He also makes numerous ungrounded generalizations in this chapter, writing, for instance, that medical historians stopped using visual images when Jean-Martin Charcot's theory of mental illness was discredited (p. 23). Then he imputes causation by association, linking Charcot's death to the institutionalization of the history of medicine in Germany (p. 24).

This book, in sum, combines several interesting, if speculative, chapters on the interpretation of images of health and illness with a display of unearned originality. It is a triumph of breadth over craft by a scholar of considerable distinction.

DANIEL M. FOX
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CHRISTOPHER G. GOETZ, MICHEL BONDUELLE, and TOBY GELFAND. *Charcot: Constructing Neurology*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xx, 392. $55.00.

Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) is well known to historians of medicine. In recent years he has received much attention, particularly as a mentor of Sigmund Freud and for his work on hysteria. Curiously, however, there has been no full-scale biography of Charcot since Georges Guillain's *J.-M. Charcot, 1825–1893* (1959). The present volume attempts to fill this lacuna and to present a life of Charcot that takes into account the imposing body of scholarship that now exists on the history of nineteenth-century psychiatry. The aim of Christopher G. Goetz, Michel Bonduelle, and Toby Gelfand is, however, also to achieve something of a shift of perspective. Although Charcot is primarily remembered, at least among historians, for his work with what would now be viewed as patients suffering from psychological disturbances, psychiatry was strictly incidental to his professional activity. As the title of this book suggests, what *was* central to his professional endeavors was the laying of the cognitive and, to a lesser extent, the institutional foundations of neurology as a medical specialty.

This is a collaborative work. Gelfand is a professional historian of medicine; Goetz and Bonduelle are neurologists with an interest in aspects of Charcot's career. Multiple contributions of this kind run the risk of producing a disjointed text, and there is some evidence of this, especially early and late in the book where several short sections are strung together. On the whole, however, the authors have achieved a remarkable unity of voice. Among them they have also assembled an impressive array of sources; the bibliography is itself a valuable document. In addition to published and archival materials they have, moreover, been able to make use of what might be called the unwritten folklore of the Salpêtrière. Even in the late twentieth century, there appears still to be a lively oral tradition concerning Charcot and his legacy.

Much of the book is extremely technical and likely to be of interest only to specialists. The authors recognize that the study of hysteria, which has received most attention, formed only a small part of Charcot's professional activity. Of more long-term importance was his establishment of the anatomo-clinical method as the preferred approach to the investigation and classification of nervous disorders. Charcot also pioneered the use of novel technologies—notably photography—for recording and imparting information about the conditions he described. In his day he was known above all as a teacher: his lessons at the Salpêtrière were spectacular theatrical events that attracted a large lay as well as professional audience.

The fact that his teaching had so broad an appeal is one indication of the prominent role that Charcot played in Parisian society. Charcot was a widely recognized public figure who mixed with prominent authors, intellectuals, and members of the political elite. There are tantalizing hints in the books about the range of cultural repertoires out of which he constructed his public persona, playing in particular upon a physical resemblance to the first Napoleon to present himself as an emperor of medicine. The cultural context of the Third Republic also favored the investment of cultural authority in a man of science with a

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distinctly secular outlook: an important contrast here is with that other major scientific figure of the era, the pious Louis Pasteur. Charcot's chosen persona did not, of course, recommend him in all quarters. He and his school attracted scorn from Catholic apologists and from conservative authors such as Léon Daudet, and even Leo Tolstoy deigned to denounce Charcot as one of the pernicious "priests of Science" he so despised.

The authors might have made more of the material they assembled on Charcot's self-fashioning. It would, in particular, have been interesting to read a discussion of this theme with reference to recent work by other scholars on the influence of patronage systems on styles of scientific work. Most of the existing literature deals with the early modern period; it would be of value to see these topics addressed in the case of a nineteenth-century figure.

This is an impressive work that will be a standard point of reference for all those interested in the history of French medicine. It offers, moreover, many insights into the culture of the Third Republic.

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Eugene Taylor. *William James on Consciousness beyond the Margin*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 215. $35.00.

Conventional wisdom has it that after 1890, when he published *The Principles of Psychology* to great acclaim, William James left the field of professional psychology in favor of philosophical and religious concerns. Eugene Taylor argues that James did not leave psychology; rather the profession left him, and thus impoverished itself by losing the humanistic brilliance of one of its founding figures.

Taylor uses mostly primary sources to tell the story of James's pioneering efforts to broaden the definition of psychological science. In particular, he points out ways in which James remained active after 1890 in experimental neuropathology, physiological psychology, and psychical research—areas of psychology sidelined by the triumph of experimental psychology, behaviorism, and psychoanalysis with their orientation toward scientific naturalism. Taylor provides a new twist on James's well-known turn to the philosophies of pragmatism, radical empiricism, and pluralism. James's work in non-positivist psychology provided him with experiential inspiration and substantiation for his theoretical innovations. Far from being embarrassments, Taylor argues, James's alternative psychologies were the sources of his ideas. For example, radical empiricism admits as fact only what can be experienced, and that may include "aspects of experience that were non-cognitive" (p. 126), aspects that James studied as the subliminal consciousness out of reach of waking awareness.

Taylor's discovery of source material also confirms another impression of James as a popularizer and as a philosopher who wrote and lectured to reach people about vital matters. Taylor depicts James pursuing psychology not just for theoretical insight but also for practical results: his experimental psychotherapeutics could help people troubled by demons that were elusive because rooted in consciousness beyond the margins of everyday awareness. This suggests parallels with the work of Freud, which Taylor touches on by hinting that James's outlook is at the root of American psychotherapy despite the two men's striking differences on religion (p. 76).

The place of religion in psychology is a constant subtext of this book. Like James, Taylor does not argue for the truth or falsity of religion but for its reality in human experience and its dramatic impact for good or ill. From this point of view, religious experiences blend with mind cure therapies, multiple personality conditions, hypnosis, and telepathy among the range of subconscious experiences. By analyzing all these together, Taylor is able to make links between *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) and James's extensive work on psychic experiences and exceptional mental states. Although Taylor makes a case for James's evolution toward these non-mainstream analyses of consciousness from the more positivist early phase of his career, this still leaves unanswered the question of how someone trained in science and imbued with respect for scientific authority could turn to such alternative strategies for understanding consciousness.

By the end of the nineteenth century, scientific psychology had split into experimental and clinical schools, and it is in the context of this schism that Taylor places James's evolution. Experimentalists, rooted in Germany in the work of Wilhelm Wundt, sought understanding of human behavior in laboratory research; clinicians, especially strong in France and centering on the work of Pierre Janet, emphasized the experience of patients. Although James founded the first American psychological laboratory, he grew impatient with experimentalism because it ignored wider fields of human experience that could not be evaluated in a laboratory setting (or even recognized in the questions that emerge there). Taylor not only shows James's evolution as a psychologist in the clinical school, but also depicts the luxuriant flowering of his extramarginal inquiries as creative extensions of its basic premises. Taylor's particulars, however, sometimes slip outside the categories of his bold generalizations, for example in his frequent references to the experimentalism of the alternative school.

Taylor also argues vigorously that contemporary psychologists need James's insights to combat the "stranglehold" of "experimental laboratory procedures" (p. 149) and to explain why important aspects of psychology have spilled out of the profession and into psychological discussions within other fields. In particular, academic psychology, Taylor argues, "misses the essence of a psychology of adult development, of consciousness, of spiritual experience, and of religion" (p. 149), all of which James commented on astutely.

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More generally, Taylor is part of a broad and diverse contemporary movement that is skeptical of professional positivistic science.

Taylor's emphasis on primary sources makes his book a treasure of information, but it slights the insights of relevant secondary sources, many of which support his thesis. As if aware of the problem, Taylor includes an annotated bibliography as an appendix to the book, but it, like many pages of the text itself, reads like a list. For historical readers, the book lacks broad contextualization. Taylor's concern is, instead, the presentation of a revisionist history to psychologists. In doing so, he carries a very important message, but readers must look elsewhere to find out how James came to adopt his alternative perspectives, how his ideas could become the "diagnostic and therapeutic regimes" (p. 23) promised here, or how his theories are linked to "present problems in the neuroscience revolution" (p. xii).

PAUL JEROME CROCE
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RUTH LEWIN SIME. *Lise Meitner: A Life in Physics*. (A Centennial Book; California Studies in the History of Science, number 13.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 526. $30.00.

Ruth Lewin Sime has written a splendid biography of the physicist Lise Meitner (1878–1968), combining an authoritative account of Meitner's scientific work with a sensitive portrayal of her personal life.

Meitner arrived in Berlin in 1907, at the age of twenty-nine, with a doctoral degree in physics and expertise in the study of radiations. Ludwig Boltzmann had been one of her teachers in Vienna. She began working with the radiochemist Otto Hahn (1879–1968) in a chemistry institute where she was required to enter her basement laboratory through a separate entrance, since the institute was off-limits to women. Meitner and Hahn worked together off and on for the next thirty-one years, although it was only after fifteen years that they addressed each other familiarly with "du."

Gradually, professional circumstances improved for Meitner. By 1913, she was appointed to a paid position in the new Kaiser Wilhelm Institute (KWI) for Chemistry, where she shared direction of a laboratory with Hahn, and in 1917 she became head of her own section for physics, parallel to Hahn's section for radiochemistry. In 1922, Meitner qualified for the right to teach in the University of Berlin, a right granted to women by Prussian universities only in 1918. By 1928, Meitner was a university professor with a a group of doctoral students and visitors in her laboratory, and she was an integral member of the Berlin physics community. These were important steps for women in Germany, as Sime rightly notes.

During World War I, while Hahn served at the front in a special unit for chemical warfare, occasionally returning to Berlin, Meitner pursued their joint project to identify the radioactive element that decays to produce actinium. A co-authored paper of 1918, based mainly on Meitner's research, announced the discovery of the element protactinium.

Their work diverged in the 1920s, with Meitner establishing an international reputation for her research in nuclear physics, concentrating on radiations and the constitution of the nucleus. Sime argues that it was Meitner who enlisted Hahn in 1934 to follow up reports from Rome on neutron irradiation of uranium (atomic number 92) when Enrico Fermi claimed that neutron capture by the uranium nucleus produces a transuranium element (atomic number 93) with chemical behavior similar to protactinium (atomic number 92).

By 1934, most of Meitner's Jewish colleagues had been forced to leave Germany, and Meitner found herself surrounded by assistants, students, and colleagues who often were pro-Nazi as well as pro-German. Why did she stay in Berlin? Meitner, who had formally withdrawn from the Jewish community in 1908, was able to stay at the KWI because she was an Austrian citizen. She was dismissed from the University of Berlin, however, and no longer permitted to give reports at scientific meetings. Later, in 1947, Meitner told friends that her decision to stay had been not only unwise but morally wrong.

In 1938, as Meitner and Hahn, assisted by Fritz Strassmann, were following up on reports from Paris regarding "transuranic" substances, Meitner had to flee Berlin after the Anschluss and after denunciations by Kurt Hess, a KWI chemist and Nazi party member. In a suspenseful chapter, Sime describes the circumstances of Meitner's escape from Germany to Sweden and the personal courage of the Dutch physicist, Dirk Coster, who accompanied her by train across the German border. Sime provides a detailed account of Meitner's and Hahn's correspondence after her escape, their meeting in Copenhagen in November 1938, and Hahn's letter of December 19 telling Meitner that what he and Strassmann had thought must be radium isotopes, in fact acted chemically like barium, an element three-fifths the atomic number of uranium. Could she come up with an explanation? "If there is anything you could propose that you could publish, then it would still in a way be work by the three of us!" (p. 234).

Within a couple of weeks, Meitner and her nephew, Otto Robert Frisch, who was working at Niels Bohr's institute in Copenhagen, had the theory for division of the uranium nucleus, which Frisch called "fission." After the war, when it became known that Hahn had written about his experimental work to Meitner while delaying word to colleagues in Berlin, some German physicists were furious and claimed that they could have published a fission theory before Meitner and Frisch.

In the concluding chapters of the book, Sime writes of the war years and of Meitner's feelings of estrangement and isolation in Sweden. A major focus is

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Meitner's relationship with Hahn and her place in the history of physics. In a carefully argued analysis, Sime describes the professional and political pressures that led Hahn to avoid mention of past or present collaboration with a Jewish woman. After the war, Meitner was shocked and hurt to learn that Hahn, who alone received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1944 for the discovery of nuclear fission, frequently failed to mention her and let pass references to her as his *Mitarbeiterin* or his pupil. Meitner was equally disturbed, Sime argues, by Hahn's failure to acknowledge responsibility among German scientists and citizens for the horrors of the Nazi years. He suppressed the past, she wrote a friend, and "I am part of the suppressed past" (p. 344).

The story told by Sime is a powerful one. Rooting her account in a wide array of archival and published sources, she not only explains how scientists went about their work in Germany during the first half of the twentieth century but how they came to grips with the tragedies of those years.

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ANCIENT

WILLIAM ARMSTRONG PERCY III. *Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic Greece*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1996. Pp. x, 260. $24.95.

Later Greeks thought of the Homeric heroes Achilles and Patroclus as lovers. Their own homosexual pairs conventionally included an adolescent or youth and his older model and mentor. But Homer was so discreet that they could not agree which roles Achilles and Patroclus played. Indeed, there is no explicit reference to male homosexuality in Greek sources until about 650 B.C.E. William Armstrong Percy III argues that this silence does not merely reflect literary and artistic conventions or the vagaries of sources' survival. In fact, the Greeks did not institutionalize pederasty until the late seventh century, when the system created by Cretan lawgivers to control the numbers of the elite spread throughout the Greek world, often by the agency of identifiable historical figures such as Solon at Athens. From that time on, institutionalized pederasty and its concomitants, the gymnasium and the symposium, characterized Greek culture and fostered its flowering.

Percy is not a classicist or ancient historian but a specialist in the medieval period and the co-author of *Outing: Shattering the Conspiracy of Silence* (1984). Slips—the Spartan subjection of Boeotia (p. 28), three errors regarding Greek words on a single page (p. 81), the identification of the Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge as "he" (p. 91)—are therefore to be expected and excused. The quality of the argument is more surprising: "Much is speculative, conjectures abound, hypotheses are shaky" (p. 6). To take one chapter as an example, here are three supports for Percy's central contention that the Greek pattern of homosexuality originated on archaic Crete: (1) there may have been a Cretan member of Plato's Academy; (2) Herodotus suggests that athletic nudity began on Crete; (3) Plato sets his last dialogue, *Laws*, on Crete. The first point is irrelevant. The second is inaccurate and misleading: most sources ascribe the introduction of nudity to a runner from Megara or Sparta and date it well before the end of the seventh century. His third argument is accurate but misleading: Plato condemns homosexuality in *Laws*.

In the end, Percy's case rests on two well-known pieces of evidence: a comment on the Cretan segregation of women and the consequent relations among men in Aristotle's *Politics*; and a long account of Cretan homosexual courtship, also from the fourth century. Percy employs the Cretan member of the Academy (mentioned above) to provide Aristotle with credentials as an authority on the early history of the island. As for Cretan courtship, Percy finds echoes in a story set in archaic Corinth, which suggests "that Corinth ... like Crete, a leading maritime power, borrowed pederasty directly from Crete" (p. 72), and not, like other communities, from Sparta. That the story has a dramatic date about 730 B.C.E., a century before the Cretan institution of pederasty, is acknowledged but dismissed. Such capriciousness is evident elsewhere as well, as in the conflation of two poems of Solon to justify the translation "happy is he who has boy-friends" instead of "sons" (p. 171).

Indeed, Percy's attempts to stretch our scarce and unsatisfactory evidence for archaic Greece into the shape his argument demands sometimes smack of desperation. Plutarch, who wrote about 100 C.E., is presented as an authoritative source of information on the late seventh and early sixth centuries (p. 31). The poet Bacchylides, omitted from a list of Greeks from Alcaeus to Zeno who practised pederasty (pp. 9–10), is later claimed as a candidate despite the lack of traditional homoerotic themes in his extant work: "He received the patronage of the greatest of the Sicilian tyrants at a court renowned for its pederasts and . . . he wrote epinicians for victors at the four great pan-Hellenic festivals" (p. 170).

The first part of Percy's book includes perceptive critiques of alternative theories on the origins of Greek homoerotic customs and the third part is an ambitious and often stimulating survey of the evidence for variations in those customs in different parts of the Greek world. Much of this is unfamiliar. Percy has read widely in ancient and modern sources alike and is sensitive to the value of evidence from archaeology and art (there are fifteen plates). But his enthusiasm for his subject is insufficient to establish his main thesis.

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PETER KINGSLEY. *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean Tradition*. New York:

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Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 422. $62.00.

In recent years, several excellent studies both of individual Presocratic philosophers and of the entire tradition of Greek philosophy prior to Plato have been published. Such works regularly incorporate detailed analysis of the extant fragments and testimony, debates over standard scholarly controversies, and the development of a narrative that ties together the evidence into a compelling story. Peter Kingsley's book is not about Presocratic philosophy in this way. While it starts with an analysis of Empedocles and frequently returns to him, it is not a comprehensive treatment of that thinker. Kingsley does analyze a few Empedoclean fragments, but he spends most of his time examining a vast amount of other textual, historical, and even archeological evidence. Nor does the book tell a complete story about Empedocles or the tradition of Presocratic thinkers. Nonetheless, Kingsley's book may be the most important book about Presocratic philosophy in years, and it is certainly one of the most exciting, challenging, and stimulating.

Kingsley stands in two traditions: that of those like Harold Cherniss, who doubt the reliability of Aristotle and Theophrastus as sources for interpreting the Presocratics, and that of those like A. Dieterich and A.-J. Festugiere, who emphasize the magical and mysterious elements in ancient Greek and Hellenistic culture. The proper way to understand the Presocratics, Kingsley argues, is to appreciate the tradition of mystery, magic, and esoteric religious practices that stretches from the Pythagoreans through Neoplatonisn and alchemy and to look to that tradition for guidance about the meaning of their lives and their writings. In short, ancient philosophy is not a quest for increasing rationality, nor is it akin to science. Rather, it is a tradition of philosophy as a way of life, religious in direction and practice, complexly associated with magic, salvation, and immortality.

These claims are not wholly new, but they are bold and extremely significant, and Kingsley realizes this. His book is filled with meticulous argument. It weaves its way through detailed philological analysis and inference and uses linguistic, geographical, archeological, and other evidence to forge those connections that support his views. Often the detail is so fine-grained, so technical, and so overwhelming that the general points become obscured. Fortunately, time and again Kingsley returns us to his main line of thinking and to his large claims: the tradition of mystery, magic, and esoteric piety does not begin in the Hellenistic period but is present in ancient Greek culture and philosophy from the outset; Empedocles is better understood by Neoplatonists and later alchemists than by Aristotle and Theophrastus; religion and especially mystery religion is the best context for understanding the aims and nature of ancient Greek philosophy. At the center of these claims, moreover, is Empedocles, not a scientist and natural philosopher but a Pythagorean, an Orphic thinker and magician, deeply immersed in the mythology, the cults, the ritual practices, and the geography of his native Sicily, whose writings are vehicles for initiation and ultimately for salvation.

Kingsley's book has three parts. In the first, he challenges the conventional readings of Empedocles concerning the equation between the four elements and traditional divinities. He shows that the key to deciphering Empedocles's thought and bringing to light the esoteric nature of ancient philosophy is the identification of Hades, the god of the underworld, and the element of fire. In part two, Kingsley turns to the myth at the end of Plato's *Phaedo*. His exploration leads from Plato to the geography of Sicily, the relationship between volcanic activity, cult and mythology, the Orphic sources of Plato's myth, and western Pythagoreanism, and the results are an emerging picture of the tradition in which Empedocles and his view about the central fire in Tartarus should be situated. Finally, in part three, Kingsley turns to a famous legend about Empedocles's death. Here he constructs a picture of religious magic, the motifs of death and rebirth, intiation rites, purification and healing, fire, heroization, and the ascent to divinity. Empedocles's teachings, it turns out, are more practical than doctrinal, vehicles to help others, like his disciple Pausanias, to achieve purification and ultimately salvation through magic and rituals of initiation. For Empedocles, as for Pythagoreans and others, philosophy is not proto-science; it is a way of life aimed at the soul's highest goal, to become divine.

This is the kernel of Kingsley's case, but it is not clear that he has made it as decisively as he seems to think. His scrupulous philological arguments are suggestive, and they come one after another, a virtual avalanche of evidence and inference. But Kingsley treats them as certain and unquestionable, whereas to most readers they will seem less secure than that. In the end, the reader may see his approach as a reasonable, tantalizing alternative but not by any means an undeniable one.

Furthermore, the sketch of a tradition of esoteric religious practice, magic, and myth emerges as the books develops. Kingsley's argument, if we accept it, ends with this background picture. He does not tie the pieces together; nor does he show clearly what this implies for understanding ancient philosophy as a whole. In this sense, Kingsley's task here is a preliminary and foundational one. By the book's end, we have a new context for interpreting ancient philosophy; we can see how some details about Empedocles might be understood differently, and we have been invited to rethink a bit of Plato. But what this context might mean for an overall reading of Empedocles or Plato or of other figures such as Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Democritus is never broached. Given the magnitude of Kingsley's task and the intense detail of his achievement, this shortcoming is understandable, but it is still a concern. One wonders, after all is said and done,

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what it all means, and Kingsley has left us, to a large extent, guessing about that.

Finally, Kingsley's polemic—and it is definitely a polemic—relies on a sharp distinction between the rational and the irrational, between science and religion. Since Kingsley never thoroughly confronts these distinctions but only comments on them in passing, it is not completely clear whether he rejects them, modifies them, or accepts them. At times he seems to appreciate that there are kinds of rationality and no exclusive separation between reason and the irrational, but at other times he seems to be arguing that ancient philosophy ought to be viewed as a religious rather than a scientific activity, as if the two were completely different enterprises. Throughout the book, to be sure, one has the sense that he wants to cast off this terminology or to stand on the intimate interpenetration of scientific and religious thinking and practice, and I for one would certainly endorse this tendency. But in the end he fails to make clear exactly what he has in mind. The reader is left with some significant doubts to go along with a great deal of new light shed on ancient philosophy and the interpretation of it.

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P. M. FRASER. *Cities of Alexander the Great*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 259. $72.00.

A small number of readers will appreciate the originality of this book and the contribution that it makes to Alexander studies. On the one hand, non-specialists will no more plod through it than they did through P. M. Fraser's earlier, magisterial study, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (1972). Once again, Fraser demands of his readers fluency in the classical languages. He also favors abstruse vocabulary ("metonomasy," "tralaticial") and rambling sentences that routinely exceed one hundred words. Fraser has done nothing to make his work accessible to the casual student of Alexander's career. On the other hand, even some specialists will be challenged to find the wheat amid the chaff. Most will look for fresh insight into Alexander's policies as a city-founder and will focus on which cities the king actually built and where. These matters are addressed in the text (most notably in chapters three and five to seven), but without much that is really new.

Fraser offers no detailed discussions of city-founding procedures, classifications of settlers and settlements, or the larger issues of colonialism/imperialism that we find in, say, Richard Billows's *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism* (1995). More simply, Fraser concludes that Alexander founded far fewer cities than reported by Plutarch and others; that these foundations in places such as Bactria (roughly modern Afghanistan) did not long endure; and that for various reasons these sites cannot easily be located today, except, of course, Alexandria in Egypt. These findings are not much different from those sketched over thirty years ago in a single paragraph of Bradford Welles's well-known article "Alexander's Historical Achievement" (*Greece and Rome* [1965]: 225–26). And when Fraser argues that Alexander founded cities for practical mercantile and military reasons rather than to spread Greek culture, he hardly stands on new ground.

Rather than in its reconstruction of Alexander's actions and ideas, the originality and enduring worth of this book rests on its exegesis of later texts and traditions. In three appendixes and chapters one, two, and four, Fraser explores the making of myth as history. He takes us from Alexandria to Asia, showing how fact, fantasy, and folklore were woven together around the theme of Alexander the city-founder. He traces the evolution of the Alexander romance, and boldly postulates the existence of a *Liber de Urbibus Alexandri*, a propaganda list of Alexander's cities born out of the rivalry between Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Asia. He next examines Persian, Arab, and Chinese traditions regarding Alexander place names as recorded by early travelers and encyclopedists. Quite interesting are his new calculations for distances between cities as preserved in the works of ancient geographers having access, directly or indirectly, to the surveyors' records of Alexander's march. Here lies a mine of fresh information and insight that tells us, as Fraser makes plain, less about Alexander's life than about his legend.

The lack of a bibliography places an added burden on the footnotes, but there the relevant titles, dates, and authors are too often missing or mistaken (e.g. "Bernstein" for Burstein on pp. 12 and 217). Some influential books and articles by important scholars (e.g. Ernst Badian, Alan Bosworth, Pierre Briant) find no place in the notes or discussion. Place names, a fundamental element in this source study, will not stay put in Fraser's text. The Syr Darya becomes the Amu Darya further south (p. 72), and Alexandria-Eschate mysteriously vanishes from Fraser's list of Alexander-foundations (pp. 73, 99). This city reappears in the final enumeration of Alexandrias (p. 201), but others suddenly disappear in turn (compare these six foundations with those accepted in chapter five and marked on the two maps). Here lies the very textual problem that the author so skillfully exposes in the various lists and legends of antiquity. This does not sink the whole enterprise, of course, but it leaves us listing awkwardly.

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EMMA DENCH. *From Barbarians to New Men: Greek, Roman, and Modern Perceptions of Peoples of the Central Apennines*. (Oxford Classical Monographs.) New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 255. $55.00.

This is an intriguing book, and not just for individuals interested in the Central Apennine peoples of Hellenistic Italy. As Emma Dench immediately makes clear,

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her intent was not to rewrite E. T. Salmon's *Samnium and the Samnites* (1967) or other similar regional studies. Instead, she is concerned with perceptions of how these peoples viewed themselves and how they were viewed by others: by Greeks, by Romans, and by modern scholars. Dench contends (and few informed anthropologists or historians would today disagree) that ethnic self-definition and images of "the other" are situational constructs and that "changes and fluctuations in questions of identity should be emphasized" (p. 25). Dench brings these observations to bear on a set of ancient peoples known chiefly through the observations of others and explores, through detailed studies, the sheer complexity of asking just who these peoples were.

The book is divided into two parts, the first of which surveys Greek and Roman attitudes toward other peoples and how these played out specifically in relation to the Italian communities. Flexibility through time is noted in the particular postures adopted, as is the "two way" nature of this interaction, with neither side remaining unchanged by contact and scrutiny. The second section explores certain distinctive features of life in the Central Apennines. In "Mountain Society," Dench first deconstructs modern and ancient presuppositions about the area's mountainous landscape; she then draws on a range of sources, including archaeology, to outline patterns of elite behavior that appear to differ from those of Tyrrhenian Italy (notably, a relative lack of emphasis on the display of private wealth). Dench argues that such alternative behavior on the part of Central Apennine elites may well have encouraged the very image of ruggedness and austerity praised and used by Roman sources, while at the same time it slowed their successful assimilation into the Roman political sphere.

In "Rural Piety, Witches and Snake-Charmers: Religion in the Central Apennines," Dench explores the different strands of religious practice noticed and addressed, either for praise or blame, by the Romans, while also observing just how much common ground (for example, the shared worship of deities such as Hercules) they ignored. In the final chapter in this section "Questions of Identity amongst the Peoples of the Central Apennines," Dench attacks essentializing, "fixed" definitions of these peoples as the product of outdated racial theories. This, in turn, allows her to argue that there was, among the allies of the Social War, an increasing stress on common origins and shared identity, a notion that would itself supply the desired image of a united "anti-Rome" to Roman authors. After an all-too-brief epilogue, the book ends with two appendixes collecting appearances of the name *Safin-* and the ethnonym *Sabellus* in the ancient sources.

Interesting as Dench's book is, there are nonetheless some problems. The theoretical underpinnings of the study are clear (although a richer literature on alterity exists than appears in the bibliography), but discussions of "ways of seeing" sometimes seem laid atop, rather than thoroughly assimilated with, the details of the historical analysis. The structure of the book leads to some repetition of evidence and arguments. Finally, and beyond the author's control, the physical production of the book is occasionally sloppy, with incompletely printed footnotes (e.g. p. 150, n. 182) and repeating lines of text (e.g. pp. 107–108).

Dench acknowledges that her work fits within a developing literature on the role of shifting perceptions in ethnic self-definition and social action; she cites, in particular, studies of fifth-century Greece by François Hartog (*The Mirror of Herodotus* [1988]) and Edith Hall (*Inventing the Barbarian* [1989]). Her extension of this type of approach to peoples more written about than writing is noteworthy, and the ambition of her study is both timely and praiseworthy.

Susan E. Alcock
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J. F. Lazenby. *The First Punic War: A Military History*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1996. Pp. xvii, 205. Cloth $45.00, paper $17.95.

It is unfortunate that specialists in ancient history do not write more for the mass audience. The structure of reward within universities militates against this type of writing, even though the audience for it is still there (as it was in the nineteenth century), and the result is that while specialists pursue their technical controversies with each other, the mass audience is usually left in the hands of often-incompetent amateurs. A book on the First Punic War (264–241 B.C.) intended primarily for the general public but written by J. F. Lazenby, an established scholar, would seem therefore to merit a warm welcome. Lazenby's previous books in this style, one on the Hannibalic War and one on the Persian invasion of Greece in 480–479 B.C., were solid jobs.

In taking on the First Punic War, Lazenby has certainly chosen a topic of great historical importance. This was the war that transformed Rome from an Italian power into a Mediterranean power with, for the first time, a large war fleet protecting new overseas interests. Moreover, the scale of the fighting was enormous, as were Roman and Italian losses. The war therefore constituted a severe test of Rome's alliance system in Italy, which passed with flying colors. Finally, of course, this first war between Rome and Carthage directly paved the way for Hannibal's war, which would leave the Romans (after another severe testing) as the masters of the entire western Mediterranean. Not only has Lazenby taken on an inherently interesting and dramatic topic, but he writes very well. Usually the discussions even of complicated events, such as the great sea-battle of Ecnomus in 256 B.C., are quite easy to follow, and he can rise on occasion to true eloquence.

The book, however, also suffers from significant weaknesses. Aside from the occasional howler, such as the implication that Polybius, the Greek historian who is our main source for the war, spent the last fifty years

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of his life in Rome (p. 3), there seems an almost total lack of familiarity with any scholarship published later than about 1970. Yet this is one of the major reasons we would want a specialist to write for the general public: to reveal to them the conclusions reached by the most recent and best technical work. Thus we are told as an uncontested fact that politics in Rome consisted merely of the maneuvering of aristocratic senatorial factions (a theory dominant *ca.* 1965); Lazenby seems unaware of the exciting scholarly debate over "democracy" at Rome that began with Fergus Millar's path-breaking article "The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic" (*Journal of Roman Studies* 74 [1984]), which is not in Lazenby's bibliography. Lazenby depends on B. H. Warmington's *Carthage* (1964) for his discussion of Carthage's empire, but the crucial study of the development of Punic imperial structures is now C. R. Whittaker's "Carthaginian Imperialism" (in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, eds., *Imperialism in the Ancient World* [1978]), a work not listed in Lazenby's bibliography. Lazenby accepts the doubts of G. de Sanctis (*Storia dei Romani* [1916]) about the large number of city-states in Sicily that, according to Diodorus, went over to the Roman side in 263, but de Sanctis's doubts were demolished by R. T. Pritchard in "Perpaucae Siciliae" (*Historia* 24 [1975]), once more not in Lazenby's bibliography. These examples could, unfortunately, be multiplied many times over. Lazenby even presents as his own contributions (and no doubt believes they are) hypotheses that have already appeared in print by others as long as a decade ago (compare, for example, p. 51 with Arthur M. Eckstein, *Senate and General* [1987], pp. 341–344).

Moreover, while there is nothing wrong with military history—and because of the usual focus of the ancient history writers, it is a natural topic in our field—too much of the book is a bald (if detailed) chronicle of the military operations and the scholarly problems attendant upon them, with very little broad analysis of the *meaning* of the operations either within the war or within the societies involved. For example, there are long discussions of the exact numbers of ships on both sides in the various battles, as given by variant sources (see pp. 70–72, 82–84, or 153–55). But everyone accepts the huge scale of these encounters, and so unless there is a broader point, such long discussions seem not to lead anywhere. They bog down the text, and one suspects they are included simply because these are some of the traditional questions that scholars have asked. A great deal of the book appears simply to describe complicated maneuvers around obscure places, with no summing up to explain their importance (pp. 75–77).

In short, this book may sell well because of continued popular interest in topics such as the Punic Wars, but it seems a wonderful opportunity missed. Given Lazenby's previous performances in bringing solid ancient history to the mass audience, I expected more.

ARTHUR M. ECKSTEIN
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ANTHONY CORBEILL. *Controlling Laughter: Political Humor in the Late Roman Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 251. $35.00.

The title of Anthony Corbeill's book is itself an example of the pointed wordplay that forms an important part of the subject matter. The work focuses predominantly on Ciceronian rhetorical invective (not restricted, despite the subtitle, to humorous attacks), set against the background of the political and social milieu of the last decades of the republic. The title refers, on the one hand, to laughter as a means of control. Corbeill shows how Cicero and like-minded contemporaries exploited humor to ridicule (and ultimately inhibit) their opponents' deviation from the actions, mores, comportment, and physical appearance prescribed for a *bonus*. He writes as well about the necessity in a post-republican, autocratic state to constrain the free expression of wit. Here "controlling laughter" takes on another, more sinister meaning, which Corbeill illustrates through documentation of Julius Caesar's interest in monitoring and restricting Cicero's political speech.

Corbeill begins by exploring the Roman attitude toward physical deformity, citing passages in Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical works that imply—unlike Greek rhetorical works—that physical deformities could function as a valid sign of internal corruption. Corbeill then documents Cicero's employment of this strategy in several speeches, most notably *In Vatinium*, where the orator constantly alludes to Vatinius's pus-filled neck swellings (*strumae*) as a sort of objective correlative for his opponent's moral putridness. Corbeill's argument is convincing as far as it goes, but the vagaries of preservation of late republican oratory should not, I believe, lead us to assume that the opposite point of view would not also have been found in Roman political rhetoric, for Roman orators were extensively trained to respond *in utramque partem*. I believe that Corbeill is correct in arguing that if Roman audiences had considered ridicule of physical deformity distasteful, cruel, or ignorant, this strategy would never have appeared in Cicero's speeches. He is also accurate in documenting a Ciceronian, and presumably Roman, tendency toward "concretizing" an abstract argument by encouraging an audience to make use of visual clues (including appearance, style of dress, physical peculiarities) to characterize individuals referred to in a speech. But *In Pisonem* (in which Piso's demeanor and appearance *belie* his evil character), which Corbeill treats as an exception that proves the rule, might be but one surviving example of many speeches employing this and other types of counter-argument.

The second chapter deals with witty exploitation of

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nomina and *cognomina*. Corbeill again expands his argument beyond the bounds of mere rhetorical analysis to contend that the frequent assignment of pejorative *cognomina* exclusively to elite families represents an attempt by the upper classes to set limits on the eminence of potentially dominant individuals. Chapter three is a study of invective connected to "mouths," while chapter four connects a variety of negative moral traits with charges of "effeminacy." Here Corbeill demonstrates his wide-ranging knowledge of current scholarship on sex and gender as well as his own insight into the subject. His conclusion that there was such a thing as a homosexual type and that this type was an object of ridicule is carefully argued and supported by close analysis of primary texts. Although Corbeill carefully and ably describes the appearance and style that might expose an individual to charges of effeminacy and dissipation by politicians such as Cicero (the wearing of a loosely belted or long-sleeved toga, for example), he devotes little space to exploring the meaning of these affectations from the point of view of the individuals who practiced them. Corbeill ends his book with a chapter entitled "A Political History of Wit" that includes a discussion of certain bons mots of Pompey and Caesar, illustrating their attitudes to the state, and a study of Caesar's attempts to restrain Cicero's wit and humor after the inauguration of the dictatorship.

From beginning to end this is an excellent book: carefully researched, well written, at once thoughtful and thought-provoking. Corbeill is a younger scholar who unites an impressive command of the literature and culture of the late Roman Republic with a creative and original turn of mind; he is a welcome and articulate new voice in the field of Roman studies.

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ROBERT ALAN GURVAL. *Actium and Augustus: The Politics and Emotions of Civil War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1996. Pp. xiv, 337. $45.50.

On September 2, 31 B.C., Octavianus, the adopted heir of Julius Caesar and the future first emperor of Rome, defeated Marcus Antonius and his Egyptian ally and consort Cleopatra in a naval battle off the promontory of Actium in northwest Greece. The victory ended a century of social strife and intermittent civil war and brought to a close the era of republican government in Rome. But the significance of this ambiguously fought engagement only became clear gradually. Antonius and Cleopatra were not finally defeated and eliminated until a year later, in Egypt; the triumphal celebration of Actium occurred only two years later; and no rational calculation could have predicted that the sickly young victor, soon to change his name to Augustus Caesar, would continue in power for another forty-five years and introduce a period of stability and prosperity whose institutions became the basis for two more centuries of Roman imperial rule throughout the Mediterranean and in Europe and the Near East.

Robert Alan Gurval's book examines the public commemoration and celebration of the victory at Actium in monument and poetry and shows how its presentation evolved during the regime of Augustus. This is not a neglected topic, but Gurval questions a premise that has dominated scholarship for over fifty years and whose most learned and eloquent presentation can be found in Sir Ronald Syme's classic work, *The Roman Revolution* (1939) and, more recently (at least in his treatment of Actium), in the highly influential work of the German art historian Paul Zanker (especially his *Augustus und die Macht der Bilder* [1987]). In this view, the Augustan cultural and artistic achievement is the product of "a rigid imposition of a carefully planned and formally articulated ideology on poets and artisans" (p. 54 n. 76), and so the victory at Actium immediately became, in Syme's terms, the legitimizing "foundation-myth of the new order" and a dominant theme of the coinage, ceremony, architecture, and poetry that celebrated it. Gurval argues instead that the image of Actium, as the decisive act of a brutal civil war, only slowly emerged under Augustus, and its ultimate expression as an inspirational myth owed more to the evolving reaction of poets to the event than to any program imposed by Augustus.

In the first half of his book, Gurval carefully considers the numismatic and architectural evidence regarding Actium to show that an orchestrated program of propaganda, far from being proved by the evidence, is actually a misleading premise applied to the examination of the evidence. This analysis is a necessary preliminary to his evaluation of Augustan poetry, because the evidence of coins and monuments is usually taken to be the tangible representation of the program that the Augustan poets are supposed to have slavishly promoted or daringly subverted.

Gurval provides a sensible and judicious interpretation of how Actium was addressed in Augustan poetry, a field of classical literature that is surpassed only by Greek tragedy in its complexity and the extensiveness of a bibliography of interpretation that goes back to antiquity itself. Gurval sees an evolution in the attitude of the poets toward Actium, not simply a dichotomy between those who could be persuaded to sing its praise and those who avoided or only reluctantly undertook the assignment. He argues that the ambivalence of Horace and Propertius reflects joy at the end of civil conflict, tempered by a reluctance to celebrate victory achieved in civil war and an anxiety about what would come next. It was only over a decade after the battle that Vergil, in his national epic the *Aeneid*, found the appropriate balance of glory and pathos to address the complicated issue of Actium and Augustus and in the process finally defined how that victory related to Roman political culture. The Augustan poets are proof of what is reasonable on the face of it, that "[Actium] could not become the start of a more

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glorious future until that future became assured" (p. 290).

Gurval's study is an important book for historians interested in the era, but it will not be easy for nonspecialists. We lack a good, contemporary historical narrative of the Augustan era and are forced to use essentially nonhistorical media as witnesses to his age; hence the importance of Gurval's analysis but also the complexity of it. At points, he is a bit blunt in his characterization of Augustan scholarship. The scholarly consensus he criticizes, one developed essentially between 1939 and 1960 by British and American scholars, has been much refined in many aspects, especially in the area of political and legal history; it never enthralled German ancient historians as it did their Anglo-American colleagues. But Gurval's thesis, especially as it relates to the art and poetry of the age, is valid and deserves serious consideration.

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JUDITH EVANS GRUBBS. *Law and Family in Late Antiquity: The Emperor Constantine's Marriage Legislation*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. x, 390. $60.00.

This book is a must for anyone with an interest in current debates about "traditional"/Christian "family values," the history of family and marriage, early Christianity, Roman law, or the European transformation from antiquity.

Judith Evans Grubbs challenges—and successfully overturns—the entrenched view of the emperor Constantine as a radical innovator, praised by Christians for introducing a new moral tone into degenerate pagan concepts of marriage and family (p. 54) and condemned by others, since the emperor Julian, as an impious wrecker of venerable Roman traditions, *novator turbatorque priscarum legum* (pp. 1, 341–342). She situates Constantine's fourth-century legislation on sexual behavior and marriage in its proper historical context (especially in chapter one, "The Social and Legal Background"). In chapter two ("'Pagan' and 'Christian' Marriage"), Grubbs demonstrates that the early Christian communities—objects of suspicion to contemporary mainstream society—based their own sexual and moral codes on traditional (non-Christian) ideology and practice, their chief innovations being the privileging of sacral virginity, celibacy, and asexual marriage (pp. 71–73). She probes the extent of Constantine's commitment to Christianity and his understanding of Christian teachings on marriage (pp. 28–40) and establishes continuities between his moral legislation and that of the first emperor (or *princeps*), Augustus, in 18 B.C.E. (chapter seven, "Perspectives on Constantine's Legislation," and chapter one).

Many steps in her solidly constructed argument are controversial, and the book will renew and stimulate debate. Some might dispute her conclusion that Constantine's abolition in 320 C.E. of the Augustan penalties on celibacy and childlessness was intended to appeal to the non-Christian senatorials at Rome as much as to Christians (pp. 137–138). Others might challenge her view that certain ascetic strains of Christianity did not gain general currency until the late fourth and early fifth centuries (pp. 66–74, 131–139) and that the attitudes of most Christians were molded more by regional councils (Elvira, Ancyra) than by the treatises of Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria (pp. 73–74). Yet the evidence sustains her picture of Christian adaptation of existing institutions rather than moral revolution.

From the time of the so-called Edict of Caracalla (*constitutio antoniana*) of 212 C.E., which assigned Roman citizenship to most free subjects of the empire, Roman law theoretically applied to millions of peoples with diverse traditions and legal systems. Roman imperial administration was tolerant of such diversity (p. 41), but clashes were inevitable (pp. 16, 98–100). Grubbs argues that some of Constantine's legislation, held up by other scholars to illustrate the permeation of "vulgar law" or "Eastern concepts," is better viewed as a response to the resultant uncertainty (pp. 40–53). One example is the regulation of spousal gifts, legislation designed to forestall unnecessary litigation and perhaps to benefit the imperial treasury (pp. 116–118). Yet she acknowledges "vulgarization" in the sense that the elitist and Rome-centered focus of the classical jurists of the early empire yielded to a wider and more "cosmopolitan" legal perspective in late antiquity (p. 339).

Grubbs concedes that there were Christian innovations not only in the elevation of virginity and celibacy (pp. 71–73) but in the denunciation of child exposure (p. 70) and a more restrictive and censorious approach to remarriage and divorce. Such ideas were expressed by Lactantius (pp. 90–94), who had Constantine's ear, but Grubbs demonstrates that there was no consistent, distinctively Christian view of these topics in Constantine's day. Their absorption into doctrine, let alone into imperial law, was a very gradual process (pp. 70, 242–60).

I have a few quibbles. Grubbs does not establish to my satisfaction Constantine's "hands-on" contribution to the legislation of his reign (pp. 49–50). Elsewhere admirably skeptical, she is inclined to credit the *topos* that the sexual morals of the bourgeoisie, municipalities, and provinces were superior to those of the decadent aristocracy at Rome (pp. 26, 212, 339–40). Her treatment of "close-kin" marriage (never properly defined), a potential index of legal responses to cultural and moral clashes, is disappointingly sketchy. But the reservations are few for a work of such scope, and they are arguably subjective (like my aversion to the convenient term "pagan").

This is an important book, a shining example of the new style of socio-legal history that places juristic developments in their historical context. Grubbs's scholarship is impeccable, her writing clear and accessible. She always supplies the reader with the relevant

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information to contest her interpretations. She has thrown valuable light on the Western cultural heritage and the processes of social change.

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JOHN VANDERSPOEL. *Themistius and the Imperial Court: Oratory, Civic Duty, and* Paideia *from Constantius to Theodosius*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 280. $44.50.

As John Vanderspoel admits, it is not easy for modern readers to warm to Themistius. We live in an age that distrusts flattery and rates plain speaking higher than praise. To most of us, the rhetorical panegyric, delivered on formal public occasions, is almost unknown, and speeches of thanks at formal occasions are tolerated only if they are brief. Vanderspoel makes the brave claim that his subject was "one of the most important individuals in the fourth century." Yet, in his introduction and epilogue alike, he feels the need to defend Themistius from his detractors rather than to give positive reasons for agreeing with this claim.

Themistius was an orator, philosopher, and teacher from Paphlagonia—in modern Turkey—who went to Constantinople at an early age and spent his life (he died soon after A.D. 388) as a panegyrist of successive emperors from Constantius to Theodosius I. He also wrote philosophical works and liked to present himself as a philosopher even in his more political speeches, of which thirty-three survive (in the ninth century Photius claimed to have known thirty-six). Some of these were delivered in his role as an ambassador for the city of Constantinople, where Themistius became the leader of the senate; others were addressed directly by him to individual emperors. To what extent this constitutes what we would now call political activity is less clear, however, and while Themistius often defends himself against the criticism of opponents, equally often we have no idea how his arguments were received or whether any action ensued.

The fact is that we still lack the necessary framework of reference for a real understanding of the place of rhetoric, and especially panegyric, in public or "political" life in the fourth century A.D. Vanderspoel is acutely aware of the problem. Panegyric, he says, was "endemic in the fourth century" (p. 5). The modern reader may not like it but should at least be grateful that not all panegyrics have survived. Insofar as he is revealed in his speeches, Themistius was a humanitarian worthy of admiration, in contrast to Christian publicists or, indeed, the thin-skinned Emperor Julian, who was at pains to reply to points made in Themistius's *protrepticus*, and with whom the latter's relations were henceforth rather cool.

It does seem surprising that a pagan orator should have enjoyed closer relations with Christian emperors such as Constantius and Theodosius than with the pagan Julian. But this may indicate that, as writers, Themistius and the Christian panegyrists were not in fact so very far apart. Much common ground was shared by all writers on kingship, the Christian Eusebius of Caesarea included. We cannot readily assume that Themistius's "own views," still less his political stance, if any, can be easily identified with the tropes he takes up in his various public speeches. Even his seeming tolerance is susceptible to an explanation in terms of rhetorical strategy (see C. Ando, *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 4:2 [1996]: 171–207). We may, however, assume that his choice of themes and language, while not necessarily expressing a consistent view of his own, was finely calculated and deliberate. Themistius was both clever and, on his own terms, successful, and Vanderspoel is right to see that he ought to be taken seriously. The next stage will be to go deeper under the surface of Themistius's speeches and compare his techniques more closely with those of contemporary Christians. This curiously elusive writer might then emerge as a pivotal figure indeed.

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PETER IVER KAUFMAN. *Church, Book, and Bishop: Conflict and Authority in Early Latin Christianity*. (Explorations: Contemporary Perspectives on Religion.) Boulder, Colo.: Westview of HarperCollins. 1996. Pp. ix, 166. Cloth $61.50, paper $16.00.

PETER BROWN. *Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 91. Cloth $34.95, paper $12.95.

A visitor to museums and archaeological sites is often puzzled by the ambiguity of the symbols on artifacts left by the people of the late Roman empire. Here a ram-bearing figure, a *kriophoros*, is Hermes, perhaps bearing the soul to repose after death; there, an identical composition is clearly, from its context, Christ, the soul's Good Shepherd. Broken statues of pagan gods, tossed into a well, seem apt evidence of "the triumph of Christianity." But what of those other statues, quite intact, still standing in public places in the Christian empire, like those of Livia and Augustus in Ephesus that are mentioned by Peter Brown (p. 25)? What went on in the minds of those who commissioned the paintings, smashed the statues, or ordered them preserved? Are these relics of the victory of the One God or signs of the infinite adaptability of the old gods and power structures, putting on new disguises?

The alternatives, the triumph of Christianity or the persistence of paganism, both belong, Brown shows, to comprehensive narratives constructed by the propagandists of Christianity in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. Each corresponds, he argues, to a way of representing in cosmic terms the shifting styles of imperial rule and upper-class ethos. The triumphalist model persisted in the East, but, in the West, the more

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pessimistic view enunciated by Augustine of Hippo and some of his contemporaries came to prevail and continues to mark even our modern historical models. "*Antiquitas*, an ancient, pagan past that dogged the Christian present, lay close to the heart of medieval Christendom—an inescapable, endlessly fascinating companion tinged with sadness and with a delicious sense of danger, a synecdoche of human nature itself, lived out under the shadow of Adam's sin" (p. 26).

The rise of Christianity to power entailed, according to the now common view, the introduction of religious intolerance to a Roman world to which such fanaticism was foreign. Brown does not disagree, but in his second chapter he explores the ways enduring habits of urban elites tended to check excessive zealotry for the new faith. It was not that the old order really held to some principle of toleration; at most, only a handful of philosophers believed in such a principle, to no practical effect. Restraint came rather from a sense of the limits to commanded obedience, bred into the commanding classes as part of the "late Roman emphasis on civility": "*Paideia*, not philosophy, set the limits to intolerance" (p. 40). That, plus experience: it was hard enough just to collect taxes from a recalcitrant population without antagonizing them further by forbidding their familiar local cults.

In the final chapter of this small book (originally three lectures given at Cambridge University in 1993), Brown returns to a figure familiar to devotees of his *oeuvre*, the "holy man" like Simeon Stylites whose "rise and function" Brown analyzed in his classic essay (*Journal of Roman Studies* 61 [1971]: 80–101). In the style of a *retractatio*, he enlarges the context into which he had earlier set the athletes of asceticism. Now he sees them as focal points in an ongoing negotiation between the old world "heavy as a swollen cloud . . . with the presence of many divine beings," (p. 8) and the empire of the One God, carried out not in the grand narratives of theology but in the day-to-day struggles of ordinary people with illness, drought, and conflict.

Reading the minds of late antiquity is Brown's specialty. Mind-reading is an intuitive business; historians fond of statistics and data will grumble that he has not proved his case. Indeed, it is not quite clear what the case is. What Brown does is not to mount an argument but to invite us to see the many-sidedness of the countless human transactions that must have filled that mist-covered transition period between what we, looking back, call Greco-Roman culture on one end and Christendom on the other. There is hardly anyone else who so adroitly uses the anecdote, the odd fact, or the striking phrase from an obscure text to make us blink and look again.

Peter Iver Kaufman's book tells a more conventional story and tells it in plain language, well suited for a college textbook. It is the story Max Weber once called the "routinization of charisma"—the evolution of the Christian movement from several varieties of sectarian groups into a large and complex organization—although Kaufman accepts the new consensus that the first generation of Christians was much more diverse than Weber's Protestant informants believed. Kaufman focuses on the "management strategies" that the movement's "executives" developed in order to control conflict and consolidate authority (pp. 2–5). The scope is limited to the Western church, from apostolic times to the papacy of Gregory the Great. The major personages treated, besides Gregory, are Tertullian and Augustine, who receive a chapter each, Irenaeus, Cyprian, and Ambrose. The chapter on Augustine is particularly lucid, an apt introduction to the thought as well as the policy of this watershed figure.

Standard church-history textbooks identify three bulwarks that the emerging Catholic center erected against its opponents, the "heretics" and "schismatics." Of these, Kaufman treats only two: quite briefly, the formation of a Christian canon of scripture; at greater length, the development of the monepiscopacy. The third, use of creeds as rules of faith, receives only tangential notice, as does, indeed, the development of doctrine in general. These omissions make for a more compact narrative, and it is a lively one, although a reader new to these quarrels may wonder just what made the Gnostics and the Marcionists seem so dangerously attractive or what all the fuss was over Arius's claim that Christ was once just human.

Kaufman does not complicate his story, either, by more than cursory attention to the politics of empire; he pays even less attention to the cultural habits of late Roman people. This is an insider's story, and of the insiders, it is the "managers" who are the focus: "this is a book about the elites" (p. 3). Kaufman is not unaware, however, of the work of social historians; the suggestions for further reading he provides at the end will take the student into that area and several others.

WAYNE A. MEEKS
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GERHART B. LADNER. *God, Cosmos, and Humankind: The World of Early Christian Symbolism*. Translated by THOMAS DUNLAP. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. vii, 334. $45.00.

"Can symbolism still be experienced and recognized as a vital and living force?" asks Gerhart B. Ladner (p. 1) in this important, careful, and thorough work. He examines late antique Christian symbols from three different perspectives: theological, cosmological, and anthropological.

"I have heuristically presupposed the living and spiritual reality of symbols . . . and the existence of the sacred and the divine" (p. 2). Having presented definitions of symbolic reality by J. W. Von Goethe and Karl Rahner, Ladner draws from his own patristic roots: "Clement was the first author . . . who . . . defined the symbol as the visible sign of the invisible . . . as the mysterious sacred image of the divine" (p. 82).

In this book, Ladner analyzes symbols of the incar-

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nation, crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, Holy Spirit, Trinity, the Creation and the Fall, heavenly hierarchies, the human community, and the individual. To help the reader, many examples are given from works of art and biblical and patristic texts, carefully translated and analyzed.

"The entire Cosmos . . . consisted of signs of God and could itself become a divine sign" (p. 66). Church fathers like Basil and Augustine understood Genesis in symbolic terms. Furthermore, the second creation account (Gen. 2:5) implied a pre-Creation, based on the "seminal reason principles" (*logoi spermatikoi*) of the Stoics. Philo and Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine saw the six-day work as symbolic of the gradual unfolding of the instantaneous burst of creation, a sort of patristic Big Bang for which "everything was created first in the mind of God . . . through the . . . Logos" (p. 71).

Despite corruption, creation was accepted as good by the early church. Not so the Gnostics, who awaited Jesus, the messenger of the "alien god," to bring the saving knowledge (*gnosis*) to free them from the cosmic rulers (*Aeons*, *Archons*) and the demiurgic creator, who first trapped spirit in the material creation. Ladner attributes the Gnostic world view to "Hellenistic-Oriental" syncretism. But careful study of the Nag Hamadi corpus has changed the face of Gnostic scholarship: a more nuanced view is called for, acknowledging the possibility of origins in traditions more concrete than a vague "Hellenistic-Oriental Syncretism" (e.g. in renegade Judaism).

A central author for Ladner is Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (fl. *ca.* 500) who combines the language of Romans (1:20) "with Neoplatonic overflowing of the intelligible, the divine . . . into the angels, humankind, and the entire cosmos" (p. 89). Thus the cosmos itself becomes icon and theophany, thoroughly symbolic. The angelic and ecclesiastical hierarchies depicted in late antique and medieval art were sacred symbolic forms of the just, the good, and the beautiful (p. 91).

Ladner discusses the animal symbolism of the bestiary *Physiologus*, also the symbolism of minerals, bread, fish, and wilderness. In the syncretism of late antique art, at times only the context—for example, with shepherd or Orpheus symbolism, or in "Dionysian" scenes (p. 149)—reveals a Christian or pagan work. In the symbolism of the Quadrivium from Plato to Gregory the Great, Ladner presents a fascinating discussion of number symbolism in music and astronomy.

According to Ladner, the incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension are powerful Christian symbols that bring into close rapport theological and anthropological symbolism. Important here are the church councils, especially Chalcedon (451), at which there was an attempt to grasp the mystery of the incarnation through the symbolism of nature and person. For the Greeks, who recognized God more easily in human than any other form, the incarnation was the symbolic reality of salvation at the hands of God. This is closely connected to the Gospel idea that Christ is an entirely new image of man. The death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ constitute the linch-pin of Christian faith: the dead will be resurrected in a spiritualized body, implying unity of body, soul, and spirit. Thus, Christ is frequently depicted with a nimbus of rays and a chariot, like a new Helios but also a new Elijah. The basic apostolic symbolism alludes to this sequence: Matthew, human, incarnation; Luke, ox, sacrifical death; Mark, lion, resurrection; and John, eagle, ascension. The descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost is the symbolic beginning of the church. Mary symbolizes both the human embodied soul and the church. Her purity allows her to be assumed into heaven (body and soul) before the universal resurrection and the last judgment. She represents the pre-Christian divine mother in a mystical sense so that the early Christian male concept of God included the eternally feminine.

Late antique art depicts Christ eschatologically, enthroned between Peter and Paul and flanked by the letters *alpha* and *omega*, symbolically the kingdom of heaven. He is depicted also on a rainbow, or on the globe as *Kosmokrator* or ruler of the universe. The cross is identified with the tree of life and the world-tree.

The greatest of all symbolic realities is the eucharistic sacrament, the transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ around which celebration of the Mass has taken form.

Regeneration through baptism and "likeness to God" are central to late antique Christian anthropology. Human being is created in God's image and likeness (Gen. 1:26). Gregory of Nyssa defines the latter as human bliss. In contrast, Gnostic anthropology is based on "overcoming the forgetfulness of the world of light through grace, a return to purity through a recall from above" (p. 190). Here Ladner gives us a neatly compressed definition of myth as "an epically elaborated summation of primeval symbols" (p. 189).

Among symbols of human community, the Christianized Roman Empire (*basileia*) is an earthly symbol of the kingdom of heaven, with its inherent danger of divinizing the state. The earthly *ecclesia* was symbolically, therefore, not completely coincident with the empirical church: the Heavenly Jerusalem, the "City of God," the "body of Christ" itself (p. 213).

Ladner's discussion of typological Biblical allegory is included and leads into a discussion of the multiple meanings of scripture—literal/historical, tropological/moral, anagogical/eschatological—summed up in the medieval jingle "the letters teach what happened; allegory what to believe; the moral meaning what to do; *anagogē* the goal" (p. 237).

Ladner's thorough discussion includes Christian language symbolism and architectural symbolism. The dome, for example, symbolized the cosmos of heaven and earth; the exchange of clothes, likewise, might symbolize conversion. In his introduction, Ladner makes a significant methodological statement: "The

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linkage of symbolism with the sphere of the sacred does not constitute in any way a denial of the material, social contexts which Peter Brown has recently described so brilliantly . . . However, since the symbolism of early Christianity sought the invisible in the visible, the relationship . . . between symbolism and the sacred . . . lies at the heart of the book" (p. 2). In short, the exclusive preoccupation with the social as the "real" brings with it the danger of losing any sense of the late antique mentality (this phrase is intended in a conceptualist rather than a realist sense).

Ladner wears his considerable erudition lightly, and his attention to fundamentals will make this standard reading for students as well as scholars. Lamentably, it is the last major contribution of our greatest medievalist of recent decades.

JAY BREGMAN
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HUGH ELTON. *Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350–425*. (Oxford Classical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. xv, 312. $72.00.

Originally covering the years 300–600 A.D., Hugh Elton's dissertation was cropped for this book to the short span of seventy-five years, from 350–425 A.D. The two opening chapters, "Barbarian Economy and Society" and "Barbarian Military Practices," deal with European "barbarians," showing how alike and primitive they were. Few had horses, Elton claims (p. 59). This comes as a surprise, for Caesar, Tacitus, Cassius Dio, Arrian, and Dexippus are all much taken by the number and skill of German horsemen. And did not Gothic cavalry rout the Roman field army at Adrianople? Moreover, Elton argues that "there was no significant change in barbarian equipment from Tacitus's time until the sixth century" (p. 72). Archaeologists, tracing the rise of the fearsome *francisca* throwing ax and the Hunnic reflex bow, would hardly agree.

The following seven chapters cover aspects of Roman warfare, dealing with organization, arms, equipment, finance, recruiting, fortifications, foreign policy, strategy, and operations. Based on primary sources, they bring together much material, some useful, some not. Although the time period covered in the text was cropped, the notes were not. As a result, much of the evidence comes from periods outside the scope of the book. At times the sources prove the opposite of what Elton claims; for example, a late Roman orator (Paneg. Lat. 2,34) shows that the army indeed could cross rivers by swimming them under arms even if foes held the other bank (p. 246).

Elton has gone to some length to buttress his basic hypothesis that the Roman army was largely recruited from native "Romans," not from "barbarians." When, at the opening of battles, the Roman army sang the German battle song (*barritus*), he avers not to "understand how [this] reflected ethnic composition" (p. 144). Or, when Synesius in 400 A.D. says that the emperor's guardsmen all wear blond hair, he suggests that "Barbarian appearance does not prove barbarian origin" (p. 151). In his rush to Romanize the army, Elton omits to mention that Synesius goes on to describe these troops as foreigners.

The chapter on recruiting lists soldiers and officers classed as "Romans" or "barbarians" by their names. Because soldiers often changed their names when they enlisted (Priscus frag. 18), nothing can be learned from such lists.

Elton concludes that the fall of the Roman empire had nothing to do with structural weaknesses of the army: the defeat at Adrianople was the fault of the emperor and "some over-eager tribunes" (p. 266). "Events, rather than processes" are thus offered as explanation for the fall of Rome (p. 266). Such a conclusion will not satisfy modern readers who believe that bringing to light underlying processes is the historian's task. The rise of foreigners in the army was such a process. Indeed, Ammianus Marcellinus, our source for Adrianople, says that the over-eagerness of the troops—and not that of the tribunes—brought doom. These troops were foreigners who, lost to Roman discipline, caused structural weakness.

That foreign language titles in this book are often mangled and almost every Greek word misspelled may be minor faults. It is a moral fault, in my opinion, that the Germanic nations, founders of the European Middle Ages, are made out to be "barbarians," a label no American university professor such as Elton would give Native Americans or Africans.

MICHAEL P. SPEIDEL
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PAT SOUTHERN and KAREN RAMSEY DIXON. *The Late Roman Army*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xvii, 206. $30.00.

The late Roman army presents the modern enquirer with multifarious problems on many levels. Pat Southern and Karen Ramsey Dixon aptly describe their task at the outset as "rather like trying to grasp the soap in the bath" (p. ix). Nevertheless, they have succeeded in providing an introductory survey that is likely to be widely useful. The structure is simple and lucid, comprising eight main chapters: the first two describe changes in the Roman army from the Severan period down to Justinian; the next six consider, respectively, recruitment, conditions of service, equipment, fortifications, siege warfare, and morale. There are eighty-three figures, nineteen plates, four maps, eight pages of chronological tables, and a glossary of Latin terms.

The best part of the book, which occupies nearly half the text and to which most of the figures and all the plates relate, is the discussion of military equipment, fortifications, and siege warfare. Here Southern and Dixon effectively synthesize a large amount of recent archaeological discovery and research. Unfortunately, much of the rest of the book fails to match the same high standard, merely rehashing A. H. M. Jones's long

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chapter on "The Army" in his *Later Roman Empire 284–602* (1964).

Southern and Dixon follow Jones's account in a manner that sometimes veers perilously close to plagiarism. They reproduce the substance of many passages from Jones with due acknowledgement (which is legitimate), but they also use him in exactly the same way in other passages without citing him as an authority. Moreover, they sometimes reproduce Jones's actual words without quotation marks, occasionally making their borrowing obvious by faithfully transcribing inaccurate or out-of-date references from Jones. For example, three consecutive paragraphs (pp. 84–85) reproduce the substance and some of the wording of three consecutive paragraphs in Jones (p. 632). Jones gives an inaccurate reference to "Synesius, *Epistulae* 129" for a passage he quotes from *Letter* 130; Southern and Dixon paraphrase Jones's translation and repeat his inaccurate reference.

This serious and pervasive flaw appears to result from Southern and Dixon's belief that the works of modern scholars can be regarded as "secondary sources" to be used in a fashion similar to the "primary sources," the ancient evidence. Admittedly, this way of speaking may sound innocuous and is widely encountered, especially in the classroom. But I believe that it is always dangerous to assume or imply that modern studies of the ancient world can in any way share the epistemological status of ancient evidence, and the dangers of such sloppy thinking are perfectly exemplified in this book. By treating Jones and other twentieth-century historians of ancient Rome as "secondary source material" (p. 1), Southern and Dixon have insidiously distorted their presentation of the ancient evidence. In his social, economic, and administrative survey of the later Roman Empire, Jones assembled a superb collection of material, organized it rationally, and advanced a coherent and often compelling interpretation. Southern and Dixon appear to have repeated much of Jones's account of the late Roman army as their own without themselves systematically examining the evidence on which he based his conclusions.

T. D. Barnes
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MEDIEVAL

Janet Martin. *Medieval Russia 980–1584.* (Cambridge Medieval Textbooks.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995. Pp. xxvi, 450. Cloth $65.00, paper $22.95.

For nonspecialists in Russian history, this interpretive survey offers a comprehensive and readable account of what is now called European Russia from the time (the 800s) that an internationally recognized political elite (the Rus' dynasty) created a state at Kiev incorporating indigenous East Slavic (and some Finno-Ugric) peoples until the turbulent reign of Ivan the Terrible, ruler not of Kiev but of Moscow, some 700 years later. Janet Martin cuts through the complexities of identity, continuity, and discontinuity suggested by the preceding sentence. She presents the history of a single society in which many states evolved over time, based on the legacies of Kiev Rus'. Her argument for "cohesion" challenges most historiography, which as a rule has favored discontinuity over continuity in traversing this ground. Some argue that Kiev Rus' generated three separate nationalities (Ukrainian, Belarusian and Great Russian) and at least that many histories; others argue that only Russia (the empire that grew from the Grand Principality of Moscow) was the direct and primary heir of Kiev Rus', despite striking differences between them. Martin recognizes that Muscovy's autocratic ideology and governing apparatus marked a break from Kievan tradition (explicable in part by the exigencies of Moscow's relationship with the Mongols), but she argues forcefully that the Muscovite experience represents continuity with Kiev Rus' in its dynasty, its economic structures, and the cultural codes bequeathed by the Orthodox Church. Martin identifies the dynastic system of collateral succession as perhaps *the* crucial exemplar of the cohesion she sees: the fact that Moscow's rulers rejected that system (gaining short-term advantage and long-term disaster) linked Muscovy "paradoxically" with Kiev Rus'.

The thesis is complex and will not please everyone; after all, Martin still argues rather traditionally that a good portion of the Kiev Rus' lands (much of modern Ukraine and Belarus') in essence dropped out of the common heritage when they became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the Kingdom of Poland (p. 165). And the Mongols here assume their traditional role as an explanatory device for Muscovite divergences from Kiev, although she defines their significance differently. Architectonically it is hard to argue for cohesion and community over centuries given the familiar pattern of a loosely centralized dynastic state breaking down into its constituent parts, some of which become absorbed into larger entities and others of which become major players at different capitals in different times. I personally see less unity than does Martin, but this issue depends so much on individual historians' judgments about what constitutes continuity and cohesion and how to measure them, that there will never be a definitive solution. Martin's effort to pull it all together has the virtue—rare in these sorts of books—of engaging and challenging the reader.

Martin's strengths are many: her attention to sources, her use of architecture to analyze political symbolism, her confident embrace of controversial interpretations (the Normanist issue, for example). Most noteworthy is her integration of recent revisionist work that reframes issues such as Kiev's demise, the Mongols' role in Moscow's rise, the status of the Daniilovich dynasty, the relationship of the church to the Muscovite state, and Muscovite court politics. Her resolute refusal to anachronize premodern social structures, economic patterns, or mentalities is very

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refreshing. Because a key theme is dynastic succession, there is a heavy dose of chronological political narrative here, and students might find it dense. Historians will appreciate the degree to which the argument is supported by important excurses into society and economy, administrative structures, and ideology and symbolism, and students should enjoy grappling with Martin's argument and with the counterarguments that she so fairly and lucidly presents. Martin is to be commended for prodigious work and thoughtful synthesis; this book will set the terms of debate for years to come.

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Stanford University

CLAY STALLS. *Possessing the Land: Aragon's Expansion into Islam's Ebro Frontier under Alfonso the Battler, 1104–1134*. (The Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1453, number 7.) New York: E. J. Brill. 1995. Pp. xiii, 337. $115.50.

Alfonso I of Aragon, known as "the Battler," was one of the great kings of the Spanish reconquest. During his thirty-year reign, Christian forces seized the urbanized and agriculturally productive regions of the Ebro Valley, culminating in the capture of Saragossa, Tudela, and Calatayud in 1118–1120. He died without a son in 1134 and left his kingdom to the Knights Hospitaller and Templar, thus precipitating a crisis ultimately resolved by the union of Aragon with the county of Barcelona. The early twelfth century thus marks not only the expansion but also, in a sense, the foundation of the medieval kingdom of Aragon.

Clay Stalls's book begins with the military campaigns but is centered on the process of consolidation during the remaining fourteen years of Alfonso's leadership. Stalls's central argument is that conquest was not accompanied by a planned expansion of settlement. Instead of a newly open frontier that the king and nobles immediately began to repopulate, Stalls points to a more haphazard pattern of settlement undertaken gradually by knights and peasants. In addition, the Muslim population was allowed to remain, and so the Aragonese frontier must be understood as a more complex site of cultural interaction than simply one people replacing another.

Stalls takes issue with Aragonese historiography that portrays the expansion under Alfonso I as a triumphant progress of carefully planned conquest and consolidation. He is also critical of those who consider repopulation as closely linked to the imposition of a seigneurial regime of lordship and exploitation of peasants. It is not always clear whether he is arguing that the Ebro Valley was different from the rest of the Iberian peninsula or suggesting a more general revision of how the frontier and its Christian resettlement are to be viewed, but his description of a fairly limited but important region provides a useful case-study of the securing of conquered territory.

There are some problems with the approach used in this book. Stalls relies on published sources, so although he criticizes Aragonese interpretations, he does not add much in the way of new evidence. He also frames his historiographic critique in large terms but is really only describing the situation for the limited period between the conquest of Calatayud and Alfonso's death. To the extent that kings and nobles *did* play a role in issuing charters of privilege for frontier communities (*fueros*) after 1134, the argument is simply that there was a certain lag in the consolidation of the frontier rather than a revaluation of its essential character. Similarly, when Stalls energetically attacks the views of historians such as García de Cortázar that nobles imposed a seigneurial regime throughout Spain in the wake of reconquest (pp. 205–206), he admits that such developments took place after Alfonso.

Two of the potentially most interesting chapters concern the role of the church in settling the frontier (pp. 224–78) and the position of Islam under Christian occupation (pp. 279–315). Stalls shows that ecclesiastical foundations were less interested in dealing with frontier settlement than in disputing diocesan boundaries and zones of influence. With regard to the Muslims, he emphasizes the survival of free farmers and the integrity of the Islamic community as opposed to those who depict the population as legally subjugated and culturally isolated. In both these chapters, the conclusions are unexceptionable, although not based on any new or startling evidence and again confined to the last fourteen years of Alfonso's reign.

Stalls is strongest on the actual initial process of settling the Ebro Valley, particularly with regard to the enterprise of individuals of modest fortune who were more energetic, at least initially, than the great lords of the region. There remains much that could be done in situating the era of Alfonso I within a larger chronological and geographical context.

PAUL FREEDMAN
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AMY G. REMENSNYDER. *Remembering Kings Past: Monastic Foundation Legends in Medieval Southern France*. Ithaca: Cornell University Pres. 1995. Pp. xiii, 355. $49.95.

Amy G. Remensnyder approaches her topic of medieval monastic foundation legends with a missionary zeal intended to convert scholars of northern French material from their misguidedly parochial view that the southern legends are merely local tales, lesser in value than and borrowed from the richer northern tradition. She examines foundation legends that developed from 1000 to 1250 at some two score Benedictine houses located in southwestern France, arguing that these tales imagined the past to create a present identity for their monasteries.

Southern abbeys reconstructing their origins generally imagined saintly and royal founders for themselves, with the earlier legends tending to favor the saint as founder and the king in a supporting role as

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patron. As legends proliferated in the eleventh century, they also evolved to feature an increasingly saintly king as sole founder. The kings of choice became Clovis, Pippin the Short, and, best of all, Charlemagne, chosen, perhaps, to evoke Capetian interest in and protection of southern abbeys. Although Remensnyder emphasizes that this "remembering kings past" predated Capetian ascendancy (and hence any substantive royal help), abbeys angling for advantage in local contests of authority associated themselves with powerful royal figures of the past as they did with popes to assert their liberties and autonomy.

Monastic foundation legends functioned in practical ways to promote relics and give them authority and institutional particularity, to emphasize an abbey's rights as a property owner, and to underline the liberties of a monastery. Clashes between monasteries were particularly likely to trigger the embroidering of foundation stories. Less frequently, it was episcopal threats or, even more occasionally, the depredations of lay lords that the legends countered. Legends could even repair the self-image of a community as it did for Lagrasse, when a series of internal stresses led to the production of the *Gesta Karoli Magni*, a glowing monastic success story. Remensnyder cautions, however, that the legends functioned as tools for reconstructing positive institutional identities rather than simply as defensive weapons against attacks. Their imagined northern royal founders signaled that, far from being peripheral, southern abbeys believed themselves an integral part of the epic past of the kingdom of Francia.

Medieval monasteries—despite contemporary rhetoric—were remarkably integrated into their surrounding lay communities, which supported them with donations and recruits to their work force and choirs. When monks created fictive founders, they did so surrounded by lay neighbors who could applaud the monastic fabrications, lose interest in a house, or even become antagonistic to the monks. Monastics were well aware of these dangers and of the need to placate and attract relatives, patrons, and pilgrims with appropriate rhetoric and reputation. Omitting this essential backdrop to monastic identity-formation risks serious distortion.

If southern monks were becoming "makers" of themselves, makers of kings, and makers of the world in their own image" (p 301), that world included the abbot's brother, niece, or uncle: the powerful lay relative perched on a neighboring hillside with a stake in the local abbey and the ability to help or hurt it. By treating her rich material with little reference to this surrounding secular scene, Remensnyder skews her picture and loses some of the interactive liveliness of the medieval world, a shame in what is otherwise an excellent study of medieval monastic mentalities.

PENELOPE D. JOHNSON
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TUOMAS M. S. LEHTONEN. *Fortuna, Money, and the Sublunar World: Twelfth-Century Ethical Poetics and the Satirical Poetry of the Carmina Burana*. (Bibliotheca Historica, number 9.) Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society. 1995. Pp. 188.

Between 1225 and 1230, three clerics on the Austrian-Italian border transcribed 228 Latin poems—composed in northern France mainly during the twelfth century—into a single codex. Known as the *Carmina burana* from the Bavarian monastery of Benediktbeuren where the manuscript was preserved, this anthology of medieval Latin poetry is the most important to its date of transcription. It was one of the earliest of the thirteenth-century collections and foreshadowed the later voluminous compilations of French vernacular verse. The *Carmina burana* consist largely of moral-satirical verse; love, drinking, and gamboling songs; and religious plays. Since their discovery in 1803, literary scholars have edited the poems, collated other manuscript versions, and established their literary status. Trained in the distinguished Finnish tradition of neo-latin studies, Tuomas M. S. Lehtonen interprets this poetry within two contexts, one intellectual and literary, the other sociocultural. To make this task manageable, he concentrates on two themes, fortune and money.

Lehtonen devotes the most attention to the intertextual and intellectual networks. As poetry, the texts are situated within the philosophic systems of Augustine, Boethius, Hugh of Saint-Victor, Bernard Sylvester, and others, for whom poetry is subsumed under ethics. In their view, poetry employs metaphors and fictions to delight. As a subgenre, satire delights through description and criticism that ridicule life within the sublunar world where fortune operates. Personified as a female, *Fortuna* combines the attributes of worldly success, destiny, chance, and randomness. After situating the *Carmina burana* within the theories of Augustine and Boethius (who disagreed on the issue of chance) and Alain of Lille, Lehtonen concludes that the *Carmina burana* sided mainly with Boethius, since the poems legitimize fortune but limit her sphere of operation. Also within the sublunar world, money, personified as *Nummus*, exercises a potent force. As is well known, many of the celebrated poems follow classical Roman satire, expose the degeneracy of learning and generosity, and protest the rapacity of the papacy and the prelacy.

Lehtonen's second perspective, the sociocultural, is of greatest interest to historians, but, unfortunately, the least original. Eschewing the search for specific occasions, he remains at a high level of generalization and accepts the hypothesis that the rise of the monetary economy generated urban society in northern France in the twelfth century. In particular, he entertains Alexander Murray's speculation that *Fortuna* emblemized the social mobility of the new urban society and accepts Lawrence Elredge's demonstration that the poem *Propter Sion non tacebo* is a direct

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criticism of the influence of the canonist Gratian on papal government. In sum, Lehtonen situates the *Carmina burana* in the context of the secular clergy—perhaps even that of the new Augustinian canons—who competed with the monks in the emerging towns of northern France. In particular, this poetry provided a voice for the lower clergy who sought to subvert their superiors, as they did in their annual Feasts of Fools. That the *Carmina burana* may be read as a *speculum clericorum* is plausible, even if not surprising.

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GABRIELLE M. SPIEGEL. *Romancing the Past: The Rise of Vernacular Prose Historiography in Thirteenth-Century France*. (New Historicism Series.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1993. Pp. xiii, 422.

This study derives its title from Gabrielle M. Spiegel's thesis that, in early thirteenth-century France, the Franco-Flemish aristocracy used vernacular prose chronicles "to redeem the present by means of a revitalized past" (p. 5). Spiegel describes her book as "a poststructuralist study of thirteenth-century French historical texts" (back cover) and justifies it thus: "Literary text and historical context are not the same thing . . . [T]he historian of texts is a 'writer' in his or her function of composing the historical narrative, but a 'reader' of the already materially extant text. The task facing the one is broadly constructive, the other broadly deconstructive, and it is not hard to see why few literary critics or historians of texts have given equal attention to both undertakings. My book does attempt to do both history and literature" (p. 9).

Implicit in the above are certain premises that are never explicated, most notably, what are this "history" and "literature" that Spiegel is going to "do"? The answer is not readily discernible either methodologically or from the works selected for treatment. After an introduction treating the historical setting, the book moves, with a passing nod to Chrétien de Troyes's *Cligés*, from the *Pseudo-Turpin* through *L'Histoire ancienne jusqu'à César*, *Li Fet des Romains*, Jean de Thuim's *Hystore de Jules Cesar*, and two chronicles attributed to Anonymous of Béthune, to the *Grandes Chroniques de France*. The works covered are disparate, and one is truly out of place. Because it is "the most influential work of ancient historiography to appear during the first phase of vernacular translations of classical texts" (pp. 118–19), *Li Fet des Romains* is understandably important to Spiegel's study, but it hardly supports her thesis. Compiled in the court of Philip Augustus, it espoused explicitly and with gusto the French king's political causes and even contains an enthusiastic castigation of his political enemies. The anonymous clerical translator was a loyal supporter and perhaps an educator of the king, whom he had known since the latter's "tousled" youth. Spiegel says "there seems little reason to reject the notion that at least one important audience that he envisaged was the nobility of northern France among whom, in fact, the *Faits des Romains* had a substantial success" (p. 122), but that is an inadequate justification for forcing the encyclopedic text into the straitjacket of a nostalgic Flemish aristocracy thesis.

Spiegel's contention that historiography evolved from deversified romance is also erroneous. It eliminates from consideration all prose texts written before the thirteenth century, when "vernacular prose had been confined to juridical texts, charters, translations of the Bible, and homiletic works" (p. 56). The contexts of prose that had for centuries ensured its respectability and authority, beginning with the first extant piece of French in 842, have thus been summarily dismissed by Spiegel as irrelevant to the formation of prose. Omitted also from consideration are all Latin histories, regardless of the crucial parallelisms between Latin and vernacular historiography. The most serious omission of all is that of crusading literature, whether Latin or vernacular. Spiegel here gives an explanation of sorts, namely that "the chronicles of the Crusade are well known and much written about" and, "although equally works of prose, the chronicles of the Crusade direct their narratives to an account of deeds performed in distant lands and of an almost exclusively military character. They therefore seemed to me less promising material for my principal interests than texts more closely focused on France, its past history, and contemporary conflicts" (pp. 7, 8). This explanation notwithstanding, it is paradoxical that a historian would neglect some of the most important prose texts of the thirteenth century and would choose to explain the rise of vernacular prose historiography through "literary" works, whatever that may mean.

Paradoxical, also, is Spiegel's preference for a nineteenth-century "literary" model *à la Lanson*: first came epic, then came romance, then came prose by the miracle of *dérimage* (upon the urging of Yolande de St-Pol). This evolutionary construct is so crucial to the book's thesis that it is repeated in various forms, as in the misguided assertion that "the evolution of historical genres—from Pseudo-Turpin translations, to ancient histories, to political and military chronicles—strikingly recapitulates the evolution of romance genres from epic, to *romans d'antiquité*, to courtly romance, while recasting them in prose" (p. 77). (*Pseudo-Turpin*, supposed "pioneer" of French historiography, based its spurious authority on a Latin archival source, spoke the language of Turpin's *clergie*, and derived its topical immediacy from the Crusades!)

The best chapters in this controversial study are, in my view, the first, in which the voice of a well-trained historian rings clear as she sets the historical scene for her thesis; and the second, which is visibly an outgrowth of Spiegel's article, "*Pseudo-Turpin*, the Crisis of the Aristocracy, and the Beginnings of Vernacular Historiography in Thirteenth-Century France" (*Journal of Medieval History* 12 [1986]: 207–223). Self-reinforcing rhetoric deforms and denatures the later

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chapters, however, to a point where I wonder whether I can possibly have read the same primary sources as Spiegel. Codicological evidence is never discussed, but that in itself is understandable when the thesis of the whole book is intentionality, and patronal intentionality at that. But the question inevitably arises: who is ever to prove—or disprove—motivation? Even contrary evidence can be used *per contrarium* in sentences introduced by "curiously" or "surprisingly" (see, for example, the last sentence on p. 240). And if Spiegel's self-styled "deconstructive reading" offers little *prima facie* evidence to support her particular interpetation of the *Pseudo-Turpin* over that of its editors (Ronald Walpole, Ian Short, André de Mandach, and Claude Buridant), there is also little that can disprove it. It is Spiegel herself who at one point topples the precarious house of cards she has built by asking "if in thus problematizing the heroic past they were simultaneously creating, vernacular chroniclers were not expressing—consciously or unconsciously—the impossibility of sustaining the chivalric codes they sought to ground in antiquity . . . If vernacular chroniclers wanted to reinforce the sense of historical mission and social prestige of a beleaguered elite, the message they actually conveyed was highy ambiguous" (p. 158).

Whatever the answer to the intentionality question, however, one thing at least can be said unequivocally. Spiegel, who is an excellent writer, formulates it well, and her romancing of the past is "a good read."

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GÉRARD SIVÉRY. *Les capétiens et l'argent au siècle de Saint Louis: Essai sur l'administration et les finances royales au XIII^e siècle*. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion. 1995. Pp. 205. 130 fr.

Gérard Sivéry is a well-known specialist of thirteenth-century France and a student of the social and economic history of Flanders and the Hainaut in the late Middle Ages. This book explores the changing shape of Capetian financial resources and the personnel responsible for collecting them. It is a narrowly focused sequel to his useful *L'économie du Royaume de France au siècle de Saint Louis* (1984). The present book examines the evolution of royal finances and financial personnel in the reigns of Philip Augustus, Blanche de Castille, Louis IX, and Philip III. Sivéry takes account of recent American scholarship and revises older French scholarship. He has done significant research on royal accounts at the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Archives Nationales.

In a search for influences on royal accounting procedures, Sivéry notes in passing that of the Benedictines, the Flemish, and the Normans. It was the Temple, however, that made the most profound impact on royal finances. In 1202–1203, Brother Aymard and the Templars managed the royal treasury and the provosts' and bailiffs' accounts, as well as money that was not funneled through the treasury but was dispersed immediately for military expenses. To counter the control of the Temple, the clerics and accountants of the *Curia* came to verify royal accounts at the Temple until permanent controllers were established by Louis IX. The third arm of royal finance was the *Hôtel du roi*, for which there were chamberlains and accountant clerks. The *Curia* accountants, the royal controllers at the Temple, and the *Hôtel* personnel represent the origins of the Chamber of Accounts. Sivéry maintains that Temple payment and credit techniques continued to be important in the thirteenth century, even as Italian procedures influenced the organization of royal accounts with the separation of receipts and expenses.

The major challenge for the king of France in the thirteenth century was enlarging the resources available to support a growing royal political agenda. The main unexploited resource of royal finance was urban, and the towns were first tapped by the bailiffs. The urban contribution went from 17.4 percent of the bailiffs' and provosts' receipts in 1202–1203 to 52 percent in the Ascension receipts of 1248; this represented a watershed. By 1252, the king had adopted the forced loan under royal commissioners and *maîtres de comptes*, not the bailiffs, who became regional administrators. Nonetheless, bailiffs' revenues were three and one half times those of provosts by 1286–1287.

Although one may quibble with interpretations here and there, Sivéry has provided a distillation of information that furnishes clear insights into the growth of French royal finance. The book contains useful appendixes in the schematic presentation of provosts' and bailiffs' accounts for 1234, 1238, 1248, and brief tables of administrative geography of *baillages*, *prévôtés*, and *sénéchaussées*.

As a footnote, I must add that the book could have profited from closer proofreading. There are many candidates among the numerous typos, but my choice for the most show-stopping is the bibliographic citation of C. W. Hollinster and J. W. Baldwing for their article, "The rise of Administration kingship," *AHR* (1978).

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LÉOPOLD GÉNICOT. *L'économie rurale namuroise au bas moyen âge*. Volume 4, *La communauté et la vie rurale*. (Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de philologie, number 49.) Louvain: Collège Erasme. 1995. Pp. xviii, 514.

This posthumous work completes Léopold Génicot's four-volume history of rural life in the county of Namur during the late Middle Ages. Previous volumes treated the *seigneurie*, the nobility, and the common people. Given the time lag of fifty-two years between the first and fourth volumes and the partial overlapping of subject matter, some topics discussed here are treated more fully in the other books and often refer to them.

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Génicot was best known in the United States for *Rural Communities in the Medieval West* (1990), which provides much of the analytical framework of the present book. While the earlier volumes, particularly the second, showed a tendency to generalize the applicability of conditions in the economically underdeveloped Namurois to other parts of Europe, here Génicot brought a comparative perspective to bear, appearing at times to be more attracted by the unique features of rural life in the Namurois than by its typicality.

The themes are explained clearly at the beginning of each section, followed by examples and comparisons. Génicot begins with a summary of developments until around 1000. Much of his analysis is terminological. By the thirteenth century *universitas* generally distinguished the community of the village from the fields and the hamlets on its outskirts. Land clearance created common bonds of agricultural exploitation and founded new villages. Yet the clearances probably altered the habitat less in the Namurois than in other regions. Although the cluster village rather than the street village was the norm, the cohesion and isolation of the village communities imposed a common agricultural routine and mandatory triennial rotation that were essential features of community.

Community as it developed in the thirteenth century was established largely by strong lords, who appointed all village officials and enforced the still-oral village customs. In treating the different juridical categories of peasants uniformly, contrary to early medieval practice, and in imposing common fiscal and judicial obligations, the lords contributed powerfully to developing a sense of community that had been lacking before the expansion of the central Middle Ages. From the late thirteenth century, the Dampierre counts provided the nucleus of a central administration that transposed some notion of community in matters of justice and finance from the village to the county. The counts of Namur had no significant opposition from either powerful immunists or large cities. The villages of the Namurois did not even have written bylaws or collective seals; Génicot seems at times to be manufacturing a notion of community to bring his beloved homeland into conformity with what other research has suggested for different regions.

The nature of Génicot's analysis changes along with his documentation around 1300. Where before he bases his conclusions mainly on *censiers*, he uses mainly domanial accounts for the fourteenth century and tax records for the fifteenth. Each source has different problems regarding ascertaining "community"; the tax records often group several distinct habitations for administrative purposes and are less invariably centered on the villa than are the earlier *censiers*. The focus shifted from villa to hearth as a tax unit, and the community became defined as those who maintained hearths in the village. Génicot's analysis thus has reflections on the structure of the family. His later chapters discuss the rudimentary political organs of the communities in the Namurois, common agricultural routines, the *seigneurie*, and particularly the role of the church in providing a common cult and also secular activities such as poor relief.

The book concludes with three appendixes: two editions of texts and a group of twelve village studies that elaborate the main themes of the text. But the emotional termination of the book is an epilogue, "Let Us Walk in the Namurois," the title taken from a nursery rhyme, in which the author bade a touching valedictory to his beloved home and to the readers who followed and admired his career of exemplary scholarly productivity and integrity.

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MICHAEL PRESTWICH. *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. ix, 396. $37.50.

Drawing on the vast body of scholarship on the history of medieval English warfare (to which he has made his own distinct contribution), Michael Prestwich now offers readers a *summa*, taking up one basic topic of military history after another from the later Anglo-Saxon era through the Hundred Years' War (omitting the Wars of the Roses, as he announces). The book might also be termed a *sic et non*, for Prestwich typically begins with one scholarly position on some complex topic (usually the popular view or the received wisdom of previous generations) and soon shifts to the opposite view, all the while perhaps justifiably emphasizing the difficulties of the evidence itself and of establishing any final position based upon it. How dominant was cavalry in medieval war? Was the ethos of chivalry a significant force in the shaping of knightly conduct? How did the structure of recruitment and reward change over centuries? How much continuity crosses the great dividing line of the Norman Conquest? Did commanders generally seek battle or avoid it? Can we really know what happened on a medieval battlefield? Can we know it well enough to diagram it? The chronological and topical sweep is broad, but the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries receive the most thorough coverage as especially important and well-documented periods. The book is profusely illustrated, and the illustrations are to an unusual degree integrated with the text.

This is a book that will probably be valued for its details and for its engagement, chapter by chapter, with most (if not quite all) relevant scholarship on the practice and culture of war in medieval England; the larger theme that ties the chapters together, however, is announced in the preface, sounded at every chapter's end, and forms the conclusion. The idea of a single sixteenth or seventeenth-century "military revolution" is tirelessly punctured with sound medieval evidence. Enough of the characteristics claimed for these early modern revolutions can be found, especially in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries

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and again in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, to lead to the argument that England experienced a series of striking and important changes in the practice of war rather than some stagnant and centuries-long species of "feudal warfare" in the Middle Ages followed by a stunning revolution in the early modern period. It is true that medieval armies did not excel in drill, but both their tactics and strategy were more sophisticated and skillful than some have thought. The supposed new strategy of devastation practiced by post-medieval armies will, of course, look quite familiar to students of medieval military history. The complex system of supply under Edward I will stand comparison with that under Oliver Cromwell; that king's war finance in its scale and use of credit mechanisms will look surprisingly modern to those considering it for the first time; the sheer size of Edward I's armies would not be matched again until the eras for which military revolutions are claimed. Castle architecture changed to meet the new force of powerful counterweight siege engines. Contract and pay changed both recruiting and battlefield tactics. Integrated retinues of mounted men moved swiftly across the French countryside and then dismounted; fighting together, men-at-arms and archers (longbows in hand) took up the formation that won famous engagements of the Hundred Years' War. If few of these arguments will surprise medievalists, all historians can appreciate the importance of presenting and evaluating the evidence on war, which, even in the medieval period, absorbed so large a share of human energy and resources.

This analysis, with its emphasis on two intense periods of change within the overarching millennium of the Middle Ages, leads Prestwich more than once to a view he labels "unfashionable," namely a stress on the "relative failure of the late medieval state," and he concludes that "the history of the English armies of the later part of the Hundred Years War suggests that the weakening of the central control, and the decrease in royal bureaucracy, did contribute to an evident stagnation which was characterized by an unwillingness to experiment with different forms of military organisation" (p. 344).

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ANNE CLARK BARTLETT. *Male Authors, Female Readers: Representation and Subjectivity in Middle English Devotional Literature*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 212. $32.50.

Members of a new "reading public" significantly attractive to male authors of their own time, late medieval Englishwomen, religious and lay, are currently inviting exceptional attention from modern scholars as well. Joining Anne Clark Bartlett's lively and innovative book are several other studies of this group of readers, notably David Bell's *What Nuns Read: Books and Libraries in Medieval English Nunneries* (1995). In an appendix less comprehensive than Bell's, Bartlett, whose specialty is Middle English literature, also lists vernacular books owned by medieval English nuns and their communities. At least two-thirds of all surviving works formerly in their possession are the vernacular texts on which her study is based.

More fundamental to Bartlett's concerns than the quantitative study of these texts are the questions posed, and the possibilities revealed, by women's complex engagement with a vernacular devotional literature written almost exclusively by men and often antifeminist in spirit. Why, she asks, were women of this period such enthusiastic, even avid readers of works whose misogyny ranges "from the subtle to the vociferous"? She answers by showing how women might read, and read themselves into, texts whose antifeminism was challenged and often diminished by the intrusion of alternative literary conventions.

In one way or another, she argues, all of these devotional works carried multiple or mixed messages, drawn especially from the three "counter-discourses" that strongly influenced their authors: the courtly romance, monastic letters of spiritual friendship, and narratives of nuptial and Passion contemplation. With frequent, usually judicious attention to still another discourse, that of postmodern critical theory, Bartlett explains how medieval counter-discourses offset misogyny by offering readers, or hearers, appealing, even compelling female images and models.

"I would have been one of them": declaring her longing to share with Christ's female companions in the experience of his Passion, Julian of Norwich voices most powerfully the response sought from women readers both to this discourse and to the others. Offered the role of beloved heroine in a discourse presenting Christ as the soul's courtly suitor, women as "ghostly sisters in Christ" were also invited to share in still another discourse, the egalitarian epistolary language of spiritual friendship and familiarity, which was especially important in encouraging them to aspire to roles of spiritual and intellectual equality. Stressing the diversity of these models and of the texts that often accompanied them in the manuscripts, Bartlett seeks to demonstrate how all of them appealed to and helped to shape their readers' sense of self.

Yielding to the appeal of theory, Bartlett ends her study rather too abruptly by hailing the "birth" of the female reader and the "death" of the male author. Though she enlarges our understanding of the "participation of English women in medieval literary culture," she also sends some mixed messages of her own. Emphasizing the role of the individual reader, she does less than justice to the significance of these women readers as a collective phenomenon, as a "textual community" not only in the "book revolution" of the later medieval centuries but in the flowering of a new vernacular spirituality. In the formation of this spiri-

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tuality, it would be hard to say, regarding male authors and women readers, "who followed and who led."

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MODERN EUROPE

FRANZ WIEACKER. *A History of Private Law in Europe, with Particular Reference to Germany*. Translated by TONY WEIR. Foreword by REINHARD ZIMMERMANN. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. xvi, 509. $98.00.

Tony Weir is a brilliant translator of legal German, and here he has surpassed himself. For this we should be all the more grateful, because Franz Wieacker (1908–1994) was one of the great German scholars of the postwar world. His range and depth of learning are unsurpassed. His German is remarkably complex and difficult. He once remarked to me: "Als ich jung war, war ich wunderbar unklar" ("When I was young I was wonderfully unclear"). Weir has astonishingly managed to convey this complexity, in thought as in language, in English that is nonetheless fluent.

This, in my opinion, is the best general book on European legal history in any language. I say "general" because of the breadth of the enterprise, but it is nonetheless detailed, original, and insightful. The volume is given cohesion by a focus on Germany, but Wieacker's intention and performance are much wider.

Wieacker opens with a discussion of the medieval foundations of modern private law, locating the beginnings of a European—not Roman—legal science in eleventh-century Bologna. He emphasizes the intellectual strength of canon law and its impact on secular law, and describes the triumphs of the glossators and commentators.

In the following five parts, he concentrates much more on developments in Germany. Wieacker's whole approach is well defined in part two, on the reception of Roman law in Germany. He begins by discussing earlier circumstances, political conditions, the failing power of the Empire, changes in the courts, and the position of canon and secular law. He then deals in a theoretical manner with the nature of a reception, identifies what was received and the proponents and opponents of the reception, and explains the success of Roman law. Subsequently Wieacker deals with the importance of printing for the reception and the nature and purpose of law books written in German and in Latin. We have here no narrow conception of legal history; legal change is set in a political, social, and intellectual frame with an overlay of philosophy.

This is not a book to be read from page one to the end. Rather, it is a book that all legal historians will need to keep close at hand for constant reference. Intellectual historians should also wish to have a copy nearby. We owe a great debt to Weir for making this work accessible to an English-reading public.

ALAN WATSON
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GERHILD SCHOLZ WILLIAMS. *Defining Dominion: The Discourses of Magic and Witchcraft in Early Modern France and Germany*. (Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Civilizations.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 234. $39.50.

What do the fourteenth-century tale of Mélusine, the *Malleus Maleficarum*, Paracelsus, Johann Weyer, Jean Bodin and Pierre de Lancre have in common? They all participate in Gerhild Scholz Williams's central theme, "the discourse of magic as it relates to women and witchcraft." Intersecting with them come the subsidiary discourses of discovery and religious diversity (p. 3). This book does not claim to be about the history of magic (p. 12), and it has even less to say about the history of witchcraft. Instead, it inhabits a Foucauldian universe governed by Discourse, where actions do not matter. For readers of this journal, it may be of value primarily as a cultural artifact of the 1990s, essentially a reading of classical demonologies by a scholar of comparative literature wearing feminist goggles, which have been further fogged by reading a fundamental text (Bodin) only in its German disguise.

To be fair, Williams's early chapter on Mélusine provides a rich analysis of a wonderful parable about what can and will go wrong when a half-supernatural female meets an above-average but still very human male. Her following chapter on Paracelsus, who rather admired Mélusine and other nymphs, also makes pleasant and generally persuasive reading. But the last half of this short book inadvertently provides an object lesson in what can go wrong when demonologies are read only in the context of other demonologies. Exposure to this kind of scholarship, even in a short book, brings out the Dr. Johnson in me.

My critque is simple. Bodin and de Lancre, who occupy center stage for most of the second half of Williams's book, actually wrote their demonologies "uphill," against the grain of their kingdom's practice. If one examines the discourse on witchcraft by French appellate judges, the people whom Bodin and de Lancre were primarily addressing, one finds that these judges spoke about witchcraft at least 2,600 times between 1570 and 1650. Fewer than one time in ten did they say to a witch, "die." Surprisingly, fewer than half of the 258 people whom they executed were women. Bodin tried to change this in 1580 but evidently failed (in France anyway, and he had some nasty things to say about German justice). In a better world, a scholar with Williams's talents would provide us with a close reading of just how Johann Fischart adapted Bodin's text, making it more palatable to Germans, and enriched by a preliminary study of how Germans had adapted and used the legend of Mélusine. As for de

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Lancre, his fellow judges considered him a *naïf*; when most of his Basque prisoners got to them in 1610, they put his witnesses on trial instead. Now there is real refutation of one's thesis—and de Lancre himself tells us this juicy detail, thereby suggesting that his colleagues judged him correctly. Even the Germans wisely ignored him. But today, some literary scholars take him very seriously indeed.

WILLIAM MONTER
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PETER BURKE. *The Fortunes of the Courtier: The European Reception of Castiglione's* Cortegiano. (The Penn State Series in the History of the Book.) University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 210. Cloth $40.00, paper $16.95.

Peter Burke is brave to try, in 157 pages, to measure the effects on European civilization of its most celebrated courtly primer. The results, accordingly, can only be suggestive.

First published in 1528, Castiglione's *Cortegiano* was soon translated into five languages and, by 1600, had been through 115 editions. Why the book was so successful obviously belongs to the history of its reception. Burke contends that its open, dialogic form enticed readers; that part three, dedicated to the court lady, appealed greatly to women; that the work's numerous gleanings from the classics attracted the educated; and that its remarkable charm, anecdotes, and conversational ploys won over sociable men and women. An effort is made to look at text and readers in their milieux, but these contexts are too thinly drawn.

The Courtier was at once seen as a book for the surpassingly ambitious, for all who desired place at court, from great barons and little noblemen to clever lawyers, commoners, and worldly clerics. He nourished that gross enterprise verging on art, "Renaissance self-fashioning": artful upward mobility in accord with dynamic social structures, where the animating ghost was in the seductions of power, place, money, and all their symbolic appurtenances. No wonder the *Cortegiano*, an early do-it-yourself book, was long a best-seller. But it also had critics: the Tridentine Church, scandalized by Castiglione's cynical view of friars, and Protestants of the sort who resented the power, posturings, and privileges of the influential.

Although Burke considers the book's reception, his work is more an excursion in theory than the application thereof. How do we establish a book's readers, their attitudes, and modes of reading? By checking appropriate inventories and signs of ownership on early copies of the book itself, by examining marginalia, combing through the relevant correspondence, locating references to the book in later writings, identifying imitations and influences, and by studying "paratexts" (i.e., the editorial frameworks of later editions of the book, including preface, index, notes, chapter headings, and glosses where available). For all these operations and for some aspects of reception theory, Burke's study is exceptionally useful. Not to be missed are his pages on translation, touching on the question of how a book is received and adapted, as disclosed by what translators do with key words and phrases. Here, however, problems arise. When reading a humanist like Castiglione, if we focus on his pivotal word "grace" (*grazia*), do we turn to Ovid and other classical writers for its freight, or to Renaissance literary and vernacular usage? The two are not easily reconcilable. My sense is that we should opt for usage. Yet to do so requires a tidal wave of labor, for *grazia* appears variously in almost every love poem and love tale of the period. This means that we shall have trouble taking hold of Castiglione's text, let alone trying to take hold of all those readers who came later.

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MARVIN B. BECKER. *The Emergence of Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century: A Privileged Moment in the History of England, Scotland, and France*. Bloomington: Indiana University Pres. 1994. Pp. xxiii, 164. $24.95.

This is a sequel to Marvin B. Becker's *Civility and Society in Western Europe, 1300–1600* (1988). Originally an Italian Renaissance historian, Becker has for some years been pursuing one of the great themes in western historiography: the way in which a society based ultimately on aristocratic values, in which heroic *virtu* was the essential underpinning of both monarchical and republican polities, changed into one dominated by commercialism, division of labor, and a minimalist ethic.

He begins with a discussion of civil society, starting with a quotation from Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767). Ferguson is not only the writer from whom modern sociology is ultimately derived but also an interesting case in his own right. He was a professor and leading light of the Edinburgh Enlightenment, but he was also a Gaelic speaker from Logierait in Perthshire, a member of a clannish society that cherished the heroic virtues in song and verse. He is buried in the cathedral kirkyard of St. Andrews, to which he retired, not far from a contemporary Macleod of Macleod. The overlappings of eighteenth-century reality often made nonsense of the sharp Highland-Lowland antithesis so useful to romantic novelists. Becker is intrigued by the eighteenth-century Scottish origins of our unheroic but durable commercial and industrial society operating under what the Scots philosopher David Hume called the "artificial virtue of justice." Adam Smith called it "a society of strangers."

This book surveys a series of European thinkers, from Thomas Hobbes to Blaise Pascal and a host of others. Jansenists like Pascal, Pierre Nicole (who had read Hobbes), and Antoine Arnauld are very impor-

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tant for the argument that there was a gradual recognition that society could cohere on the basis of enlightened self-interest. The debate on the nature of social obligation is then pursued through Samuel von Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, Gershom Carmichael, and John Locke. With that widely read popularizer, the Earl of Shaftesbury, Becker reaches his main sections, for Shaftesbury depicted a natural law rooted in innate moral sense as the bedrock of a civilized, discursive society. This is pure intellectual history. How can a slim book also cover fundamental shifts in Western social history?

Becker's answer is that civil society was the creation of a particular moment in time in eighteenth-century England and Scotland, a privileged time, an oasis of consciously crafted calm between the storms of the seventeenth century and the hurricane of the French Revolution. We march through the canon, with Joseph Addison and *The Spectator* prominent in the unfolding pattern of civility. From there, we progress to the Scotland of Francis Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith, with its emerging free-market economics, stadial theory of societal progression, and, above all, its Walter Scott. In Scott's great novels, Becker rightly finds an obsessive discussion of the progression from heroic to polite, civil society and of the price paid by those caught between the two. An epilogue glances at views on civil society held by German thinkers such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

This book is misnamed. It is not about social reality so much as about conceptualization by writers. There is some solid social history in the Scottish section, but the problems facing Becker are much more complex than he imagines. Scott was obsessed with clash of values, but he is useless as a guide to Jacobite Scotland. He wanted to manipulate early nineteenth-century perceptions of the Jacobite era, to assuage Scottish national pride and thereby strengthen the Union of 1707. Stadial progression was an ideological formula. It no more corresponded to concrete reality than Hobbes's state of nature. The France of Louis XV embodied enlightened civility. In the heyday of that urbane, salon-based discursive society, the Abbé Ferdinando Galiani argued in his *Dialogues sur le commerce des blés* (1770) that it was free-trade fanatics, the Physiocrats, who were reintroducing the worst kinds of dogma and anathematization of opponents. The fathers of the American Republic adhered to heroic antique virtue as an ideal. Changes in ideologies and changes in social realities are connected, but never simply.

BRUCE P. LENMAN
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JOHN B. RONEY. *The Inside of History: Jean Henri Merle d'Aubigné and Romantic Historiography*. (Studies in Historiography, number 3.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. 1996. Pp. vi, 214. $59.95.

Long ago, Kenneth Latourette recognized the nineteenth century as a "great age" of Christianity. It is the great value of John B. Roney's study of Jean Henri Merle d'Aubigné that it further reminds us how fully nineteenth-century audience remained attuned to the history of Christianity and responsive to the Protestant Reformation as the central event in world history.

Roney, avoiding the chief pitfall of those who attempt to resurrect long-forgotten nineteenth-century historians, makes no claims for a modern revival. Keenly aware of his subject's limitations, he urges a reconsideration of Merle, not for his sixteenth-century erudition but because Merle has much to teach us about the nineteenth century and its preoccupations.

Roney begins by firmly establishing Merle within his nineteenth-century settings: Geneva, French culture, the German university, and a pastorate at Hamburg. He places him in the historiographic mainstream; Merle's masters were François Guizot, Jules Michelet, and Leopold von Ranke. We are asked to consider the great popularity of Merle's Reformation histories, which were published in half a dozen European languages. Merle gave his audience what it was seeking: an understanding of the French Revolution through a study of its Christian roots. The secret of Merle's success was precisely his ability to treat the Reformation as an important link in the chain of modern revolution. Roney's achievement is to present us with a Merle engaged in that great nineteenth-century liberal enterprise, the creation of a revolutionary tradition that was Protestant in the sixteenth century, English in the seventeenth, and French in the eighteenth.

The nineteenth century was rich in efforts to reconcile Christianity and the French Revolution. Hughes-Félicité-Robert de Lamennais had proposed such an alliance on the grounds that Christianity itself was radically revolutionary. For Merle, reconciliation did not require such extremes; the Protestant Reformation demonstrated Christianity's inherent ability to regenerate society. Merle believed that God intervened in history through great individuals such as Luther and Calvin: "God gives to every people and every epoch the men necessary to it" (p. 150).

Merle was aware of the dangers of placing the Protestant Reformation within a revolutionary tradition, for it exposed the Reformation to the charge of conservatives—like Joseph de Maistre—that as an ancestor of modern revolution, it was a source of all modern troubles.

The purpose of Merle's history was not to introduce a new age of religious warfare or to foment modern revolution. Rather, Merle believed that a history of the Protestant Reformation properly rendered by a Christian writer could be reconciling and healing. In this, too, he emerges as a worthy exponent of nineteenth-century history.

STANLEY MELLON
EMERITUS
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DAVID G. HERRMANN. *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 307. $39.50.

David G. Herrmann provides us with the most detailed and most encompassing account to date of European land armaments before World War I. The book is based on archival evidence and published documentation from the Western and Central European powers. It is more multiperspectival than any other study (including David Stevenson's *Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914* [1996]), even if the absence of Russian, Ottoman, and Serbian records should be noted. It sets new standards for the discipline.

In some ways, the assembly of supporting material is the most impressive aspect of this book. Herrmann presents a convincing bird's-eye view of armaments before 1914. He highlights the centrality of the reserve issue (it is people that mattered) and the difficulties with new technologies; machine warfare (rapid firing plus heavy artillery and machine guns) was the dominant issue. The strongest and most convincing claim of the book is that armaments acquisition was driven by international rather than national considerations. The subtle shift in European geopolitics is equally important, if less conspicuous. The centrality of Austria-Hungary and Russia (and, lest we forget, of the sadly neglected Ottoman Empire) as well as the changing balance of power in southeastern Europe (with Italy and Serbia as the crucial actors) are powerfully reinforced as markers in the turn toward war.

Herrmann's main argument concerns the link between the acceleration of land armaments in the years preceding World War I and the outbreak of the war. While cautioning against overly monocausal interpretations, Herrmann argues that the arms race "created a new attitude toward the use of military force" (p. 226), which consisted in making military force a central concern of international politics. It also produced a new set of anxieties that had to do with the exigencies of balance-of-force considerations; that is, a now rampant fear that windows of opportunity (for successful war) may close in the near future. It is quite typical of this change that, in 1914, there was much less free-floating bellicosity (previously a specialty of German diplomats) and less random talk about preemptive war but a much greater readiness and, indeed, an insistance on going to war. Unfortunately, this crucial transition in "perception" or "attitude," although stated as fact, is not well understood. Quite apart from the difficulties of making sense of the peculiar cognitive dissonances of this perception (officers like von Moltke moved millions of soldiers and talked about it as gentlemen's duel), the main question concerns the logic of preception in 1914. Why is it that, after five years of change toward a balance-of-force and after two years of accelerated armaments, almost everybody in Europe thought that the effective change, as it appeared in 1914, would continue forever? If the balance-of-force had replaced the balance of power between 1909 and 1914, why should it do so between 1914 and 1919? If Herrmann's argument is right, the answer must be sought in the logic of the arms race; if not, the issue of perception looms even larger than it has before.

Herrmann's book suggests that we should distinguish rather more carefully between balance-of-power and balance-of-force politics, the latter being a product of the arms race before 1914 and a cause of World War I. I would add (and this is clearly my reading) that it is ironic that this militarization of a balance-of-power politics has become the foundation from which "realists" in International Relations judge international politics.

MICHAEL GEYER
University of Chicago

PATRICIA CLAVIN. *The Failure of Economic Diplomacy: Britain, Germany, France and the United States, 1931–36*. New York: St. Martin's. 1996. Pp. x, 279. $59.95.

The London World Economic Conference of July 1933 was the last attempt at large-scale international economic cooperation in the interwar period. It proved a miserable failure and constituted a significant step in the deterioration of international relations and the move to war. Traditional accounts have blamed in particular President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "bombshell" message of July 3, 1933, refusing to contemplate a dollar stabilization and attacking the "old fetishes of so-called international bankers." Patricia Clavin provides a neat and appropriate revisionist argument that pins the failure on Great Britain, the British tariff, and British imperial preference rather than on the United States.

Clavin gives a rather more positive account of U.S. policy than is traditional and is especially interesting about trade and the early origins of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which she rightly portrays as being at the origin of the much more successful approach to international economic management of the post-1945 period. If Britain had been prepared to make concessions on trade policy and less obsessed with attempting to obtain reduction of the U.S. inter-allied debt from World War I, the conference might have been more successful. Clavin provides a fundamental indictment of a British failure of leadership. France is seen as having been limited by its refusal to contemplate a devaluation of the franc. Nazi Germany, and to a lesser extent Soviet Russia, simply behaved disruptively.

The strengths of the study are its interesting major thesis and Clavin's willingness to provide a detailed account of trade negotiations as well as of the financial diplomacy that too often is treated as the sole or major element in international economic relations.

The book also attempts to show the links between foreign and domestic economic policies. Unfortunately, however, Clavin's analysis is largely limited to

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personalities. Although there are some well-done pen portraits of Roosevelt and his advisers and of the old and mentally feeble British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, these are poor substitutes for an analysis of what interests and pressures determined domestic outcomes in the major economies and shaped the approach to the international economic order. Sadly, some factual errors reduce confidence in this interesting and original approach to a major problem in the history of international economic cooperation.

HAROLD JAMES
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G. E. MAGUIRE. *Anglo-American Policy towards the Free French*. (St. Antony's Series.) New York: St. Martin's, in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford. 1995. Pp. x, 210. $59.95.

Britain, the United States, and the Free French needed each other to wage World War II, both in Europe and in the Pacific. Each had, however, to overcome—or, more accurately, learn to live with—certain disagreeable and self-serving attitudes exhibited by the others. From the Anglo-American perspective, this meant, as G. E. Maguire puts it, "De Gaulle and his movement although not loved were necessary" (p. 153). This is the essential argument of this study, and Maguire argues it exceedingly well.

First among Maguire's subjects is the Free French, organized and led by General Charles de Gaulle. After the fall of France in June 1940, de Gaulle went to England, from whence he called on the French to resist both Germany and the Vichy regime that was cooperating with the invaders. His aim was to have France involved with the victory, so that France "will refind her liberty and her grandeur" (p. 5). Second among Maguire's subjects is the British, their backs to the wall after the fall of France. Needing any sort of European ally that they could acquire, they armed and supplied the Free French despite wide-ranging differences with de Gaulle over long-term policies. The sense that they needed the Free French continued, even expanded, even after the Soviet Union and the United States entered the war. Finally, there were the Americans, neutral until December 1941. The concerns of the U.S. were whether de Gaulle was really a republican and whether he could be trusted. When the United States entered the war, like the British, they decided that they needed the Free French. Also like the British, the Americans supplied de Gaulle's forces, although not on the same scale as did the British.

Maguire examines in detail each major area of concern regarding relations among the British, Americans, and the Free French, and in the process, she leaves the reader amazed that the alliance survived at all. She explains the formation of the Free French; why the British undertook to support them, and how the United States overcame their initial reluctance regarding them; the role played by the French colonial empire in relations between the three; Anglo-American involvement in the conflict among Admiral François Darlan, General Henri Giraud, and de Gaulle over French leadership in North Africa; the development of Free French involvement with resistance groups in France, along with arguments regarding how much influence British and American intelligence services should have with those groups; how the Allies responded to de Gaulle's running of the provisional government of France after August 1944; and, finally, she brings new evidence to bear on the relationship, much discussed by historians, among de Gaulle, Winston Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the process, Maguire raises doubts regarding Churchill's supposed Francophilia, offers evidence that the anti-Anglo-Saxon sentiment expressed by de Gaulle in the 1960s was already in place by war's end, that Roosevelt's dislike of de Gaulle evolved into hatred, and that the attitudes of all three men toward each other were based less on rationality than on emotion.

Maguire has done an excellent job in this short but thorough study. Her research is exhaustive, her writing is clear and accessible to readers outside of her specialty, and her conclusions are cogently argued and well documented. If there is a weakness, it lies in an occasional tendency to be repetitive, but this is a minor flaw. Maguire's volume adds much scholarly substance to our understanding of Anglo-American and Free French relations, as well as the long-term implications of those policies.

ROBERT COLE
Utah State University

BERNARD WASSERSTEIN. *Vanishing Diaspora: The Jews in Europe since 1945*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1996. Pp. xx, 332. $27.95.

Bernard Wasserstein is the newly appointed director of the Center for Jewish Studies at Oxford University. He is the author of a number of first-rate books, including the prize-winning *The Secret Lives of Trebitsch Lincoln* (1988). Because of such accomplishments, I (and other scholars) take Wasserstein and his work seriously. But this is an odd book. It shows what happens when one aspect of Jewish history, the theme of disaster, becomes the dominating thread in seeing all Jewish history.

Wasserstein has written a competent history of all of the bad things that happened to Jews in Europe after 1945. What is missing is any evaluation of what is "bad" and whether good things have been omitted from the narrative. Wasserstein's frame is the claim that the Jews of Europe are vanishing. He compares them in his conclusion to the tiny community of Jews at Kai-fend who were assimilated into Chinese culture over a thousand years. Yet today, their descendants still have some sense of themselves as different, perhaps even as Jews, given their claims for such an identity in the ethnic politics of the People's Republic of China. Better, he should have taken the case of the Jews of Iberian peninsula, expelled in the fifteenth

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century; there, too, he would have found descendants who have only a vague sense of their difference. In Mexico, there are still individuals who light a candle in a closet on Friday evening because it is a family tradition, although they do not know from whence this tradition came. But there is also the world of Sephardic Judaism, ranging from secular, ethnic Jews to ultra-orthodox ones. It is the spectrum of Jewish experience that is important, not focusing on one aspect to the exclusion of all others.

The Jews of Europe are vanishing. Soon, there will be no Jews left in Europe. They are intermarrying and they are emmigrating. They have a low birthrate and are not reproducing themselves. This is not (only) the thesis of Wasserstein's book. It was the claim of the Jewish physician Felix Theilhaber in *Der Untergang der deutschen Juden: Eine volkswirtschaftliche Studie* (1911). Written before Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* (1918–1922), but with the notion of decline firmly in place, Theilhaber's book was a bestseller, as were numerous other books about the decline of the birthrate in France, England, and Germany. What all of these discussions of the declining birthrate and the vanishing races did was, first of all, to label the groups in question as victims under biological siege and, second, to define the essential characteristics in the self-definition of these groups. Certainly, the Jews in 1911 were not vanishing; indeed, the only real issue in Theilhaber's books was who counts as a Jew? As an example of early Berlin Zionist rhetoric, Theilhaber's book made sense. The "Jews" that Theilhaber saw as "vanishing" were the German Jews (in his definition); the Eastern European Jews living in Germany (his *bête noire*) were thriving, as even he admitted.

We turn now to 1996: Wasserstein prefaces his latest work with a table that tabulates the number of Jews in Europe. The commentary to this table, on which all of Wasserstein's argument rests, notes that these numbers are of "varying reliability and in some cases are subject to a wide margin of error and interpretation" (p. viii). According to Wasserstein's table, there were 56,000 Jews in Hungary in 1994, down from 80,000 in 1967. Recently I asked the community leader in Budapest (where most of the Jews of Hungary now live) how many Jews were there; he said there were anywhere from 60,000 to 120,000, depending on how you define a Jew. This is the crux of such arguments. Wasserstein's claim really should read: "My Jews are vanishing!" For it is the definition of what is Jewish that is at the heart of this book.

Even though Wasserstein is aware of this problem and discusses it in the opening pages of the book, he falls back on crude biologism. A Jew is that person who is biologically or halachically (ritually) Jewish. Sadly, Wasserstein even uses an odd biological argument to buttress his thesis: that Anglo-Jewish women marry later (p. 73) and marry out (p. 74) accounts for their "particularly low reproduction rate" (p. 74). He says similar things about French Jewry (p. 243). Marrying out decreases the number of Jews only if a strict religious definition of "Jewish" is taken, and even then the offspring of Jewish women are always counted as Jewish.

The Jews of Europe are not vanishing. Their numbers were reduced after the Shoah because of emigration to Israel and persecutions in Eastern Europe, but other (perhaps smaller) groups moved to Europe over time. North African Jews moved to France and Russian Jews (no matter how defined) into the Federal Republic of Germany. Indeed, there is now a notable Israeli presence throughout Europe, including Germany.

Jewish cultural visibility in mass and high culture is at its highest point since the beginning decades of the century. The painters of the School of London are mostly Jewish and show that in a wide range of expressions. Jewish culture in Germany is complex, self-contradictory, and difficult, but exploding, and not just because of a romanticization of the Eastern European Jewish past or a "necrophilia" (a trope that figures in Wasserstein's book and in the general discourse in today's Germany) for the victims of the Shoah. Wasserstein, by the way, shares the bizarre neoromantic German notion that Yiddish culture in Eastern Europe consisted of klezmer and bagels, "sentimental drama; haunting folk-songs and a dynamic newspaper press" (p. 6). Where is Yiddish literary modernism, such as that of I. J. Singer? Where is the political Yiddish culture of the Bund (which he even discusses)? Where is the complexity of Eastern European Yiddish life and culture in contact with the mainstream of Western European culture before the Holocaust?

Wasserstein's sense of high culture is equally cramped when he looks at Western Europe. He stresses the presence of Franco-Jewish intellectuals at the forefront of contemporary French intellectual life. But he tots up lightweights such as Jean Daniel or Bernard-Henri Lévy and uses their occasional comments on the political scene in the Middle East to discuss their "Jewishness." Where are Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, who have actually written on Jewish questions with depth and meaning for a broad intellectual audience and who represent the best of the Ashkenaz and the North African Jewish intellectual tradition on a level respected throughout the world?

Wasserstein manages always to see the glass half empty (and I am in the odd position of seeing it half full). Thus, Wasserstein claims that Jewish activity on the Left in Europe is now that of "a club bore reminiscing about street battles against fascism" (p. 57). His suggests that the British pattern of a "clear voting trend to the right" may be proof that middle-class British Jewish voters loved Margaret Thatcher (p. 140), but she was denied an honorary degree at Oxford University because of the action of a don who was not at all secretive about his Jewish identity.

When Wasserstein speaks about collectives, he tends to isolate the Jews from the rest of the culture. Thus his discussion of the disappearance from Ireland and

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small towns in the United Kingdom of organized religious Jewry (p. 245) is clearly parallel to the similar "vanishing" of Jews from the southern United States and small towns in South Africa. It is the mark of urbanization and emigration, not of decline. In Ireland, especially, there has been a general decline of the college-educated population, which includes many Jews. They emigrate because of the difficulty of finding appropriate work; it is not a Jewish but an Irish problem.

My sense is that Wasserstein is another Theilhaber. He creates the virtual Jews he needs, sees them in distress, and can read only decay although he is seeing diversity and change as well. This is the pessimist's history of the Jews of contemporary Europe: certainly true, accurate, and well written, but less than half the story.

SANDER L. GILMAN
University of Chicago

DAVID M. HEAD. *The Ebbs and Flows of Fortune: The Life of Thomas Howard, Third Duke of Norfolk*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1995. Pp. xi, 387. $55.00.

Thomas Howard, third Duke of Norfolk (1473–1554), was a major political figure during the early sixteenth century because of his inheritance, longevity, and genius for survival. Eighteen years older than Henry VIII, he outlasted the king and many other figures who have attracted considerably more scholarly attention, including Thomas Wolsey, Thomas More, Thomas Cromwell, and John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland. Soldier, diplomat, treasurer, earl marshal, uncle of two queens, and father of the poet Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, Norfolk has been curiously underestimated and marginalized. During his long career, he helped bring down Wolsey and Cromwell, supported the king's divorce from Queen Catherine, fought to defeat the Pilgrimage of Grace, and survived the reign of Edward VI to preside at the coronation of Queen Mary. David M. Head is therefore to be congratulated for producing the first comprehensive biography of this powerful Tudor nobleman.

Unfortunately, Head did not find Norfolk an agreeable subject; beginning with the introduction and in virtually every successive chapter, he assures the reader that the duke was nasty, cruel, unloved, and an ultimate failure. He arrived at this conclusion by assuming that Norfolk's goal was to attain primacy at court and in the privy council, an ambition that eluded him except for brief intervals. Norfolk failed for two reasons: first, he was disinclined to do routine administrative work; and second, he failed to command the personal friendship of Henry VIII despite his complete devotion to the king's interests. Head concludes that Norfolk was a seriously flawed leader who nevertheless serves as an exemplar of an age that combined aspects of the middle ages with the Renaissance and Reformation.

This carefully researched book suffers from excessive deference to a historiographical tradition that exaggerates the importance of administrators and parliamentary legislation, especially during the 1530s, and seriously neglects the influence of the nobility and the demands of war. A bolder historian would have attempted to create a new political framework for the early sixteenth century so that Norfolk would have assumed greater prominence. Head's problem lies in his ambivalence and even disdain for his subject, an attitude that reveals how an honest historian wrestles with troubling evidence, but one that also weakens the overall impact of his work. Although no one would argue that Norfolk was a man of goodness and virtue, he may not have been quite as bad as his reputation. As the court of Henry VIII was a veritable snake pit in which only vipers could thrive, Norfolk competed with his own kind.

Head recognizes that, after 1530, Norfolk was an aging man challenged by younger, upwardly mobile competitors, but the subject of generational conflict during the reign of Henry VIII would be worth further study. "New men" such as Edward Seymour, John Dudley, and William Paget who competed with the Howards for place and prestige were less frequently low-born churls than younger men of ability and ambition. Questions may be raised on a variety of other issues in this book, including unnecessary repetitions in the text, the alleged Caesarean birth of Prince Edward, the extent to which the Edwardian Reformation was in any sense radical, and the plethora of vaguely defined parties and factions that Norfolk is said to have encountered. Head also missed an opportunity to relate Francis Bacon's intriguing essay on "Fortune" (1625) to the title of his book.

The strengths of this highly readable work clearly outweigh its weaknesses. Head offers a detailed narrative that will be of interest to specialists but also accessible to undergraduates. He concludes with an invaluable analytical chapter that encapsulates the attributes of an English duke. Although Head admits that he has lived in the shadow of G. R. Elton, a new generation of scholars will find this book a useful resource for further investigation.

BARRETT L. BEER
Kent State University

LISA FERRARO PARMELEE. *Good Newes from Fraunce: French Anti-League Propaganda in Late Elizabethan England*. Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 204. $59.95.

Modern Britons are much concerned with whether, and to what extent, the future of their country lies in a full union with the states of continental Europe. Is Britain's proper role to be no more than a minor power in a European federation led by Germany? Or should the British pursue a rather more independent path, perhaps linking themselves not only to the French and Germans but also to English-speakers in America and

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the Commonwealth? The debate has a historical dimension, for if it can be shown that British attitudes and institutions have developed on their own distinct lines and that they are quite unlike those that prevail on the European continent, the case must surely be strengthened for supposing that Britain's place is not (or not only) in Europe.

The early modern period was crucial in the development of English political and historical attitudes. Some have argued that English ideas were dominated by the common law, which allegedly differed sharply from continental legal systems, and that the English were self-consciously insular in their thinking. The peoples of continental Europe might have based their ideas on abstract rights and duties, or on the concept of legislative sovereignty, but the English looked almost exclusively to their own past practices to guide them on what they ought to do. While abstractions led some continental thinkers to argue for royal absolutism, so the argument continues, the English held that immemorial customs limited the powers of their kings.

A very different perspective was offered in John Salmon's *The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought* (1959). Drawing on a wealth of continental and British writings, Salmon demonstrated that ideas that had circulated in France during the wars of religion in the later sixteenth century were profoundly influential across the Channel from the age of Elizabeth to the Glorious Revolution. British thinkers borrowed and adapted French ideas, and there was a ready market for English translations of French writings. Salmon filled ten closely printed pages with brief titles of such books printed just in Elizabeth's reign.

Lisa Ferraro Parmelee's lucidly written and finely researched book develops some of the themes that Salmon explored. In 1584, the Protestant Henry of Navarre became heir to the throne of France, and a Catholic League was set up to prevent his succession. The League was soon attacked by polemicists including both Protestant and Catholic *politiques*. Parmelee shows that there was great interest in England in French anti-League propaganda and produces a bibliography still fuller than Salmon's. Her subject is how and why the French works came to be translated, what they said, and what influence they had on English thinking. The first chapter succinctly introduces some major themes in Elizabethan history: the Spanish war and the threat to the queen posed by Presbyterians and Catholics. The second chapter discusses printing and publishing and talks about the efforts at espionage and propaganda of some leading Elizabethan politicians. It also surveys the personal contacts in England of various important French figures. The next chapter analyzes English and French accounts of civil war and especially of the religious wars in France, while the fourth examines how the English responded to the ideas of legitimate resistance put forward by both Huguenots and the league. The last three chapters are about the influence on England of French *politiques* (Catholics who stressed the importance of peace and order and moved increasingly toward absolutism); Neostoicism; and the pamphlets produced by English Catholic priests in their own civil war of words, the Archpriest Controversy.

Parmelee convincingly argues that a number of elements in late sixteenth-century French thinking helped to pave the way for the growth of absolutism in Stuart England. The Gallicanism that surfaced in the Archpriest Controversy, the Neostoic stress on constancy and tradition, and the Bodinian theory of sovereignty adopted by the *politiques* all influenced Stuart attitudes. On occasion, Parmelee could have engaged more aggressively with recent literature; for example, she does not address the claims of Richard Tuck's *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651* (1993), although it tackles some of the same issues as her book. Nevertheless, this is a scholarly and well-argued work that makes an important and original contribution to the histories of early modern Britain and of political thought.

JOHANN P. SOMMERVILLE
University of Wisconsin, Madison

MARY C. FULLER. *Voyages in Print: English Travel to America, 1576–1624.* (Cambridge Studies in Renaissance Literature and Culture, number 7.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 210. $44.95.

Mary C. Fuller has written a wonderful account of the early English voyages, the classic instances of a genre that shares its name with the object of its representation (or with the qualifying experience of its authors). It is lucidly intelligent, erudite, witty, critically sensitive, theoretically sophisticated, and suffused with a kind of common sense that is actually quite rare and unpredictable. There is barely a word of jargon in it, despite its considerable and graciously acknowledged debts to many New Historicists and their theoretical muses Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau. And its thesis, or perhaps more accurately, its narrative, is original, although it is presented with such concise but unhurried persuasiveness that one is lulled into thinking for long stretches that it only stands to reason.

The book begins with the perception, never unavailable but somehow never noticed (like any good family secret), that "England's great prose epic," as James A. Froude called Richard Hakluyt's *Principal Navigations* (1589) in an 1853 review, was largely a record of failure and exhaustion. Fuller (herself perhaps related to Pocahontas: see p. 90, n. 53) rewrites the national epic as a farce, thereby demystifying an important and consequential piece of historical myth and at the same time sidestepping the tendency toward Jacobean tragedy in the main lines of New Historicist work on the English Renaissance and the "contact period" in the New World. It is not just that Fuller is funny (although she is: see, for instance, her treatment of seasickness in Thomas Churchyard's prefatory poem, "The journey of Sir Humfrey Gilbarte Knight," pp. 30–31). She has

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a sure and profound sense of the comic as structure: it shapes her vision of the improvisation of empire as well as of the organization of a voyage collection.

The introduction sketches the main argument "that if the history of those early decades [of English colonization] is about any one thing, it is about the ways in which the failure of voyages and colonies was recuperated by rhetoric, a rhetoric which in some ways even predicted failure" (p. 12); it also provides an incisive and crystal clear account of the special circumstances of voyagers whose writing is both testimony and information, self-discovery and pragmatic subsitution ("the voyages were important, at least in part, because they . . . [stood in] for the success which England did not yet enjoy in the field of colonization" [p. 148]).

Subsequent chapters offer sensitive and faintly psychoanalytic readings of the texts and in most cases of their authors' social situations and contexts generally. There are particularly detailed readings of Sir Humphrey Gilbert's *Discourse of a Discoverie* (1576), Sir Walter Raleigh's *Discoverie of Guiana* (1596), Captain John Smith's inconsistent sequence of works about Jamestown, Hakluyt's *Principal Navigations*, and the nineteenth-century consolidation of that last work's imperial significance in the critical essays of historians and critics such as Froude and Walter A. Raleigh (holder of Oxford's first chair in literature). The chapters elaborate the idea of "failure" into a complex system based on or at least focused by a concern with "purgation and transcendence," its manifest signs being starvation, financial disaster, and the failure to locate filthy lucre.

The narratives of protoimperial haplessness made good by a rhetoric of profitless self-sacrifice, while making no claims for themselves as political interventions, have a liberatory effect on the heart; Fuller is briefly eloquent at the end of her final chapter on the meaning and function of her demystified history of early English colonial settlement. As she constructs our view of the production of this myth of national glory (a glorious future forecast through "reconstituting" the body of a glorious but, until Hakluyt, scattered past), partly by showing us Hakluyt's constructive efforts, we lose the sharp outlines (not seriously challenged by Stephen Greenblatt or Louis Montrose) of the prehistory of empire and gain a freedom from the dead hand: "This early history is genealogically related . . . to the British Empire (and the American one) that ensued, but in a way not yet determined . . . If we are talking about *figurative* bodies, there is a time when the parts had not become a whole, let alone fragments of a whole that had been lost. The very *copia* of the voyage literature promises the making of other histories for the uses of the present" (pp. 173–74). We who are interested to read and write those other histories have in Fuller's book a model combination of historical insight, thorough research, lively writing, and good ideas about the function of the aesthetic and the rhetorical in the psychodramas of nation-building.

MARY BAINE CAMPBELL
Brandeis University

GLENN BURGESS. *Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. ix, 229. $30.00.

The overarching thesis of this book is that true absolutist theory, if it existed at all in the England of the first half of the seventeenth century, was an incidental phenomenon, an intellectual construct relegated to the margins of early Stuart political thought. Glenn Burgess is persuaded that the historiographical preoccupation with absolutism is a remnant of outmoded Whiggism, the simplistic notion that the Stuart era was a century of revolution in which constitutionalism, pitted against absolutism, ultimately won the day. Although he concedes the relevance of that dichotomous analysis to the Restoration era, by which time a "pacified politics" had been shown by civil war to be unworkable, he finds it wholly inappropriate to the period before the 1640s. Burgess contends that divine right theorists during the reigns of the first two Stuarts, most conspicuously James I himself, were focused on nothing more than subjects' obedience. He believes that they were concerned to refute categorically any assertion of a right of resistance. Beyond that, however, they were thoroughly committed to the idea of limited monarchy. Rather than an oxymoronic absurdity, the idea of an irresistible but nonetheless limited king was the central reality of early Stuart political thought. This, Burgess claims, does not add up to a theory of absolutism.

Not surprisingly, Burgess finds more ideological consensus than conflict in early Stuart England, and, citing the revisionist work of Conrad Russell, he argues that there can be no convincing theory of absolutism without the premise that kings may "make or ignore laws at their pleasure" (p. 95). In this regard Burgess is content to cite Jean Bodin's *Six Bookes of a Commonweale* (1606) and maxims of the civil law (e.g., what pleases the prince has the force of law). "The essential feature of absolutism," he writes, "was its claim that the king alone was superior to the positive law and not bound by it. In practical terms, this guaranteed the right of an absolute sovereign to give people laws without their consent" (p. 97). Yet, according to Burgess, this characterization of monarchical right was not the case in England, nor did this doctrine of sovereignty find favor anywhere in the mainstream of English political thought. An English case for absolute monarchy would require a king who had the power to make law unilaterally but who would not himself be bound by the positive law.

Here is where Burgess joins issue with those, most notably J. P. Sommerville, who are intent upon reviving the case for a strong current of absolutist thought in England before the Civil War. He argues persua-

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sively that to locate a theory of true royal absolutism, we need to know whether the unregulated will of English kings was ever understood to have had the force of law. As Burgess fully appreciates, it is not enough to situate that theory in the familiar—and highly ambiguous—observations by contemporaries that it was the king who made the law and that the law was the king's law. If those commonplaces of English legal thought had been all that was required to establish the vitality of the theory, absolutists would not be difficult to find. They would be everywhere. The operative distinction was that by the seventeenth century, the English constitutionalist tradition had acknowledged that although the king made the law, he made it in Parliament, not on his own.

Admittedly, the first two Stuarts would have preferred it to have been otherwise, and both were resolved to test the limits of the royal prerogative. Yet, when civil war came in 1642, it was because Parliament, not Charles I, attempted to make law on its own. Speaking from the scaffold, the condemned king was right to identify Parliament's Militia Ordinance as critical to the outbreak of the war. The charge, not without merit, squares with Burgess's assertion that "Charles I offended deeply held beliefs, but it was not clear that he acted illegally or unconstitutionally" (p. 131). As Burgess would have it, Charles may not have been subject to the coercive power of the law, but he, like his father, was attentive to its directive authority. In this regard, he was in keeping with the mainstream of royalist apologetics of the early Stuart period. Only with the advent of war did it begin to seem that a limited monarchy might be inconsistent with an irresistible king.

HOWARD NENNER
Smith College

HAROLD M. WEBER. *Paper Bullets: Print and Kingship under Charles II*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1995. Pp. x, 292. $39.95.

This book floats a number of large ideas about the impact of printing: ideas about its "levelling influence" and its contribution to "scientific investigation" (p. 53), about the creation of what Jürgen Habermas has called a "public sphere in the world of letters" (p. 9), and (by way of J. R. Jones's *The First Whigs* [1961]) about its role in the establishment of political parties. As its subtitle suggests, however, the book is primarily concerned with the much narrower relationship between "print culture and the kingship of Charles II, between . . . an ancient political institution and a young commercial industry" (p. 5).

In the first half of the book, Harold M. Weber explores the ways in which royalist attempts to adapt the myths and rituals of traditional monarchy to the discursive medium of print resulted in a literature that paradoxically tended to desacralize the royal person and thereby to render royal sovereignty problematic. He shows, for example, how accounts of Charles's 1651 escape from Worcester, while drawing on the miraculous motifs of literary "romance," failed to reconcile the prince's spiritual authority with the obviously mortal elements of his successful disguise and chicanery; how efforts to legitimize the monarchy by repromulgating the ancient rite of the "sacred touch" (court documents claim some 92,107 persons touched by the king through 1682) became the focus for a skeptical and desacralizing body of "medical texts, millenarian prophecy, scientific speculation, and political propaganda" (p. 64); and how royalist insistence on the masculine potency of the *pater patriae* provoked skeptical counter-images of his sexual profligacy and political impotence. Richly detailed and drawing on a wide range of archival material, anecdote, and literature (including the scandalous farce *Sodom* [*c.* 1678; pub. 1864]), this portion of the book is an engaging and useful study in the literary representation of kingship. Because Weber's guiding lights are literary new historicists whose main focus has been the power and image of the Elizabethan-Jacobean crown, he concentrates more on the expression of symptomatic, epiphenomenal attitudes toward the royal person and toward writers whose increasingly discredited "Business was to exalt the Power and Dignity of the Princes under whom they wrote" (p. 86) than on the defining role of print in the reign's more decisive political and religious developments.

This more important role of print is an implicit background of the second half of the book, where Weber turns from "narrative structures to institutional relations" (p. 18) and to "the centrality of the press to the political crisis of 1678–82" (p. 170). In fact, however, Weber's chapters on censorship and on the 1681 trial and execution of the "Protestant joiner" Stephen College pass over the complicated links between authors, publishers, audiences, and political interests, focusing instead on "the way in which royal authority constructed the print industry and those individuals, particularly the reading public and the author, who attempted to appropriate its cultural powers" (p. 18). If this procedure makes for conceptual symmetry, it also shows the shortcomings of a literary, "constructivist" methodology (effective as it is in the book's first half) when applied to historical phenomena whose dynamics are not limited to those of cultural representation.

LAWRENCE MANLEY
Yale University

STEVEN SHAPIN. *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England*. (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations.) Paperback edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1994. Pp. xxxi, 483. $16.95.

In this provocative sociological study, Steven Shapin explores the basis for determining the validity of posited facts about the natural world in seventeenth-century England. Using courtesy texts and ethical

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treatises of the period, Shapin maintains that the degree of credibility assigned to scientific factual statements in that age was intrinsically related to the social stature and moral character of the individual asserting them.

Shapin suggests that scientific inquiry then was proscribed by a set of norms appropriated from notions of the proper Christian gentleman, where truthfulness resided in a traditional culture of honor and statements could be expressed with greater freedom than was true for individuals in dependent social positions. He asserts that gentlemanly conventions regarding credibility were "relocated" to scientific dialogue in order to address the need of experimental science to determine which findings of contemporaries to accept as true. By this means, one could discriminate between the credible and the questionable without resorting to ancient authority and thus further the goal of expanding the pool of accepted facts about the natural world.

Shapin develops his argument methodically, first establishing the social and cultural basis for perceiving knowledge claims as true and defining the norms of gentlemanly behavior as they were then codified. He next describes how knowledge claims were evaluated and how uncertainty was addressed, using examples of contested testimony to illustrate how investigators attempted to resolve conflicting yet plausible claims of equally credible authorities. Testimony couched in too authoritarian or too precise terms was viewed as indecorous, because it discouraged extended discourse, inferred that humankind could achieve knowledge of laws known only to God, and led to uncivil dissension and friction within the scientific community. This in part explains why some virtuosi, like Robert Boyle, placed limits on the articulation of nature in purely mathematical terms.

At the end of the book, Shapin discusses the relationship between gentlemen virtuosi and their amanuenses. He shows how the necessary reliance upon laboratory technicians and assistants required that the virtuosi generally trust their findings, but in the larger forum of scientific discussion, it was the reputation and stature of the virtuoso who publicly forwarded the findings that determined the acceptance of this testimony.

In an intriguing epilogue, Shapin discusses present-day cultural assumptions underlying scientific credibility. He concludes that the general public now identifies scientific credibility with an unknown group of researchers at recognized institutions rather than with recognized individuals of particular moral or social stature. He adds, however, that within smaller communities of researchers, cultural norms relating credibility to personal reputation still adhere.

Shapin posits a broad argument in this book, thus opening himself up to criticisms of overgeneralizing and failing to consider other factors that influenced the conduct of science in that period. He tends to overemphasize the degree of independence that a gentleman of means actually could possess and the value of disinterested testimony. The role of expertise in assigning credibility is only briefly touched upon. Although Shapin carefully describes Boyle as an exemplar of reliable personal authority, he does not identify many other gentlemen with scientific interests in the period whose biographies reinforce his arguments about credibility.

These criticisms, however serious, should not negate the importance of this book in bringing attention to the role of social conventions in the public conduct of science. By suggesting that courtesy texts and ethical treatises can provide significant insights into the "public face" of the new science in the seventeenth century, Shapin has extended the scope of historical inquiry.

Although Shapin does not emphasize the point, the period in England about which he writes was one of social discord, rampant sectarianism, and civil war. This compelled people like Boyle to become particularly sensitive about how they conducted themselves in public company. If the new science was to be accepted and its adherents not dismissed out of hand as contentious extremists, some etiquette had to be institutionalized to permit moderate discussion and create a public image of collegiality and relative professionalism. Shapin sheds light on that etiquette. That some individuals may have held private views on science that were much more radical than those they displayed publicly in no way alters our understanding of what such men were trying to accomplish, for their chief concern was to promote scientific discourse that extended human knowledge of nature beyond the pronouncements of ancient authority and that permitted discussions of plausible evidence while avoiding both premature theory-building and stultifying skepticism. By suggesting that a gentlemanly ethic supported this effort, Shapin broadens our perspective and points the way to new avenues for research.

BARBARA BEIGUN KAPLAN
University of Maryland

MARY MURRAY. *The Law of the Father? Patriarchy in the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*. New York: Routledge. 1995. Pp. 160. $16.95.

Marxist sociologist Mary Murray gives two reasons for continuing the important debate about the relationship between class and patriarchy. First, she differs with postmodern feminists over the direction in which they have taken the discussion. Challenging these feminists' rejection of large-scale social analysis, Murray claims that the very complexity and interrelatedness of patriarchy and class structure require such an approach. She also denies their rejection of women as effective historical agents, insisting that this role is essential for women if feminism is to continue to be liberative. Murray therefore offers a "broad brushstrokes" approach and systematically looks for women's independent actions.

Although Murray affirms the recent trend among

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sociologists toward historical analysis, she points out that the effects of patriarchy have been left out of the specific disputes over the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Her main contribution is thus to ask at each crucial point, what difference did patriarchy make to major economic and political changes, and what difference did the coming of feudalism and then capitalism make to patriarchal structures? The rigor of her gender analysis makes this a new and important interpretation of material that has been much worked over.

But before discussing what Murray found, I must note that the book deals only with England, a fact not mentioned in the title. This specificity makes the arguments more compelling, but it also creates a book somewhat different from what the reader is led to expect. A further criticism addresses the way Murray argues with other scholars throughout the book. One chapter on the recent debates should have taken care of the historiography, leaving her free then to advance her own position. Instead she keeps circling around, when one wishes she would concentrate on developing her own ideas.

Using property relations as her main focus, Murray concludes that women were not property in Anglo-Saxon or feudal times and cannot be considered as such, absolutely, even under capitalism, because it is a system that permits women the means to break out of the very subjection into which it has placed them. By insisting that "class and patriarchy were integral parts of a single historical process" (p. 29) that cannot be understood separately, indeed that the relationship between labor and capital was constructed through a patriarchal system, she brings new gender material to light. Historians will appreciate the way Murray traces interactions over long periods of time; feminists can use her rigorous application of patriarchal analysis.

As for the much-argued question of which, in historical analysis, must have priority, patriarchy or class, Murray concludes that "in England class relations cannot be understood without reference to patriarchy" (p. 123). Although she questions a number of the conclusions of feminist scholarship, her own work is proof of the need for this approach.

ANNE LLEWELLYN BARSTOW
State University of New York, Old Westbury

PAMELA SHARPE. *Adapting to Capitalism: Working Women in the English Economy, 1700–1850.* (Studies in Gender History.) New York: St. Martin's. 1996. Pp. x, 226. $59.95.

Admirers of Pamela Sharpe's several articles, particularly the one on spinsters in Colyton, will find much satisfaction in this sustained discussion of women's work in Essex. The title fails to capture the comprehensiveness of the book, which resembles A. F. J. Brown's *Essex at Work, 1700–1815* (1969) in its detailed description of production and local setting. Yet the archives of this much-studied county never yielded so rich a harvest devoted to the experience of women. The female poor become integral to the inexorable march of material production. Sharpe's account of the cloth trade, straw-plaiting, agriculture, and domestic service brings to life fragmentary evidence of myriad humble ways that women contributed to the economic life of the county while eking out a living.

Sharpe gives a vibrant sense of industrial development in one region, minus a leading character: the cotton factory. Without this particular element, the rise and decline of domestic cloth production and the consequent "re-industrialisation" in the "fashion trades" of silk and straw-plaiting provide a startlingly clear picture of how relatively marginal and precarious forms of employment became central to women's identities as workers. Sharpe is particularly good at accurately dating the course of each employment, as one entrepreneurial opportunity followed upon the failure of the last. The silk trade, for example, developed in locales ideally positioned to absorb labor cast off from the worsted cloth trade, and straw-plaiting busied hands rendered idle by declining opportunities in textiles or insufficiently supported by agriculture. Combining parish records with local histories, Sharpe illustrates these developments with voices of poor women, many of whom were driven to apply to local officers for assistance when trade was slack. In some instances, she tracks women who migrated to find work elsewhere, as they kept up a correspondence with the parish throughout their travails in employment. Officers duly considered the "wider (widow) with 2 Children in a strange Place," who reported "it was a grat favour for anyone to give me credate" (p. 43). In fact, the parish repeatedly heard from women of all descriptions, single and married, whenever their power to combine the odd job (selling rat-tails, for example) with prodigious economizing failed to add up to a living.

It is not Sharpe's intention to make blanket assertions about women's work. The very quality of mind that commends her book—her sensitivity to all sides of an issue—leads Sharpe to qualify many of the larger arguments historians have made regarding women's marginalization and exploitation without supplying a conceptual alternative. As a result, she sometimes appears to be shadowboxing with multiple opponents, yet she reneges from taking a stance on certain issues. In a chapter on women in agriculture, the most obvious point—that farmers, desperate in the face of depression at the end of the nineteenth century, employed the cheapest labor they could find—remains undiscussed. Surely this, and not local custom, which Sharpe stresses, was the final determinant of whether women found jobs in agriculture. As Sharpe herself points out, women agricultural laborers received six pence a day over the course of decades in Essex, while the wages for men working alongside them fluctuated and improved. Given all the evidence Sharpe provides, we need to ask what assumptions governed a world in which generations of women worked themselves to the

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bone, grasping at employments that historians, including Sharpe, lacking a better word, call "opportunities." To what extent did their grueling labor impinge on the larger picture? Did women's work enable a faltering local economy to survive? Or did female workers enable employers and capitalists to maintain obsolete ways of working, profitable in the short run, but ultimately ruinous for all involved?

The role of the parish needs to be interrogated on this same account. In a particularly revealing chapter on domestic service, Sharpe reports an order issued in Terling in 1790: "all single persons living at home to get into service; it is agreed that no person permitting their children above the age of fifteen years to live at home with them will be relieved until they have places for them" (p. 109). The prevailing attitude toward female children, which the poor seem to have shared, was that they were infinitely employable as domestics, owing to their malleable and disenfranchised natures. It is not surprising that we find them, twenty years hence, searching for makeshift employments at wages below subsistence while they struggled to support families.

Sharpe's reluctance to confront the tensions surrounding women workers no doubt grows out of the deep respect she demonstrates for the fragile dignity of poor women. With dramatic insistence, she highlights women's indomitable ability to "make shift." This is the extemporaneous talent that women of the past developed in order to put together the best and the worst means of surviving, often for the sake of dependent family members. Eloquently captured by Olwen Hufton some time ago (see "Women and the Family Economy in Eighteenth-Century France," *French Historical Studies* 9 [1975]: 1–22), this socially determined female capacity has assumed for historians the characteristics of a siren song. While crediting the resourcefulness of women and recognizing their triumph over adversity, the argument hypnotizes as much as it informs. We hardly notice the agents at work: specific interests utilizing women's so-called traditional skills within an exploitative setting. Sharpe's study is one of the best, most meticulous monographs on all the ways that women worked in the early industrial period. Women indeed adapted to capitalism, and it has taken decades to bring to light all the costs of that achievement. Sharpe and other historians may now wish to train their gazes in other, equally revealing directions.

DEBORAH VALENZE
Barnard College

ANN B. SHTEIR. *Cultivating Women, Cultivating Science: Flora's Daughters and Botany in England 1760 to 1860.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 301. $29.95.

The study of plants has been implicated in complex ways in the distribution of social roles between the sexes. Women's involvement with plants descends from early modern traditions of herbal healing. During the European Enlightenment, middle-class women enrolled in large numbers in botanical study as a part of "polite" science. In the Victorian period, too, a certain kind of study of plants was thought particularly appropriate for women. At the same time, however, botany was being constructed as a predominantly male scientific discipline from which women were almost entirely excluded. Ann B. Shteir has illuminated these changes by examining English women's participation in botany from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries. She has produced a book that is both a commemoration of the lives of women botanists and a valuable contribution to historical understanding of the role of gender in the formation and communication of natural knowledge.

Shteir focuses primarily on the role of women as botanical authors, which she has documented through assiduous bibliographical research. In this respect, she works within the tradition of women's history that has sought to recover the works and lives of largely unrecognized female contributors to scientific culture. She reads the texts with a sympathetic eye for the struggles of women writers as they developed the role of author within the prevailing conventions of female respectability in the eighteenth century. The dialogue form is shown to have emerged, in the works of such writers as Priscilla Wakefield and Jane Marcet, as a solution to the quandary of a woman's assumption of the pedagogical role. In dialogue, a woman teacher can play a maternal part, conveying knowledge while deflecting allegations of pedantry or sensuality.

Alongside the story of the self-fashioning of women as authors of polite science, Shteir develops an analysis of gendered imagery and metaphors in the constitution of their discourse. Much concern was focused on Carolus Linnaeus's sexual system for the classification of plants, which, though described by Shteir as "conservative" in its assignment of male and female characteristics, caused significant controversy as it was taught to women students. While Erasmus Darwin celebrated the polymorphous plant sexuality that Linnaeus had revealed, many male and female authors downplayed or censored it. At the end of the eighteenth century, Richard Polwhele was one of those who saw female interest in plant sexuality as a lamentable sign of women's assertiveness. Not surprisingly, in the early Victorian period, sexual classification generally gave way to an alternative system. Women authors, such as Mrs. E. E. Perkins, were among those who bowdlerized Linnaeus at this time.

The same period also saw rigorous moves to demarcate women's botany from the institutionalized scientific discipline. In tracing this story, Shteir contributes to recent work on the importance of gender discriminations in the formation of various domains of professional science. John Lindley, professor of botany at London University from 1829 to 1860, led the charge to reject the Linnaean system and to segregate scientific botany from the polite tradition in which women

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participated. Serious botany was henceforth to be the prerogative of scientific institutions restricted to men.

As Shteir goes on to show, however, the mid-nineteenth century saw continuing activity by many women botanists and continuing publications that addressed them. The tradition of female botanical authorship retained its vitality, notwithstanding the rebuffs its practitioners sometimes faced when they tried to enter the world of professional male science. Shteir's description of this complements other work on the different social worlds in which natural knowledge was practiced in the nineteenth century, showing how the dimension of gender was implicated in sustaining the boundaries that divided these worlds and in licensing certain kinds of traffic between them.

In these ways, Shteir's book makes an important contribution to work on the history of gender and science. She modestly presents it as a "flora," devoted to cataloguing and describing the women authors whose work it celebrates; but, in fact, she has not hesitated to extrapolate general trends and to gesture toward significant parallels in other fields of social and cultural history. For this reason, the book has important things to say to those interested in the role of gender in changing configurations of natural knowledge.

JAN GOLINSKI
University of New Hampshire

DIANA DONALD. *The Age of Caricature: Satirical Prints in the Reign of George III*. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art. 1996. Pp. viii, 248. $60.00.

In this closely reasoned study of Georgian satiric prints, Diana Donald constructs a series of interlocking but "consciously detached" chapters (p. vii). She begins by surveying the trade in and material practice of caricatures and then focuses on their cultural and moral values. Donald finds that makers of satiric prints occupied an extensive and constantly shifting range of positions from amateur to hireling; that the political bias of a print is not always inferable from the artist's status or opinions; and that connecting an artist's production to his "sincerity of feeling" (p. 43) marks a Victorian, not an eighteenth-century, standard.

Next, she demonstrates that the Renaissance emblem tradition migrates downward into the semiliterate classes, becoming the "*argot plastique*" of the streets (p. 50), while up-market prints employ "high art" rhetoric and parody. By arguing that each mode is produced during the same period, Donald substitutes for E. H. Gombrich's teleology of artistic development a more dialectical model.

Third, she shows that graphic satires of the fashionable world in the 1760s lampoon the macaronis and Frenchified fops, a moral and visual strategy encoding the age's ambivalence about the "struggles for happiness" and appealing to both ends of the class system. Toward the end of the century, refuting French revolutionary propaganda led establishment caricaturists to disfigure the excesses of the aristocracy "*as a caste*" (p. 99).

Fourth, Donald examines representations of the crowd, concluding, in line with the preceding argument, that the genial mixing of classes evident in the libertarian bias of earlier social prints is replaced before the end of the century by increasing physical segregation and moral stigmatization of metropolitan workers.

Having implicitly critiqued the myth of John Bull, freeborn Englishman, in the preceding chapters, Donald concludes by analyzing the figuration of "John Bull bother'd." She rejects consensual readings of the revolutionary decade, positing instead a darker class warfare and a John Bull who often serves as an Aristophanean Demos, projection of demagogues (p. 160).

These intertwined social, political, and representational issues have been at the heart of most studies of Georgian caricature. To Dorothy George's invaluable catalogues and surveys, Donald adds more consideration of the connections among style, class, and ideology. Distinguishing her conclusions from those of historians such as E. P. Thompson and Roy Porter, Donald asserts that graphic imagery reached a much wider range of educational, occupational, religious, commercial, and regional classes than they have posited (cf. p. 19 and n. 143). Construing "the *artistic* as *political*" (p. viii), she also takes issue with Ronald Paulson over the relative importance of political as opposed to broader cultural and ideological formations in the shaping of satire.

Donald, trained in art history, brings those disciplinary perspectives to bear on these prints, especially when she looks at the connections between iconographic conventions and class. She is often persuasive in her readings of political and ideological history; she has firm convictions and a solid sense of where she stands in relation to previous interpreters. On the other hand, this version of "the Age of Caricature" slights literary battles (e.g., the Ancients and the Moderns), philosophical shifts (e.g., from rationalist to benevolist and psychological theories), topical issues, the connections between verbal and visual satire, and illustrated works by William Hogarth, Thomas Rowlandson, and William Blake that figure importantly in the late Georgian politics of representation. Those lacunae are not necessarily faults; rather, they define the boundaries of Donald's investigation.

About caricature no one can be interpretatively comprehensive. Excess is the prime trope of graphic satire; there are too many images, referents, viewers and viewing situations, too many artists, and too many targets for any one account to encompass them all. Donald, although she disclaims "comprehensive coverage" (p. vii), does try to find some enabling strategies for reading and connecting these prints. In her insistence that they reached wide and diverse audiences through many means, she complicates previous ac-

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counts presuming more limited circulation and more rigid stratification of mode and audience. Nonetheless, she, too, wants to control excess, especially moral excess: she criticizes the protean nature of satirists by convicting them of inconsistency, venality, or madness. Yet these prints were meant to provoke as well as to command allegiance. That an artist damned more than one party is a problem only if one needs to discover in the work and life a coherent political creed; the multivalence of satire is not, I believe, a sign of the "moral nihilism" of which Donald repeatedly convicts James Gillray (pp. 41, 177).

The complex relationship between ideology and graphic design is the declared subject of this dense and deeply pondered study; more covertly, the book explores major shifts in the rhetoric of morality during the long reign of George III. Donald's enjoyment of the glorious bluster, irreverence, and improvisation deployed in these images is tempered by the seriousness of her project, a sobriety that dampens even this review. One of the hardest things to get right about satiric prints is their humor; however much we want to untangle their knotted ties to their age, we cannot appreciate them until we laugh. That is perhaps the only response that Donald's rich investigation cannot provoke.

Robert L. Patten
Rice University

W. M. Elofson. *The Rockingham Connection and the Second Founding of the Whig Party, 1768–1773*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 266. $49.95.

Some of the most interesting and innovative work in the field of British history is being done in eighteenth-century studies. W. M. Elofson's book is cast in a more traditional mold. The usual suspects—George III, the Earl of Bute, the Earl of Chatham, George Grenville, Lord North—are on parade. Inescapably, the air is rarefied and the company exclusive. The blood of the Whigs was deep blue and their acreage vast. High politics was largely a minuet among leviathans.

Central to the story was the second Marquis of Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth, who led a somewhat rickety band of followers toward the reinvention of the Whig party. The degree to which this happened by accident or on purpose is one of the intriguing questions addressed by this meticulously researched book. Elofson traces the evolution of Whig constitutional philosophy as the grandees metamorphosed from upholders of the status quo during the first half of the century into champions of economic and even parliamentary reform during the late 1700s and the early nineteenth century. This transformation into the party of improvement, which Elofson dates between 1768 and 1773, was caused by suspicions of royal and ministerial authority arising out of the cathartic struggle with Bute and the maddening success of North, as George III attempted to escape the toils of Whig oligarchy.

Elofson rejects both the Namierite view (Lewis B. Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution* [1930]) of the Rockinghams as one of many unscrupulous factions merely intent on seeking office and the bipolar party system posited by B. W. Hill (*British Parliamentary Parties, 1742–1832* [1985]) and Frank O'Gorman (*The Rise of Party in England: The Rockingham Whigs 1760–1782* [1975]). He argues that the new Whig party was based on principles closely resembling those of "country" parties in the past. His analysis of Edmund Burke's *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents* (1770) is discerning and useful. His belief that the Rockingham connection at its height was more numerous than previously assumed is plausible.

Rockingham was a man of paradoxes. He would not coalesce with allies on terms of equality and "desperately wanted to lead" (p. 111). Yet he was indolent, indecisive, and happy out of office. A subtext of the book is poor Burke's profound frustration with his patron's dilatory habits. I am not sure Elofson has quite gotten Rockingham in his sights. The marquis may have been complex and contradictory, but he was a self-conscious grandee, not so much slothful as ponderous, whose breeding concealed both ambition and ineptitude.

Elofson's use of the term "country" is a source of confusion in an otherwise admirably lucid book. Descriptions of "country-like politicians" (p. 186) pursuing undefined "country objectives" (p. 192) do not advance our understanding effectively. "Country" is an anachronistic term in the later eighteenth century. Sometimes Elofson seems to imply that a liking for bucolic pursuits is sufficient explanation for an anti-court philosophy. Surely this is a dubious supposition in the reign of "Farmer George." A penchant for hunting or pigs was never a litmus test for principle among the governing elite. Putting a half decade under the microscope can illuminate subtle shadows and even reveal previously unnoticed trends, but the countervailing danger is losing sight of the forest. This book would have been enriched had Elofson engaged more directly with the broader themes in eighteenth-century society and politics recently analyzed by Jonathan Clark, John Brewer, Linda Colley, Nicholas Rogers, and others. High politics is as valid a form of history as any other, but it benefits from context.

Elofson's book is a model of clarity and efficiency. His work highlights a point crucial to understanding modern Britain: the ruling elite was divided over important matters of ideology and outlook until the late nineteenth century. Instead of being a source of weakness, this was the aristocracy's greatest strength and the secret of survival in a society in which the electorate was feisty and increasingly independent and in an age when industrialization and revolution endangered hereditary privilege. No important interest was left without an advocate in the political system. The Whig dinosaurs stumbled and lurched around the

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dangerous tar pits of closed oligarchy and a one-party state under the leadership of Rockingham and his successors. Some, like Charles Grey and John Russell, steered a carefully calculated course. The marquis moved more out of instinct, but in his own way he was no less important.

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RORY MUIR. *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807–1815*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xiv, 466. $45.00.

In *Statesmen at War: The Strategy of Overthrow, 1798–1799* (1974) and *War Without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt, 1799–1802* (1984), Piers Mackesy successfully integrated the fiscal, strategic, operational, and governmental aspects of the beginning years of the British struggle against Napoleon Bonaparte. Rory Muir has now adopted Mackesy's methodology and continued his story in a substantial work that covers the years from the fall of Lord Grenville's Whig ministry in March 1807 through the allied victory at Waterloo in June 1815. It is strange that Muir refrains from any reflections on the impact for his own period of the 1793–1802 war. The contest against France and its allies outside Europe, so superbly recounted not only by Mackesy but also by Michael Duffy and Edward Ingram, was largely over before Muir takes up his own narrative. Yet, it is striking that in this detailed study, save for the Anglo-American War of 1812, Muir has little need even to mention events beyond the seas and hence can concentrate on Europe only during the final years of the French imperium.

Muir is intent on seeing the war from the point of view not just of the local British commanders and strategists in Portugal, Holland, Spain or (after 1813) France but also of the Admiralty, the War Office, the Foreign Office, the Ordnance, and the Treasury. He describes how the ministries and departments interacted, quarreled, and arrived at decisions in a well-written, subtle, and masterful analysis that is likely to survive as the standard single-volume work on the subject. Muir accompanies his text with exceedingly apt cartoons and prints. His maps of Spain and Portugal are excellent; those of Wellington's French campaign, however, are barely adequate. The map of Napoleon's Russian campaign of 1812–1813 is incomplete, and a map of the Canadian and United States fronts in the War of 1812 is absent altogether.

One of the joys of Muir's work is his mastery of the sort of short pen portrait of individuals that once abounded in historical writing but is now too often a lost art. His telling and humorous delineations of such characters as the Prince Regent ("lazy, indecisive and a moral coward" [p. 160]), Count Bernadotte (an "avaricious, posturing liar" [p. 223]), Lord Wellesley, Maria Carolina of Naples, George Galway Mills, and Sir Charles Stewart are invaluable.

If Muir has a bias, it is his dislike of Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh and his admiration for his rival, George Canning. It was Canning who, as the Duke of Portland's Foreign Minister in the difficult years after Jena and Auerstadt, energized the British war effort. It was Canning, not Castlereagh (as Sir John Fortescue thought), who insisted on sending Sir Arthur Wellesley to Portugal as commander. Muir takes Canning's side in the famous duel of September 1809 and regards Castlereagh's conduct as brutal and sarcastic. In 1812, Canning made the greatest mistake of his life by refusing to join the Liverpool ministry as Foreign Secretary, so that Castlereagh was left with the office. Muir, however, is withering about the quality of Castlereagh's diplomatic appointments during the crucial years of 1812–1814: the inexperienced and self-regarding Lord Aberdeen at Vienna, the foolish Sir Charles Stewart at Berlin, even the indiscreet Duke of Wellington at Paris.

Yet even Muir gives Castlereagh credit for his performance at Vienna in 1814–1815, and, in a larger sense, the entire book is meant as a rehabilitation of the senior British ministers—like Perceval, Liverpool, and Bathurst—who presided over the final years of the French wars. Decidedly non-glamourous, sometimes halting in their vision, they never passed into British folk memory as did Elizabeth I, the Pitts, David Lloyd George, or Winston Churchill. Nonetheless, the successes of the Peninsular War and Waterloo were due to their firmness, fortitude, and staying power.

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BRIAN JENKINS. *Henry Goulburn, 1784–1856: A Political Biography*. Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 440. $55.00.

This biography of Henry Goulburn tells us much about the life of a long-serving public figure who did not quite reach the top of the "greasy pole." It does not purport to challenge recent Whig and Liberal histories but rather to resurrect the career of a noted Tory and devoted follower of Robert Peel. By judicious use of public and private papers, Brian Jenkins has written an elegant study that avoids hagiography; warts, disappointments, private and public sacrifices, and failures compete for attention with considerable achievements.

Goulburn's life never escaped the genteel impoverishment bequeathed by his father's profligacy and indebted Jamaican slave estates. Forced to leave boarding school, Goulburn's future was made possible only through the intervention of a family friend, who saw to it that the young Henry got to Trinity College, Cambridge. It was there that he met his closest friend and political ally, Peel. By the time Goulburn first entered Parliament in 1807, his political support of monarchy, church, and private property was established. Himself a slave owner, his laissez-faire attitudes favored a minimal state. His circle included the leading Tories.

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Jenkins's study portrays a somewhat pathetic but sincere man caught up in the vicissitudes of nineteenth-century society. Reduced to serving as his own butler, he nervously associated with men of rank and wealth. The reach of his ambition was limited throughout his long career by his own reserve and lack of station. Politics was a vocation; unlike most of his associates, Goulburn required the income of office. His family required preferments. A long career of government service began in 1810 in Sir John Perceval's administration, where Goulburn served as an under secretary at the Home Office. He switched to the War and Colonies Office in 1812. In 1821, he became Chief Secretary for Ireland, and in 1828 he was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Wellington government, a position he filled again under Peel in 1841. His tenure of office can be characterized as one of competence and compromise.

Goulburn's staunch defence of the ascendency was doomed to failure. Described as "the most furious Protestant that ever was" (p. 133), he opposed the repeal of the Test and Corporations Acts but had to support it and Catholic Emancipation as well. He fought vigorously against parliamentary reform, and it was only Peel's intervention that prevented him from allying with the Radicals to bring down Grey's Whig government. This was perhaps the first of several times that Peel was forced to temper Goulburn's Tory predilections. Jenkins is undoubtedly correct that Goulburn was not Peel's alter ego. He advised a reunion with the Tory ultras in 1835, but Peel's Tamworth conversion to Conservatism revealed a very different credo (if Peel's statements are to be believed). But Goulburn set aside his own views and helped build bridges to the Tory ultras while following Peel's tactic of not turning the Whigs out until the ultras could be dished. This support was at considerable personal sacrifice, and it was with real financial relief that he accepted the chancellorship, and income, in Peel's 1841 government. Before long, Goulburn had to swallow his principles again to support an income tax that he had fought and to drop his own proposal to reduce duties on sugar from the colonies, where he himself owned a plantation.

Jenkins's treatment of Goulburn's plantation ownership is revealing. Goulburn struggled with the morality of slavery and his reliance on income from it. His Jamaican plantation had a history of cruelty, overwork, and declining births. His recognition that slavery would one day be abolished caused him to pursue less than honorable attempts to buy slave women on the open market and to advocate tough discipline for rebellious slaves. He was constantly torn between political duty and private need. In the end, just as the furious Protestant emancipated the Catholics, the slaveowner emancipated the slaves.

Jenkins is certainly correct to emphasize that Goulburn was not an anachronism. Peel's rise to power was based on the support of ultras and Tories. There has indeed been a revival of Whig and Liberal histories, and one marvels at the speed with which the historiography of the period has changed since Norman Gash's studies. But the period was not one monopolized by liberalism. Most of the English political world distrusted Catholics and opposed democracy. They favored the freeing of trade but not the abolition of the propertied class or monarchy. It is unsurprising that Peel's chancellor should be among them.

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JESSICA GERARD. *Country House Life: Family and Servants, 1815–1914.* (Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times.) Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 1994. Pp. x, 372. $49.95.

Life in the English country house is an endlessly fascinating subject with a rich historical literature. In spite of the number of books on the topic, Jessica Gerard has managed to make an important contribution by focusing on the way family and servants of an English country house depended on one other for their very existence: "The landed classes were free to run the nation and Society only because other people performed all the domestic chores essential for day-to-day existence . . . Only by studying both elites [sic] together, examining their roles and their relationships within the country house community, can each be fully understood" (p. 3).

As Gerard emphasizes, the country house was seldom the place for a truly private family life; family and servants together celebrated major family events and participated in family concerts, theatricals, and cricket matches. Gerard argues that the master's treatment of his servants, whether authoritarian or paternalistic, might well correspond to his behavior toward his own family. Gerard's central argument is that the strength and continuing influence of the nineteenth-century English landed classes were rooted in their system of childrearing and in a corresponding exertion of influence and authority over their household employees and tenant farmers. Gerard uses an impressive array of primary documents and family papers to prove her point, including letters of reference for servants, private correspondence, inventories of family property, memoirs, and autobiographies, and she shores up her argument with a sampling of quantitative data.

Gerard paints a perhaps too benign portrait of country-house life. Children were comforted by having a nanny always there, even when parents were distant. The nannies and nurses themselves, she argues, chose the occupation because they liked children and had some aptitude for it. The vast majority of autobiographies mention servants as friends and most remember their nannies affectionately (pp. 40–41). Although authoritarian parents were the norm, they were inspired by religious piety and a strong moral sense; they were hardly sadistic or unloving. In arguing that not all parents were distant: Gerard cites cases of fathers who

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were present at the birth of children, and she notes the preference for breastfeeding by mothers over the employment of wet nurses (p. 73).

This positive view of family life complements Gerard's perspective on the conjugal relationship, for Gerard insists that husbands and wives held strongly shared ideals, even while they maintained very separate spheres of activity and influence. In a provocative aside, she ventures that marriages among the landed classes of the nineteenth century were actually more companionate than today's marriages because of those mutual ideals and shared values (p. 116). Her accumulated insights could significantly reshape the conception of the landed classes' private life.

Servants were plentiful and cheap in the countryside and provided an easy solution to the labor needs of the landed classes. It is clear that a large staff of personal retainers also manifested one's wealth and social position. But whether one can reliably calculate the size of a "typical" domestic staff is not so uncontroversial. The census sample cited by Gerard indicates an average staff of ten, but the range is considerable; the mean is not particularly revealing and probably exaggerates the size of the typical staff. The indoor staff of a country house might be swelled by casual labor when the events of family life, a crush of guests, or seasonal tasks imposed additional needs for domestic labor. Masters could always hire local residents for a short term to augment their permanent staff (p. 154). Yet the size of the domestic staff is not insignificant in establishing the nature of the relationships within the household.

In a nuanced portrait of country-house servants, Gerard distinguishes among four types: the young servant who eventually abandoned service for another occupation or marriage; the career servant who made the work a lifetime occupation; the impoverished gentlewoman forced to earn her living as a lady's companion or governess; and the unskilled casual laborer. Each of these had distinctive demographic characteristics and each may have had a different experience of service. But, "directly or indirectly," Gerard insists, "the landed family shaped the lives of its staff" (p. 238).

In portraying the range of experiences in the English country house, Gerard presents an almost overwhelming range of examples, but the argument is well-constructed. I finished the book convinced that the persistence of the landed classes depended on their values of family life and noblesse oblige and no less on the existence of a ready supply of live-in servants. "We needed them and they needed us," said the Astor family's butler (p. 284). Theirs was a way of life that so effectively integrated social values, family life, and economic realities that the country house persisted well into the twentieth century, disappearing only with World War II.

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JONATHAN PARRY. *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain*. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 383. $20.00.

The paperback edition of this book is a welcome addition to those works available in less expensive (but still not cheap) form. Jonathan Parry focuses primarily on what is now often derisively termed "high politics," with only passing attention given to race, class, or gender. The fundamental thesis advanced here is that between 1832 and 1886, the various Whig and Liberal governments provided a coherent response to the tremendous changes that had affected Great Britain since the middle of the eighteenth century. The basic aim of liberalism in this respect was to harmonize potentially incompatible interests within a framework of constitutional government.

Parliamentary government under Liberal direction prospered because Liberals identified themselves with liberalism in ways that Conservatives could not. In four areas, Parry argues, the Liberal Party sponsored an agenda based on liberal principles and thus retained an electoral appeal that spanned two generations. In the first instance, the Liberal Party was a British party, committed to the United Kingdom, and not parochially English. Next, the Liberal Party responded more openly to popular grievances and was less anxious about the defense of government authority. Further, classical economics stressed the commonality of social and economic interests and could therefore appeal to a broader spectrum of groups within the nation. Finally, the party's latitudinarian approach to religion made possible the rejection of narrow dogma and turned religion into an avenue of national unity far better than the established church. The evidence for these propositions occupies most of the book.

In broad outline, Parry argues against the interest-group theory of the Liberal Party, a position that stresses the essential disparity of support for the party and holds that only a forceful personality such as Lord Palmerston or William Ewart Gladstone could impose some measure of discipline on the varied elements gathered under the Liberal big umbrella. The increasingly specific emphasis on national assertion, restriction of government interference in many areas and lowering of taxes after the Napoleonic era blended well with traditional British liberties. Parry is sensitive to the ambiguities here, for public opinion idolized local government even as it placed greater demands on the developing administrative state. This latter tension made parliamentary government crucial to Liberal aspirations.

In support of his arguments, Parry devotes approximately half of the book to the period 1820–1841, with the other half carrying the story to 1886. This organization may strike some as unbalanced, but the description of principles requires as much effort as the depiction of their realization in the political arena. The role of Gladstone as party leader in causing the fall of

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the Liberal government might strike some readers as perversely revisionist, but surely Parry is right to reconsider Gladstone as paragon and look again at the actual course of events.

The prospective audience for this paperback edition is unclear. It is too detailed and sophisticated for undergraduates, whereas graduate students will perhaps regard its political viewpoint as insufficiently trendy. This, however, does not detract from the series of propositions that command attention from scholars of the period, who will engage Parry on many different levels. The chronology, biographical notes, and bibliographical references are valuable appendixes from which any reader might profit.

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MICHAEL R. WATTS. *The Dissenters*. Volume 2, *The Expansion of Evangelical Nonconformity*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xxi, 911. $120.00.

The first volume of Michael R. Watts's projected three-volume series on British Nonconformity (*The Dissenters*, vol. 1, *From the Reformation to the French Revolution*) appeared in 1978. On publication, it was hailed as the standard history of the subject. This second volume is an equally splendid work, a tour de force in British historiography that provides a comprehensive history of an important but much-neglected movement during the period of its greatest influence. It surpasses the earlier portrayal of English dissent by Owen Chadwick in *The Victorian Church* (2 vols., 1966 and 1970) and gives a fuller treatment of Nonconformist evangelicalism than David W. Bebbington provided in his helpful survey, *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s* (1989).

Watts begins with the expansion of dissent abroad, taking the unusual starting point of the growth of Nonconformity's foreign missionary concern, which did much to stimulate expansion at home. He engages charges of missionary complicity with British imperialism, political quietism, and ineffectual otherworldliness in relation to the record of the dissenting missionaries. He deals with the complex issue of the Religious Census of 1851, and his appendixes include almost 100 pages of maps that use the census to show the distribution of worshippers by region throughout England and Wales. For each area, there are seven maps, showing all worshippers, Anglicans, Nonconformists, Congregationalists, Baptists, Wesleyan Methodists, and Primitive Methodists.

Watts also addresses the question of the correlation of prosperity to religious observance. He argues that low levels of religious observance were due in part to the relative weakness of the Anglican parochial system. During the period under study, evangelical Nonconformity's rapid growth occurred in areas where its flexibility enabled it to harvest a crop on ground that had been tilled but inadequately tended by the Church of England. Neither the Dissenters nor the Anglicans could obtain significant followings, however, in the most and longest neglected areas: the poorer parts of large cities, especially London, and "sparsely-populated mountainous border regions" (p. 36).

Watts offers a provocative discussion of the evangelical conversion experience. He assesses its emotional content, accounts for its disproportionate appeal to women, examines the ages at which it most often occurred (15–20 years), and discusses the role Sunday schools had in preparing people for such conversions. He critiques Elie Halévy's attempts, in *The Birth of Methodism in England* (1971), to connect revivalist-induced conversions to trade cycles, concluding that economic downturns may have been helpful at certain stages, but that in the long run they hindered settled religious life. He also addresses the chief motivation in evangelical conversions: "It was fear: fear of disease, fear of death, fear of judgement, fear above all of eternal punishment in the torments of hell" (p. 72).

In the second of his five sections, Watts investigates the social appeal of dissent and the factors that created internal cohesion for this complex religious movement: its family ethos; its role in conferring status on individual participants; its creation of unique worship spaces; its preaching and participatory worship; its internal discipline and finances; and its ministerial expectations and educational endeavors. Watts is particularly helpful in his assessment of the social composition of dissent. He has undertaken an extensive analysis of Nonconformist baptismal registers to establish the social location of its adherents. His conclusions overturn widely held historical assumptions about the essentially bourgeois nature of the movement and its supposed failure to attract substantial numbers of those below the highest echelons of the working class, the so-called "aristocracy of labour." Watts argues persuasively that many evangelical Nonconformists occupied a lower position in the social hierarchy than has previously been assumed, with the movement's greatest appeal being to the "more backward and superstitious sections of the English and Welsh peoples" (p. 100).

The book's third section is devoted to Nonconformity's engagement in British politics in the period up to 1833. Watts begins with the difficulties the French Revolution created for the movement and continues to the enormous changes effected in the British constitution by the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (1828), Catholic Emancipation (1829), and the Great Reform Act (1832). The fourth section continues the focus on dissenting politics but shifts to the issue of Nonconformity's relationship to the Church of England and its attempts to overcome its legal and social inferiority. Watts's final section addresses the problems Nonconformity's upward social mobility created for the movement as a whole.

In all of this, Watts is never content to survey previously published material. This lucidly written

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work is based on a vast amount of original research and deals with all the major issues of historical debate, offering cogently argued—and often provocative—interpretations. He is always eager to relate the religious movement under review to the larger social, economic, and political movements in British society. Watts's findings will be of great interest to a wide range of scholars.

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W. D. RUBINSTEIN. *A History of the Jews in the English-Speaking World: Great Britain.* (Studies in Modern History.) New York: St. Martin's. 1996. Pp. viii, 539. $49.95.

This book is remarkably stimulating, illuminating, and iconoclastic. W. D. Rubinstein's purpose is twofold. Accomplishing his first aim, he narrates a straightforward history of Anglo-Jewry, although with far more attention than is usually allotted to the response of the host society to the presence of Jews. Rubinstein also gives ample space to the internal histories of the several communities within Anglo-Jewry, but he does so without making the account so internalist that a non-Jew cannot follow it.

Rubinstein's second purpose is to launch a manifesto against the prevailing interpretation of Anglo-Jewish history, "the new school" (p. 33) that has surged to the fore since 1970. Historians such as Geoffrey Alderman, David Cesarani, Tony Kushner, and Bill Williams, he says, seeing with post-Holocaust eyes, misconstrue British Jewry as victims, confounding the British case with the continental model of Germany. They exaggerate anti-Semitism (partly by concentrating on it to the exclusion of other themes) and ignore countervailing philosemitism. They also pass over other—often worse—expressions of British prejudice, such as that leveled at Italian immigrants, Quakers, Scots, enemy aliens in both world wars, and most especially the Catholic Irish. "No Popery" and the penal code functioned over the centuries as surrogate hatreds, English analogues to continental anti-Jewish ideologies and legislation. In counterpoint, Rubinstein celebrates "the unique symbiosis of Britain and Jewry" (p. 172) and vindicates the views of Cecil Roth (*History of the Jews in England* [1941]) and the older school.

Rubinstein is, however, anything but old-fashioned. He is deeply immersed in the primary sources and secondary literature concerning his subject, and he is an able practitioner of social history. Proof—or not—of his claims for the distinctiveness of worldwide English-speaking Jewry, as well as for the parallel developments within it, must await his second volume. He proposes that Anglo-Jewry constitute a more illuminating example of Jewish modernization than the much-studied German instance, where emancipation climaxed in Auschwitz. By contrast, "nothing happened" (p. 5) to Anglo-Jewry: no ghettos, crusades, pogroms, Dreyfus Affair, discriminatory legislation after the 1690s, or Holocaust. The hiatus between the expulsion of the Jews from England in 1290 and their readmission in 1656 allowed a fresh start, with markedly little continuity of medieval Judaeophobia.

To Rubinstein, most British anti-Semitic writers and agitators were "ambiguous" rather than "hostile" (p. 119). They typically attacked specific Jews, not "the Jews." Unlike continental racial fanatics, they did not see in Jews hereditary traits that rendered them evil, alien, dangerous, or satanic. Rubinstein's analysis of J. A. Hobson, notorious for his anti-Semitic fulminations during the Boer War, illustrates this approach: he traces Hobson's career to his death in 1940, by which time he had roundly condemned Nazism and recognized that Jews did not control the world economy. To Rubinstein, this "total repentance" (p. 112) means that Colin Holmes's interpretation of Hobson in *Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1876–1939* (1979), although true, is not the whole truth and therefore misleading. Rubinstein deals with many figures in this way, insisting that they have to be "contextualised" (p. 215). The hazard is that he contextualizes their anti-Semitism out of existence.

Rubinstein persuasively rebuts a number of the new school's interpretations: that East European immigrants after 1880 were victims of conspiratorial "social control" exercised by the "grandees" (p. 104); that World War I led to a deterioration of the status of British Jewry (p. 193); and the "myth" that interwar governments were anti-Semitic (p. 272). By contrast, "the British left was, regularly, surprisingly hostile to Jews" (p. 220), as exemplified by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Ernest Bevin, and post-1967 anti-Zionism. Rubinstein analyzes three bouts of intense anti-Semitism (1919–1922, 1945–1948, and post-1967), concluding that they were short, had no permanent impact, were displaced to the lunatic fringe of Left or Right, and resulted in Jews becoming even more acceptable as "a legitimate component of British society" (p. 386).

Rubinstein's mightiest salvos are directed at the new school's depiction of the period 1933–1945. Historians such as Alderman, Richard Bolchover, and David Kranzler are hypercritical of Jewish leaders and the British government, who, he contends, saved many Jews by 1939. Such critics make no reckoning of what could realistically be known, predicted, or done at the time. I hope that, when Rubinstein writes his promised book on "The Myth of Rescue," he will be more judicious and less dismissive of "most" or "perhaps all" histories critical of the "failure" of rescue efforts by the Allied governments and Jewish leaders on the grounds that the historians effect a "near-complete decontextualising of these events" (pp. 357, 348, 350). That some of Rubinstein's thunderbolts go astray, however, is a small price to pay for compelling us to reexamine and rethink our assumptions. His is an immensely more solid work of scholarship than Daniel Goldhagen's sensationalist *Hitler's Willing Executioners*

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(1996), and it ought to have a salutary impact on Holocaust historiography.

Inevitably, there are lacunae, especially in the dozen pages that carry us from 1066 to 1656. There are too many typographical errors in a book that is otherwise meticulously edited, especially unclosed quotation marks. Yet, these and others that could be enumerated seem trivial as one reads this exhilarating counterattack on "recent Anglo-Jewish historiography" (p. 33). Rubinstein gives stunning testimony to the truth that historians of Britain—or almost any field of Western history—will have only a defective and incomplete command of their subject unless they bring to it considerable knowledge of Jewish history, for Jewish and general history are so often, so intimately, and so surprisingly intertwined.

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DEREK BIRLEY. *Playing the Game: Sport and British Society, 1910–45*. (International Studies in the History of Sport.) New York: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's. 1995. Pp. x, 342. Cloth $79.95, paper $24.95.

After one distinguished career as a teacher, education officer, and writer on planning in education, Derek Birley has in retirement embarked on another. He is already becoming known for the efforts that have produced, so far, three ambitious volumes on the implications of sport in British society. The first, *Sport and the Making of Britain* (1993), sought to connect sporting pastimes to the English world from the Romans to the Victorians. With this bold preamble complete, he then launched into a far more detailed examination of the remarkable past century, which has carried sport to the center of today's cultural world. The first part of this story, *Land of Sport and Glory: Sport and British Society, 1887–1910* (1995), focused on the late Victorian and Edwardian years. The present volume carries Birley's examination from the death of Edward VII to the end of World War II.

Questions of continuity and change dominate the study of recent British social and cultural history, and the focus on sport does not break this mold. Indeed, the picture that emerges here is of powerful continuities and evolutionary change, advanced, of course, by two horrifying world wars. Through it all, Birley points to the underestimated influence of games on British culture and to what he calls the nation's "unifying myth" of sport and fair play.

Much of his representation concerns economic standing and status. The complexities of British class differences, ignorance, and jealousy are displayed in all their unique glory, as when a royal prince in 1936 innocently asked the horrified president of that fierce bastion of middle-class amateur values in sport, the Rugby Football Union, "Do you pay your players well?" (p. 284). Aristocrats, the middle classes, and the masses all pursued sport in very different ways, even when sharing a particular passion, such as horse racing. This is complicated ground, but Birley has come quite close to constructing a comprehensive chart for its exploration. From America's Cup sailing to the working man's coarse fishing, from rowing to racquets, from King Edward VII at Ascot to his son's government awaking slowly to the values of sport in international affairs, the tale unfolds impressively.

Birley stresses the evolution inherent in this progress. As in the wider society, building on the past rather than demolishing it was the order of the century. Assisting this construction in a crucial way, Birley feels, was the organic cement of a widely shared British concept of "what is right and fair." Many will see this as very shaky methodological ground indeed, and Birley himself admits that all sides in sport and in society at large did not always "play squarely" and that hypocrisy and self-interest often wrote the rule books.

Despite these questions, one must commend the energy in Birley's work. Where many would confine concentration to a few important and representative sports, Birley opts for inclusiveness. He has been untiring in gathering together and putting to good use a wide range of the very best of recent research. Sometimes this boldness and energy reaps rewards, as when regional nationalisms, in Wales and especially in Ireland, are given their fair share of analysis. But even the intrepid slip, and there are glaring errors of detail here and there in this latest volume. The Duke of Kent did not become the abdicated Edward's successor; his brother the Duke of York did. In uncharacteristically poor editing for this excellent Manchester University Press series of books on sports history, the unpardonable error of describing General Pershing's commander in chief in 1918 as President *Harding* was allowed to remain uncorrected.

Still, my overall reaction is one of applause. Methodologically, there are certainly better and more soundly based social histories in this area; the work of Richard Holt would be only one example. Perhaps none provide such a full and rich and encyclopedic introduction to the sheer complexity of this extraordinary subject, however. Simply by pulling together much of the wide-ranging research of the past fifteen years and putting it to work to tell the widest story possible, Birley has already performed a useful service. From here, for the British case, at least, the exploration and the arguments over the complexities of this most ubiquitous of human activities can and will continue.

JOHN OSBORNE
Dickinson College

KEITH NEILSON. *Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894–1917*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xv, 408. $84.00.

"Russian statesmen are such incurable liars!" wrote Lord Curzon in 1901, stating with characteristic bluntness a view shared to varying degrees by all those who

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made Britain's foreign policy. Keith Neilson's fine study examines the provenance of such outlooks and their importance in British diplomacy. It also argues convincingly that Russia, not Germany, was the focus of British attention in the decades before the outbreak of the Great War, an argument whose implications extend beyond the period he examines.

Neilson suggests that historians have overemphasized the importance of Anglo-German relations because they have looked at the prewar period from across the breach of 1914–1918. If Germany did move to the center of British attention after 1905, it shared that space with Russia, which had long dominated strategic concerns in Whitehall. Drawing on an impressive breadth of archival sources, Neilson proves that British strategists were preoccupied with the security of their global empire, whose only serious rival they saw in an equally far-flung Russia. This rivalry deepened around the turn of the century with mounting ferment in China and Central Asia, where British and Russian interests abutted. British policy sought to contain Russian threats through agreements or hostile combinations before finally concluding the entente of 1907. If that accord resolved immediate concerns in Asia, British fears of Russian ambition persisted even while the two fought as allies during World War I.

British apprehensions about Russia may have sprung from strategic concern, but they were articulated through widely held views on that empire and its government. In the first part of his book, Neilson examines the institutional, social, and cultural matrices that framed British policy toward Russia. He introduces the principals in British policy-making—ministers, undersecretaries, military planners, diplomats, and such "Russia hands" as D. M. Wallace and Bernard Pares—and canvasses their views of Russian statesmen and of Russia itself. Using standards imbibed at Eton and Oxford, they found their counterparts a rum lot, given to mendacity, inhabiting a semibarbarous empire ruled by the inscrutable Nicholas II and a venal court. This view was reinforced and reflected by middle-brow literature, including such novels as Joseph Conrad's *Secret Agent* (1907), which painted lurid pictures of the political repression in and military rapacity of that era's evil empire. These views played their own role in British diplomacy during such instances as the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 or the Bosnian crisis of 1908. In each case, what we now know to have been genuine disarray in Russian decision-making was construed as dissembling by British officials.

Having set the scene, Neilson follows Anglo-Russian relations throughout the reign of Nicholas II. He weaves his earlier discussion into a demonstration of Russia's primacy in British strategic calculations. Neilson identifies two pivots for the turn in the empires' relations that set in from 1904 until the understanding of 1907. Previous British efforts to contain Russia through bilateral agreements in response to episodic conflicts were succeeded by a new policy of coopting the Russian threat through broad cooperation following the latter's military defeat by Japan in the Far East. This shift reflected a generational change in Whitehall, where the older "Victorians" (Neilson's term) and their penchant for splendid isolationism were supplanted by younger "Edwardians" of a more activist bent.

Neilson's study has much to recommend it. Rare in histories of British policy, he uses Russian-language secondary sources to supplement a comprehensive Western bibliography. The writing and organization are exemplary in their clarity, although two chapter titles refer to a post-1907 "alliance," a term that overstates a relationship whose tenuousness is properly emphasized in the text itself. Eschewing the empyrean of theoretical speculation, Neilson is laudably empirical, grounding a provocative argument in patiently accumulated evidence.

Finally, this book stresses the continuity in Anglo-Russian relations, which mirrored the abiding scope of their imperial interests. By tracing the nineteenth-century roots of the 1907 entente, Neilson persuades us that it did not mark such a sharp departure as is often supposed. More interesting, however, is the continuity implicit in Neilson's cultural analysis. One cannot read his discussion of British potboilers about Russia without recalling their lineal Cold War descendants. These are merely one instance of the many strong links binding British and subsequent American discourses regarding the Russian/Soviet nemesis. In this context, Neilson's study suggests a new narrative for twentieth-century international relations, driven not by responses to German hegemonism but by global contention between Russia and what were once called the Anglo-Saxon powers. As such, this book merits the attention of the usual suspects—advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and practitioners of Russian, British, and diplomatic history—and also of those interested in the origins of the imperial struggle that dominated the second half of this century.

DAVID MCDONALD
University of Wisconsin, Madison

MOSHE GAT. *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949: The Decline of British Influence*. Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic; distributed by ISBS, Portland, Oreg. 1996. Pp. ix, 230. $59.95.

Italy's place in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other institutions shaping Western Europe after World War II is now taken for granted. The astonishing process by which the Axis power of 1943 was transformed into the NATO partner of 1949 would have been hard to predict, however. Weighing against it were the massive Communist bloc on one side of Italian politics and, on the other side, those demanding the restoration of Italian colonies as the price for cooperation with the West. Moreover, the traditionally dominant power in the Mediterranean, Britain, was

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more intent on punishing its former enemy than transforming it into an ally. The British had to balance this goal against the need to keep Italy strong and out of the Communist orbit: no easy task.

Moshe Gat's book describes the progression of British policy toward Italy, concentrating on the year from the fall of Benito Mussolini in July 1943 to the fall of Pietro Badoglio in June 1944. Relying heavily on British Foreign Office papers, Gat views events, whether in Italian or world politics, as they appeared from Whitehall. His book does not replace earlier works such as David W. Ellwood's *Italy 1943–1945* (1985), which are broader histories of Italy at the war's end.

Much of Gat's story is familiar. While Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt were both willing to treat Italy more leniently than Germany or Japan and to restore it to democracy and sovereignty, they had very different visions of how this was to take place. Britain was determined to punish Italy, less for fascism than for the "stab in the back" of 1940. Churchill wanted to preserve the Italian monarchy and to make sure that Italy was in no position to challenge future British hegemony in the Mediterranean. He hoped to bind Italy to a list of conditions or "long armistice terms" that would be stipulated in the terms of its unconditional surrender. He also hoped the U.S. would grant Britain a dominant voice in settling affairs in the region.

Roosevelt rejected that notion, and, indeed, most of Churchill's agenda. His experience with Italy had not been one of bitter betrayal; his sizeable Italian-American constituency did not want to see the Italian people punished; he did not favor keeping the king on his throne and thought the issue of preserving the monarchy should be left to Italians. Although he demanded unconditional surrender, he was ready to help Italy move quickly toward full political and economic rehabilitation. More to the point, he wanted Italy to be free of foreign domination, whether Soviet or British.

Gat sees in this conflict of goals a test of Britain's ability to survive the war as a great power. In the end, Churchill had to back away from almost all of his objectives and cede leadership in Italy to the United States, a decisive step down in Gat's view. The fall of the Badoglio regime and rise of Ivanhoe Bonomi, he writes, "more than any other event, reflected the waning of Britain's influence" (p. 83). Here, in 1944, came a significant foreshadowing of what the Truman Doctrine would make clear to the world years later: only the United States had the resources and the will to block the advance of Soviet power and influence. Churchill recognized this and put the containment of communism above other goals.

The Soviet Union was excluded from the negotiations for Italy's withdrawal from the fighting, something that Joseph Stalin resented. Precisely because the Russians had not fought in Italy, bombed its cities, occupied its territory, or placed restrictions on it while winning great victories in the east, Russian stock was high. Communist Party propaganda in Italy portrayed the Soviets in a predictably positive fashion, and party membership was growing rapidly. The USSR led the way to annulling Italy's status as an occupied enemy country by exchanging diplomatic representatives with it before Britain and the United States did. In short, Churchill's fears were well grounded.

Although Gat's treatment of the postwar era is brief, it provides a fascinating postscript to his study. Britain was able to achieve its aims in the peace treaty with Italy signed in 1947: Italy was divested of its colonies, and the Soviet advance was checked. But even then, British officials were still looking backward toward the perfidy of Italy in the past. The Labour government tried to maintain a policy of keeping Italy at arm's length, excluding it from full military participation in the Western alliance then taking shape. Once again, as in 1944, a more forward-looking American view prevailed, and British objections were swept aside. It was not, Gat concludes, that Britain underestimated Italy's strategic importance. Rather "it was hard for her to accept the fact that a country which had been an adversary only a few years previously, was now aligned with her and other nations, in signing a document establishing a North Atlantic Treaty" (p. 181).

DONALD S. BIRN
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R. D. ANDERSON. *Education and the Scottish People, 1750–1918*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 337. $55.00.

One of the more compelling myths in Scottish history has been that of the democratic intellect. As the story goes, Scotland was gifted with a forward-looking system of universal education at the Reformation, largely inspired by John Knox. Fundamental to this system was the establishment of an endowed school in every parish, with a schoolmaster responsible for conveying elementary education to every child, male and female, and also for identifying and providing advanced instruction to the "lad o'pairts." All children were educated to assume their civic responsibilities in the presbyterian "godly commonwealth," but the more academically gifted boys were prepared for the universities, where they were supported by modest bursaries, lived in cheap lodgings, survived on oatmeal, and returned home to work on the farms during vacations. On completing their courses, they became clergymen, professors, lawyers, and physicians, often rising to eminence and serving as examples to others in their villages. The Scottish educational system, according to this view, was guided by the twin ideals of universal provision and the "ladder of opportunity." Popular education was credited with the glories of the Scottish Enlightenment, the region's Industrial Revolution, and the country's distinctively democratic character.

In this authoritative study, Robert D. Anderson, a leading scholar of the history of education, explores

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Scottish popular education during the long nineteenth century. Although Anderson recognizes the creative power of the myth of democratic intellect in shaping Scottish national consciousness, he is more concerned with the complex story of the institutional development and diversification of Scottish education, especially under the influence of an increasingly interventionist British parliamentary state. In tracing these developments, he is struck with the discontinuities rather than the continuities between the Reformation and the nineteenth century. Anderson is particularly interested in explaining how, despite Scotland's claims to educational uniqueness, "it ended up with the same kind of mass education as every advanced country" (p. 296).

Anderson opens his book with a survey of the parish system of education in the later eighteenth century, offering a critical appraisal of the democratic intellect. Although he admits that the Scottish educational system was distinctive in comparison with England, where an effective parish system had not taken root at the Reformation, he also argues that its educational provision was not unlike that of other Protestant countries in Europe. He questions the effectiveness of the often overcrowded parish schools in imparting more than the most basic literacy. The promotion of the occasional talented student, he observes, generally accomplished through aristocratic patronage, was more a matter of preserving the hierarchical social order by coopting young men of ability into the ranks of the elite than of encouraging any democratic social ideal. Only a tiny minority of boys from the lower social orders, moreover, advanced to the university, and many of them ended up as poorly paid parish schoolmasters.

Whatever merits it might have had, Anderson argues, Scotland's parish system was clearly failing by the early nineteenth century. It had never been effective in the remote highlands and islands. Furthermore, despite heroic efforts by Presbyterian clergymen such as Thomas Chalmers in Glasgow, the schools could not be made to work in the overcrowded parishes of the rapidly growing industrial towns and cities. The break-up of the national Church of Scotland at the Disruption of 1843 proved fatal to the system. Finally, with the Educational Act of 1872, Scotland followed the English example in developing a state-supported national system of education; schools governed by elected school boards replaced the parish schools. Thereafter, inspired largely by the national-efficiency movement and its commitment to making Great Britain more competitive among the advanced industrial states, the state imposed a growing standardization of educational provision. The new system featured a trained and graded teaching profession (increasingly dominated by women) and a hierarchy of schools—primary schools, secondary schools, technical schools, and centers for continuing education—"linked by formal systems of transfer and examination" (p. 297). These schools provided specialized training for the needs of an advanced industrial society and imparted loyalty to the British imperial state.

This is a detailed and convincing study in institutional history, judicious in its analysis and thorough in its research. Anderson's account is, however, history written from the top down, more concerned with the development of educational policy than with the experiences of pupils and teachers in the classroom. The myth of the democratic intellect, with its enduring popular perception that the Scottish educational system was distinctively open and egalitarian, must have reflected the educational experiences of many individual Scots. It would have been good to have had more discussion of human interactions in the classrooms in this otherwise superb book.

STEWART J. BROWN
University of Edinburgh

DAVID SETH JONES. *Graziers, Land Reform, and Political Conflict in Ireland*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 1995. Pp. xv, 287. $44.95.

David Seth Jones's study is based on a thesis completed in 1977. His footnotes and bibliography suggest a conscientious attempt to take into account the work of the intervening period. But historians of rural Ireland will nevertheless be brought up short by the very first sentence: "Much of the recent historical and sociological writings [*sic*] on agrarian society and politics in Ireland has concentrated upon the peasantry" (p. ix). That is not even remotely true and has not been for some considerable time.

This jarring opening note highlights the importance of viewing Jones's book in its historiographical context. Irish historians did indeed at one time take the agrarian nationalism of the nineteenth century at its own valuation, viewing it as the struggle of an oppressed peasantry against a religiously and culturally alien landed class. In 1973, however, a short but hugely influential article by Joseph Lee ("The Ribbon Men," in T. D. Williams, eds., *Secret Societies in Ireland* [1973]), drew attention to the importance, in the first half of the nineteenth century, of conflict further down the social scale, pitting farmers against the smallholders and landless laborers who were their employees and subtenants. Seven years later, Paul Bew highlighted the social tensions between laborer and farmer, large and small occupier, that lay concealed behind the apparently united front of the Land League (*Land and the National Question in Ireland, 1858–82* [1980]). Jones's study, dating from precisely the same period, looked more specifically at one group, the graziers who engaged in large-scale stock rearing on holdings ranging from 150–200 acres to giant ranches several times that size. He emphasized the differences in wealth, status, and economic interest that set these ranchers apart from other sections of the rural population and the extent to which they, too, became the targets of cattle driving, boycotting, and intimidation.

The importance of these histories was two-fold.

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First, such arguments made it clear that the recurrent agrarian disturbances of nineteenth-century Ireland could not be explained in terms of a simple opposition between landlord and tenant. Instead historians have learned to think in terms of a complex and variable pattern of conflicts and alignments. Second, the revised view stripped away the spurious appearance of social radicalism that mainstream Irish nationalism derived from its association with the land question. A struggle legitimized by the slogan "the land for the people" in practice dispossessed the landlords for the benefit of the tenant farmer while leaving the other inequalities of rural Irish society untouched.

Jones is entitled to the credit due to a pioneer, but the themes he opened up have since been developed and extended in subsequent work by Bew, David Fitzpatrick, Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh, and others. In particular, the story of the "ranch war" of 1906–1912 is by now a familiar one. Moreover, Jones does not really bring out, as Bew in particular has done, the gulf that opened up between rhetoric and reality as the Nationalist Party ostensibly committed itself to the anti-grazing movement while continuing to give a prominent place in its local leadership to members of the very rural elite at which that campaign was aimed. His attempt to explore the position of graziers in rural society relies on a precarious mix of literary sources. A discussion of their superior social status, for example, switches indiscriminately from remarks in a survey of County Meath in 1802 to a visitor's account from 1935 (p. 146).

What remains of enduring value is the first half of the book, in which Jones examines the economics of large-scale stock rearing. Drawing on both national statistics and the account books of a sample of graziers, he traces the growth of ranching after the Famine. He shows that many of the charges that graziers acted as active agents of eviction and depopulation were unfounded or exaggerated. Instead, graziers competed primarily with one another, often in a system of eleven-month lettings, outside the scope of tenant-protection legislation, which gave landlords considerable advantage. Despite their comparative wealth, moreover, the graziers' enterprise was inherently precarious, at the mercy of short-term movements in the price of young and fat cattle. Indeed, the ironic outcome of this belated publication may be to bring full circle the historiographical process that Jones's original work helped to launch. Having been briefly identified as the new villain in Irish agrarian history, the grazier now begins to seem, like the landlord before him, just one more hapless prisoner of a system that provided lasting security to none of those it sustained.

S. J. Connolly
Queen's University, Belfast

Kristin Elizabeth Gager. *Blood Ties and Fictive Ties: Adoption and Family Life in Early Modern France.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. 197. $39.50.

Historians of the early modern French family have long accepted at face value legal commentaries to the effect that adoption disappeared from law and practice in France between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this book, however, Kristin Elizabeth Gager describes and analyzes legal adoptions in Paris between 1540 and 1690, and in so doing she has not only highlighted the error of reading legal prescription as practice but cast new light on the early modern family.

Adoption (the legal transfer of authority over a child until adulthood) took two main forms in early modern Paris: private (transfers of authority over children between two sets of parents) and institutional (charitable institutions transferring authority of some of their charges—especially abandoned children—to parents). In the first category, children were adopted (often to other family members) mainly for financial reasons, leading Gager to see adoption as an alternative to abandonment. The adopting parents were generally childless and better off, making adoption a means of limited upward social mobility for the children concerned. Although there was one case of a noble adopting a commoner, the great majority of adoptions took place within the milieu of laborers, artisans, and small merchants. More than a quarter of adoptive parents were unmarried, widowed, or separated women.

Gager makes no claim as to the frequency of adoption, and most of this study is based on the records of eighty-two cases (thirty-seven private and forty-five institutional) found in notarial and charity archives: one case every two years. She is surely right to suggest that, rare as they might have been, adoptions indicate that the spectrum of family forms and linkages in the early modern period is wider than has commonly been supposed. The case might, however, have been made more strongly, for although one of this book's merits is that it is well focused, some arguments could have been more fully contextualized. More space might have been devoted to the place of children in the family economy of the social groups involved in adoptions, and the relationship of adoption to the various forms of fostering children could have been more fully developed. Even allowing for reasonable hesitation to project too much from limited sources, Gager might also have included more explicit discussion of the significance of adoption practices for broader patterns of family and parental relationships. The epilogue, a brief survey of French revolutionary attitudes toward adoption, contributes little to the book, although it implicitly raises the question of law and practice in this period, too. (The revolutionaries failed to legalize adoption, but adoptions did take place.)

This book is an important work. Gager has successfully exploited a specific phenomenon that is not only fascinating in its own right but also illuminates broader issues. Adoption might have been condemned by elites

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as contrary to nature, but many childless Parisians regarded it as repairing nature. As portrayed here, law was made not only by parlements but by ordinary women and men and their notaries. It is not the least of Gager's achievements to have demonstrated the mutual benefits of bringing legal and social history into dialogue.

RODERICK PHILLIPS
Carleton University

JAMES PRITCHARD. *The Anatomy of a Naval Disaster: The 1746 French Expedition to North America*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1995. Pp. xvi, 322. $39.95.

James Pritchard's primary aim is to tell a story that began during the War of the Austrian Succession, when the French navy under Jean Frédéric Phélypaux, comte de Maurepas, launched an expedition to North America to avenge the loss of Louisbourg. Maurepas arranged to have his cousin, the duc d'Enville, given command, and early in 1746 preparations began. D'Enville had never commanded a ship before, let alone a fleet, and very likely had never set foot on board a sailing vessel (he had some experience in Mediterranean galleys). Fitting out and provisioning ships took longer than expected, and contrary winds pinned the expedition in port until June, months too late to catch favorable winds across the Atlantic and to take full advantage of the campaign season. The largest French overseas expedition until the War of the American Revolution—twenty-two warships, some seventy ships in all, and over 10,000 men—got off to a bad start.

Worse lay in store. After a long and arduous passage in which thousands died of scurvy, typhus, and typhoid, the fleet met a storm off the coast of Nova Scotia. D'Enville's ship limped into the bay where Halifax now stands, and there the young duke quickly died of disease. His successor in command ran himself through with his sword but survived. Sailors and soldiers succumbed to diseases left and right. An old salt, Jacques-Pierre de Taffanel, marquis de La Jonquière, took command and prudently withdrew. Maurepas and d'Enville had hoped to turn the war in North America in France's favor by recapturing Louisbourg, taking Annapolis Royal, securing Canada and Placentia (Newfoundland), and harrying New England ports. Delays, disease, bad weather, and shoddy provisions prevented the French from achieving any of these ambitions. La Jonquière led the remnants of the fleet back to France. Despite the loss of several thousand men and a handful of ships, no inquiry took place, and the expedition sank quickly into oblivion.

In addition to telling this tale, Pritchard aims to provide a measure of analysis. It emerges that Maurepas organized the expedition chiefly to advance his own family and political goals in a struggle for influence within Louis XV's court. Pritchard shows, as others have, how decisive epidemics can be in military affairs and how ossified, inefficient, and negligent *ancien régime* bureaucracy could become. He shows that the great expedition had only unexpected consequences: the deaths of thousands of Frenchmen and hundreds of Micmac Indians (French infections spread to the local population) and, after the war, the foundation of Halifax by the British crown, which recognized the value of a naval base in Nova Scotia. The expedition had no impact on the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).

Pritchard's archival research is very thorough and his story very detailed. His analysis is sound and persuasive. Pritchard has achieved his twin goals and has rescued the d'Enville expedition from oblivion. Historians interested in the Anglo-French struggle in eighteenth-century North America or in the French navy will appreciate his diligence.

J. R. MCNEILL
Georgetown University

PHILIPPE BOURDIN. *Des lieux, des mots, les Révolutionnaires: Le Puy-de-Dome entre 1789 et 1799*. Paris: Clermont-Ferrand. 1995. Pp. 514. 149 fr.

The locus and origin of revolutionary beliefs have been of great interest to scholars. Recent studies of political culture and the politics of culture have illuminated and emphasized the wellsprings of such transformative ideas. For all of this, however, historians mainly have chronicled the broad national picture; if a locality is involved, it is usually Paris. By focusing on the Massif Central, particularly Puy-de-Dome with its capital of Clermont-Ferrand, Philippe Bourdin contributes to this literature by taking a very important question into a remote region. Here, he examines in microscopic detail the growth of political ideas in a very circumscribed area.

Bourdin studies the erstwhile politics of elite culture in prerevolutionary Puy-de-Dome by examining institutions such as Masonic lodges and the academies. Concluding that the distance between the Old Regime and the French Revolution remains too great to find the origins of the latter in the former, Bourdin turns his attention to local political life during the revolution. His investigation of municipal politics directs him toward the militant culture of local Jacobinism.

A multi-chapter investigation of the many Jacobin organizations that dotted the region constitutes the core of Bourdin's search for the lode of revolutionary ideas. An amazingly large number of groups took on this radical coloration. Bourdin systematically examines these bodies from an enormous number of perspectives with highly detailed and diligent research. Following the Jacobins so closely, he ends up largely framing his inquiry along the following lines: how independent were local radicals from Parisian influence? Here, Bourdin contrasts the persistent and pervasive way that delegates, representatives on mission, and the press communicated militant priorities to the Puy-de-Dome area. In contrast, he also recon-

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structs how the provincial locals understood the unfolding of the revolution, concluding that some disagreements between the two discourses always existed.

Although such generalizations prove interesting, Bourdin's book is not very precise about them. The sources seem to overwhelm him. To indicate the influences emanating from the capital, Bourdin provides a vast array of information but never closely analyzes what the overall theme or even themes might be. Moreover, the local response emerges only as a chronological narrative. A thorough analysis could reveal the timing and nature of resonance and dissonance in order to specify in detail the independent ideas of the provincials. Certainly specifying such a strain of independence would be a significant addition to the scholarly understanding of revolutionary ideas and preconceptions.

Ideas just do not emerge here with sufficient clarity. Even when Bourdin occasionally sums up his arguments, he does not relate them well enough to the evidence to make his account compelling or to show generalizations well supported by evidence. But even if the broadest promise of the work remains unfulfilled, it does have its virtues. Although more analysis is needed, it is clear that the discourse from Paris did not control everything. Arguments that ignore the provincial contribution—and these are frequent in this field—do so at their own risk. Also, the contrast between the Old Regime and the revolution, which similarly deserves more systematic attention, becomes clear enough to raise questions for those who want to locate the origins of radicalism in the period before 1789. Finally, in its array of information, this volume provides invaluable vignettes. The depiction of the local press provides a running description of provincial news unavailable elsewhere. Especially interesting, although relegated to an epilogue, is the account of women's activities. These rich descriptions—the result of extraordinary research—make useful contributions to our knowledge.

JACK R. CENSER
George Mason University

JOHN EHRENBERG. *Proudhon and His Age*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International. 1996. Pp. ix, 184. $45.00.

When I was a graduate student during the 1970s, considerable attention was being given to the inadequacy of Karl Marx's analysis of modern French society. The historians who trained my generation were methodically dismantling the "Marxist paradigm," not only for our understanding of the French Revolution but also for the nineteenth century. Many of my own generation have been attempting, if I may be permitted a rash summary characterization, to find new perspectives from which to interpret French society and new conceptual frameworks within which to analyze French culture. Some have been drawn to social analyses that employ more subtle categories; others have followed E. P. Thompson's emphasis on working-class culture and emerging class consciousness. Yet others have been drawn to anthropological analyses of contentious events and to "thick descriptions" of local working-class movements, or have focused on the power of discourses and the discourses of power, or have attempted contextual analyses of overlapping intellectual traditions.

John Ehrenberg ignores all of this new scholarship in his book. The framework he employs is provided by Roger Garaudy and Eric Hobsbawm, which is to say that it is informed by a doctrinaire Marxism. The class nature of French society is assumed to be a struggle among the bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, and ideologies are assumed to be reflective of the "objective social position" of a given class (p. 163). Ehrenberg offers up an abstract, ideologically driven social framework that has little to do with what we now know to have been the nature of nineteenth-century French society. The Revolution of 1830, we are told, "had shown the power of the 'little' people and their desire to end feudalism once and for all" (p. 18). The late 1830s, we are informed, experienced a "heightened level of class conflict which accompanied the formation of a modern proletariat" (p. 44). Most historians will be surprised to encounter either feudalism or a modern proletariat in 1830s France.

Proudhon's theoretical contribution is similarly straight-forward, according to Ehrenberg. "From the beginning of his career his self-defined project was to defend the interests of France's large, powerful, and vulnerable *petite bourgeoisie*" (p. 1). Proudhon's economic theories "reflected the concerns of the beleaguered petty bourgeoisie" (p. 74). His actions in June 1848 were driven by "his desire to protect the petty bourgeoisie" (p. 97). Even the moral theory that he developed in *De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église* (1858) was driven by "Proudhon's desire to defend the petty bourgeoisie" (p. 141). Moreover (though not surprisingly, given the author's philosophical orientation), Proudhon was not a true socialist, and his "attempt to separate the political from the economic aspects of the working class movement was theoretically mistaken and tactically dangerous" (p. 155).

The scholarship on Proudhon is notable for its conflicting interpretations and its often partisan nature. Some have seen Proudhon as an anarchist, others as an utopian socialist, an integral nationalist and anti-Semite, a neo-liberal, a patriarchal misogynist, an anti-theist, or a socialist reformer. If one wants to revisit the second of these interpretive frameworks—the one that analyzes Proudhon through the ideological lens of reductionist Second International Marxism—then Ehrenberg's book is to be recommended. If, on the other hand, one wishes to understand Proudon in terms of his own historical period or to approach

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Proudhon in terms of the scholarship of the past thirty years, then one must look elsewhere.

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Roger V. Gould. *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1995. Pp. viii, 253. Cloth $40.95, paper $15.95.

The French revolutions of 1848 and 1871 have been favorite subjects for study by sociological writers from Karl Marx to Charles Tilly. In this book, Roger V. Gould undertakes a comparative study of June 1848 and 1871 with respect to the emergence of collective identities. Socialist writers have usually seen the June Days as a rudimentary working-class revolt and the 1871 Paris Commune as the product of a more highly developed working-class movement. Based on interesting findings about trade cohesion, Gould concludes the opposite, finding that the June Days were authentically proletarian but that the Commune was more of a neighborhood than a working-class uprising.

Gould adds little to our knowledge of the June Days, which was a rebellion provoked by the dissolution of the national workshops that encompassed the working-class districts of eastern Paris. What he omits to tell us is that it was a spontaneous and isolated movement of workers without leadership and ideology, one that was suppressed by other workers organized in the Mobile Guards and one that failed to mobilize republican clubs and leaders, who went on to propagandize the rest of the country for the cause for which workers had fought.

Gould jumps from June 1848 to a discussion of the rebuilding of Paris, which forced workers from the center to seek cheaper accommodations in the suburban communes annexed in 1860. Overall, as many have noted, the result was greater social segregation between bourgeois districts in the west and center and working-class neighborhoods on the periphery. Where Gould innovates is to show more social mixing within the lower-middle class in the periphery than in the center, where certain trades such as the iron founders remained clustered. These more cohesive trades, Gould claims, were the most active in the 1860s revival of the labor movement. But these were precisely the ones, he adds, who were least active in the defense of the Commune in May 1871.

This argument, based on the importance of trade solidarity, which is intellectually ingenious but tenuous at several points, supports his contention that the Commune was not a working-class but a localist rebellion against the centralized state. Also supporting this contention are the popular political meetings that spread to the periphery from 1868 to 1870, which Gould interprets as expressions of neighborhood solidarity rather than of the class and ideological struggle shown by Alain Dalotel, Alain Faure, and Jean-Claude Freiermuth in *Aux origines de la Commune: Le mouvement des réunions publiques à Paris, 1868–1870* (1980).

Gould ignores not only this contribution but also that of Jacques Rougerie, the Commune's leading historian, who demonstrated the importance of the First International and of cooperative socialism to its understanding. He bases his argument on the experience of a few trades, essentially essentially iron founders and tailors, who apparently participated less in the May fighting than did metal and construction workers. It is risky to rest historical interpretation on such statistically weak, partial, and ambiguous evidence. Did founders and tailors stay out of the fighting because of trade cohesion or because of their social isolation in bourgeois quarters, which made it riskier to fight? Were they not too busy working for the Commune in their producer cooperatives to shoulder a rifle? Skilled workers on the periphery were probably more class-conscious than they were because of their concentration and links with the lower middle class that further empowered them.

Gould adds a new dimension to our understanding of the Parisian working class during the two great revolutions of the nineteenth century. If his interpretation is partial, he stands in good company. Marx came to similar conclusions about the Commune in his first draft of *Civil War in France*.

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Gay L. Gullickson. *Unruly Women of Paris: Images of the Commune*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 283. Cloth $39.95, paper $16.95.

Ever since its suppression at the end of May in 1871, the Paris Commune has been considered an epochal event in modern history. To its opponents, it became a specter of what could happen if the dangerous working people were allowed to get out of hand; to sympathizers, it was a portent of the social republic that would come when the working class won its rightful place. The memory of the Commune continues to be contested: in the year of its centenary, there was no commemoration in conservative central Paris, while there was an impressive exhibition in the "red" suburb of Saint-Denis. In this book, Gay L. Gullickson argues that the insurrection should be seen as a defining moment not only in modern politics but in gender relations as well. She asserts that the view of women participants conveyed in newspapers, histories, memoirs, and images has had an enduring effect, reinforcing gender preconceptions down to our own day.

Gullickson offers a persuasive account based on an almost exhaustive marshaling of the relevant evidence. She shows that eyewitnesses and later historians who described the role of women during the outbreak of the insurrection on March 18 were deeply influenced by preconceptions about the nature of women and their proper place in society. She then demonstrates

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effectively that perceptions of the Communards, and especially the Communardes, were shaped by memories of the French Revolution and its legendary *tricoteuses*. These memories were reinforced by the fact that revolution in general and the Commune in particular were represented in female form. In a chapter on "The Symbolic Female Form," Gullickson examines the rich variety of composite or stereotyped female figures sprinkled throughout the newspapers, histories, and memoirs produced during and following the conflict: women grieving loved ones, women workers and passersby killed or wounded in an armaments explosion, female fighters, female canteen and ambulance workers, and women orators. Gullickson shows gender assumptions everywhere.

The final three chapters of the book are especially revealing. One deals with the real women who wrote posters, newspaper articles, diaries, and memoirs. From a variety of social backgrounds, these women presented a wide spectrum of viewpoints ranging from pacifist through militant feminist to opponents of the Commune; all shared, to different degrees, the prevailing gender divisions. Then Gullickson offers an incisive analysis of the origins of the *pétroleuse*, which opponents used to obscure injustices committed by the Versailles forces. A final chapter deals with the Communard women prisoners, who were judged by observers—mostly bourgeois males—according to their physiognomy, dress, and cleanliness or lack thereof.

Despite its careful presentation of evidence, there are some weaknesses in the book. One is the author's failure to discuss adequately the female allegorical figures produced (at the time and long afterwards) by champions of the Commune and its opponents. Gullickson argues that although allegorical figures almost always conform to the gender of the nouns that they personify—*la Révolution*, *la République*, *la Commune*—they are only effective when they correspond to gender conventions and stereotypes. If, as Gullickson demonstrates so well, women were considered even by male Communards to be "naturally" nurturing, passive, and frail, then why did so many allegories of *la Commune* depict female figures as active, militant, and powerful? It may be that pro-Communard artists were attempting to show the progressive, combative, and potent nature of the insurrection rather than of women. Gullickson does not reproduce a single one of these allegorical figures.

Another weakness in this otherwise impressive book is the author's selective use of illustrations of actual women or men. Since the Commune lasted only seventy-three days and its radical press was equally short-lived, there are many more negative images of the insurrection, its destructiveness, and its "unruly women" than there are positive ones. Artists sympathetic to the Commune did, however, produce numerous images of noble, brave, and powerful women. None are reproduced here. In anti-Communard imagery, there are many more representations of female incendiaries than of male anarchists; nevertheless there was a number of images of males carrying torches, emerging from smoking ruins, or lampooned for believing that burned-down buildings were a solution to the problem of rents. Gullickson devotes one sentence and no illustrations to such images.

These omissions, however, do not seriously diminish the importance of this book both as a contribution to our fuller understanding of the Commune and its role in reinforcing gender stereotypes.

JAMES A. LEITH
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DAVID M. GORDON. *Liberalism and Social Reform: Industrial Growth and* Progressiste *Politics in France, 1880–1914*. (Contributions to the Study of World History, number 55.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood. 1996. Pp. 226. $59.95.

A century after 1789, a republic established by default and led orginally by "dukes" had only recently acquired the support of most French voters. Old ideological issues continued to undermine political consensus, and Radicals and Socialists threatened to dominate politics as David M. Gordon's liberal industrialists began their political careers. Gordon argues that these *progressistes* exemplified "the heroic spirit of French industrial capitalism" in the decades before World War I and helped to ensure "the stability and success of the country's bourgeois social order" (p. 2) by moderating the programs of Socialists, Radicals, and nationalists and defending "the civility of political life" (p. 27). Put slightly differently, by appealing to the material interests of workers as well as bourgeois, they helped make a fractious body politic safe for large-scale capitalism and laissez-faire.

To support his conclusions, Gordon examines in greater detail the political careers of Eugène Motte of Roubaix, Georges Claudinon and Antoine Arbel of the Loire, and François de Wendel of Lorraine. Among the largest industrialists in France—Motte in textiles and the other three in steel—these men encountered opposition from owners of smaller businesses as well as artisans and workers, and yet they won elections by addressing the practical concerns of potential allies while avoiding divisive ideological issues. Successful in business, they could offer good wages and generous social programs that helped retain workers and undermine the apocalyptic predictions of Jules Guesde and the Socialists. They provided credibility for their support for the republic by avoiding identification with *ralliés* and other clericals.

Gordon concludes his study by claiming that the political success of these liberal industrialists strengthened French capitalism by limiting government interference and assured capitalist elites a role in political life that later made them more resistant to authoritarian or fascist solutions than their counterparts in other continental states. While such conclusions seem plausible, they invite qualification. I suspect, for example,

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that the support *progressistes* gave the republic before World War I was as pragmatic as that which most of their descendants gave the Vichy regime. On this subject, see in particular Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera, *Les patrons sous l'occupation* (1995). Although we know relatively little of the mentality of most *patrons*, they were probably motivated less by grand principles of 1789 or even the rational pursuit of wealth than by a desire to defend their identity as *patrons* of family firms and assure that the government would support their interests with an appropriate combination of free trade and protection. Through enlightened paternalism and astute political campaigns, the *progressistes* of Gordon's study sought to protect their industrial estates as the masses gained political strength.

Yet these protagonists hardly resembled most French capitalists, whose interests they could only partially represent. Gordon notes that they defended an enlightened paternalism, which indeed had deep roots in French business culture, while also praising them as "partisans of a dynamic capitalism that did more than any other factor to destroy traditional manufacturing" (p. 191). Indeed, many successful firms were dynamic in some respects and traditional in others. The entire fabric of French capitalism was woven from diverse markets, industries, sizes of firms, types of organization, families, and personalities. Gordon's informative study focuses on a conspicuous and important segment of this fabric: the industrialists of immense enterprises, their politics, and their party. But it also invites research on the more diverse social and cultural foundations of French capitalism in a period of important transformation between 1880 and 1914.

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PAUL SMITH. *Feminism and the Third Republic: Women's Political and Civil Rights in France, 1918–1945.* (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 301. $72.00.

The first wave of scholarship on the women's rights movement in France, written in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on the nineteenth century and paid less attention to the period after World War I. A few studies, such as James McMillan's *Housewife or Harlot: The Place of Women in French Society, 1870–1940* (1981) and Laurence Klejman and Florence Rochefort's *L' Egalité en marche: Le Féminisme sous la Troisième République* (1989), concluded with brief chapters on the postwar period but left detailed examination to the next generation of scholars. The only close examination of the 1920s and 1930s, Huguette Bouchardeau's *'Pas d'histoire, les femmes . . .' 50 ans d'histoire des femmes, 1918–1968* (1977), gave a socialist view unsympathetic to bourgeois feminism.

The published scholarship of the 1990s has already shifted our focus to the interwar period. Christine Bard's *Les Filles de Marianne: Histoire des feminismes, 1914–1940* (1995) gave the first detailed survey of French feminism in the 1920s and 1930s; Mary Louise Roberts's prize-winning book about the 1920s, *Civilization Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (1994), also showed how the analytical focus has changed since the 1970s.

Paul Smith's book makes an important contribution to this trend by providing the first comprehensive portrait in English of the French feminist leagues and their campaigns after 1918. It offers both more and less than the subtitle suggests. More, because Smith does not limit his study to the defeat of women's suffrage and the reform of the civil code. He also joins the debate about the family and depopulation opened by Karen Offen's "Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France" (*AHR* 89:3 [1984]), rejecting Offen's argument about how issues of the family distinguished France from Britain and America as "wildly overschematic" (p. 234). Less, because he has only written a history of the 1920s and 1930s, supplemented by a sketchy four-page epilogue on 1939–1945. Smith leaves the status of women under Vichy to other authors and gives no help in understanding the Algiers *ordonnance* of April 1944 granting women the vote.

This book contains much valuable detail about the 1920s and 1930s, and it will probably become the standard English source for the period. It includes a helpful history of interwar Catholic feminism, bringing into focus the role of the Duchesse la Rochefoucauld and Catholic leagues founded after 1918. Smith's research also finds differences between the pre-1914 and post-1918 women's rights movement. His study of the *Etats généraux du féminisme* (especially the 1929 congress) found more provincial support of feminist aims than studies of the prewar era have shown. His examination of provincial membership in the *Union française pour le suffrage des femmes* uncovered a shift in the sociology of bourgeois feminism. Instead of the teachers, who were so active before the war, Smith found a movement dominated by professional and business women.

Smith's analysis of the postwar defeat of women's suffrage underscores the well-known role of the Radical Party in blocking the vote. He carefully studies the Senate votes of 1928 and 1933 in addition to the famous vote of 1922. There is no ambiguity in Smith's words: "The doctrine of separate spheres was deeply entrenched in Radical ideology" (p. 76). The opposition of the Radicals is certainly the basic explanation for the defeat of women's suffrage in France, and Smith stresses this by criticizing previous studies that have seen it as the necessary-but-not-sufficient explanation. (This includes my own work, which Smith misreads as "challeng[ing] this accepted wisdom" [p. 150] rather than seeking to supplement it.) He rejects more nuanced interpretations that have spread some

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of the explanation across legal, religious, regional, and other political factors, including the nature of the women's movement itself.

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BENJAMIN J. KAPLAN. *Calvinists and Libertines: Confession and Community in Utrecht, 1578–1620*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xv, 347. $65.00.

This ambitious and well-documented book represents one of the most significant contributions to Dutch religious history in recent years. Taking as his topic the history of the church in Utrecht during the Reformation and immediate post-Reformation periods, Benjamin J. Kaplan demonstrates the importance of pre-Reformation social and political factors in helping to determine religious choices made by Utrechters during the tumultuous years of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In doing so, Kaplan takes issue with a number of recent interpretations by scholars in the field. He also succeeds in explaining larger issues involving the origins and nature of religious toleration in the early modern Dutch Republic.

The core of the book is devoted to an examination of the early development of the Reformed church in Utrecht during the years 1578–1620. Kaplan makes this rather complex picture more understandable by organizing his account around the conflict that took place within the church between two groups: a confessional party of strict Calvinists favoring an exclusive model of the church based on doctrinal and moral discipline along with a theocratic conception of church/state relations, and an anti-confessional party favoring a more inclusive and particularistic model of church and an Erastian conception of church/state relations. To a part of this latter group Kaplan gives the name "Libertines," a term often applied to the anti-confessionalists by their opponents, but one still so loaded with presuppositions and biases that it may strike the reader familiar with the bitter religious polemics of the late sixteenth century as an awkward or even inappropriate label to be applied in modern scholarship. Nevertheless, by organizing his study of the Utrecht church around the single most important controversy within Dutch religious life after 1570—the rise of Calvinist confessionalism and the opposition to it—Kaplan shows how clashing ideals of religious unity based on an inclusive and undoctrinaire conception of the church and religious uniformity based on doctrine and church discipline helped to determine the development of the Utrecht church as it moved from Catholicism through stages of "libertinism" and theocracy before arriving at the moderate Calvinism that embroiled it in the Remonstrant controversy after 1610. Kaplan also argues convincingly that this conflict between two very different conceptions of the church resulted in an important distinction between public and private religious practice and in an ideal of freedom of conscience that together created the foundation for religious toleration in Dutch society at large even as the Reformed church itself moved toward confessionalism. Either one of these conclusions would make for a good book. Taken together, they constitute no mean achievement.

The book is less successful in its attempts to describe the broader outlines as well as the intellectual foundations of the struggle over confessionalism in the Dutch Republic. The battle within the Reformed church did not end with the victory of the confessional party at the Synod of Dordrecht (1618–1619), as Kaplan claims. Rather, the battle continued in slightly altered form for the rest of the century, as confessionalist theologians like Utrecht's own Gijsbertius Voetius clashed with Cartesian-influenced clerics such as Balthasar Bekker and advocates of the exegetical ideas of Leiden theologian Johannes Coccejus. Furthermore, in sketching the ideas and positions that characterized the confessional and anti-confessional wings (Kaplan calls the latter a-confessional, but their position was stronger than that) of the Reformed church, more attention needs to be given to the two fundamentally different conceptions of scriptural exegesis that provided the intellectual starting point for the controversy over the value of theological doctrines, confessional formulae, and church discipline. Finally, it must be said that an author with as much to say as Kaplan deserved better editing support than was provided by the Clarendon Press.

These few reservations aside, there can be no doubt that this is not only a good book but an important one. It adds substantially to our knowledge of the Reformation in Utrecht and, in a broader sense, to the ongoing examination of confessionalism and its impact on the churches created by the reformers.

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S. R. E. KLEIN. *Patriots Republikanisme: Politieke cultuur in Nederland (1766–1787)*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 1995. Pp. 340.

The late eighteenth century in the Dutch Republic has for some years been the subject of increasing interest and controversy. In particular, the Patriot period (usually considered the years between the outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1780 and the Prussian intervention in 1787) has become the center of this historiographic concern. Some of us have viewed this patriot movement as the culmination of a long development in the history of the Netherlands, marked by continuing conflict between those who supported an enhanced role for the *Stadhouders* of the House of Orange and the States (or Loevestein) faction that saw the provincial estates and the urban regents as the true sovereign. Others have emphasized the role of the patriots as precursors to the ultimate triumph of the

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unitary and liberal state culminating in 1848. Now S. R. E. Klein takes a fresh look at the period.

Using the concept of "political culture" broadly and subtly, he begins his investigation in 1766, when William V became the first hereditary *Stadhouder* in all of the Provinces and secretly made the duke of Brunswick his principal advisor. The first part of the book examines how the existing tension between the House of Orange and the older republicanism began to be affected by newer political insights largely imported from Great Britain and its American colonies. Klein's discussion of these themes and their use in the Netherlands is influenced heavily by the studies of J. G. A. Pocock and others on classical and civic republicanism.

The second part of the book deals with four themes: a free political press, the role of a sovereign prince, an armed citizenry, and the concept of popular sovereignty. Klein discusses the virtual explosion of printed matter of all kinds, especially pamphlets and political cartoons, in the 1780s and draws useful conclusions about the effect on a hitherto closed political process. Sexual scandal and pretensions to princely splendor on the part of William V contributed to the image of the corrupt prince, morally and politically antithetical to the ideals of republicanism. Klein also examines the practical problems raised by various patriot writers concerning how the citizenry should participate in and influence the government. Coupled with the question of citizen participation was a new emphasis on the need for an armed citizenry, influenced by Andrew Fletcher's work on militias and a reexamination of indigenous institutions. This culminated in the organization of free corps and drill societies, which played an ever growing role right down to 1787.

It is Klein's thesis that, in the period beginning around 1784, a new kind of republicanism came to replace the historic model of Loevestein and "true liberty." He demonstrates this by documenting the rise of a new term: "aristocrat," with all of its pejorative and conspiratorial contrasts to "democrat." Aristocrats were seen as thwarting the true will of the people, opposing the increased participation of the burgers in the choice of government, and, ultimately, allying with the forces of Orange. In the same period, new proposals for "constitutional restoration" were debated, but before they could be acted on, the Prussians forced the leading patriots into exile or silence.

Klein's book makes a convincing case for a new kind of republicanism, more radical and more strongly influenced by Anglo-Saxon ideas than has hitherto been presented. The argument is strengthened by a very deep, sophisticated examination of the pamphlet literature of the period and supported by new research on every aspect of "political culture." Because of its clear and documented emphasis on the interaction of foreign and domestic influences, it fits very well within the framework of new and fruitful investigation of the age of democratic (or republican) revolutions. For all of these reasons, I can only hope for the speedy appearance of an English version.

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Nathalie Heinich. *The Glory of Van Gogh: An Anthropology of Admiration*. Translated by Paul Leduc Browne. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. xiv, 218. $29.95.

Written by sociologist Nathalie Heinich, this study is concerned with the rhetorical framework within which admiration for Vincent Van Gogh has developed, from early recognition by the Symbolists to the heady excesses of the late twentieth-century art market. Heinich provides an interesting analysis of the ways in which accounts of the artist's work and life offer structural parallels to the saintly lives chronicled in the thirteenth century by Jacobus de Voragine in *The Golden Legend*. She then convincingly compares the experience offered by a blockbuster Van Gogh exhibition to that sought by religious pilgrims. Although it is hardly surprising to read of the importance of spirituality to the art and life of Van Gogh, this alignment of audience expectation with the artist's synthesis of the secular and the sacred is less familiar.

Reminding us that the reputations of artists have a dynamism of their own that reflects the changing needs and tastes of new audiences, Heinich inadvertently reveals some hazards of focusing on a "constructed" discourse when ignoring the tangible material to which it refers. Any visitor to the Louvre who has seen the crush of tourists around the *Mona Lisa*—even though other works by Leonardo da Vinci are available for viewing—should agree with Heinich that publicized admiration has a self-perpetuating force. What is objectionable is the focus on this aspect of an artist's reputation at the expense of the palpable riches at its source. It is only a commentator blinkered to the visual evidence of Van Gogh's canvases who could attribute the magnitude of his reputation to self-referential rhetoric. Speaking of the crowds drawn to the artist's exhibitions and the huge sums spent on his paintings, Heinich maintains that "We are dealing here with the circular and exponential logic of celebration which (like a self-fulfilling prophecy) produces the very thing it proclaims, namely the power of the one celebrated . . . [A]dmiration, by the power of its testimony alone, transforms an unknown painter into a universally celebrated hero, and a piece of canvas into a universally coveted treasure" (p. 134).

Hidden by this familiar academic refrain is the fact that the tenacity of Van Gogh's reputation, and the urgency with which his art appealed to later generations, arose primarily from his astonishing artistic accomplishments. The "hermeneutic space" in which Heinich locates the artist's fame would have collapsed long ago if it were not for the impasted pigments with which Van Gogh imbued his chair and pipe with the intimacy of a self-portrait and projected his joyous

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perception of sunlight onto the wheat and irises of Provence. Visual evidence also could have strengthened the discussion of the attribution of suffering and sainthood to Van Gogh. Reference to Roland Holst's image of a drooping, haloed sunflower that adorned the catalog of the 1892 Van Gogh retrospective in Amsterdam (reproduced in Robert Goldwater, *Symbolism*, [1979] p. 9) would have been welcome in this context.

Expecting readers to respond to her account of the "hagiographical construction of the artistic legend" with "strong reactions . . . ranging from laughter to exasperation" (p. 58), Heinich does not consider the possibility that modification of an artistic legacy by future generations can be creative or, at least, worthy of empathic curiosity. That Van Gogh's paintings and biography have so elicited subjective response reflects the fertility of an *oeuvre* overlooked by the author of this unillustrated exposé of false consciousness.

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Boston University

MARK ROSEMAN, editor. *Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770–1968*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 314. $59.95.

Although Karl Mannheim conferred social science legitimacy on the concepts and phenomena of "generation" and "generational conflict" during the 1920s and generational issues have long been explored by German historians working on the collapse of the Weimar Republic or the student revolts of the 1960s, this book announces itself as "the first English-language collection of essays on modern German history with a generational theme" (p.3). Mark Roseman justifies adopting a generational perspective by noting "the striking persistence of youthful rebellion in Germany" and calling attention to the succession of dramatic ruptures in German history that resulted in vastly different experiences among age groups (p.1). These claims for a generational perspective are somewhat vitiated, however, by Roseman's frank acknowledgement that there is no single phenomenon of generation. Most authors in this volume define generations as historical cohorts that were crystallized by crucial events or experiences such as World War I. Nonetheless, the essays clearly diverge on whether generations are essentially imagined communities or whether they can assume a more substantive reality rooted in demography and institutions. The authors are generally alert to the ways in which class, gender, and religion shaped and in many instances undermined generational identities. Apart from two articles, generation becomes almost synonymous with youth, and twelve of fourteen treat the history of German youth or the myths of youth.

Despite the book's subtitle, which extends youth revolt back to 1770, only two of the essays are concerned with Germany before the 1890s. Joachim Whaley analyzes three key literary works of the late eighteenth century—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's *Die Leiden des Jungen Werthers* (1774), Friedrich Schiller's *Die Räuber* (1781), and Friedrich Hölderlin's *Hyperion* (1797–1799)—to trace the development of late Enlightenment images of alienated and rebellious youth who challenged conventions and official rationalism and attempted to heal what they perceived as a broken world through aesthetic renewal. Rainer Elkar examines the relation between the literary coteries that identified themselves as Young Germany in the 1830s and 1840s and male friendship groups at classical gymnasia and universities in north Germany that viewed themselves as liberal and emancipated. Despite their universalistic claims, Elkar demonstrates that such middle-class academic youth were often hostile to young journeymen, and, as 1848 proved, there was no basis for a common oppositional youth culture. Although "youth" had ostensibly become affiliated with liberal bourgeois nationalism by mid-century, glaringly absent from this book are any articles on generational politics or identities during the years leading to or immediately following national unification.

Wilhelmine Germany also receives somewhat short shrift. In one of two articles that treat generation but not youth, Jacob Borut uses generational experience to account for a more assertive German Jewish communal politics in the 1890s. From social profiles of Jewish community leaders, Borut concludes that there was a major break between those born in the 1820s and 1830s, who were cautious about asserting Jewish interests, and those born in the late 1840s or 1850s, who accepted emancipation as a given and who, as participants in the new political mobilization of the 1890s, founded the Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith to react more militantly to discrimination. In "Mobilizing Youth in Wilhelmine Germany," Jürgen Reulecke ably synthesizes some recent research both on official youth policy directed at creating a conformist working-class youth and on middle-class groups like the *Wandervogel*, both of which he situates in relation to middle-class anxieties about a variety of issues ranging from national strength and socialism to changing masculine roles.

The bulk of the articles converge on the era from the end of World War I until the early 1950s, the era to which generational analysis has conventionally been applied. Richard Bessel skeptically deconstructs the idea of a "front generation." The war was experienced in a variety of ways even by soldiers; women who participated in war work were excluded from this generation; the vast majority of veterans reintegrated into German life during the 1920s and could be found in every party across the political spectrum. Bessel observes that the idea of the "front generation" was essentially a political myth instrumentalized by the Nazis that largely appealed to disenchanted youth who had missed the war. Peter Lambert's piece on history professors between 1918–1945 is more about the defensive strategies of conservative nationalist historians

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in post-World War I Germany than about generations. Cornelia Usborne and Elizabeth Harvey raise questions about the generational experience of young women during the Weimar Republic. In one of the most intriguing articles, Usborne makes the case that, far from being a pure media invention, the rationalized, sexually emancipated New Woman leaped into life. At least among middle-class girls, sexual emancipation and rejection of inherited gender roles became widespread during the 1920s, and the debates over female sexuality were central to conflicts about the ideological, social, and political transformation ushered in after the war. Harvey documents the tensions between religious commitments and desires for social usefulness and national service within middle-class Protestant girls' groups in Prussia during the early 1930s and the equivocal relations of their members to Nazism.

The most innovative and compact group of essays are the four by Alexander von Plato, Dagmar Reese, Michael Buddrus, and Mark Roseman dealing with those young people who belonged to the Hitler Youth. All four scholars are basically interested in the ways in which the experiences of the Hitler Youth affected the attitudes and orientations of young adults during the formative years of the Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic. They present remarkably similar accounts of this generation as one that could not openly express its sense of the positive aspects of its experiences in Hitler's Germany. Disillusioned by Germany's defeat, its members adopted attitudes of hard-working, depoliticized, pragmatic accommodation to the occupying powers and the new German states. Plato surveys the common orientations of this generation in both German states; Reese explores the contradictory emancipation experienced by members of the Nazi League of German Girls; Buddrus dissects the virtually complete failure of youth policy in the Soviet Occupation Zone during 1945–1946; and Roseman examines why the fears among employers in the Ruhr mining industry that the Hitler Youth generation would be extremist radicals and among trade unionists that they would reject unions never materialized. Heinz Bude's singular article on the generation of 1968 combines a rather arbitrary psychoanalytic study of Georg Baselitz's painting of a manchild wielding a giant phallus ("Die grosse Nacht im Eimer") with several oral histories to argue provocatively, if bizarrely, that the generation of 1968 was less part of an international youth movement that liberalized German social values than a specifically German generation that identified wholly with its guilty parents and engaged in a "proxy rebellion, designed in a way to protect and 'clear' a parental generation which could no longer bear its own history" (p.305).

This essay collection resulted from a conference held at the University of Keele in 1991. Like most such conference volumes, the articles are highly uneven and represent various stages of research. Since conference debate and discussion are omitted, differences over concepts of generation are unresolved. The obvious divisions among the four authors on the Hitler Youth generation over the degree to which the Nazi regime explicitly or inadvertently facilitated modernization are never addressed. There is little critical scrutiny of sources and methods. Given the deployment of novels, paintings, oral history, pioneer social surveys, and historical psychoanalysis as evidence, such critical self-reflection would be especially welcome and warranted. Nonetheless, a number of the articles are exemplary in charting new and fascinating directions in research. This is especially true of the Bessel and Usborne articles on the Weimar Republic and the articles on the Hitler Youth generation. They all indicate that an imaginative approach to generational issues that remains sensitive to social, gender, and religious differences among the young can compel rethinking of central interpretations of Germany's recent history.

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ANNE-CHARLOTT TREPP. *Sanfte Männlichkeit und selbständige Weiblichkeit: Frauen und Männer im Hamburger Bürgertum zwischen 1770 und 1840.* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, number 123.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1996. Pp. 444. DM 92.

"The goal of this study," states Anne-Charlott Trepp, "is an undogmatic, broadly based gender history, which aims to examine the relationships of men and women in all their complexity" (p. 9). Works such as this show that the fields of women's and gender history have come of age. Concepts that were once revolutionary are now sufficiently established to invite revision by a new generation of scholars. Trepp takes issue with many key concepts developed by the first generation of feminist scholars, claiming that such abstract and ideologically driven theories cannot encompass the complex reality of individual lives. She gains a closer and more differentiated view of gender relations by looking at the personal documents, including letters, diaries, autobiographies, memoirs, shopping lists, and account books of a group of men and women from the middle class (or *Bürgertum*) of Hamburg during the period from 1790 to 1840. Her approach to this source material shows the influence both of anthropological methods and of the new field of "men's history," which applies much the same kind of analysis to male gender as a culturally constructed aspect of individual identity as has been applied to female gender.

The story begins with adolescence and the first experiences of sexual attraction; proceeds to describe courtship, married life, and parenthood, including childbirth and childrearing; and concludes with a lively account of social life and civic activities. Trepp emphasizes the inner lives and interpersonal relationships of her subjects, as illuminated through an unusually rich and self-revealing body of private documents, most

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held in the family records of the Hamburg Staatsarchiv.

The results of this investigation do, indeed, call into question some of the central concepts that have shaped historical accounts of this era, especially those that emphasize the separation of spheres and the resulting polarization of gender characteristics. Trepp discovers that her male and female protagonists differentiated far less between appropriate male and female characteristics and behavior than the recent historiography of the period would lead us to expect. Men as well as women shared a culture formed by the Enlightenment's stress on sensibility and the romantic movement's idealization of feeling. Both genders placed a high value on emotional expressiveness. Women, although acknowledging the authority of fathers and husbands, were permitted substantial self-determination in their choice of mates, the management of their households, the raising of their children, and their participation in community activities.

Challenging conventional assumptions that marriage among the middle class was arranged and therefore emotionally distant, Trepp shows that the Hamburg men and women placed very high value on romantic love and often refused marriages of convenience. Moreover, the intellectual and cultural congeniality between men and women enabled many couples to form and maintain close and intimate relationships; those who did not achieve this ideal paid tribute to it through their disappointment. Childrearing, influenced by fashionable ideas such as those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, stressed the child's individuality and was shared by both parents. The home, far from being a protected refuge from the outside world, was often a center of both professional and social activity.

This story is told with great sensitivity and psychological insight and with an abundance of well-chosen quotations and descriptive details. The portrayal of male gender identity among this group is particularly new and intriguing, and it contradicts stereotypes of a career-oriented and emotionally inexpressive male culture. Trepp successfully shows that the history of gender relations is too rich and complex to be subsumed under any set of abstract generalizations, including feminist theories of male supremacy and women's oppression.

But this criticism of feminist historiography, although true, is by no means new. Indeed, over the past two decades the field of women's history has been subjected to a very intense challenge by groups of women who claim that its theoretical framework does not adequately reflect their individual and collective experience. Trepp's own criticism of the field would have been more effective if placed in the context of this broader critique.

Like some other historians of everyday life, Trepp often allows her rejection of abstract generalization to lead her to the opposite extreme of ignoring the broader legal, social, and economic conditions that structure individual experience. For example, Trepp's picture of harmonious family relationships hardly hints at the harsher and more coercive aspects of male supremacy. But, in fact, these families were subject to a legal system that enforced the dominance of husbands and fathers. Were there no cases of spouse or child abuse, no abandoned illegitimate children, no scandalous cases of adultery or marital separation among this fortunate group? Certainly the Hamburg feminists who launched campaigns for the reform of marriage laws and female education in the 1840s, just a few years later, did not have such an optimistic view of middle-class marriage. Similarly, Trepp's discussion of the Hamburg families' social life makes almost no mention of the class relationships that dictated not only who was included in but who was excluded from these convivial gatherings. And, finally, what does this reconstruction of the lives of a small sample of privileged and articulate people tell us about more general trends among middle-class people in the German-speaking world and in Europe? Although Trepp speculates in a concluding paragraph that similar groups in other cities developed in the same way, she does not engage in any systematic comparison. This fascinating study would have been even more valuable if placed in a broader context.

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DAGMAR HERZOG. *Intimacy and Exclusion: Religious Politics in Pre-Revolutionary Baden*. (Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 252. Cloth $49.50, paper $16.95.

Dagmar Herzog has written a fascinating first book that provides an excellent example of successful use by a historian of methods of textual analysis developed by literary scholars. Her theme is a series of religious conflicts in the southwestern German state of Baden, which has long had the reputation of being the most politically liberal area of Germany before the revolutions of 1848–1849. Her main contention is that "it was on the ground of religious conflict that activists of the 1830s and 1840s sought to negotiate the 'irrational' aspects of political life: to come to terms with intergroup prejudice and sexual desire, the power of ideology, and the complexities of individual psychology" (p. 169). The choices such activists made, she argues, had important implications for later liberal attitudes toward emancipation, assimilation, and ethnic and gender differences.

The book examines five related but separable topics. First chronologically was an assault by Protestants and liberal Catholics on priestly celibacy, which failed to win state support and ultimately led to the appointment of a much more conservative Catholic theological faculty at the University of Freiburg. Growing out of this conservative revival was a Catholic counterattack on mixed marriages, which in Baden began in 1845, well after the so-called "Cologne Troubles" over

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the same issue had arisen in Prussia. In Baden, the debate over mixed marriages became intertwined with the emergence of the radical "German Catholic" movement, which included priestly celibacy, along with worship of relics and confession, in its list of perceived abuses by the church. In the most striking finding of the book, Herzog shows how defense of the civil rights of German Catholics led many leading liberals to change their views on the fourth theme, Jewish emancipation, a resolution in favor of which passed the lower house of the Badenese legislature in August 1846. Intertwined with all these themes were issues of sexuality and women's rights, the fifth of Herzog's topics.

Although drawing on a wide variety of sources, Herzog focuses her attention on texts by a limited number of people. For the Catholics, these include the Freiburg theologian Franz Josef Buss and the publicist Alban Stolz. Among German Catholics, Carl Scholl, a dissenting pastor from Mannheim, takes center stage. For the liberals, the leading spokesmen are the more widely known Karl von Rotteck, Friedrich Hecker, and Gustav von Struve.

The final chapter explores the views of feminist Louise Dittmar. Her inclusion is problematic: Dittmar was not from Baden and published none of her works there, although she did give a series of addresses to Scholl's and Struve's Mannheim Monday Club in 1847. She is important for Herzog as one of the few feminist thinkers of the *Vormärz* who challenged the ideology of innate gender differences shared by both conservative Catholics and radical liberals and dissenters. According to Herzog, "no other language but religious language . . . could properly convey her [Dittmar's] sense of the sacredness of each individual's right to self-determination" (p. 157).

In the conclusion, Herzog notes an interesting contradiction in liberal arguments for emancipation: "Jews were constantly enjoined to become less different, while women were insistently told to retain their difference" (p. 171). Her own authorial voice seems to condemn both positions, leaving her with Dittmar's advocacy of individual self-determination, which she nonetheless considers to have been "a German variant of that utopianism which was found in France and Britain in the 1830s and 1840s" (p. 168).

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DAVID B. DENNIS. *Beethoven in German Politics 1870–1989*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 251. $30.00.

David B. Dennis's book is about the perception by German politicians of Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827) and his music from 1870 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. These dates are significant, for they symbolize the unification and reunification of Germany, respectively. It is interesting that, as Dennis astutely observes, such key events should have been coupled, in a signal fashion, with Beethoven's perceived political persona.

It would have been easy for the author to select as his theme what for most readers with commonplace, preconceived notions might be some sort of automatic association of Beethoven's heroic music with right-wing, nationalistic causes. Hence, it is to Dennis's credit that he has avoided such facile stereotyping and has searched, instead, for evidence of Beethoven's acceptance, mostly as a symbol of "Germanness," *both* on the right and left as well as the political middle. The degree to which the creator of the *Eroica* (1804) was utilized by almost all political and ideological factions in German lands even before 1870 is indeed astonishing. Dennis begins logically by showing how the historic Beethoven was anything but a consistent *homo politicus*. As a young man late in the eighteenth century, he was enamored of French revolutionary goals in his native Rhineland; from Vienna, he embraced Napoleon the Emperor, only to be disgusted by his vanity and schemes for European conquest. Dennis shows how Beethoven, of lower-middle-class background, fancied himself a member of the social elite by virtue of his artistic genius (at one time, Dennis implies, also by dint of the "van" in his name). Beethoven the composer aped the aristocrats around him, on some of whom he depended financially, while mistreating his domestic servants and demonstrating a distinctive venality of his own.

As the political spectrum in Germany defined and redefined itself in the decades after 1870, each political faction laid ideological claim to the composer. Dennis elucidates how imperialists under Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II, left-wing republicans in Munich under Kurt Eisner in 1918–1919, democrats and hyper-nationalists in the Weimar Republic all adopted him as their *spiritus rector*. Beethoven seemed to offer something specific to each party: notions of fraternity to the left, a model of heroism to the right, even the moderation that goes with responsible citizenship to tempered democrats. To the aspiring National Socialists, who especially abused the composer as they abused Friedrich Nietzsche, he represented virtues of Adolf Hitler's catechism, above all heroism (the will to historic greatness; the will to conquer his deafness), struggle (both of the above, plus an imputed desire to fight against alien Frenchmen and for German unity), and aesthetic perfection (Beethoven's music as the epitome of nineteenth-century Romanticism, on which all Nazi-inspired composers based their epigonal works, in defiance of atonality or the serialism of the Second Vienna School).

Dennis raises a number of important questions, some merely rhetorically, because, as he rightly infers, most are unanswerable, short of using combined investigative techniques from musicological analysis, clinical psychology, and sociological theory. Why was no other German composer appropriated, since the middle of the nineteenth century, by so many ideological lobbies? Implicitly, Dennis suggests that Beethoven's

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music (and character) contained all the qualities that German aesthetes and politicians were looking for ever since his death, but to me this is too obvious and superficial an answer. If we can rule out Richard Wagner as useful to the left and Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy to the right for obvious reasons, what about Johannes Brahms? Was his music not equally perfect as Beethoven's and his character not more virtuous (given Beethoven's many unsavory sexual exploits)? What exactly was the "German" essence of Beethoven's music (apart from obviously suggestive titles, dedications, and libretti), which Dennis detects as having attracted the political right (and not a few leftists); what was the essence of Beethoven's universal (international) fraternity, so appealing to the left? Finally, why did the Nazis concentrate on Beethoven after 1933 to an unprecedented extent, so that Elly Ney, the archetypal Nazi musician, styled her luxuriant hair and furrowed brow after the master's massive head whenever she presented herself on the concert stage, performing Beethoven, often sloppily but to great effect, on the piano?

Three additional considerations highlight the importance of this last and crucial question. First, the Nazi Party had trouble coming to grips with Beethoven's obvious physical deficiencies which, after 1933, might have warranted his being sterilized or even "mercy-killed": his deafness, the effects of congenital alcoholism later in life, and, probably, venereal disease (with his swarthiness as an additional negative indication). Second, after 1945, conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler, in his quest for de-Nazification, claimed that he had remained in the Third Reich in order to defend the ideals of the real, the secret Germany, typified by his idol, Beethoven. But how did Furtwängler manage to differentiate his Beethoven from the Beethoven of the Nazis? Third, in Sachsenhausen concentration camp, a prisoners' choir once performed Beethoven's music to the text of "Friendship! Comraderie! Solidarity!"; later in Auschwitz, SS guards ordered Fania Fénelon's women's orchestra to play Beethoven especially for them. Whereas, understandably, Dennis cannot resolve these contradictions, they do suggest that the image of Beethoven and his music had been constructed and reified as a phony metaphor of rectitude that was dangerously at variance with the originals. Dennis's important book provides striking evidence of this process over time, but a subsequent study still must explain why it took place at all.

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STEFAN MEINEKE. *Friedrich Meinecke: Persönlichkeit und politisches Denken bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges*. (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, number 90.) New York: Walter de Gruyter. 1995. Pp. xii, 386. DM 186.

Friedrich Meinecke himself coined the term *Gelehrtenpolitik*: the "politics of scholars," not "scholarly politics." Meinecke had in mind the peculiarities of professorial political engagement in still-authoritarian Germany, where scholars were often deliberately unpolitical and opportunities for political action were limited. Meinecke was writing about other scholars, but he was also discussing himself because he, too, played a role in the drama of German *Gelehrtenpolitik*. In his lengthy and polemical opening chapter on the historiography of Meinecke's politics, Stefan Meineke shows that this role was controversial.

There was much in Meinecke's career to feed controversy. A liberal monarchist before 1919, he helped form the German Democratic Party (DDP) and supported the Weimar Constitution. Was his political shift real? If it was, how could one explain such rapid and profound change? If it was not, does that mean that the politically least illiberal of Germany's great academic historians was a mere opportunist? There is also the matter of the Hitler era. No friend to the Nazis, Meinecke nonetheless remained in Germany from 1933 to 1945, and his postwar book *The German Catastrophe* (1946) astonishingly called for the creation of Goethe-reading societies as a means to German moral regeneration. Was this advice serious, or was it just a recurring symptom of an apolitical idealism that had contributed to Germany's catastrophe in the first place?

Meineke is surely correct that the four decades of literature on Meinecke reflected the postwar German politics of the years in which his critics wrote. He provides his readers with a detailed bibliographic essay that also lays bare the errors and blindness of previous writers. Not kind to any of them, he is especially abrupt dealing with the American Robert A. Pois, the Israeli Shulamit Volkov, and the West German antinationalist Imanuel Geiss. This criticism is integral. Meineke's work is openly revisionist. He intends to show that Meinecke's real political evolution was continuous.

Meinecke, that is, applied the same, decent principles to changing German political realities, and these principles derived from the individualist liberalism of Wilhelm von Humboldt in particular and of the Prussian reformers in general. Meineke's study is the first of a projected two volumes and, in three hundred pages, traces Meinecke's political development through the end of World War I. That is a lot of space to devote a discussion of Meinecke that carefully treats his short, often incidental political writings while discussing his major works only in their political aspect. The detailed narrative form that this discussion takes, however, is well written and presents the contents of hitherto unexamined and unpublished materials. Meineke's book is a resource for scholars, not only of Meinecke but of *Gelehrtenpolitik* in general. The portrait that emerges is of a political moderate who was at once far more decent than the often nationalist colleagues with whom Meineke contrasts him and far more politically sensible and pragmatic than the fatuous advice in *The German Catastrophe* suggests.

Meineke proves beyond reasonable doubt his central

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thesis: that there was no sharp break in Meinecke's political thinking in 1918–1919. The proof, however, lies in the documentary record that he has assembled, not in his social-scientific demonstration that adults create their political personae by age thirty, so that Meinecke, in his fifties during World War I, could not have changed. Meineke's confidence in the results of developmental psychology can be as harmful as the faith in psychoanalysis of which he complains in American psychohistorians. Nonetheless, he clearly shows the course of Meinecke's political development.

Meinecke came from a pietistic family that left Salzwedel in the Altmark for modernizing Berlin. Berlin, and Meinecke's education, estranged him from his parents' religiosity. Meanwhile, the inhospitality of German conservatives to academics drove him from their ranks, initially into admiration for economist-reformer Friedrich Naumann and then, in Freiburg, to electioneering on behalf of the National Liberal academic Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz. Called to a professorship in Berlin in 1914, Meinecke wrote, signed petitions, and advised Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg to achieve a compromise peace and to democratize the Prussian constitution. Far from being sudden opportunism, then, his support for the republic was a logical outgrowth of Meinecke's prewar and wartime politics.

This is, again, a convincing portrait. I wonder, however, if Meineke understands that his interpretation of Meinecke's political career is just as tinged with current politics as all those he found wanting in his opening chapter.

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ULRICH HERBERT. *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903–1989*. Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz. 1996. Pp. 695. DM 58.

Ulrich Herbert's important, well-conceived, exhaustively researched, and intelligently written biography is more than just an insightful treatment of an obscure but important Nazi SS leader, Werner Best. It is also a portrait of a generation of young men who were shaped not by their experience in World War I, during which they were children, but by defeat, revolution, national humiliation, and economic chaos during the postwar era. They represented the second generation of Nazi leaders and were, if anything, more ruthless than the first.

Best, born in 1903, is characteristic of this generation. He lost his father in 1914 and grew up under the impact of national disaster. Like many rootless young men, he gravitated into the *völkisch*-nationalist camp in the early 1920s, fighting French occupation. Best earned his doctorate in law, joined the Nazis in 1930, and soon thereafter enlisted in the SS. He experienced a brief setback in 1931, when he formulated plans for a Nazi putsch that became public as the "Boxheimer Documents," causing him to lose his position as a civil servant and displeasing Adolf Hitler, who was pursuing a legal strategy for taking power at the time. The episode was no disadvantage, however, after the Nazis took power, and the ambitous Best quickly rose through the ranks. In 1933, he was already Police President of Hesse and founded the Osthofen concentration camp there. The following year he aided Heinrich Himmler in the purge of the SA, handling the action in Munich.

By the late 1930s, Best was busy helping Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich conceptualize and organize what Ernst Fraenkel termed the "dual state"—one with norms, the other without—which provided the philosophical foundation for Hitler's terror regime. Best believed that the police represented the all-important fourth pillar to the *völkisch* state, alongside government, party, and army, and that it had the vital task of seeing to the political "health" (p. 203) of the German body politic. Its concrete manifestation, which Best helped to shape, was Heydrich's police state apparatus, the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA), fully installed by 1939. Steeped in the "scientific" eugenics of the time, Best and the other young SS intellectuals contributed as well to laying the intellectual groundwork for the Holocaust.

A personal fallout with Heydrich sent Best to occupied France in 1940. There, he again used his intellectual powers to envision a kind of iron fist inside the velvet glove approach with which the Nazis hoped, with some justification, to win the collaboration of the peoples of Western Europe. Best got the opportunity to try out his ideas as Hitler's plenipotentiary in occupied Denmark during the last three years of the war, but gradually, under the impact of wartime setbacks, the velvet glove frayed and the fist emerged.

Remarkably, Best avoided being tried at Nuremberg as a war criminal after the war, although he appeared as a witness. He did serve time in prison, however, in Denmark, the nadir of his career. Never, however, did he appear as the accused in any German court. During the postwar decades, he devoted his considerable energies toward exculpating as many of his former comrades as possible, partly through a process of selective amnesia. Best also agitated for a general amnesty for former Nazi officials in the framework of the emerging Cold War. Through all this, his personal fortunes swelled because of the legal services he rendered to the tycoon Hugo Stinnes, Jr.

Herbert's book reminds us of the importance of biography in understanding the Nazi regime in particular, because power relations were so often personal and definitions of Nazi ideology so idiosyncratic. Herbert reminds us that Nazism was not just Hitlerism but rather a powerful ideology embraced by many of Best's generation independent of the dictator, of whom they were often critical. This book goes far in helping to answer the question of how a generation of young men from the best families—well-educated, socially well-situated, energetic, and ambitious—could devote their lives to such a murderous ideology and regime. In this

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context, Herbert offers us a portrait of a man whose version of Nazi ideology was, to use Best's own characterization, "heroic realism" (p. 88): an antiliberal, anticosmopolitan, anti-Semitic approach consciously linked, not with hatred and emotion (Best was critical of Hitler on this score), but with cold, hard, "rational" calculation; a combination of sober professionalism and fanatic radicalism.

Best saw himself as part of a new twentieth-century elite of social engineers who would rejuvenate Germany through a popular movement, cleanse Europe with scientific racial hygiene, and win the allegiance of other Europeans by example. If Hitler had won his war, men like Best would have been running Europe and much of the world in the 1950s and 1960s. The prospect is terrifying.

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STEVEN E. ASCHHEIM. *Culture and Catastrophe: German and Jewish Confrontations with National Socialism and Other Crises*. New York: New York University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 210. $40.00.

Steven E. Aschheim's insightful collection of essays focuses on three primary themes: the cultural meaning and scholarly validity of collective memories and historical interpretations of the Holocaust; the intellectual origins and rationales for the Third Reich's policy of genocide; and the complex relationship between prominent German-Jewish thinkers and their German gentile counterparts immediately before and after the Holocaust. Although the influence of George Mosse, Aschheim's dissertation director, on his subject matter and approach is apparent, Aschheim brings a moderate postmodern perspective to bear on these topics and often challenges the conclusions of his mentor.

Although Aschheim concurs with Mosse's view of the centrality of the liberal conception of *Bildung* or cultivation to German-Jewish identity, he also argues that an explicit rejection of the liberal doctrines of rational self-cultivation and linear progress provided a common denominator to the philosophical and religious systems developed by the major figures of the Weimar Republic's Jewish revival: Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Franz Rosenzweig, and Gershom Scholem. He contends that their ideas reflected a "quasi-messianic, utopian, and apocalyptic temper, which so widely pervaded the Weimar Republic" (p. 37) and ultimately undermined the ideological foundations of German-Jewish emancipation. Whereas Mosse highlights the distinctive German-Jewish ethical humanism behind Benjamin's and Bloch's socialism and Scholem's Zionism, Aschheim stresses how these thinkers defined their Jewishness in post-Nietzschean terms that exploded the "most-cherished assumptions" (p. 44) of the enlightenment rationales for Jewish integration into German society.

Aschheim's refusal to reduce the relationships between Germans and Jews to facile generalizations informs his two essays on the post-Holocaust correspondence between German and Jewish intellectuals. The letters exchanged between Hermann Broch and Volkmar von Zuehlsdorff confirm the typical polarization of German and Jewish attitudes after Auschwitz. Broch, who returned to Judaism after having converted to Catholicism, castigated the Germans for their lack of guilt over the mass murder of European Jewry and their myopic sense of self-pity for their own postwar sufferings. Zuehlsdorff, a participant in the resistance against Hitler, dissociated the German masses from Nazi atrocities and believed that only the rapid restoration of Germany's sovereignty could enable its people to confront the Nazi past. In contrast, the correspondence between Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers often "rose above communal postures and conventional pieties" (p. 97). Although each had disputed the other's idiosyncratic notion of Jewish and German identity before 1933, the Holocaust prompted Jaspers to condemn the German public for its complicity in genocide, and it led Arendt to see Nazi totalitarianism as a breakdown rather than a culmination of German culture.

In the two chapters on the intellectual roots of the Holocaust, Aschheim avoids engaging in the teleological exercise of tracing direct causal connections between ideas and policies. As he observes in his discussion of the myth of the "Judaization" of Germany, the charge that Jews exerted too much influence in Germany was a "polyvalent myth" that was "easily adapted to different interest groups and ideological orientations" (p. 45), resulting in a variety of proposed solutions for the problem. Precisely the diverse connotations of this accusation made it so lethal when appropriated by racists to justify genocide as a cure for all kinds of cultural, economic, political, and social ills.

Discussing Friedrich Nietzsche's influence on Nazi anti-Semitism, Aschheim recognizes that his writings on Jews and Judaism "provide a positive goldmine of varied possibilities" (p. 71) for contradictory interpretations. He adds, however, that Nietzsche's amoralism and his critique of Judaism as the source of slave morality were all too easily invoked as rationales for the unprecedented extent and nature of the Holocaust. To counter the tendency of some postwar scholars to deny any such connection by reading Nietzsche entirely as an existentialist or postmodernist, Aschheim cites Jacques Derrida's admission in "Otobiographies: The Teaching of Nietzsche and the Politics of the Proper Name," (*The Ear of the Other: Otobiography Transference Translation* [1985], pp. 30–31) that it must be significant that until now "the only politics calling itself—proclaiming itself—Nietzschean will have been a Nazi one" (p. 76).

Aschheim begins and ends his book with essays on how the Holocaust has been remembered and interpreted. In the first chapter, he describes the various purposes the Holocaust has served in the writings of prominent eyewitnesses and survivors. Next, he reviews the emotional and political role the Holocaust

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has played in the formation of German and Israeli identities.

Aschheim's final essay cogently summarizes current trends in Holocaust historiography. He asserts that much of the recent research on the Third Reich's bureaucratic structure, policy making, popular support, and treatment of other pariah groups has led to the recognition of a variety of factors besides the virulence of anti-Semitism in modern Germany that, taken together, culminated in the Holocaust. Although Aschheim clearly recognizes the influence of German *völkisch* nationalism and racism, particularly on the Nazi leadership, in the genesis of the Final Solution, he does not discount the effect of more universal factors such as the amoral efficiency of centralized state governments and industrial technology. He wisely concludes that no monolithic explanation can ever fully do justice to an event as complex as the Holocaust. At a time when the thesis that the Holocaust was the inevitable climax of German anti-Semitism has been resurrected by Daniel Goldhagen (*Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* [1996]), Aschheim's nuanced approach is sorely needed.

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T. C. PRICE ZIMMERMANN. *Paolo Giovio: The Historian and the Crisis of Sixteenth-Century Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 391. $39.50.

A biography of Paolo Giovio (1483–1552) was long overdue, and T. C. Price Zimmermann's work bridges an important gap in the history of sixteenth-century Italy. Giovio was a humanist and historian present at many of the important events of the sixteenth century. He was in Rome during the sack of 1527 and at the battle of Agnadello in 1509; the latter encounter marked the end of Venice's status as a major power. Giovio interviewed many eyewitnesses to the military campaigns of his period and gathered information from visitors of the most distant places. He also traveled extensively throughout Italy, Germany, and France. After a period of studies at Pavia and Padova, Giovio practiced briefly as a physician before choosing letters as his main occupation. He was at the court of various popes—Leo X, Adrian VI, Clement VII, and Paul III—before ending his days in Florence at the court of Cosimo I. Giovio wrote extensively, mainly in Latin, on many topics. His most important writings include a series of biographies of the great leaders of his time, the *Ragionamenti sopra i motti e disegni d'arme e d'amore* and the *Historiarum sui temporis libri XLV* (in reality thirty-five books, not forty-five), which cover the period from 1494 to 1547. As Zimmermann points out, Giovio lacks the historical acumen of Francesco Guicciardini or Niccolò Machiavelli. Yet the humanist's approach to the battlefield is of great value to military historians, because he based his narrative on eyewitness accounts.

This work offers a meticulous description of every facet of Giovio's life. Zimmermann's decision not to give a literal but sense translation of Latin and Italian citations is to be praised. Literal translations sometimes miss a phrase's meaning. Zimmermann can be very incisive, as in his concluding chapter, where he gives a short but insightful comparison of Giovio's work with that of Machiavelli and Guicciardini. Yet the more ambitious project announced in the book's subtitle leaves the reader puzzled. There is little, except the biographical details of Giovio's own life, about "the crisis of sixteenth-century Italy." The psychological and intellectual crises of most of the personalities of the century are touched only on the surface. Zimmermann's attempt to place the details of the historian's life in a wider context fails. Giovio belonged to a generation of intellectuals (Baldassarre Castiglione, Giovanni Della Casa, Carlo Gualteruzzi, and others) born toward the end of the fifteenth or at the beginning of the sixteenth century. This was a period characterized by the Italian wars, the split of Christendom, and the disintegration of many political and social institutions in Italy. It witnessed the emergence of a new type of relationship between the intellectual and the ruling class, the destruction of many courts, the increasing tendency toward stronger and tighter political regimes, and the spiritual anguish of people such as the later Michelangelo, all pointing to God, or among the *terza rima* poets of 1530s Rome, lost in a vain display of wit and lust. Nor can one find much in this book about the important period of transition in the 1540s that led the Italian states into the Counter Reformation nightmare. It is not that Zimmermann ignores these events. Giovio did live through them, after all, but Zimmermann makes only a modest attempt to tie his life to the larger picture.

One of the problems is Zimmermann's understanding of the term "Italia" as used in the sixteenth century. He views it in the same perspective as many nationalist historians of the nineteenth century, who consciously or unconsciously confused the cultural nation with the politically unified or unifiable country that existed neither in the hearts nor on the political maps and plans of the Cinquecento. This applies not only to writers like Giovio but even to Machiavelli, despite his concluding remarks in *The Prince*, the nineteenth-century interpretations of Francesco De Sanctis, and the influential twentieth-century view of Antonio Gramsci.

Zimmermann's work is a good, reliable biography of Giovio, but readers inquiring about the "crisis of sixteenth-century Italy" should seek elsewhere.

ANTONIO SANTOSUOSSO
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ALESSANDRA STADERINI. *Combattenti senza divisa: Roma nella grande guerra*. (Biblioteca storica.) Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino. 1995. Pp. 450. L. 48,000.

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Italian historians, with the notable exception of Giuliana Procacci, have shown little interest in the home front during World War I. In this impressive monograph, based almost exclusively on the rich sources in the Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Alessandra Staderini examines the impact of the war on the various groups in Roman society. In particular, she explains the changing relationships of the citizens to the state that resulted, in Italy as in other belligerent nations, in increased state involvement in individual lives. As a result, the state created a mentality of dependence on central authority.

The citizens of Rome, so many of whom relied, directly or indirectly, on the state for employment, were perhaps more susceptible to this mentality of dependence than those in Milan or Turin. Nevertheless, as Staderini convincingly demonstrates, the city's inhabitants lived in a completely different manner at the end of the war than they had at the beginning. There was a general leveling of Roman society, as all classes came to accept as a right the state's help for consumers, those seeking employment, and those demanding pay increases.

In an eloquent chapter on the politics of rationing, Staderini points out the difficulties faced by authorities. Although Rome did not witness any demonstration as dramatic as the upheaval in Turin in August 1917, there were a number of anti-war demonstrations in the poorest sections of the city that year. As the state restricted the distribution of grain and flour, the prefect of Rome, Faustino Aphel, warned his superiors of the connection between the demonstrations (primarily composed of women) and the lack of food on store shelves. Indeed, politicians attempted to use the cooperatives to help with the distribution of food, but decentralization proved cumbersome, and, in early 1918, responsibiiity for distribution reverted to the state.

The war also brought military control in the factories. Although the factories in Rome were never as politicized as those in northern Italy, the military did face grave disciplinary problems. Long hours and the strain of piece-work increased absenteeism sharply and affected the quality of production. In particular, adolescent males revolted so vigorously against the ever-increasing demands made on them that, by 1916, they faced the same disciplinary actions formerly reserved for the military.

The author has produced a meticulously researched study of the effects of the war on the home front in Rome. Her extensive footnotes often contain insights that might profitably have been included in the text and do, certainly, offer an exhaustive bibliography of both primary and secondary sources. If the book has a weakness, it is its failure to give full consideration to the *mentalité* issue. Perhaps because of Staderini's concentration on organizations, she does not provide the full flavor of daily life on the home front.

However, as Staderini correctly points out, the effect of all these changes was to alter forever the mentality of the Romans. Nothing united them more than their common sorrow over their fallen loved ones, who had made the ultimate sacrifice for their country.

CHARLES L. BERTRAND
Concordia University

RICHARD DRAKE. *The Aldo Moro Murder Case*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 318. $45.00.

Richard Drake, author of the excellent *The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy* (1989), is one of the few men in North America who really understands the revolutionary left in Italy.

His new book is a methodical investigation into the judicial aftermath of the 1978 kidnapping and killing of Aldo Moro. Drake takes us back to the dog days of the Cold War, when Moro was on the verge of creating what ideologues in both Moscow and Washington viewed with bilateral horror: a *compromesso storico* between Italy's Communists (the PCI) and the generally conservative Catholics of Moro's own Christian Democratic Party (or DC).

Some history books are totally accessible to the reader who knows nothing of the topic. This is not one of them; Drake asssumes on page one that we understand the main outline of post-war Italian history and the general story of the Red Brigades. For Italian history enthusiasts, however, his story is an exciting one. When Moro's body was found in Rome on May 9, 1978, the "historic compromise" was dead and the rumors began to fly. Clearly, the solemn, scholarly, professor-statesman had been murdered by the Italian Red Brigades, led at that time by the demonic Mario Moretti, but who—if anyone—was behind the gunmen?

Drake takes us carefully through the sixteen years of trials and public hearings that followed. The famous Moro Commission was Italy's answer to the American Warren Commission, and it did a better job. From an outsider's perspective, some other trials might have seemed unconnected with the Moro tragedy, but Drake's analysis of the P2 Scandal (the story of Giorgio Galli, Michele Sindona, Lucio Calvi, and their rogue Masonic Lodge) shows that—in Italian politics—everything is connected to everything else.

Drake's concluding chapter is well conceived and executed. Just as the American public has never quite accepted Lee Harvey Oswald's responsibility in the Kennedy assassination, Italians have always wondered if the real responsibility for Moro's death has been assigned.

On the basis of competent work by the Italian judiciary, Drake argues convincingly that the verdict is in. Moro was killed by the Red Brigades, an authentically Italian and independent revolutionary organization. The Red Brigades did it as part of their campaign to overthrow the Italian government and replace it with a Marxist regime. Henry Kissinger, assorted American intelligence organizations, the Mossad, and

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the Soviet Secret Service may all have had their reasons for wanting to destabilize Italy and destroy Moro, but they did not order his execution. The Red Brigades did and they did it alone. Moretti and his colleagues were captured, tried, justly convicted, and sent to prison. There was a murder, but there is no longer a mystery.

RICHARD O. COLLIN
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DAVID I. KERTZER. *Politics and Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of Communism*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 211. $25.00.

David I. Kertzer concedes that his book is not the most thoroughgoing factual account yet published of the old Italian Communist Party's (PCI) momentous transformation into the new Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), but he claims to offer an original theoretical insight into the story's hidden elements. An anthropologist and a social scientist, he criticizes political scientists for their rational model of human motivation and supports such theorists as Pierre Bourdieu, Antonio Gramsci, and Michel Foucault who are said here to deal in the root emotional forces of history: symbols, ceremonies, and ritual. The book mounts a strong case for the importance of these categories of analysis in understanding the true nature of the clash between the PCI moderates who led the fight for the creation of the PDS and the intransigents who sought to keep the dream of communism alive but ended by seceding from the party. He reveals in an admirably detailed and clear way how the contending PCI factions fought their battles not over a stable set of quantifiable interests but on the terrain of history. Both sides sought to manipulate the party's past, its symbols, and its rituals to suit their political needs of the moment. This, the main part of the book, is a convincingly argued case study of Kertzer's mythic model of political analysis.

Difficulties arise when he ventures to claim too much for the model. Not content merely to employ it as a means of understanding a particular issue in contemporary Italian politics, Kertzer unaccountably expands his argument to include a world historical generalization. He claims ultimately not to see "really such a great difference" (p. 92) between the mythmaker and the historian. As proof of his general theory about the partisan use of history, he points out the failure of Communist historians to acknowledge the popular support that existed in Italy for fascism and to analyze accurately and honestly the true nature of the Italian Resistance movement during World War II. While such criticisms expose the inadequacies of Italian Communist historiography, in the manner of the late Renzo De Felice's polemic (uncited in this book) against what he called the grossly misleading Marxist vulgate on fascism, they do not justify Kertzer's sweeping theoretical conclusions.

He himself undercuts any such conclusions in a chapter entitled "Making Communist History." There he essays the role of historian and fully exposes the patent differences between historical analysis and mythmaking. Arguing against the Communists' self-serving interpretation of their past, he resorts to the telling phrase "In fact" (p. 28) and then adds that they counted practically for nothing during most of the fascist regime. Moreover, the decisive moral, democratic, and heroic wartime role that the Communists retrospectively fashioned for their party had little to do with its Stalinism or the military realities of the Italian theater. On the basis of what he calls the true historical record, Kertzer exposes the essential falsity of the Communist interpretation. History, he makes plain in this chapter, is the difficult quest for an authentic understanding of the past as opposed to the mythmaking and propagandizing of special interest groups, such as the Italian Communist party, which always have a primary agenda of power, not of truth. Foucauldian pronouncements about the imprisonment of "truth" in an iron cage of quotation marks for the crime of being nothing more than a function of power are shown in numerous specific ways by Kertzer himself, contrary to his elaborately hedged theoretical argument, to be fundamentally inadequate in the writing of history.

RICHARD DRAKE
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MARTIN MAYER. *Elementarbildung in Jugoslawien (1918–1941): Ein Beitrag zur gesellschaftlichen Modernisierung?* (Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, number 96.) Munich: R. Oldenbourg. 1995. Pp. 247. DM 68.

Martin Mayer's scholarly study of the relationships in the first Yugoslavia (1918–1941) between education, economic development, social institutions, and anthropology is inspired by Holm Sundhaussen ("Alphabetisierung und Wirtschaftswachstum in den Balkanländern in historischer komparativer Perspektive," in Norbert Reiter and Holm Sundhaussen, eds., *Allgemeinbildung als Modernisierungsfaktor: Südosteuropa von der Aufklärung bis zum zweiten Weltkrieg* [1994], pp. 21–36) and Marie-Janine Calic (*Sozialgeschichte Serbiens 1815–1941: Der aufhaltsame Fortschritt während der Industrialisierung* [1994]) and influenced by the perspectives of such scholars as Carlo M. Cipolla, George M. Foster, Charles Jelavich, Daniel Lerner, Hans Medick, Theodore W. Schultz, Emmanuel Todd, and Jozo Tomasevich. Mayer acknowledges a lag of twenty years before a certain level of literacy can exert an initial impact and more than a hundred years before it can exert a maximum impact on economic growth (p. 19). He nevertheless draws conclusions from two decades of exceptional political and economic disorder that fell hard on the newly formed state of Yugoslavia, whose political nucleus—Serbia—had lost much scarce human capital in World War I but had to govern territories with German, Hungarian, Italian, and Ottoman traditions, Muslim and Catholic populations (so different from those of pre-1912 Orthodox Serbia),

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non-Slavic minorities, diverse weights and measures, and different money, school systems, and law codes.

In the Western European experience, a forty to sixty percent level of literacy preceded rapid economic growth (p. 15). Such growth occurred in the zone of high literacy: Scotland, England, Scandinavia, and, as others have shown, Europe east of a line from Saint-Malo to Geneva and northern Italy and west of a line coinciding with the eastern boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire (Carlo M. Cipolla, *Literacy and Development in the West* [1969]; François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, *Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry* [1982]; Lars G. Sandberg, "Ignorance, Poverty, and Economic Backwardness in the Early Stages of European Industrialization: Variations on Alexander Gerschenkron's Grand Theme," *Journal of European Economic History* [Winter 1982]: pp. 675–97). Mayer identifies a literacy gradient in Yugoslavia along the Sava and Danube rivers. In 1900, the literacy level stood at forty-five percent in Croatia-Slavonia, sixty-five percent in Vojvodina, and twenty-one percent in Serbia (p. 54), where it was no lower than it had been west and south of the Saint-Malo–Geneva line in 1800. Mayer neglects to relate, however, that the literacy level in Serbia under Ottoman rule, in 1800, had been no more than one or two percent.

In 1921, the number of presumed literates in Yugoslavia over the age of ten stood at 49.5 percent. It successively rose, in 1931, 1944, and 1948, to 55.4, 62.0, and 74.6 percent, respectively (p. 205). The literacy gradient was bent southward to include Serbia in its pre-1878 borders. In 1926–1927, the area with the greatest number of elementary schools—one school to 924 inhabitants—was the Bitola (Bitolj) district of Macedonia, well to the south of the literacy gradient, while the percentage of children seven to ten years old attending school was almost as high in the eastern Serbian Timok district as in Slovenia, Vojvodina, and the Danube district and slightly higher than in the Zagreb district. Favorable to school attendance was the presence of compact rural settlements as against the dispersed settlements common in Bosnia-Hercegovina (pp. 185, 187).

Mayer's work represents a genuine contribution to the study of Yugoslav schools of every kind. Like literacy, school enrollment in gymnasia—schools oriented toward middle-level careers in public administration—varied by region. In 1938–1939, it comprised one percent of the population in Slovenia, Dalmatia, and pre-1912 Serbia, 0.9 percent in Croatia-Slavonia, 0.8 percent in Vojvodina, 0.6 percent in Macedonia, Kosovo, and the Sandžak, 0.45 percent in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and 1.9 percent in Montenegro (pp. 113, 218).

Critical of the continuing valuation of the extended family in Yugoslavia, Mayer embraces Emmanuel Todd's view (*The Causes of Progress: Culture, Authority, and Change* [1987]) that the potential of a people for economic growth varies with differences in family type (as determined by degrees of parental authority and feminism, the latter expressed by delayed marriage for women) and with geographical/communicational closeness to an area from which can be diffused a demand for the achievements of the family type with the highest cultural potential (p. 195). One may object that family types are not wholly self-generative but in part the product of security or insecurity of life and property.

TRAIAN STOIANOVICH
Rutgers University, New Brunswick

TONE BRINGA. *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village*. (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. xxi, 281. Cloth $49.50, paper $17.95.

This book is based on field research carried out by Tone Bringa, who lived in the village of Dolina (not the real name), two hours' drive north of Sarajevo, in 1987 and 1988. She has visited it several times since 1993, when the Muslim two-thirds of Dolina's 600 people were thoroughly "cleansed" and all their houses were burned by the HVO (Croatian) forces with aid from the village's Croats. As a result, her book provides not only excellent anthropological findings but also a living picture of a Muslim-Catholic community that no longer exists and probably never can regain its centuries-old form.

The book's theme is the manner in which Muslims define themselves, both within their own group and in relation to others. The household and a series of "religious" practices and customs—that is, culture and especially the environment, rather than race—defined the Muslims' identity. In this regard, the Bosnian Muslims' concept conformed to the general Islamic view that faith and culture, not race, determine one's identity.

Bringa deals with the Bosnian Islamic identity first at the historical level as debated by "outsiders," meaning the urban intellectuals and politicians, and then at the communal level as part of everyday life.

Bringa might have emphasized further that the unique Euro-Islamic features of Bosnian Islam developed during the early phase of the Ottoman state from a combination of the Turks' own version of folk Islam and the unique cultural and political conditions of the Balkans at that time. The late M. Fuad Koprulu accurately described the Islam of the early Ottoman rulers as being a heterogeneous system of beliefs, for it encompassed various pre-Islamic cultural-religious elements, the heretical doctrines of certain Anatolian dervishes, and the beliefs of folk Christianity. Disseminated initially by the mystic unorthodox sufis, the "abdals" of Rum (Rome), this syncretic Islam accommodated the beliefs of the Balkan peoples and preached equality to the lower classes. It therefore attracted a large number of "heretics," that is, Chris-

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tian skeptics who had mistrusted the dogma of the state and church, and it appealed to peasants oppressed by the feudal social order of Byzantium and/or the Crusaders.

Bringa states that the Muslims of Dolina preserved and Islamized much of their pre-Islamic culture, which then became the source of their identity. They celebrated the coming of the spring and fertility on May 6, the *Jurjevdan* (St. George's Day), and they visited the tombs of the *şehit* (martyrs) and *evliya* (religious men) and the sufi *tekije* (lodges) despite the warning of the higher Muslim authorities in Sarajevo that these practices were non-Islamic. The Ottomans recognized that the Bosnian Muslims had an identity different from that of the Serbs and Croats, both as Muslims and as a linguistic group, the "Boşnaks." The Serbian and Croatian elites, in Belgrade and Zagreb, however, unlike their rural counterparts, traditionally have not regarded the Bosnian Muslims as a different *nacija* (nation in the religious sense). Instead, those elites consider the Boşnaks converted Serbs or Croats who have no ethnic (racial) origin, no "national" past, and presumably no future, unless they return to the national fold by converting to Catholicism or Orthodoxy.

Even if one ignores the existence of a medieval Bosnian state, the available evidence supports the view that the Muslim Bosnians were, in fact, a separate "ethnic" group whose identity had a religious-cultural origin rather than a racial one. While Turks in general referred to Bosnian Muslims as "Boşnaks" and defined their language as "Boşnakça," they called Bosnian Serbs and Croats "from Bosnia" and their languages "srpça" and "hrvatça" although the three languages are similar. Moreover, the Yugoslav government recognized the Muslims as a *narod* (nation in the lay sense) in the 1970s and granted them the status of "nationality" as Muslims, yet the Serbs and Croats refuse to admit that the Boşnaks are a separate ethnic nation like themselves. They are no doubt apprehensive about the high Bosnian Muslim birth rate, which could raise the proportion of the Muslims from 43.7 to 52 percent by the end of the century. By contrast, Serbs accounted for 31.3 and Croats for 17.3 percent of the total Bosnian population of 4.3 million in the census of 1991.

The bulk of Bringa's research is dedicated to studying the village community in which the Catholic and Muslim *nacijas* built and maintained their separate religious identities around specific *običaj* (customs) and in-group marriages while also socializing as individuals and members of the village community. They attended each other's ceremonies of birth and marriage, exchanged gifts, and helped each other to build houses, mosques, and churches. At the same time, the women assumed key roles, especially after being married, in maintaining the Muslim identity, for they fasted, prayed, and attended various religious ceremonies far more frequently than the men, in effect holding together the *sredina* (social-cultural environment), the main source of identity.

Bringa does not stress sufficiently that inhabiting the "new" or "old" village district, possessing modern education and manners, and having access to income from work in Europe all tended to lessen differences between Dolina's Muslims and Catholics and simultaneously increased the Christians' awareness that they could identify themselves with Europe and so claim to be superior to their Muslim fellows. Expressions such as "do nas" and "do vas" (among us—among you), which in the past had described objective differences in Muslim and Catholic customs, became value judgments. I believe that this development psychologically enabled the Croats (and the Serbs) to pose as the defenders of Western civilization against "Muslim fundamentalism." Any Muslim custom or practice could thus be indicted as a threatening fundamentalist ritual. In sum, modernization and progress increased the Christians' identification with Europe and turned the differences of faith into qualitative civilizational differences. In this process, the Croats acquired the moral alibi—or justification—for annihilating the inferior Muslims.

I only wish that Bringa had studied further the other possible latent sources of conflict in Dolina. Nevertheless, that shortcoming, some confusion about *tevhid* and *mevlud* (ceremonies for the dead), and the need for more information about the village's relations with the town and the city constitute very minor blemishes. This is a well-researched, objective, and truly original—in fact a unique—piece of work that all students of the Balkans and of religion should read.

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HERBERT H. KAPLAN. *Russian Overseas Commerce with Great Britain during the Reign of Catherine II*. (Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, number 218.) Philadelphia, Pa.: The Society. 1995. Pp. xxx, 309. $40.00.

Over the course of the eighteenth century, overseas trade between Russia and Britain became increasingly important to both countries. Russia exported to Britain materials such as iron, timber, hemp, flax, and tallow that sustained and encouraged Britain's industrial revolution, while Britain supplied Russia with fabrics, tropical colonial products, and foreign exchange that played an important role in Russia's westernization. Producers and middlemen in each country depended heavily on the market provided by the other. Russia maintained a favorable balance of trade with Britain, but British merchants, British ships, and British finance controlled the lion's share of Russia's overseas commerce. Catherine II (1762–1796) set out to increase the Russian role in overseas trade, but her efforts were in the end unsuccessful and even counterproductive.

Much of Herbert H. Kaplan's thesis, summarized in the preceding paragraph, has been anticipated by

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others and is generally accepted by scholars in the field. Rather than revising an accepted historical interpretation, his book serves to pull the various elements of an interpretation together, clarify it, and provide it with a firm factual foundation. Whereas previous judgments about Anglo-Russian commercial relations were based largely on fragmentary data and the perceptions of contemporaries, Kaplan's view of those relations is supported by exhaustive—for the reader, often exhausting—detail he has discovered in British archival collections. In them, he found not only British records on Anglo-Russian trade but also copies of records that the British requested and received from the Russians. Kaplan's presentation of this data frequently makes for heavy going, but the reader's burden is lightened by his extensive use of charts and tables that clearly and effectively summarize his material. The book provides a wealth of information on the exchange of various commodities between the two countries but says relatively little about the intangible aspects of that trade, especially the crucial role that bills of exchange and other credit instruments played in financing Russia's internal trade.

Although Kaplan has combined his archival research with a wide-ranging and exemplary examination of the secondary literature, he frequently stops short of engaging that literature in a critical discussion of the issues. His numerous and lengthy footnotes are mostly lists of references that do not specify particular contributions or distinguish supporting views from contrary ones. By the same token, Kaplan too seldom explains how his own contributions support, contradict, add to, or cast new light on the findings of others.

For Russian historians, the most interesting and valuable part of this book will be its portrayal of Russia's efforts to loosen British control of its commerce and expand the role of Russian merchants and ships. Kaplan faults Catherine for failing to give a high priority to those efforts and to support her goals with a concerted and coordinated program focused on merchants and shippers. Instead, her government allowed foreign merchants to enroll in Russian merchant guilds and foreign ships to fly the Russian flag, thereby taking advantage of the abatements and other privileges Russia offered its own subjects. The result, as Kaplan clearly shows, was a nominal but essentially fictitious russification of overseas trade. In reality, the participation of native Russians in overseas trade diminished and the imperial government lost vitally needed revenue. Kaplan also presents armed neutrality as a futile diplomatic effort to russify or at least diversify Russia's foreign trade. He argues persuasively that it failed because the country lacked the means and resources to make it effective.

British historians will also find much that is interesting and valuable in Kaplan's discussions of the importance of Russia in Britain's international trade and the importance of Russian commodities in the eighteenth-century British economy. The mutual dependence of the two economies constituted a fundamental and largely unalterable condition of eighteenth-century commerce and diplomacy, as Kaplan convincingly demonstrates.

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[All reviewers of books by Indiana University faculty are selected with the advice of the Board of Editors.]

Thomas C. Owen. *Russian Corporate Capitalism from Peter the Great to Perestroika*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 259. $55.00.

Thomas C. Owen's book, his third to focus on the understudied phenomenon of Russian capitalism, is complex and ambitious. In it, Owen shares the results of his long effort to produce a comprehensive set of data on corporations founded in the Russian Empire between 1704 and 1913. Surveying over 4,500 corporations, this RUSCORP database provides information on their function, location, capitalization, number and price of shares, and restrictions on property ownership, as well as on the ethnicity and citizenship of managers and stockholders. Owen presents eighteen tables and nineteen figures, provides detailed descriptions of the statistical tests employed in analyzing the data, and sets his discussion in the framework of population ecology. Although Owen's discourses on statistical methods and organizational sociology will appeal to some historians more than others, his conclusions are worthy of serious consideration.

Owen also takes a daring approach chronologically. Following consideration of corporate capitalism in imperial Russia, Owen describes the forms of corporate entrepreneurship that emerged during perestroika, from 1985 to 1990. The book concludes with an illuminating reflection on what the pre-1914 and the post-1985 experiences reveal about the nature of Russian capitalism. In the second half of the book, Owen demonstrates his mastery of an extraordinarily diverse range of sources, both historical and contemporary.

Owen's nuanced consideration of the overall shape of corporate capitalism in Russia before 1914 includes a periodization of the founding of corporations. He identifies patterns that reappear in the late 1980s, chief among them being a generally small number of firms, a high degree of geographical concentration, and the predominence of foreign investment and practices. He also notes that, in both periods, former bureaucrats predominated in the corporate elite, although the comparison of five years of perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev with two hundred years of corporate enterprise under the tsars may exaggerate this common trend. The most significant dissimilarity between the two periods Owen observes is that, whereas the tsarist regime rejected incorporation by simple registration until the very end, Gorbachev broke this tradition with the Law on Enterprises issued in June 1990.

Although the RUSCORP data does not reveal much

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about the social status of corporate managers, it provides a wealth of information on their ethnic background. It will not surprise many scholars in the field that these data reveal the strong presence of russified Germans, Jews, and Poles, as well as foreign subjects, among corporate managers at the end of the old regime. Owen's empirical information offers a more complete picture, however, than the anecdotal evidence on which we have heretofore relied. He also profiles the ethnic composition of managers in various cities and various branches of industry.

Although Owen does not stress it, his data also demonstrate that the role of ethnic Russians in corporate management was rising between 1905 and 1914. The conflation of Jews and others born inside the Russian Empire with foreign subjects for the purpose of quantifying the "foreignness" of Russian capitalism raises some concern. There were many Russians who distinguished between "foreigners," whose presence in management they resented, and native-born Germans, Poles, and Jews, whom they accepted as colleagues.

The argument Owen is keenest to make on the basis of his empirical data and his comparison of periods is that the most serious obstacle to the acceptance of capitalism in Russia has been its identification as a foreign phenomenon. He draws on a wide range of well-known and obscure figures both past and present to build his case for the essentially xenophobic anticapitalism of both radicals and reactionaries. Although he demonstrates convincingly that antiforeign feeling accounts, at least in part, for the failure of "capitalist" attitudes to take root in Russia, Owen pushes some af this material too far. Are we obliged to take V. I. Lenin's reference to the power of foreign creditors such as the Rothschilds and Gerson Bleichroeder as a symptom of his anti-Semitism or xenophobia? Owen is on firmer ground when he describes what he calls "Slavophile capitalism" (p. 127), although his lucid description of the phenomenon complicates his general argument that the weak development of corporate capitalism in Russia stems mainly from xenophobia. Owen does distinguish, although too briefly, between cultural anticapitalism based on antipathy to market-oriented behaviors and xenophobic anticapitalism, but occasionally he offers as evidence of the latter material that suggests the former.

In his final chapter on the varieties of Russian capitalism, Owen offers a welcome assessment of the prognosis for corporate capitalism in Russia's future. His effort to rate each of three possible variants against Weberian categories (Table 6.1) may appeal to readers who have little use for the methodical accumulation of evidence outlined in the book's first five chapters. But, in this ambitious book, Owen has offered powerful proof that careful historical investigation is the key to understanding our own times.

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ANNA PROCYK. *Russian Nationalism and Ukraine: The Nationality Policy of the Volunteer Army during the Civil War*. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. 1995. Pp. xvi, 202. $39.95.

As Mark von Hagen notes in his thoughtfully written preface, "this is a book about history's losers and about lost opportunities" (p. ix). Anna Procyk's subjects are the men and women who struggled to build an independent Ukraine on the lands of the fallen Russian Empire in 1917–1920, the Russians who supported the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army, and the way in which both groups failed to bring into being a democratic, multi-ethnic, federated republic that could offer a meaningful alternative to Bolshevik dictatorship. Ultimately, as von Hagen explains, Procyk's study is the story of "the tragic confrontation of Ukrainian federalism with Russian great-power centralism" (p. xi). As such, it tells of missed opportunities, failed compromises, and flawed visions that permitted tradition and prejudice to overrule good political sense in an arena in which the opportunities for effective common action between the peoples of the former Russian Empire have always been few and far between.

In comparing the Whites who struggled to shape an anti-Bolshevik alliance in Russia's southwestern borderlands with the several Ukrainian governments that held power between 1917 and 1920, Procyk clearly sees the latter as the most farseeing. One of the key points in her carefully researched volume is that the Whites in Russia's south—many of whom were, in fact, liberal Kadets and not the reactionary monarchists they often have been made out to be—remained inexcusably shortsighted in demanding that a united Russia be preserved at all costs, even when an alliance with powerful minority federalist groups might have turned the tide of the civil war in their favor. Convinced that "a federated Russia with a constitutional regime at the center" (p. 169) would mark the beginning of the empire's disintegration, the Whites repeatedly rebuffed efforts by Ukrainian federalists to find common ground from which to launch joint action against the Bolsheviks. Only the Great Russian vision, they insisted, could be allowed to shape the future of lands that had once been part of the Russian Empire, and in no case would they agree to letting Russians be reduced to the role of a national minority in any part of it. Procyk insists that in principle such Whites "made little distinction between the nationalists in the borderlands and the Bolsheviks in the center," and they therefore lumped borderland nationalists, federalists, and Bolsheviks all together as "traitors and 'aliens'" (p. 166).

Forced to maintain their key bases of operations in the very lands in which such "traitors and aliens" sought to realize their own national visions, the Whites in Russia's south and southwest alienated the very elements that could have given them the most effective support. In the end, the Bolsheviks' victory destroyed not only the Whites but also the men and women who

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could have been their most natural allies. Ever-faithful to "great-power chauvinism, . . . at times blurred by the lofty, enlightened slogans in the progressive political programs of the Western-oriented Russian intelligentsia" (p. 175), Procyk concludes, the Whites were destroyed in large measure by their own rigidity and prejudice. The result was defeat in every sense of the word, and the greatest tragedy of all was that the dreams of the men and women with whom they had failed to make common cause perished with them.

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Robert W. Thurston. *Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia 1934–1941*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xxi, 296. $30.00.

From the late 1970s well into the 1980s, "revisionists"—young social historians, myself included, who challenged the totalitarian model and criticized Cold War bias in Sovietology—were the center of controversy in the new field of Soviet history. Critics claimed that the revisionists had their own political bias, namely the desire to whitewash the Soviet regime and minimize Stalinist atrocities. If that was generally an unfair criticism of the work appearing in the heyday of revisionism, it unfortunately comes close to applying to Robert W. Thurston's new book. This is a study of terror and popular responses to it in Stalinist Russia whose main theses are that terror was not as bad as has often been suggested, that most people did not feel particularly threatened, and that Joseph Stalin's responsibility for terror and control of its processes was less than usually imagined. In any case, Thurston argues, ordinary life went on; many people, particularly workers, were satisfied with their lives and supported the regime; and in the end the Soviet Union emerged victorious from the World War II, which it could not have done had the population been basically disaffected.

The problem with these arguments is not that they are necessarily implausible but that Thurston seems to have so strong an *a priori* commitment to them and to presenting the prewar Stalin era in a positive light that it undermines his credibility as an interpreter of data. This is most evident in the first two chapters, where, having gathered a good deal of information on terror before and during the Great Purges, he consistently gives this "negative" evidence a positive spin. Thus, Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov's secret instruction of May 1933, calling for a reduction of terror, is cited as evidence not of the out-of-control repression described in the instruction but of a turn to "more humane" practices allegedly signified by the instruction itself (p. 11), while a hair-raising 1939 report on mass killing in Turkmenistan during the Great Purges is cited as part of an argument that such blood-letting must have been a divergence from Stalin's original intention (p. 62). To be sure, Western Sovietologists during the Cold War often gave analogous data the opposite (negative) spin in just as brazen a manner, but that is no reason for revisionists—ostensibly committed to depoliticization of the field—to emulate them.

The book contains a good deal of archival data on the Great Purges that will be new to most readers: for example, the Turkmenistan report mentioned above and the 1953 report giving year-by-year statistics on political and other arrests, convictions, and executions from 1930 to 1941 (presented in three parts on pp. 10, 63, and 119), both from formerly classified files in the Russian State Archives (GARF). To Thurston's credit, he does not exclude data that fail to support or even undermine his theses. The book has been thoroughly researched in Western and Soviet archives (primarily GARF and the former central party archive, RTsKhIDNI) and draws on the most recent post-Soviet Russian scholarship. Thurston's use of material from the captured Smolensk Archive (held in the United States) and the archive of the postwar Harvard Interview Project is particularly good. In terms of its source base, the book goes well beyond Thurston's 1986 article in *Slavic Review*, which made similar arguments on the basis of published memoir data.

Thurston is stronger on social issues than on political ones. He has interesting things to say about workers' criticism of managers, social relations within the factory, petitions and denunciations, and similar topics. In his occasional analysis of high politics, what comes through most strongly—almost endearingly—is his naiveté. He is persistently puzzled by Stalin's devious and conspiratorial modus operandi, asking plaintively on several occasions if it is really conceivable that Stalin would publicly have said one thing while thinking and planning another. On such issues, he is simply not up to the level of other recent writers on Stalinist high politics such as the American scholar Arch Getty and the Russian Oleg Khlevniuk.

It is evident that this book has undergone extensive peer review and been much revised in consequence. In some instances the modifications are undoubtedly improvements; in others, Thurston may have felt obliged to tone down his arguments so much that some of the force is lost. A case in point is the last chapter on World War II, where the data that Thurston offers against his own argument (that wartime heroism proved popular attachment to the regime) all but overwhelm the argument itself. This makes for a fairly well-rounded chapter, taken in isolation, but it all but destroys the chapter's raison d'être, which is to crown the argument that the Stalinist regime had popular support. It is an uncomfortable reminder that peer review may function not only as a gate-keeping procedure but also as a kind of censorship of unpopular opinions.

More worrying issues are raised by the reception that Thurston's book has already received. It was savagely attacked in the daily and weekly press in terms that often distorted Thurston's arguments, impugned his motives, made irrelevant and unjustified

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accusations, and generally used all the ploys of political smearing and intimidation that are familiar from the Cold War period. Implicit in many of these attacks was the notion that Thurston (or anyone else) does not have the right to draw certain conclusions from his research, that he (not just his work) should be criticized and censured, that he should be forced to confess his errors and make public recantation, and so on. This quintessentially Stalinist approach to the problem of scholarly disagreement strikes a very sour note, as well as leaving one wondering why its exponents should think so poorly of the regime that perfected the kind of political bullying and scapegoating they themselves practice.

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ILYA V. GAIDUK. *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 1996. Pp. xx, 299. $28.50.

This purports to be an account of "the Kremlin's role in Vietnam" based on briefly opened (and now closed) Soviet archives on the war. Despite its claims to offer something new, however, Ilya V. Gaiduk's book is essentially a repetition of past Soviet interpretations of the conflict in which the Americans are the aggressors, the Chinese the perpetrators, and the Russians the peacemakers. Moscow had no interest save to maintain its reputation as the protector of its allies, "fraternal parties of the socialist camp," and was most concerned with preserving détente with the United States. Soviet leaders were innocent of any advantages that could accrue from keeping the United States mired in the quagmire of Vietnam.

Gaiduk claims to cover the years 1964–1973, but he concentrates almost exclusively on the period 1964–1968. Of the book's 250 pages, 193 cover the period 1964–1968, while fifty-seven pages cover the period 1969–1973—a mere twenty-two of which are devoted to the crucial concluding phase of the war. Gaiduk does not address either the 1957–1963 origins of the conflict, during which he claims astoundingly that "the Soviet Union remained chiefly an observer of developments in Vietnam" (p. 5), nor the endgame after the Paris Agreements of January 1973.

The publisher has touted this book as using "secret documents," and there are references to some, but its essential argument is not based on such documentation—at least not on Soviet documents. Gaiduk claims that he "was given exclusive access to most of the secret documents relating to the Soviet Union's role in the Vietnam War" (p. 300), but this claim is impossible to verify. Since Gaiduk alone was given the opportunity to look at some Soviet materials, which were then reclassified, no outside scholar can examine these materials, let alone peruse Soviet archives on the subject. Gaiduk was given no documents of Politburo meetings, nor does he provide discussion of the Soviet decision-making process. His "secret" data consist primarily of reports by embassy officials that embellish but do not substantively change the public record, on which his account actually rests.

Indeed, in an approach common to Soviet writers under the *ancien régime*, Gaiduk devotes more space to analyzing American policy and citing American sources than he does to Soviet ones. There are seventy references to Americans in the index and only forty-four to Russians. His sources are preponderantly American, obtained during a six-month trip to Washington, D.C., to examine newly released materials acquired by the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project. Gaiduk cites U.S. over Soviet data by a margin of three to one, a fact that shapes much of his perspective and affects the entire analysis.

Gaiduk's thesis is that, in the interests of détente, Moscow spared no effort in the search for a negotiated solution to the Vietnam conflict. Even while acknowledging that the Soviets (and the Chinese) provided all of the military materiel with which the Vietnamese fought, his view is that the tail wagged the dog. Hanoi needed and demanded weapons, and Moscow was reluctantly persuaded to supply them. As is well known, however, North Vietnam was completely dependent on Soviet and Chinese support, as it made none of its own weaponry; this raises questions about the "tail wags the dog thesis" and the degree to which Moscow consistently sought a negotiated settlement.

The fundamental contradiction in Gaiduk's thesis between the assertions that Moscow sought a negotiated settlement while also providing the weaponry that reinforced Hanoi's determination to win on the battlefield is partly (and charitably) explained by the author's focus on the diplomatic interplay between Moscow and Washington rather than on a political analysis of the war itself. Yet, even here, the focus is on Washington's efforts to achieve a negotiated peace, not Moscow's. Thus, we have—primarily on the basis of American sources—discussions of repeated U.S. peace efforts, to which Moscow "responded." Gaiduk further argues that despite the provision of munitions, Moscow's "influence in Hanoi did not grow accordingly" (p. 64). It was Beijing's influence that was dominant in Hanoi, he says. Readers familiar with the thousand-year antagonism between China and Vietnam will be surprised to encounter the argument that the Chinese held sway in Hanoi. Even more surprising is the notion that China eagerly supported the establishment of a unified Vietnam, which would have created a long-term foreign policy problem on China's southern border. (The two countries were in almost continuous conflict with each other within months of the end of the war, and China invaded in February 1979.)

Gaiduk asserts that "the Vietnamese Communists shared with their Chinese counterparts a view of the conflict in Southeast Asia and of the international situation." China maintained troops in North Vietnam, and there existed "close ideological ties between Beijing and Hanoi." The North Vietnamese leadership

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held "a strong pro-Chinese feeling [which] pervaded the top leadership of the DRV (pp. 65–66)." In short, Beijing was the villain of the war, urging continued conflict and no negotiated settlement. This view of Chinese influence is partly true for the 1964–1968 period, when Moscow and Beijing provided roughly equal amounts of weaponry to Hanoi, but it is decidedly untrue for the 1969–1972 period (which Gaiduk hardly covers), when Sino-American rapprochement left Hanoi with no choice but to lean heavily on Moscow and be responsive to larger Soviet interests. Soviet interest in a negotiated settlement appears to have been a direct function of the success of Nixon's strategy of reaching détente with China and closing the routes of logistical access to Hanoi. Until those developments coalesced, however, Moscow showed only perfunctory interest in a negotiated settlement.

The reader will search in vain for anything resembling a strategic analysis of the war. Indeed, the only book the author scathingly mentions is Charles Parker's *Vietnam: Strategy for a Stalemate* (1989), which does offer a strategic interpretation of the war, specifically the 1964–1968 period, based on an analysis of Moscow's, Beijing's and Washington's policies. Gaiduk criticizes Parker for something that he does himself: analyzing the voluminous public record without reference to Politburo minutes.

On one crucial point, I wholeheartedly concur with Gaiduk. "Although the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was supported throughout the war by its powerful allies, the USSR and the People's Republic of China, these supporters have virtually escaped the attention of historians of the conflict" (p. xi). This book will have served a purpose if it spurs historians to take a more comprehensive strategic view of the conflict than has hitherto been the case.

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MIDDLE EAST

MICHAEL BONNER. *Aristocratic Violence and Holy War: Studies in the Jihad and the Arab-Byzantine Frontier.* (American Oriental Series, number 81.) New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society. 1996. Pp. xv, 221. $35.00.

This book makes a significant contribution to historical knowledge of the development of early Islam. The standard understanding of *jihad*, both for normative Islamic tradition and for most scholarly work thus far, has been the model defined by the jurists of the early Abbasid period, by which there is one single *dar al-islam* headed by a single political-religious leader, the caliph/*imam*, who alone has the authority to initiate *jihad* as warfare against the *dar al-harb* (the "abode of war"), that portion of the world not ruled by the law of Islam.

Yet there are significant problems with understanding Islam through this conception of Islamic statecraft and the idea of *jihad*. First, the historical development of Islamic statecraft has not followed the juristic blueprint at all well. Second, other models for the authority to wage *jihad* have emerged in Muslim history: that exemplified by Saladin, whose legitimacy as leader in *jihad* came not from being caliph/*imam* but from the individual duty of every Muslim to defend the *dar al-islam*; and the model of *ghazi* (warrior for the faith), by which the early Ottoman rulers claimed their right to inherit the mantle of the Prophet.

The present study by Michael Bonner helps enormously with getting the picture right in both these respects. Its focus is not the intellectual and political atmosphere of Baghdad and the caliphate but the Arab-Byzantine frontier, the Thugur. The importance of the Thugur in the early Abbasid period was twofold: first, it was where the threat (and the opportunity) posed by the *dar al-harb* in the form of the Byzantine Empire was directly experienced; second, the Thugur was Umayyad country, a fact that led to its being somewhat different, both politically and religiously, from the area around Baghdad and to the east.

As Bonner notes (p. 68), on the frontier there was ample incentive for any local ruler to mount an expedition against Byzantine territory for his own purposes, perhaps masked with religious justification. Given this context, Bonner suggests that the juristic requirement that only the *imam* can give permission for *jihad*, and that the *imam* is in fact the caliph, represents an effort to undercut the independence of action of such local rulers. Tied closely to this idea is its mirror image: that local incentives should be replaced by caliphal *jihad* (p. 73). Thus, in Bonner's interpretation, the wars that the early Abbasids (up through Harun al-Rashid) authorized against the Byzantines counted more for caliphal politics—cementing Abbasid authority in this historically pro-Umayyad region—than for their meager results in battle (p. 75). He supports this judgment by drawing attention to the displacement of regionally based commanders by others appointed directly by the Caliph (p. 78), Harun's reorganization of the Thugur (ostensibly better to support *jihad* against the Byzantines) so as to dismember local power bases and replace local notables with centrally appointed governors (p. 87), and, ultimately, Harun's personal leadership in *jihad* against the Byzantines, which cemented his authority as caliph by means of his role as *ghazi* (p. 99).

Parallel to this was the development of religious thought, explored here in a chapter and an appendix on the juristic scholars and ascetics of the Thugur. Common to these figures, Bonner writes, was a "partial rejection of the authority of the caliphs in the conduct of war" (p. 108). Fazari, a contemporary of the magisterial jurist Shaybani, expressed this by personally issuing judgments as to whether campaigns were properly acts of jihad (pp. 110–112). For the ascetic Ibn al-Mubarak, the characteristic expression was an interpretation of individual duty (*fard ʿayn*) that removed

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the authority for war from the caliph/*imam* and placed it in each individual warrior (p. 124).

From this study of the Thugur, then, we have two sorts of challenge to the normative juristic model of caliphal rule and *jihad*. First, the development of this model should be understood not simply as an apolitical statement of the implications of Qur'ān and Hadith but as part of the caliphal politics of the early Abbasid period, including the drawn-out struggle between the caliphate and locally based powers on the frontier. Second, the two alternative models of authorization for *jihad*, that of the *ghazi* and that of the individual seeking out his *fard ʿayn* to defend the *dar al-islam*, turn out not to be later deviations from the model defined by the jurists at the center of the empire but conceptions contemporaneous with it. Both challenges represent important issues deserving historical attention in other contexts.

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AMIRA EL AZHARY SONBOL, editor. *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History*. Foreword by ELIZABETH WARNOCK FERNEA. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1996. Pp. xvi, 357. Cloth $45.00, paper $19.95.

Islamic judicial archives from the cities of the former Ottoman Empire contain abundant material for social history and perhaps the only means of sytematically studying women and the family in this setting. Until recently, there have been some isolated forays into this realm, including the work of Abraham Marcus on Aleppo, Ronald Jennings on Kayseri, and Judith Tucker on Egypt. This volume marks a transition from individual, local projects to a coordinated investigation. From Bulgaria to Iraq to Tunisia, the contributors grapple with common methodological problems and common human dilemmas. Their joint achievements are remarkable.

The book begins with four articles on women in the Middle East by distinguished figures in the field. Barbara Stowasser treats the place of women in the earliest Islamic society, Medina, in the 620s. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot reviews the economic changes affecting women in Ottoman Egypt. Julia Clancy-Smith examines colonial discourse on Muslim women in Algeria. Peter Gran surveys how different configurations of state power relate to patterns of behavior in the realms of marriage and family.

In the five subsequent parts, the book moves on to its central concern, the ways in which judicial records can elucidate the conditions that women faced and the choices they made. In her opening essay, Amira El Azhary Sonbol articulates a principal theme. Contrary to the received idea that modernization has brought improvement to the status of women by loosening the shackles of an archaic and rigid Islamic legal system, Sonbol argues, the opposite has occured. Islamic law prior to the nineteenth century served as a framework within which individuals might negotiate. The modernizing state's obsession with uniformity and control has resulted in more rigid application of Islamic law, often to the detriment of women. The articles in this book confirm the first part of this equation. Sonbol's somber assessment of the modern period needs further examination. Ann Elizabeth Mayer's recent work on family codes in Mediterranean Muslim countries presents a more complex, somewhat more optimistic picture (see "Reform of Personal Status Law in North Africa: A Problem of Islamic or Mediterranean Laws?" *Middle East Journal* [1995]: 432–446).

The first of these sections focuses on women as litigants. Fariba Zarinabef-Shahr investigates appeals to the Imperial Council in Istanbul in the late seventeenth century. Although women were involved in fewer than one out of ten cases, their overall numbers were substantial. The issues at stake were largely economic, with inheritance disputes topping the list. But women also petitioned to recover debts, indicating their active economic role.

Abdal-Rehim Abdal-Rahman Abdel-Rehim takes the reader on a guided tour of Egyptian judicial archives. His article is concerned with the intricate details in marriage contracts and divorce cases. He concludes that Egyptian women in the Ottoman era were active participants in the legal process, not passive victims, and that divorce did not mean destitution for women. If there was a norm, it was serial monogamy for both men and women, not polygamy.

Svetlana Ivanova considers marriage and divorce records from eighteenth-century Ottoman Bulgaria. She raises important interconnected issues in court record methodology and judicial history. She points out that the Ottoman Empire brought about formalization in judicial matters, requiring that all marriage contracts be registered in court, but that many people did not follow this rule. Rather, they continued the traditional practice of having their marriages officiated by the neighborhood *imam*, and "registered" in the oral memory of the witnesses. In divorce cases, the records give hints that customary practice was interwoven with Islamic law. The records available to the historian, in other words, are products of an incomplete formalization that leaves us guessing, speculating, and looking for supplementary sources.

Iris Agmon pursues the same sort of methodological problem related by Ivanova in early twentieth-century Palestine, analyzing two divorce cases. Sensing that the judge in one case seems to have bent the rules to favor the woman, Agmon follows clues as to her identity to discover that she was related to one of the important Sufi leaders of the town. Although the gender of litigants is easily ascertainable from the records, there is a great deal more we would like to know about them, including age, ethnicity, social and economic status, occupation, education, and kinship ties. In such an emotionally charged and legally complex issue as divorce, one also needs to take account of litigants'

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shrewdness and self-control, neither of which qualities, Agmon's cases suggest, are exclusive male domains.

The next group of articles look at the composition and behavior norms of different types of Ottoman households. Nelly Hanna examines marriage-contract stipulations in Egypt, discovering that wealth, age, and previous marriage experience all contributed to empowering women in marriage negotiations. Mary Ann Fay, investigating Egypt, and Dina Rizk Khouri, studying Mosul, Iraq, enter rather exotic terrain for the modern reader, the large-scale households maintained by the Ottoman Empire's provincial elites. These included multiple wives, clients, and slaves. In seeking to perpetuate a household's corporate existence, the endowment was the legal tool of choice. The women often wielded considerable economic power. Drawing on published religious polemics, Khouri shows how the large households—and their strongly secluded if sometimes influential women—were targets of the modernizing elite in the early twentieth century. Modernizers bitterly criticized the veil, not as a symbol of oppression but as a symbol of anonymity that could screen women's autonomy.

In the section devoted to *dhimmis*, or "protected people" (Christians and Jews), Najwa al-Qattan analyzes the use of demeaning "religious markers" in the court records. Mohamed Afifi documents how wealthy Coptic men appropriated Islamic legal devices, particularly polygamy and divorce, when it suited their purposes.

In the section on children, Margaret L. Meriwether combs the court records of Aleppo for cases of the assignment of the right to act as tutor for the minor children of a deceased father. Women, especially mothers, often assumed this role, and Merriwether suggests that demographic factors may have had a bearing on this. Sonbol's article treats the complex question of who had the power to decide to whom a girl or young woman should be betrothed. She explains how the multiplicity of legal traditions in Egypt before the nineteenth century allowed for a degree of flexibility that sometimes worked to the advantage of women. More recently, however, the homogenization of law has reinforced the power of fathers and male guardians.

The deterioration of women's legal rights from roughly the mid-nineteenth century corresponds with increasing levels of constraint and violence. Dalenda Largueche treats this phenomenon, drawing on a wide range of sources for the city of Tunis. Her analysis is somewhat different from Sonbol's in that she stresses the connection between violence and social origins. Rural women in Tunisia, she argues, had always been harshly treated. With the rural exodus starting in the 1860s, the violence moved to the city.

Sonbol's second article demonstrates that women in nineteenth-century Egypt had been able to appeal to judges for favorable divorce terms on grounds of physical harm or lack of material support. In the twentieth century, the courts have become more insistent on a woman's obedience regardless of circumstances. Furthermore, the police have shown little diligence in suppressing rape and the kidnapping of women. (Readers seeking detailed treatment of this period in Egypt's legal history might consult Enid Hill's *Mahkama*.)

Madeleine Zilfi's concluding essay on the Ottoman Empire's Tulip Era provides relief from the grim realities detailed by Largueche and Sonbol. This brief period of cultural opening and social relaxation in the 1720s offers an image of a path not taken.

This outstanding collection of essays not only creates a new picture of the lives of women and families in the Ottoman Empire but also clearly establishes the rich potential of Islamic legal records for the field of social history. It is to be hoped that in the future specialists in Islamic legal history might cross over the artificial boundaries between Middle East, African, and Asian studies to build a comparative approach to the field.

In Ottoman history, two topics that might have been pursued receive limited attention in this volume. Slavery is seldom studied by Middle East historians, but it was an important phenomenon in the Ottoman period, involving slaves from both the Black Sea (Georgians and Circassians) and from sub-Saharan Africa. Slaves were especially important in the large households discussed by Fay and Khouri, and many were women.

A second, connected issue is the role of women in ritual. If we can document a decline in women's role in ritual activity, or in the legitimacy accorded that participation by male religious scholars (a topic touched on in Khouri's piece on Mosul), it might help to understand the deterioration in the realm of women's legal rights. In premodern settings, women were active, albeit separate, participants in Sufi orders. At least in the Maghrib, African slave women, with their specialized skills in spirit healing, had an important role in these activities. The elimination of slavery came at the same time as the erosion of Muslim urban women's legal position and the elimination or delegitimization of their religious voice. This coincidence deserves scrutiny.

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RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN. *The Republic of Armenia*. Volume 3, *From London to Sèvres, February-August, 1920*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. xx, 534. $45.00.

RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN. *The Republic of Armenia*. Volume 4, *Between Crescent and Sickle: Partition and Sovietization*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 496. $45.00.

In the 1960s, Richard G. Hovannisian embarked on an ambitious doctoral project: the history of the Armenian Republic, the first sovereign Armenian state in half a millennium. A number of works on the subject,

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including one by the last prime minister of the republic, Simon Vratzian, had been published in Armenian. Besides lacking objectivity, they had not addressed the multidimensional aspects of the subject, nor had they included non-Armenian sources or other related material. After examining archives in the United States and Europe and gathering numerous official publications, memoirs, newspapers and journals, and secondary sources, Hovannisian realized that he had to modify the scope of his dissertation. He chose to concentrate on the antecedents to the republic, in a work subsequently published as *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (1976) and to write the history of the republic at a later date.

The first Armenian Republic was short-lived; nonetheless, the world and the region experienced tumultuous events during its existence. The Russian Revolution, the independence of Transcaucasia, the Russian civil war, the Turkish invasion of Armenia, the conclusion of World War I and the establishment of the Armenian Republic, the Armeno-Azeri and Armeno-Georgian territorial disputes, the Paris Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson and the Armenian mandate, the negotiations for a peace treaty with the Ottomans, the Soviet-Turkish entente, and the collapse of the republic all took place within a period of less than three years. The immensity of the material necessitated a multi-volume study, and Hovannisian planned a trilogy: *The Republic of Armenia, Volume I: The First Year, 1918–1919* was published in 1971; *Volume II: From Versailles to London, 1919–1920* followed in 1982.

Now Hovannisian's final tome on the history of the first Armenian Republic is available to scholars. In many respects, this work must have been the most difficult to write, for it depicts the final and crucial year of the republic. The international, regional, and internal political and economic developments in 1920 were extremely complicated: the London and San Remo Conferences, border conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Bolshevik movements in Transcaucasia and Armenia, the dictatorship of the Dashnak Bureau and the campaigns against Muslim separatists in the republic, the Treaty of Sèvres, the United States and the resolution of the question of a mandate for Armenia, Armeno-Soviet negotiations, and the Soviet-Turkish agreement and invasion of Armenia. It is not surprising, therefore, that the third part of Havannisian's history had to be divided into two volumes.

As he approaches the last year of the republic, Hovannisian notes that despite the great hardships of the first twenty months, the republic had managed to establish a state. Ministries, political parties, a legislature, diplomatic offices abroad, and the foundations of cultural and economic projects had begun. The major problems which remained were the territorial disputes with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia, the commitment of the Allied Powers to Armenia, the outcome of the Russian civil war, and the economic challenges facing the landlocked republic.

Hovannisian's main objective in these volumes is the analysis of the strategies developed by the Armenian leadership in dealing with these dilemmas. He points out that, despite the fact that the Europeans had a history of ignoring the plight of the Armenians and despite the resistance of the United States Senate to the Paris peace agreements, the leadership of the republic, in 1920, continued to follow a firm Western orientation. Following the London and San Remo Conferences, Armenian leaders, disappointed with the loss of Cilicia and half of Turkish Armenia, were still optimistic. The new Armenian state, proposed in San Remo and officially agreed to by all in the Treaty of Sèvres, was to include the three eastern provinces of Turkish Armenia and an outlet to the Black Sea at Trebizond. The final boundary was to be drawn by President Wilson. Unfortunately, the Allied Powers were not prepared to go to war to keep their promises or to safeguard the borders they had awarded to Armenia.

There has been much speculation that, by relying on Allied promises, Armenia cut itself off from Russia at a time when the Bolsheviks had turned the tide of the Russian civil war. Soviet historians, for a long time, claimed that Moscow was willing to ally itself with Armenia and that it was the actions of the Armenian political leadership that resulted in the Russo-Turkish entente. They point out that the uprising by Armenian Bolsheviks in May 1920 was brutally quelled by the Dashnaks, the ruling nationalist party of Armenia. The latter went so far as to seek Turkish aid against the Bolsheviks. Anti-Soviet authors maintain that the Bolsheviks never trusted the Armenian government and made empty political promises while awaiting the results of their negotiations with Kemal Ataturk.

Hovannisian presents a clear, analytical, and critical narrative of a very sensitive period. He explains the errors made by various parties, policy presumptions gone wrong, confusions as to what was possible, and finally, what was, perhaps, inevitable. His objectivity in the face of historical myths generated by the Armenian political parties in Soviet Armenia and the diaspora, as well as by Soviet historians, is commendable.

The five-volume work represents a labor of over thirty years to explain the history of some twelve hundred days. More than 2,000 pages, some 10,000 footnotes, numerous maps, charts, photographs, and an exhaustive bibliography based on Armenian, Russian, Turkish, German, Italian, French, and English language archival sources speak to the complexity of the material. Hovannisian has woven a vivid tapestry of the political history of the first Armenian Republic. There is no question that this study will be the standard work for many years to come.

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AMITZUR ILAN. *The Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race: Arms, Embargo, Military Power and Decision in*

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the 1948 Palestine War. New York: New York University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 287. $45.00.

In seeking to explain the Israeli victory in the first Arab-Israeli War (1948), much of the existing literature focuses on the disparate strength of the opposing sides. Some Arab historians claim that, at the time of the declaration of the state of Israel, Israeli defense forces were already superior in manpower and weapons to their opponents. Israeli military historians are inclined to lump together all the weapons the Arab armies had at their disposal on paper, to assume that these weapons could have been used, and to argue for Arab superiority in armaments. Amitzur Ilan proposes that, given the low level of military expertise on both sides and the poor standard of weapons, what was of particular significance was the supply of arms and the extent to which the sides were able to break the embargo imposed on the adversaries by the United Nations and the major powers. Ilan considers other factors, such as troop effectiveness. He concludes, however, that "Israel's ability to cope better with the embargo situation was, by far, her greatest strategic asset" (p. 4).

The germ of what became the arms embargo grew in the British Foreign Office. If the military balance could be frozen until there were a political solution, it was believed, one side could be prevented from subduing the other in Palestine. According to Ilan, Harold Beeley, the Foreign Office official responsible for Palestine and the main proponent of the embargo, also developed other motives: such a policy might enable King Abdullah of Jordan to annex the Arab part of Palestine to his kingdom. By the end of May 1948, London had persuaded Washington to subscribe to this course of action.

Although the Israeli army was at no time numerically inferior to the Arab forces, until the main general mobilization was completed the number of Israel's combat troops only equalled that of their Arab opponents. Israel's problem, however, was neither the number of troops nor the funds needed to arm them; fundraising in the diaspora more than covered that. The difficulty was arming the troops and teaching them modern warfare.

Washington imposed an arms embargo on December 14, 1947. Although the Zionist lobby in the United States declared this policy a "cynical, hardly disguised anti-Semitic conspiracy," (p. 81) it could not persuade the State Department to lift it. This did not indicate a lack of support for the Zionist cause from the Democratic administration. Rather, it was a calculation by President Harry Truman that, in return for a British undertaking not to supply arms to the Arabs, the American embargo would be sustained. Furthermore, London and Washington felt that an embargo and a truce in Palestine were essential for a settlement that would not contradict Zionist aspirations. Both the British and American governments maintained a strict arms embargo.

Ilan challenges the historiography that attributes Israeli military successes to weapons obtained from Czechoslovakia. He shows that the Czechoslovakian aid did not include artillery, armor, or aircraft that could be used while the war was still being fought. Many of the weapons that played a decisive role in Israel's victory came from the arms markets of Western Europe, arriving in Israel at an early stage of the war and being absorbed by the Israeli Defense Force at a strategically crucial time. Their arrival was assisted by the cooperation of the French government during April and May 1948.

In the end, Ilan argues that indispensable factors in Israel's strength were its large infantry force and relatively large field artillery. Although, in October 1948 the number of combat troops on each side could be considered numerically equal, the Arabs suffered a marked disadvantage. They were short of ammunition and essential supplies, and they lacked a unified command structure.

Ilan's study in the "interdiscipline of military logistical studies and international relations" (p. ix) is based on an extensive scrutiny of archival sources in Britain, the United States, and Israel. He argues that, although Arab armies started the war better equipped, they lacked organization and their stores of ammunition and spare parts were nearly empty. Embargo restrictions cut off their former sources of supply, and no meaningful replacement was found. The Israelis not only imported weapons but produced them in Israel, and they also attained considerable foreign military expertise. This explains the Israeli advantage.

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AFRICA

SANDRA E. GREENE. *Gender, Ethnicity, and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast: A History of the Anlo-Ewe*. (Social History of Africa.) Portsmouth: Heinemann. 1996. Pp. xiii, 209. Cloth $60,00, paper $23.95.

This is an important and invaluable book on the social history of ethnicity and gender relations in the Ewe-speaking Anlo polity of modern southeast Ghana formerly known as the upper Slave Coast, from the later seventeenth to the twentieth century. Sandra B. Greene's study provides ample evidence of how ethnic identity (which is represented as a system of social classification) in Anlo has been defined and redefined over the past 300 years, how ethnic "outsiders" or "others" became ethnic "insiders." Since the seventeenth century, the area has received refugees, slaves, traders, immigrants, and conquerors, and all of these, she demonstrates, played roles in the social, political, and religious dynamic of the society. At different times in its history, Anlo was the site of civil conflict, wars of conquest, and wars of expansion; in addition, in the

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eighteenth century, Danish, Dutch, and English trading companies maintained commercial stations in Anlo ports where local merchants and brokers were resident.

Greene makes the point that, after 1750, the competition among patrilineages, which was generated by the Atlantic slave trade, contributed to the marginalization of the rights of Anlo women in complex ways. She implies that this competition was linked to a process of mercantile accumulation and to what can be called the regionalization of Anlo-based trading capital. She provides an impressive and detailed analysis of the formation of an important new social organization in the eighteenth century: the clan. Clan membership determined the social distribution of material resources such as land and cultural resources such as membership in religious orders, the formation of social identities and the defining of social statuses, and the structuring of gender relations through marriage practices and inheritance patterns. The clan was a "site" of wealth and property accumulation. Greene emphasizes the historically significant roles of women, as agents, in clan activities and relationships; they contested their own social subordination within the framework of the dictates of male-dominated lineage politics and the exigencies of Anlo's political economy.

Through her careful study of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century lives and careers of particular clans/families (such as Amlade and Gbodzo) and individuals (such as Elias Quist and Atitsogbi, better known as Geraldo de Lima), Greene demonstrates that Anlo's historical subjects—male and female—were rooted in the cultural, ideological, and social relations and outlooks of their time. Her analysis shows how these were interwoven in complicated and changing ways with hegemonic structures and connections. She traces the historical fortunes of religious orders like Nyigbla and Yewe, which women joined in large numbers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Greene has put to good use her wide-ranging and deep knowledge of Anlo history. The study is based on historical information culled from interviews that she carried out in Anlo, the records of Danish trading companies in the Danish National Archives, oral histories/traditions published during and after the colonial era, and published travelers' and missionary accounts. She has made effective and judicious use of relevant anthropological studies. Greene's book raises some questions, however. Recent studies of ethnicity in Africa have drawn attention to the fact that, in the pre-colonial period, multiple identities were the norm in African societies rather than single, fixed ethnic ones. Was Anlo social-political order, somehow, an exception to this tendency? She does not engage this literature in her own historical analysis, and the reader is left with an unanswered query. It is made clear throughout the book that Anlo society was closely connected to the Atlantic trade, especially from the 1710s on. However, the (structural) connections among wealth and property accumulation, the circulation of merchant capital, and the social distribution of the means of exchange, on the one hand, and the formation of ethnic identities and new institutions and the changing social positions over time of women, on the other, are not fully spelled out. Nevertheless, Greene has produced an exemplary work on an important aspect of West African social history. This is a study which should be read not only by Africanists but by Americanists and other scholars whose interests include the Atlantic slave trade.

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ADELL PATTON, JR. *Physicians, Colonial Racism, and Diaspora in West Africa*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 1996. Pp. xx, 343. $49.95.

In this engaging book, Adell Patton, Jr., chronicles the professional struggles of seven generations of West African doctors, from 1850 to 1985. It is a complex study, the product of fourteen years of extensive archival research and numerous interviews in Britain and West Africa. Patton was also a participant-observer in West African hospitals and clinics. He focuses on English-speaking physicians from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Gambia, and Ghana. These physicians studied in European (mostly British) universities; at Howard and Meharry in the United States; in Canada and the Caribbean; in the Soviet Union and its satellites; and, increasingly since independence, in Africa. They faced competition from British doctors and increasingly institutionalized racism. As Patton neatly puts it, "imperial power, racist ideology, notions about black sexuality, and social stratification within the medical ranks intensified intraprofessional conflict and competition" (p. 15).

Chapter one contains a brief topical overview of traditional medicine, doctors as political leaders, the British and French colonial medical services, medical certification, African women physicians, reforms in British medical education, African medical schools, and dilemmas of post-independence physicians. Chapter two, which I found to be the weakest in the book, surveys the medical profession in Africa beginning with Pharoanic Egypt. Somehow Patton ascribes the Arabic term *hakim* (scholar, physician) to this era. In his discussion of Islamic medicine, he quotes from an article on misunderstood Arabic-language diacritical marks: an interesting problem, but hardly the major story of the medical profession. Patton has read only a little of the literature and might as well have left this chapter out.

Fortunately, Patton is on much surer footing for the rest of the book. Chapter three describes the medical scene in mid-nineteenth-century Sierra Leone. He shows how the British authorities initially controlled the development of a largely British-trained African medical elite to serve their own imperial interests. Chapters four and six show how pseudoscientific rac-

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ism subsequently impeded the success of African physicians, many of whom were of Creole (repatriated former slave) origin. Here Patton includes a discussion of the era's historical context, which helps the reader follow the story. He traces the ups and downs and often bitter experiences of the Easmons, a Creole medical family that produced three generations of physicians. Chapter five chronicles African physicians' struggles for professional recognition in the colonial context, again using the careers of several prominent physicians as examples.

The tone of the book changes in the final two chapters, which take up the era of decolonization. Patton examines the career of David Ekundayo Boye-Johnson, a physician of African origin who "became Creole" by taking on new cultural patterns. He studied in North America, returned to Africa, joined the Episcopal Cathedral of St. George, married into an aristocratic Creole family, and concealed his Temne-Sherbro origins (pp. 195, 210). Boye-Johnson advanced rapidly in the colonial era and more rapidly still during decolonization, when expatriate European physicians began to leave. With the end of colonial medical regulations, foreign-trained African physicians found many long-standing obstacles removed.

With independence came new challenges. Many African physicians were educated in the Soviet Union. These physicians were trained in a different medical culture, one that emphasized teams of specialists and shorter periods of general medical education. Their focus on preventive rather than curative medicine tended to lower their status, because they lost their monopoly of medical knowledge. And, of course, the struggle between the two medical systems was intensified by Cold War rivalries. Patton concludes that "the East-West conflict within Africa laid the foundation for a mosaic laboratory of professions that still plays a significant role in development" (p. 248).

In an epilogue, Patton summarizes his main points and calls for further research in African professional associations, for the stabilization of medical standards in West Africa, and for international support for the crisis-beset region.

This carefully researched book is full of information about the social history of African medical professionalism. The author rarely strays from his primary source materials and regrettably does not consult the works of Franz Fanon, Albert Memmi, or other important analysts of colonial relations. Wider implications are suggested, but Patton's focus remains on the physicians themselves. The book must stand as a tribute to their endeavors, their frustrations, and their triumphs.

NANCY GALLAGHER
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DAVID E. TORRANCE. *The Strange Death of the Liberal Empire: Lord Selborne in South Africa*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1996. Pp. xvii, 286. $55.00.

Evaluating British high commissioners to South Africa during the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) and the reconstruction period that followed, historians rate William Waldegrave Palmer, Lord Selborne (1859–1942) a distinct second to Lord Milner (1852–1925) in importance. But they really need to be understood as a pair, for in tandem (Milner served 1897–1905; Selborne 1905–1910), they were supremely influential. Between them, they shaped South African society and politics in ways that determined decisively the course of that nation's troubled history throughout most of remainder of the twentieth century. David E. Torrance's biography of Selborne places him in a more central position in those events than previously understood. It also gives us a much clearer portrait of Selborne the thinker and politician than we have ever had. Contrasting Selborne's strategies and actions to Milner's, Torrance succeeds in placing the latter figure in sharper focus as well.

Torrance's Selborne makes a great case study for Marxists. His driving preoccupation in all things during his years in South Africa was to secure a supply of cheap and compliant "native" labor for the gold mines, whether it be South African, Mozambican, or Chinese from overseas. Selborne's Edwardian Social Darwinism nicely insulated him from the harsh implications of his policies for the laborers involved.

Furthermore, Selborne's most influential accomplishment as engineer of the Union constitution (1910) was his lobbying for British capital dominance at the expense of British imperial hegemony in the new state. That is, during the political maneuverings involved in the drafting of the constitution, he showed himself to be quite prepared to allow moderate Afrikaans-speaking politicians, who had just lost the war, to dominate the new state in the sure knowledge that such a dispensation would eventuate in firm British control of the industrial economy. Milner, who had believed above all else in British "racial" domination over all others, white or black, would have strongly opposed such a strategy. Events would prove Selborne to be right, at least until 1948.

On first arriving in South Africa, Selborne found that he needed all the diplomatic and political acumen he could muster. First, it was necessary for him to midwife the internal sovereignty of the reconstructed Afrikaner governments of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (1907). That placed the Afrikaners in at least ostensible authority over the gold and diamond mines, the very thing the British had gone to war to prevent in 1899. Second, hardly had Selborne arrived at his post when the English Unionist government that had dispatched him fell to the Liberals (led by Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman) in December 1905, placing him in a decidedly uncomfortable position. Fortunately for him, the new colonial secretary, Lord Elgin, kept him on for the sake of continuity. But Selborne remained thereafter in the awkward position of either attempting to influence the policies of a government innately suspicious of him or carrying out

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official policies with which he at times profoundly disagreed.

Torrance argues that it was Selborne's strongly conceived and enduring vision of a modern industrial postwar South Africa, loyal to the British Empire, that simultaneously guided him in his dealings with the local establishment and kept him sane in his dealings with the Liberal government in London. Conveniently for Selborne, it was a view that recognized the local African population primarily as units of labor, so that his main consideration easily became the assurance of its mobilization and reproduction rather than its human condition or destiny. It was also that vision that drove Selborne into a fateful accommodation with the reconstructed Transvaal government that so recently had been, in his own words, "the embodiment of ignorance, stagnation . . . and corruption, as well as of racial dominance and bitter hatred of every thing British" (p. 64). The alliance was made largely again in the interests of the labor supply and stability required for the postwar revival of the gold mines. Finally, that vision underlay the publication of the Selborne Memorandum (1907)—once more, in Torrance's view, largely out of concern for the supply of labor—that loosed the forces that led to promulgation of the Union constitution in 1910, under which framework apartheid was to be officially implemented following the 1948 election.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Torrance takes issue with Leonard Thompson's longstanding interpretation of the period of South African reconstruction (*The Unification of South Africa, 1902–10* [1960]) as being overly political. There is nothing terribly new about that; a generation of revisionist historians, led by Shula Marks, has zeroed in on such "liberal" interpretations of South African history since the early 1970s (see, for example, A. Atmore and S. Marks, "The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the Nineteenth Century: Towards a Reassessment," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* [October 1974]: 105–39). What Torrance adds is the degree to which materialist considerations—the railway clauses, for instance, and the administrative provisions that diminished the power of the provinces—outweighed political considerations (such as the franchise) in determining the character and longterm consequences of the Union constitution.

Torrance's book is a solid portrait of Selborne as an inspired Edwardian administrator constrained by an awkward relationship with the Colonial Office dealing with complex issues and often difficult people at a crucial juncture in South Africa's history. Selborne was an important figure in that period, and this study is a significant contribution to our knowledge of him and his times. There is attached a useful appendix presenting over a hundred sketches of individuals who figured in Selborne's life as high commissioner. But, finally, it is a pity that Torrance did not include Selborne's important role in the formulation of British postwar policy toward its protected territories in the region: Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland.

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ASIA

JAMES W. WHITE. *Ikki: Social Conflict and Political Protest in Early Modern Japan*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 348. $39.95.

The study of peasant contention (*hyakushō ikki*), long a staple of Japanese scholarship on the early modern period (1603–1868), has become a subfield in its own right among Western historians of Japan. In contrast to other recent works, which focus on specific events or regions, James W. White's book is a comprehensive study of the phenomenon, based on data concerning more than 7,000 instances of contention compiled by Aoki Kōji. White looks into reasons behind, means of, and opportunities for peasant contention to draw conclusions about the place of social and political conflict in early modern Japan.

White's quantitative analysis is both the book's greatest strength and most vexing weakness. His study is the first attempt in any language to subject the copious data on peasant contention to a rigorous, systematic analysis. He develops an elaborate taxonomy of contention (in an appendix, he classifies events into fifty-nine separate categories); he then applies a multivariate analysis that tries to account for the frequency, magnitude, and causes of contentious action throughout the early modern period in terms of factors ranging from climate to the structure of local political authority.

If one accepts the basic premises that inform White's methodology and analysis, it is difficult to dispute his argument. In any case—although he never says so—his main conclusions about the combined effects of a weakening Tokugawa state and a growing and increasingly diverse economy as explanations for an upsurge in what he calls "social conflict" (contention among different elements of commoner society) are generally congruent with those of scholars who have engaged in narrower studies of specific events, such as Herbert Bix (*Peasant Protest in Japan, 1590–1884* [1986]), William Kelly (*Deference and Defiance in Nineteenth-Century Japan* [1985]), Stephen Vlastos (*Peasant Protests and Uprisings in Tokugawa Japan* [1986]), and Anne Walthall (*Social Protest and Popular Culture in Eighteenth-Century Japan* [1986]). In that sense, one can say that White's book is—or at least ought to be—the last word on early modern Japanese peasant contention for the time being.

So what is wrong with the book? First, White never alerts the reader to the fact that he holds assumptions about the nature of the early modern polity that many specialists do not share. In particular, his practice of equating the state with the Tokugawa shogunate, rather than with a combination of the shogunate and

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the 260-odd autonomous domains, is extremely controversial, and it colors his conclusions in ways that will not be obvious to nonspecialist readers.

The book's greatest shortcoming, however, is its assumption that contention is a distinct phenomenon that can be isolated from the everyday tensions and conflicts that characterized life in peasant communities. The problem for White is largely one of setting a threshold above which conflict can be classified as "contention." Lawsuits and legal petitions—of which there were tens of thousands during the period—do not usually count, although thousands of nonviolent incidents do. Moreover, because White distinguishes mechanically between "social" conflict among peasants and "political" conflict that involved the samurai authorities, nearly all "political" incidents qualify as contentious although most "social" disputes resolved without violence in a single village do not.

The result is an analysis that gives the reader no sense of the complex texture of peasant life. White's book is therefore much less satisfying than more focused studies such as Herman Ooms's excellent *Tokugawa Village Practice: Class, Status, Power, Law* (1996). To some extent, this problem is endemic in studies of peasant contention, but White's quantitative approach exacerbates it. For example, using provinces and counties as his principal levels of analysis, despite the fact that neither was a meaningful political unit, homogenizes social and economic conditions in regions that were subject to sometimes radically different political regimes. Earlier studies in English—however diverse their outlooks and methodologies—all have the advantage of situating their examples of contention in the concrete political, economic, and ideological contexts of specific regions. In sum, White's book is the definitive study of a phenomenon whose significance is never made clear.

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MARK E. LINCICOME. *Principle, Praxis, and the Politics of Educational Reform in Meiji Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 298. $45.00.

This book, a study of "developmental education" in Japan from 1872 to 1895, is primarily about education and only secondarily about politics. "Developmental education" is Mark R. Linicome's translation of *kaihatsu-shugi*, the Japanese term for the child-centered educational theory introduced into the Tokyo Normal School in 1872. Lincicome has thoroughly grounded his study in source materials from the nineteenth century. The first two chapters focus on teaching manuals and how Japanese adaptations and translations of Western works differed from the original texts. Chapters three and four analyze articles that appeared in two educational journals. Chapter five examines the extent to which language textbooks for elementary schools incorporated the principles of developmental education.

Lincicome's narrowly focused analysis of particular texts has profound significance, however, for our understanding of the political history of modern Japan. After the Meiji Restoration, the state mandated primary school education, established normal schools, and issued directives through its new Ministry of Education. Most scholars have assumed that, by the 1880s, the government had made teachers into compliant instruments of indoctrination who could inculcate militarism and ultranationalism. Lincicome shows that the state normal school propagated developmental education, a pedagogical theory that put the individual at the center of the educational endeavor. The first modern teachers in Japan were taught to develop the innate talents of their students rather than simply "pouring in" knowledge, and they appropriated the ideals of individualism for themselves.

Through Lincicome's careful comparison of texts, we see that although foreign experts, study abroad, and translations could only imperfectly transfer western child-centered education to Japan, the difference between principle and praxis was no greater in Japan than elsewhere. As in any society, Japanese teachers sometimes failed to implement the ideals they espoused, but the ideals nevertheless retained meaning. In their professional journals, teachers spoke out against local officials who interfered with their prerogative to determine educational policy. Although most professional educators were critical of the popular rights movement of the 1880s, they still believed that all citizens had the right to participate as individuals in politics and that teachers had the duty to prepare their students for civic responsibilities. To be sure, there was a gradual shift in emphasis in the educational journals: from educating the individual to educating for the state, from scientific education to training in vocational skills. After the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, developmental education ceased to be the official pedagogical method, but it nevertheless continued to provide an ideological basis from which liberal educators could challenge the state.

The drawback to such heavy reliance on particular texts is that it privileges certain voices without problematizing them. In 1872, when Japanese students first gathered to hear an American lecture on developmental education, the military aristocracy had not yet been abolished. Throughout this book, however, we are asked to accept "educator" as an unproblematic category with no relationship to class. Although Japanese elementary schools were coeducational, there is no discussion of whether such gender equality went uncontested. The Women's Normal School is mentioned in passing, but we do not learn whether female educators were allowed to publish in the educational journals. Even the educators who are quoted at length are disembodied, having neither past nor future. Lincicome mentions Isawa Shūji as translator, student abroad, author, principal of the Tokyo Normal School, and official of the Ministry of Education, but his textual approach does not allow us to observe his

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subsequent role in bringing Japanese education to Taiwan.

Although we may regret that Lincicome did not extend his analysis to class, gender, and imperialism, we remain greatly indebted to him for showing us how the pedagogical theories first propagated by the Japanese state in the late nineteenth century bequeathed to the educators of the twentieth century an antibureaucratic stance from which to contest policies.

SALLY A. HASTINGS
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MIKISO HANE. *Eastern Phoenix: Japan since 1945*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press of HarperCollins. 1996. Pp. x, 260. Cloth $59.00, paper $19.95.

This treatment of Japan since World War II joins Mikiso Hane's earlier surveys of Japanese history and modern Japan as helpful classroom texts. Like Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen's *The Japanese Today* (expanded ed., 1995), it is arranged topically rather than chronologically to cover the Allied occupation, politics, foreign affairs, economic growth, society, education, and intellectual and cultural developments. It lacks the analytical and stylistic clarity of Reischauer/Jansen but contains more narrative substance.

Hane's interpretive approach follows conventional postwar American historiography. The American occupation "brought about a truly revolutionary change in the country . . . no one can deny the truly remarkable achievements of the occupation authorities" (pp. 38–39); "most Japanese leaders are aware of the fact that Japan owes its postwar economic success largely to U.S. support and generosity" (p. 207). Critical issues such as "victor's justice" in the Tokyo war crimes trials or the "reverse course" of American policy after February 1948 are muted (indeed, the latter is imputed to Japanese policy makers after independence came in April 1952).

Unfortunately, Hane was not well served by his editors. The chapters on post-1952 politics and foreign relations contain repetitions and missteps. Prime Minister Kishi was known as Nobusuke in the West (p. 44); it is misleading to indicate that Liberal Democrats held roughly two-thirds of Diet seats and Socialists one-third during 1955–1993 (p. 45). The politics of consensus require clarification; Reischauer was a former United States ambassador by the time of the Suzuki cabinet (p. 55). The Democratic Socialist Party is organized (correctly) in 1960 (p. 62) and in 1959 four pages later. Hane knows that Ronald Dore's first name is not Robert (p. 111) and that ritual complaints about the lack of creativity in Japanese schooling (p. 163) cannot be reconciled with the data presented two pages later. Slips like these betray hasty editing and detract from the book's worth.

The foreign relations chapter, which overlaps that addressing the economy, does not clearly distinguish merchandise trade, current account, and balance of payments. Footnote one might better have been worked into the text. One wonders why Hane believes students revolted and ideology figured so importantly. Many trade statistics are included without analysis and sometimes reproduced in subsequent chapters.

Hane generally follows Chalmers A. Johnson's interpretation (*MITI and the Japanese Miracle* [1985]) of postwar economic growth, without recognizing the sustained boom of 1986–1991. Much is made of the Japanese "work ethic"; little concession is made to generational differences in personal goals before the 1990s. Hane's discussion of marginal social groups is the book's forte (recent changes in Burakumin housing and marriage patterns are not noted). The treatment of women focuses on employment.

Readers already familiar with Hane's terrain may question his heavy reliance on insights from Jared Taylor (*Shadows of the Rising Sun* [1983]), the cliché-ridden portrait of the psychology of defeat (p. 173), the facile comments on pop culture (pp. 174–76) and tradition (pp. 177–81), and the assertion that "in the west, the Christian mode of thinking has provided the framework for judging and correlating ideas" (p. 176).

This volume is a useful topical handbook whose greatest strength is its coverage of the 1940s and 1950s. Its value as a guide to the half century since World War II is depleted by its repetitions, thickets of statistics, and familiar interpretive positions, sounding a rather dated note implicit in the phrase "Eastern Phoenix."

TOM HAVENS
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VALERIE HANSEN. *Negotiating Daily Life in Traditional China: How Ordinary People Used Contracts 600–1400*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 285. $30.00.

This book deals ably with a very important but little appreciated facet of traditional Chinese life: the central role played by contracts in negotiating daily life and death. Valerie Hansen draws on surviving contracts, legal works, fiction, anecdotes, and other sources. The book begins with a discussion of contracts during the T'ang period (618–907). This chapter makes the apparently paradoxical point that (despite its commitment to comprehensiveness) the great T'ang code, one of the most influential legal compilations in the world, says relatively little about contracts. What it does say suggests that the authorities did not want to intervene in such private matters. This appears paradoxical because, at the very time that the code was being compiled, contracts were becoming increasingly important in people's lives. Despite the lack of state rules, the T'ang period is central to Hansen's study because a relatively large number of contracts (most from northwest China and adjoining central Asia) survive, suggesting that contractual thinking was already well developed and that there was a widely

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shared understanding of what needed to be in a contract. These early examples, many of them agreements concerning land purchases or loans of goods, contain features that were to continue in later contracts, such as date, name of the purchaser, specification of boundaries (in land contracts), price indications, offer and acceptance, penalty for reneging, the private nature of the agreement, the signatures or marks of the participants, including witnesses, and agreements for sharing ceremonial wine.

Hansen next discusses the changing conditions of the late T'ang and Five Dynasties (907–960) periods, when pressure on the authorities to become involved in settling contract disputes and in setting ground rules for contract law increased. A new stage in the adjudicating process began with the imposition of a tax on contracts during the late Five Dynasties period. Suddenly contracts were a source of revenue. From this time on, the constant pressure to increase state income helped to shape contract policy. The need for increased revenues was especially important during the Sung dynasty (960–1279). Hansen uses the few extant contracts from the Sung to demonstrate continuity of practice, but she is more concerned to flesh out the social and judicial context of contracts, drawing extensively on a set of edited judicial decisions dating from the Southern Sung period (1126–1279). In combination with these decisions, she uses various sources to provide a vivid picture of the milieu within which contracts functioned.

The fifth chapter, on the Yuan dynasty, shows both continuity and some change in the use of contracts under the Mongols (1279–1368). Drawing on Chinese dramas, almanacs with guides to writing contracts, and other sources, Hansen shows the important influence of Chinese contractual practices among the large non-Chinese population active in China and bordering regions during this age.

The second part of Hansen's book describes the use of contracts in negotiations with the gods. Contracts were especially important with regard to tombs. The traditional Chinese feared that the gods of the underground might be angry when their space was disturbed by tomb construction, and they therefore set out to write agreements of purchase that would be acceptable to the spirits. The basic beliefs underlying this practice go back at least as far as the Han dynasty (207 B.C.–227 A.D.). Eventually we see the creation of a relatively standard tomb purchase contract that was buried with the deceased. The contract provided for the purchase of the tomb area from the spirits and attempted to protect the family from spiritual attacks. Similar contracts continued to be used throughout China; in some places, they were still used in the recent past.

In addition to their role in avoiding direct conflict with the spirits, these contracts were used as evidence in trials before underworld courts. Most traditional Chinese visualized the underworld as basically similar to the world above, particularly in its domination by a bureaucratic administration. People haled before underworld courts needed documentary evidence of their rights if they were to avoid serious problems. This section of the book provides a clear portrait of popular views of the relations between the human and the spirit worlds.

Hansen's book should prove valuable to a variety of audiences. Specialists in Chinese history will welcome her the labors in assembling and interpreting numerous examples of contracts of various sorts and then analyzing this body of evidence in a way that illuminates a variety of legal and social topics. For nonspecialists, the book will be an especially valuable corrective to the widespread misperception that traditional Chinese abjured legalistic behavior. It provides a vivid picture of the traditional Chinese belief in the interactive relationship between the world of the living and the world of the dead.

Hansen is to be commended for presenting a lucid analysis of a potentially difficult subject in an attractive way. This book is a welcome addition to the growing body of written materials bearing on those facets of traditional Chinese law that correspond to our civil law.

BRIAN E. MCKNIGHT
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KATHLEEN L. LODWICK. *Crusaders against Opium: Protestant Missionaries in China, 1874–1917.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1996. Pp. xi, 218. $29.95.

This book, recounting the first serious attempt to eliminate opium addiction among the Chinese, is an important contribution to the understanding of the coming of age of modern China. Although Kathleen L. Lodwick focuses mainly on the efforts of British Protestant missionaries to stop the trade and use of opium, she skillfully weaves into her narrative all the actors on all sides of the struggle: British home and colonial officials, British social activists, merchants and traffickers of all races, Chinese officials, Chinese nationalists and reformers, and ordinary opium addicts.

Lodwick explains that the Protestant missionaries in China played a crucial role in keeping the opium issue before the public in Britain and finally getting the British government to admit the error of its involvement in the drug trade. To the missionaries, such involvement was wrong, an evil perpetrated by their country on the Chinese. More than any other group at the turn of the twentieth century, they truly understood the nature of opium addiction and had the courage to pursue their campaign against the drug until they finally convinced others of the correctness of their position. They gathered the medical evidence to demonstrate the effects of opium. They campaigned for decades to convince Britain to end its support of the opium trade from India. And the evidence of the dangers of opium use carefully accumulated by the misionaries was used by the delegates to the first international conferences that sought to stop the illegal use and traffic in the drug.

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Lodwick rightfully shows that, despite all the energy they expended, the missionaries were much less successful in convincing the Chinese to give up the drug. Except for the scientific evidence gathered by the medical missionaries, the changes in Chinese attitudes had little to do with the preaching of the missionaries. Only in the last decade of the Qing dynasty, when Chinese officials, anxious to modernize China, finally recognized the harm opium did to their people and to their country, did they take action to suppress the drug. China could not be a strong nation capable of dealing with other nations on a basis of equality if the country could not rid itself of the opium scourge. Lodwick credits students returning from abroad for setting the mood for the Chinese suppression campaign that began with the issuance of an imperial edict against opium in 1906. She is probably right, but she fails to provide the solid proof that could have been found easily if she had made more use of Chinese sources.

As Lodwick remarks in her introduction, the story of the efforts to rid China of opium in the early years of the twentieth century is relevant to the century's closing years as well. The arguments of the opium advocates—that they were only meeting a need, or that farmers earn more money from opium than from food crops, or that if they did not make money, someone else would—have a familiar ring in our day, when debates on the effects of tobacco and campaigns for or against legalization of certain drugs often appear on the front pages of newspapers in the United States.

JEAN-PAUL WIEST
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PRASENJIT DUARA. *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1995. Pp. x, 275. $32.00.

This is a welcome and important book. It is metahistory and discourse analysis that directly addresses the needs of those who write other kinds of history. Prasenjit Duara not only seeks to "question narratives of modern China" but to provide better stories, which take seriously currents (such as 1920s federalism) often ignored in histories undergirded by a teleology of emerging Chinese nationhood. Although his examples of a less nation-centered political history are sometimes sketchy, they work well as hints of how historians might describe the concrete realities of what creating a Chinese nation-state and national consciousness have meant without treating those processes as the goal and meaning of modern Chinese history.

Duara argues that most post-1890 Chinese intellectuals and politicians have assumed that the creation of a modern state populated by self-conscious "Chinese" whose citizenship is their primary identity was essential for solving the numerous internal and external crises of the nineteenth century; historians have been all too willing to follow suit, treating modern Chinese history as the story of this hero/subject's maturation (or lack thereof). He traces this assumption to the influence of Western thinkers, above all G. W. F. Hegel. I would have liked to see more attention paid to Social Darwinism and, more importantly, to various indigenous ideas. Duara is nevertheless right to question the inevitability both of a single and relatively centralized "Chinese" state inheriting the Qing empire and of the emergence of a strong, perhaps even overriding, popular identification with that unit.

The much less linear post-imperial histories of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, and Romanov empires remind us how necessary Duara's questions are, and Gandhism, which Duara explores in his last chapter, raises the question of whether a commitment to the "nation" had to involve supporting all of the modernizing projects for which an elite consensus emerged in China, including industrialization and the suppression of popular "superstition." Moreover, by showing how these assumptions shaped the political views that many revolutionary leaders attributed to other actors, their unwillingness to consider decentralized models of the Chinese polity (despite the vitality of *fengjian* (localist) ideas in the late Qing), and their insistence on an absolute distinction between "primitive" popular religion and "modern" ideas representative of true self-consciousness (p. 90), Duara actually shows what some postmodern historians only assert: that a "strong statist discourse without a strong state" has nonetheless been extremely important (p. 170), and that we miss (and unwittingly reinforce) its power when we treat the emergence of a certain kind of nation-state as necessary.

But not all of Duara's excursions into "suppressed" alternate histories are equally persuasive. The attempt to find democratic possibilities in the 1920s federalist movement, for instance, is intriguing but not compelling: Duara shows that federalism cannot be *entirely* reduced to cynical posturings by provincial warlords, but not that it was, on balance, a movement with greater liberatory potential than the projects of centralizing nationalists. The discussion of Republican campaigns against popular religion—battles out of all proportion to any material threat these groups posed or to the ritual "waste" of resources needed for development—as rooted in the state's self-images as midwife of a "modern" China, however, is quite persuasive and resonates with analyses of contemporary anti-superstition campaigns. In one of the book's most provocative sections, Duara links the often enthusiastic participation of Chinese local elites in this project with their embrace of Hegelian history, and he asks why those who questioned this vision were so much less influential in China than in India (pp. 221–22).

Duara's answer, which emphasizes the fact that India was officially colonized by Europeans while China was not, represents a stimulating way to think about the lingering effects of colonialism, but it also seems incomplete. A millennium of Chinese elite efforts to displace "vulgar" popular cults—sanctioned

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by Buddhist, Confucian, and Daoist thinkers—is relevant here, but Duara largely passes over this, emphasizing the more tolerant, coopting side of pre-twentieth-century elite and state attitudes toward popular religion. Yet the gap Duara describes between twentieth-century popular religious leaders and the "national intelligentsia" (p. 222) may be less uniquely modern than he suggests: Daniel Overmyer, for instance, has described late imperial folk Buddhist sects as a "decapitated dissent" precisely because they were disdained by higher-level literati (*Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Imperial China* [1976]). A more systematic comparison of twentieth-century campaigns to remake the masses with some of these earlier efforts would have placed the importance of Western ideas of history in clearer perspective. Similarly, Duara passes a bit too quickly over other pre-twentieth-century currents that anticipate modern ones, such as the numerous critiques of *fengjian* thinking and ideas about the nature of the realm and of "Chineseness." But at worst, Duara has overcorrected for earlier histories that overemphasize continuity; the corrective is nonetheless extremely stimulating.

KENNETH POMERANZ
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MICHAEL H. HUNT. *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1996. Pp. xiv, 343. $34.50.

Michael H. Hunt offers a refreshingly non-reductionist examination of the making of Chinese Communist foreign policy. His book has remarkable coherence for a collection of articles, many of them published previously. Its strength lies in Hunt's integration of questions of foreign policy with considerations of internal problems and events as the Chinese saw them, his insistence on historicity, and the broad scholarship and rich new archival materials he draws on.

The arguments are presented in four parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first part offers an overview of past legacies, with emphasis on the late Qing period. If there is a "genesis" to twentieth-century Communist policies, it lies in the latter period, which historians have viewed mostly in terms of the emergence of a Chinese nationalism. Hunt offers as a substitute "patriotism," which he deems more productive conceptually than nationalism because it cuts "across political lines," and also because it avoids slicing "modern Chinese history in two" by bridging the disjuncture indicated by the rise of Marxism around the time of the May Fourth period (p. 55).

The next part covers the intellectual ferment during the first two decades of the twentieth century and "the rise of an international affairs orthodoxy" during the pre-Mao period of Chinese Communism (to 1934). Drawing mostly on secondary scholarship, these chapters summarize intellectual developments during the period. The "intellectual orthodoxy" refers to the emergence of a "three-worlds view" (p. 85) under the impact of Bolshevism after 1921. Of these three worlds, "the first world of imperialism and the second of the Soviet Union would dominate in CCP commentary on world affairs, while the third world of fellow revolutionaries would occupy a decidedly subordinate place" (pp. 85–86). Hunt's use of the "three-worlds view" for this period is interesting and should serve as a corrective to the recent preoccupation with literalist interpretations of the "three worlds" idea as a post–World War II phenomenon.

By far the most interesting part of Hunt's book is the third, which deals with the emergence of an autonomous foreign policy under Mao (1935–1945) and how the Maoist leadership dealt with the crises in foreign policy in the years surrounding the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) (1945–1951). Unlike the earlier parts, where the relevance of internal developments to foreign policy issues is not always clear, Hunt is at his best as a historian in this section in demonstrating the connection between issues of revolution and foreign policy and the revolutionary leadership's struggles to reconcile orthodoxy to the realities of the world situation (namely, the relationship to the United States and the USSR and the processes of decision-making at times such critical as the Korean War). He takes seriously the Maoist leadership's search for both internal and external policies that corresponded to their formulations of New Democracy and, against contemporary prejudices, portrays Mao as a leader who, while firmly in charge, nevertheless displayed considerable flexibility and "collegiality" in the making of foreign policy.

Hunt concludes, in the fourth section, "the way that the party dealt with the world at least to the early 1950s was the product of a convergence of ideological currents and political circumstances with personality" (p. 203). Although "it is tempting in looking back to seek an inner logic to Mao's thinking and behavior . . . such a quest is most likely a misguided effort for an individual as intellectually complex as Mao was. His thinking consisted of multiple strands twisted uneasily together, and his explicitly experimental style gave considerable play to combining ideas in different patterns as he faced changing circumstances" (p. 210). Not the least of the strengths of this part is Hunt's extensive use of newly available sources.

The last part of the book addresses methodological issues in the analysis of Chinese Communist foreign policy. Hunt rightly insists on a historical methodology that eschews stereotyped formulations. The final chapter, dealing with historiographical issues, should provide a point of departure for future analyses.

There are some problems with the book. "Genealogy" might have been a better choice than "genesis" for the title, as the latter presents some problems in light of Hunt's insistence on historicity. There is an unarticulated teleology imbedded in the term genesis that leads from the late nineteenth century to Mao and ignores other parties to the struggle over modern

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China. Juxtaposing nationalism and patriotism is similarly problematic. That Chinese scholars today may prefer the latter is not a self-evident reason to opt for patriotism, as "cutting across" political lines to create an all-encompassing "China" expresses current ideological proclivities. To say that "the Chinese elite has had difficulty seeing nationalism in a way that corresponds to any generally accepted definition" (p. 54) ignores both the complexity of nationalism generally and the political disagreements of the Chinese elite, which are not to be reduced to "definitions." Finally, it is not always clear whether "indigeneous" traditions are determinants of what comes later or a reservoir that twentieth-century Chinese thinkers could draw on to address questions of modernity. The book passes over these problems with too much ease, but it nevertheless achieves an impressive level of complexity and sophistication in a field all too vulnerable to the intrusions of ideology.

ARIF DIRLIK
Duke University

SHU GUANG ZHANG. *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War: 1950–1953*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1995. Pp. xiii, 338. $45.00.

STEVEN HUGH LEE. *Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949–1954*. Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1995. Pp. xiv, 295. $39.95.

In recent years, several prominent China scholars have criticized much Western scholarship on China for its failure to interpret Chinese history free from cultural bias. Paul Cohen asserts, in *Discovering History in China* (1984), that "the approaches followed, the basic questions asked ... [are] principally shaped by the sociocultural environment of the historian" (p. xvi). *Anticipating China* (1995) by David Hall and Roger Ames focuses on the "distortions" that have arisen "from a failure to give adequate notice to contrasting assumptions that shape the cultural milieux of China and the West" (p.xv). Shu Guang Zhang here makes the leap that Cohen, Hall, and Ames suggest is necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of China. Zhang goes beyond relating an account of traditional military history and characterizes the influence of Mao Zedong's thought and Chinese cultural uniqueness on the strategy behind what the Chinese refer to as the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Zhang concludes that "the cultural elements that propelled China into Korea should not be overlooked or downplayed. The Chinese leaders' historical consciousness, images, and sense of moral and political superiority played at least as important a role as their security concerns" (p. 253).

Mao and other Chinese Communist Party leaders, including some field commanders, shared an "optimistic willingness" to face the United States in Korea. Their confidence was based on their assessment of the "subjective advantage" of a highly politicized and mobilized army in contrast to the "objective difficulties" of the United States. Zhang argues that the romanticism embedded in China's warfare came from several sources, including communism, ancient Chinese military concepts, and modern Chinese experiences. As it turned out, it was not at all dysfunctional.

Zhang also outlines the more pragmatic side of Mao's strategy. The text is a highly detailed chronology of Mao's decision-making during the Korean War, his successes, and his failures. A variety of sources, including recently available documents, diaries, and memoirs are employed. Zhang also mines the vast wealth of new information found in Chinese military histories published during the 1980s. His introductory bibliographic essay is particularly useful to historians.

Among the issues candidly discussed are the Soviet role in Korea and simultaneously in Vietnam, the disagreements about strategy among China's top commanders, disputes with Kim Il-Sung, Chinese assessments of American strategy (including predicting the Inchon landing), and the mixed results of psychological warfare and mass mobilization campaigns. The conclusion highlights lessons learned in Korea and the impact they had on China's involvement later in Vietnam. This extraordinary study is a significant contribution to Korean War literature.

Stephen Hugh Lee's book provides another important addition to Cold War literature. Lee departs from the more common bilateral focus of United States-East Asia relations and considers the influence of the its allies, particularly Great Britain and Canada, on American decision-making during the early Cold War years. While Lee concentrates primarily on how post–World War II American policy makers used their newly acquired power and status, he employs a regional and comparative framework to explore whether United States policy was compatible with that of its allies. He examines, for example, the differences in the allies' containment policies, definitions of "limited war," and attitudes toward spheres of influence.

One of Lee's arguments is that the United States created a "new empire" following World War II that differed from earlier forms of empire and was influenced by the bipolarity of the Cold War as well as the break up of traditional empires. Because the United States was not powerful enough to counter the international communist threat unilaterally, it shaped an "informal empire," whose existence depended on a sometimes uneasy cooperation with its allies. Basing his analysis on recently declassified government documents from London, Washington, and Ottawa and a variety of diplomatic papers, Lee goes beyond the obvious explanations focusing solely on national interests and examines the roles of domestic issues, multilateral pressures, historical considerations, economic necessity, and political personalities.

The study includes comprehensive coverage of the "hybrid strategy" that Canada developed as part of the

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North Atlantic Triangle's diplomacy. Canadian diplomats often found themselves formulating policy based on the conflicting demands of Washington and London. After Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson admitted in 1947 that Canada's defense must be tied to the United States and not to the Commonwealth, the Canadians attempted to exert a moderating influence on President Harry S. Truman's diplomacy. They feared that Cold War strategy, characterized by some Canadian analysts as having a "tendency toward bluster and emotionalism" (p. 24), might provoke the Soviet Union into war. By 1954, however, United States involvement in Indochina led Canadian policy makers back to the Commonwealth as they criticized American strategy while simultaneously attempting to maintain U.S.-Canadian ties.

Lee concludes his analysis of the period 1949–1954 with a focus on the development of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's "United Action" plan for Vietnam. He disagrees with several scholars who emphasize the cautious nature of the American strategy at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Rather, Lee suggests, "United Action" was a dynamic, provocative policy that was reshaped and somewhat weakened as a result of "complex negotiations and multiple participants" (p. 218).

June Grasso
Boston University

William Stueck. *The Korean War: An International History*. (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 484. $35.00.

William Stueck, a prominent historian of U.S.-East Asian relations in the early Cold War, has written a major book on the Korean War, often characterized as the forgotten war. The book is a good blend of the most traditional sort of diplomatic history (a multiarchival study with research on four continents) and present-minded concerns (the impact of the Korean War on the Cold War and the impact of the end of the Cold War on our understanding of what happened from 1950 to 1953 in Korea). You can tell what is in this book by its title. Stueck tells the story of what a variety of powers did regarding Korea from June 25, 1950, the day the war began, until July 27, 1953, the day the armistice was signed. It is diplomatic, not military, social, or political history.

Stueck spends only a little space on who started the war. Using some documents recently made available from Chinese and Soviet archives, he concludes that Harry Truman's administration was more or less correct when they decided, days after the initial attack, that North Korea's Kim Il Sung was seeking to unify Korea with the blessing of Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin. But that is not the main focus of the book. Instead, Stueck devotes eight of the book's ten chapters to the diplomacy of the war. He goes over old ground in retelling the story of the events from the summer of 1950 through the Inchon landing in September, the Chinese intervention in October and November, and the eventual firing of Douglas MacArthur in the spring of 1951. But even here, where Stueck tells an oft-told tale, he brings an astonishing wealth of detail based on newly opened archives.

Where Stueck makes his greatest contribution is in his discussion of the diplomatic moves from mid-1951 until July 1953. If Korea is the forgotten war, what has dropped most from memory is the role of the United Nations. Stueck brings the U.N. back in as a central player. Decision making in Washington always had to be balanced against the desires of allies in the U.N. coalition, the views of neutrals and non-aligned states, and the response of the Soviet Union and its allies. One of the strongest aspects of the book is the careful reconstruction of the role of India, especially that of foreign minister Krishna Menon, in ending the war. Stueck shows how what came to be called the Arab-Asian bloc developed in the U.N. partly as a response to events in Korea. We see the first rumblings of Latin American separation from the views of the United States during the last months of the war.

Still, U.S. policy is key to understanding the unfolding of the war. However much material is released from the Soviet and Chinese archives (and many documents appeared after Stueck finished work on this book), and however much more comes from the British, Canadian, Australian, and Philippine governments, most of the paper trail explains American behavior. Stueck's understanding of U.S. foreign policy in the early Cold War strongly resembles Melvyn P. Leffler's interpretation in *A Preponderance of Power* (1992). Like Leffler, he gives American policy makers high marks for intelligently seeing connections among issues and across continents, adapting U.S. policy to meet changing conditions. With one exception: neither Leffler nor Stueck thinks President Truman did much personally to deserve the awe in which he is popularly held.

Truman practically disappears from the second half of Leffler's book. The president is a central figure in Stueck's book, but his contributions are mostly negative. Stueck has an excellent discussion of the tortured history of the role the prisoner-of-war issue played in prolonging the cease-fire negotiations. Truman became deeply embroiled in the issue, often raging over the maneuvers of the Chinese and North Koreans. But Stueck makes it clear that Truman's involvement did as much as anything to prolong the war. Truman's behavior the month before the election of 1952 also gets low marks from Stueck. Stung by Republican charges that his administration had been soft in the early days of the Cold War and fearful that Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson would lose badly if he reached an agreement before November 4, Truman delayed. Stevenson lost badly anyway, and the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower got credit for ending the war.

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Although Stueck comes down hard on Truman, he is less judgmental of Eisenhower. Because one of his main arguments is that international, rather than strictly U.S., forces were instrumental in ending the Korean War, he believes the Eisenhower administration's policies in its first six months were of less significance than the development of policy under Truman. This book is based on extensive research. Stueck is a careful writer who never loses control of a complicated subject. His conclusions are not new or unorthodox, but the breadth of the sources makes this the standard diplomatic history of the Korean War.

ROBERT D. SCHULZINGER
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MILTON OSBORNE. *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 1994. Pp. xi, 283. Cloth $27.95, paper $17.95.

Few political figures have been involved for so long and in such an intimate manner with the conflict in Indochina as Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Selected by the French as king of Cambodia on the death of his grandfather Monivong in 1941, Sihanouk first came to the attention of the world in the early 1950s, when he took the lead in demanding the independence of his country from colonial rule. After the Geneva Conference of 1954 brought about the departure of the French, Sihanouk resigned his throne in order to become actively involved in Cambodian politics. For the next fifteen years, as the country's de facto leader, he sought desperately but in vain to maintain his country's neutrality and avoid being sucked into the vortex of the Vietnam War. Overthrown by a military coup in 1970, he joined forces with Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge under the sponsorship of Hanoi and Beijing to oppose the new Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh. After the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975, he returned to the capital in triumph, but his relations with Pol Pot rapidly deteriorated. In the 1980s, he joined with opposition forces sponsored by China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and several Western countries in a struggle that finally resulted in the Paris Agreement of 1991. He then returned to the throne in a patent effort to provide some equilibrium to a rickety coalition government of noncommunist and pro-Hanoi communist parties, with the Khmer Rouge left brooding on the outside.

Sihanouk has been a controversial figure throughout his career, distrusted by both sides in the Cold War for his mercurial personality and the politics of zigzag that he followed for over a decade at the height of the Vietnam conflict. Milton E. Osborne maintains the tradition, painting a highly ambivalent portrait of the Cambodian leader. Although Sihanouk has often been given credit for his efforts to obtain independence from Paris, Osborne contends that for years he dedicated himself to earthly pleasures and was slow to commit himself to the cause of national patriotism. And, where others praise his adroitness in manipulating the manifold pressures of international politics to maintain Cambodian neutrality in war-torn Southeast Asia, Osborne points to his dictatorial tendencies and the brutal treatment of his enemies as evidence that his vaunted reputation as the father of his people was much overdone. In the end, although Sihanouk was still worshipped by many ordinary Cambodians, he had worn out his welcome with much of the elite in Phnom Penh.

Osborne repeats a number of familiar stories current among Indochina observers during the war: Sihanouk's anger at *Newsweek* for printing a story contending that his mother controlled the red-light district in Phnom Penh; his impish insistence that foreign diplomats join him in public-works projects wearing their "*vêtement du travail*"; and his embarrassing career as an amateur film producer. Osborne is also enlightening on the circumstances of his overthrow, which, he argues convincingly, was not engineered by Richard Nixon's administration, but by his enemies in Phnom Penh.

Osborne does not answer some of the lingering questions surrounding Sihanouk and the role of his country in the many Indochina wars. What exactly were the relations, for example, between Sihanouk and his nemesis and one-time patron Pol Pot? What were his real feelings about the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, of whose future ability to dominate Southeast Asia he was secretly convinced? And what went on at the famous conference of the Indochinese peoples in April 1970, when the Chinese leader Zhou Enlai sponsored a delicate meeting in South China to knit together a fragile alliance consisting of Sihanouk's partisans, the North Vietnamese, and the Khmer Rouge? Perhaps such gaps are inevitable in light of Osborne's decision not to interview his subject in connection with the book. As it is, this work is an entertaining and occasionally enlightening biography that throws some light on the character and personality of one of the most enigmatic leaders of our times.

WILLIAM J. DUIKER
Pennsylvania State University

ERROL HODGE. *Radio Wars: Truth, Propaganda and the Struggle for Radio Australia*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 324. $59.95.

GARY D. RAWNSLEY. *Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in International Politics, 1956–64*. (Studies in Diplomacy.) New York: St. Martin's. 1996. Pp. x, 224. $59.95.

Every Western, state-sponsored, international radiobroadcasting organization, such as the BBC and the Voice of America (VOA), inevitably engages in two types of conflicts. The first and most fundamental involves struggles for organizational independence between the broadcaster and the government of its sponsoring state, a department of that government, or

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the agency under which it operates. The second involves clashes between the organization and governments of some of the foreign nations in which it has significant audiences. Errol Hodge's volume provides rich and well-documented accounts of several such wars fought by Radio Australia (RA).

Australia's overseas broadcasting service was created in 1939 to explain Australia's and Britain's policies to the people of Asia and the Pacific. During World War II and the years that followed, there was an ongoing, three-way power struggle for control of RA among the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC), the Department of External Affairs, and the Department of Information. Throughout the war, most news and commentary programs were run by the Department of External Affairs as part of the war effort. RA was administered along the lines of the VOA. The VOA operates under direct control of the State Department and, in principle, serves as an instrument of foreign policy. During the early stages of the war, RA suppressed some information and emphasized other material according to its presumed effect on Australia's war efforts and the possible advantage reports would provide Japanese propaganda. But, because Australia was on the winning side for most of the war, it could broadcast valid and reliable reports of military action and thereby maintain its credibility. During wartime, Hodge correctly observes, maintaining a reputation for objectivity is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.

Immediately after the war, the ABC attempted unsuccessfully to have RA "revert to its care." The Department of External Affairs lost much of its power over the service, but the Department of Information continued to exert its influence. RA was used as an instrument of the government's "White Australian Policy" seeking to attract immigrants from Britain and the English-speaking Commonwealth, Germany and the Netherlands. The election of a new government in 1949 and the onset of the Cold War sparked serious controversies over the use of RA as an ideological weapon. During the 1950s, RA's journalists fought for their right to determine the contents of news and current affairs programs. They argued that they were not prepared to act as passive purveyors of Australian foreign policy. Rather, they wanted to convey the idea that they were speaking from a country that valued the expression of diverse opinions. Journalists argued that RA should be administered along the lines, not of the VOA, but of the BBC, whose charter protected it from direct intervention by the British government. (In fact, as Hodge acknowledges, the BBC had strong ties to the British Foreign Office that restricted the content of commentaries on its overseas services.) Australia's conservative Department of External Affairs responded that the present purpose of RA was to "combat Communist falsifications of events" and to "encourage Asians to believe that their own national traditions and institutions should be preserved against Communism" (p. 104). In the end, journalists won some autonomy, but RA discontinued its presentations of news commentaries.

The Vietnam War provided the next stimulus for the Department of External Affairs to seek direct control of RA. The department was particularly concerned about coverage of antiwar demonstrations in the West and the flight of Vietnamese refugees to Australia. External Affairs, however, more frequently attempted to influence RA's reporting of Indonesia than of Vietnam because Indonesia had far greater importance to Australian national interests. Also, RA had an enormous audience in Indonesia, largely because it was viewed there as a reliable source of information, not only about international affairs but also about events in Indonesia unreported by domestic media as a result of government censorship. On several occasions, RA's accounts of Indonesian affairs strained relations between Canberra and Jakarta. The most serious of these occurrences involved coverage of Indonesia's dispute with the Netherlands over control of New Guinea, and, most significant of all, Indonesia's continuing problems in East Timor. Nevertheless, the view prevailed that, although on occasion RA would irritate governments with which Australia had good relations, that had to be accepted as part of the price for greater credibility and influence achieved through operation outside direct government control.

Hodge correctly notes that factors in addition to direct pressure from the Department of External Affairs (successfully resisted in several instances as noted above) have helped to ensure that RA generally operates as an instrument of Australian foreign policy. These include the ability of the government and government departments to influence the selection of top ABC executives, self-censorship (resulting from the fact that most of its journalists have been Australians who see the world from a particular perspective; far too little is made of this point), and government selection of RA's target priorities. Hodge ends his study with some speculation about the future of Radio Australia. International audio broadcasting (if not broadcasting via shortwave), will continue, he contends, well into the twenty-first century due to its cost efficiency as a means of international communication. The medium is likely to be supplanted by international satellite television as the principal means by which Australian broadcasts reach the world. He concludes that this new medium will have to fight a "war of independence" if "it is to establish a reputation for credibility and integrity to match that won over half a century by Radio Australia" (p. 278).

Hodge's study is especially well done when RA's wars are depicted as personal conflicts between particular government and radio officials. He falls quite short, however, when discussing more abstract matters, such as differentiating among news, commentary, and propaganda. Essential newsmaking processes—such as linguistically encoding observed events, placing events in explanatory frameworks, and relying on official sources for information, to name but a few—make

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such distinctions tenuous. A broadcasting organization's independence from direct government control does not mean that the materials it transmits will simply mirror the political world and cease to promote government and/or state interests.

Gary D. Rawnsley's investigation of the operations of the BBC and the VOA over the eventful period from 1956–1964 generally avoids venturing into Hodge's conceptual quagmire. From the onset, Rawnsley argues that, despite differences in their formal autonomy, both organizations have operated to serve objectives of their sponsoring states. He documents the various ways each broadcaster has functioned as an "auxiliary instrument of policy" (p. 5) in different political contexts. Nevertheless, he does not assume that cooperation between each organization and the government/state it serves has always been easy and automatic. Rawnsley describes the BBC and the VOA engaging in many of the types of radio wars recounted in Hodge's history of RA.

As its title suggests, the unique contribution of this book is to be found in Rawnsley's distinction between media diplomacy and propaganda and his emphasis on the VOA and the BBC as diplomatic agents. He notes that broadcasting propaganda involves transmitting messages "targeted at a mass audience, based on the supposition that public opinion can exert considerable influence on its government's and state systems," while acting as an agent of diplomacy involves transmitting messages that are "more selective and aim to influence the government or regime directly, offering the professional diplomat an alternative channel of communication, and negotiation" (pp. 11–12).

The BBC's first Cold War assignment was to build support among Western governments for British policy during the Suez Crisis of 1956. It failed in its attempts, and the Soviet Union was able to portray itself as a supporter of the Arab nations in the affairs of the Middle East. The BBC's inability to achieve its diplomatic mission is attributed to the principle that even the best media efforts cannot make bad policy palatable. Putting aside the question of the tenability of this principle, there is an alternative explanation. As Asa Briggs noted in *The BBC: The First Fifty Years* (1984), the organization broadcast a variety of views on Suez, including some that directly opposed official policy. Such reporting becomes possible when there are deep divisions in government, which there were over Suez. During the Suez Crisis, the BBC had an opportunity to demonstrate some freedom from government control. In doing so, it enhanced its reputation for credibility, an organizational goal of the highest priority.

The BBC and the VOA reporting about the Hungarian uprising of 1956 effectively served Western ideological interests. The revolution lent itself to appropriation by Cold War narrative. Rawnsley offers the familiar observation that, by their strident tone, VOA broadcasts misled Hungarians to expect military aid from the United States. He also relates less frequently encountered stories about the BBC's work as a monitoring service providing channels of information for Western governments and its operation as a message service for refugees.

According to Rawnsley, the BBC became more sophisticated in matters of diplomacy as a result of its Suez experience, but the VOA learned little from its involvement in the Hungarian uprising. Subsequently, the VOA broadcast to Cuba, encouraging its people to overthrow Fidel Castro. The Bay of Pigs operation was poorly planned and failed badly. The failure of the invasion and revelations of the CIA's involvement in the affair forced the VOA to retract much of what it had claimed about the event. Finally, by the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the VOA had learned some lessons from its earlier mistakes. In this most serious of international crises, radio was used as an integral part of U.S. diplomatic procedure, clearly articulating the intentions of its government and successfully supplementing creditable policy.

In the context of Cold War consensus of the early 1960s, the VOA discussed American involvement in Vietnam in terms of stopping the advance of communism in Asia and defending South Vietnam from aggression and terrorism. As the war escalated and domestic support for it eroded, it ignored widespread dissent. According to Rawnsley, the VOA could not grant the debate the coverage it deserved, for the organization would have been accused of undermining South Vietnamese confidence in the United States and weakening the morale of American combat troops. As a result, it suffered a severe loss of credibility. Policy had put the VOA in a position about which it could do little.

Readers of these two volumes should keep in mind that they describe the operation of international radio-broadcasting organizations during major wars and revolutions. It is in these particular contexts that the battles they report were fought. Routine international radio broadcasting occurs outside these contexts. Generally, there is congruence between the perspectives offered by international broadcasting organizations and those of their governments. The "wars" these studies describe can just as well be characterized as periodic turf battles as they can be portrayed as battles for freedom to tell "the truth."

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ROBERT J. FOSTER, editor. *Nation Making: Emergent Identities in Postcolonial Melanesia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1995. Pp. vi, 280. $47.50.

The practice of ethnography seems to be engaging in larger, different, and more politically centered projects these days. This collection of essays, ably edited by Robert J. Foster, addresses critically the process of nation making in postcolonial Melanesia. Drawing on the work of Benedict Anderson, Foster in his introduction posits the nation as an imagined, contested construct whose distinctive identity is the subject of

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multiple and competing definitions. Given that much of the process of nation making is discursive in nature, takes place in the public sphere, and involves the active participation of a variety of interest groups, Foster argues for an understanding of the nation as narrative.

Edward LiPuma's piece on the formation of nation-states and national cultures in Oceania provides the theoretical locus around which a number of the essays revolve. For LiPuma, the nation-state as a political form is quite inseparable from Western capitalist culture; its beginnings in the Pacific are intimately bound up with the history of colonialism. Capitalism, then, is the necessary and first condition for understanding the process of nation making in the region. Moreover, capitalism, according to LiPuma, conditions not only the distribution of power; its workings and rhetorical practices combine to affect the very ways people understand the nation and their place in it.

Part two of this work offers a somewhat more grounded application of the themes and theory presented by Foster and LiPuma, respectively. Here the emphasis falls on an examination of discursive devices through which competing visions of nationness are publicly espoused. Henry Rutz details the dialogic of competing rhetorical strategies involving chiefs, land, and church in Fiji. These rhetorical strategies employ varying versions of tradition to legitimate rival constructions of the Fiji nation in ways that are persuasive to particular constituencies, be they chiefly, commoner, Indian, Methodist, or combinations thereof. In short, tradition becomes the highly ideologized form of history. Martha Kaplan approaches Fiji's recent political history through a selective examination of the rituals that Fijians and Fiji Indians employ to make and remake constructions of the nation. Kaplan argues that all viable nations require rituals through which particular narratives can be enshrined as real or true. The tragedy of contemporary Fiji is that there has yet to emerge an inclusive ritual that can replace the dominant narrative of violence, division, and inequality.

Government policy and commercial practices are also considered as instruments of nation making. Christine Jourdan considers the ways in which the Solomon Islands state seeks to develop the ideological and institutional infrastructure necessary for nationhood. Her investigations focus on the development of Pidgin as a common national language, the role of the schools in inculcating a sense of national identity through a program of education, and the experience of an urban-based popular culture that emphasizes a national community of consumers. In the last essay of this second section, Foster provides an insightful examination of the material practices promoted in print advertising that link the possession and consumption of commodities with an encompassing national style in Papua New Guinea.

The book contains a number of healthy, constructive, but unresolved tensions involving the interaction of the global and the local and the possible gap between theoretical structures and more local or at least ethnographic renderings. John Kelly, in a very elegant epilogue to the volume, hints at this in his description of ethnography as the place where theory goes to die. The contributions in the third part of this volume challenge the appropriateness of the construct "nation" in understanding contemporary contestations over history, culture, power, and government in postcolonial Melanesia. Eric Hirsch describes how the rural Fuyuge of Papua New Guinea secure urban material resources through a process of temporal and spatial simultaneity that involves the imposition of metropolitan place names on local landscapes. Hirsch sees in the interaction between national projects and local communities not the inevitability of a new hegemonic order but possible outcomes that include cultural persistence and even resistance. Similarly, Ellen Facey argues, through her analysis of the Nguna people's relationship to Vanuatu's first indigenous political party, that the concept of tradition, or *kastom*, is far more than an essentializing, ideological tool of elite political groups or parties. *Kastom*, writes Facey, can reinvigorate long-standing debates as well as generate new arguments over old issues; *kastom* has the power to separate as well as unite, to enfranchise as well as disenfranchise, to allow for the articulation of local identities as well as newly emerging national ones. In the final essay of this third section, Michael Jacobsen challenges the very viability of the concept of nationhood for Papua New Guinea. The tremendous diversity of cultures and languages within the bounded national entity called Papua New Guinea, believes Jacobsen, frustrates the very process of nation making.

Kelly, again in his epilogue, suggests the need for greater attention to the ways in which foreign structures are read, experienced, and interpreted locally. We might understand the arrival of global capitalism in the Pacific as not simply about exploitation, coercion, and dominance but about local enchantment, desire, possibility, opportunity, and appropriation, too. The future may prove to be about the unmaking as well as making of nations. In any event, Foster and all of the contributors to this volume have provided a welcome and valuable service in raising, advancing, and challenging understandings of the nation in postcolonial Melanesia and beyond.

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DAVID ARNOLD and RAMACHANDRA GUHA, editors. *Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia*. (Studies in Social Ecology and Environmental History.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xi, 376. $29.95.

The practice of regional environmental history has been dominated by scholars from the United States. Workers on South Asia, however, provide us with another set of examples that examine in some detail

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the dialectic between humans and nature. We can point to scholars such as Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha (*This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India* [1993]), to the collection edited by R. H. Grove (*Nature and the Orient: Essays in the Environmental History of South and South-East Asia*, forthcoming from Oxford University Press), and to a special "South Asia" issue of the journal *Environment and History* (2: 2 [1996]) as leading the way, but, as M. Rangarajan's bibliography in the last of those items shows, a substantial literature is accumulating (see Rangarajan, "Environmental Histories of South Asia: A Review Essay," pp. 129–43). The collection of essays under review, edited by David Arnold and Ramachandra Guha, must be evaluated in this context.

This book originated in a conference held in Bellagio, Italy in 1992. The work now includes a twenty-page introduction by the editors and eleven chapters contributed by authors from five nations: India, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Australia. The essays cover a time span from the Mughals to the Mahals of recent times and topics from forestry to irrigation agriculture, pastoralism and fisheries to smoke pollution in Calcutta. There is, however, a preponderance of material on the colonial period. The book is indexed, but there is no consolidated bibliography of the footnote citations in each chapter.

For American readers, the introduction will be of considerable value, for it situates these essays on South Asian themes in the context of previous scholarship on other continents, especially North America. Arnold and Guha identify two major themes for the key years in the United States and Canada: first, the effects of two centuries of European-inspired colonization and the development of capitalism; and second, a celebration of those who have challenged the environmental degradation unleashed by those forces. The authors single out scholars such as Donald Worster, William Cronon, and Roderick Nash as leading figures in the weaving of these two strands of intellectual anabasis. Arnold and Guha consider the current position of Indian academics, however, to be more akin to recent French scholarship. The concern of French historians with the *longue durée*, for example, fits well with the antiquity of the lived environment of the Indian subcontinent; equally, Marc Bloch's close analysis of the ecology of agrarian life (*French Rural History: An Essay on Its Basic Characteristics* [1966]) finds echo in the adaptations of peasant cultures in India during the periods of rule by conquerors from other regions.

To single out any one essay for more detailed critical analysis would be unreasonable and indeed beyond the reach of a single reviewer. As might be expected, the source materials vary from essay to essay in their yields of material for environmental history, and we might be grateful to the record-keepers of the British Empire for their minute-by-minute recording of their activities. Some authors have exploited such records closely, however, and combined them with local knowledge and cultural insight to produce enlightening pieces of work. I would single out the essay by Elizabeth Whitcombe on the environmental costs of irrigation in British India as an exemplary combination of ecological knowledge with both history and moral concern.

These works make us reflect as well on the way the contributors balance issues of nature, culture, and history. Some contributors emphasize nature much more strongly and almost ignore culture except as a homogenous human input; others tell us little about nonhuman conditions. It is surely a challenge for environmental historians that they, along with historical geographers, must find the interface of nature, culture, and history to give us the kind of insights denied by emphasizing any one of these alone. To that extent, a book such as this needs to be self-critical and to point the way ahead. It is a pity that Arnold and Guha did not write an afterword noting the more general intellectual lessons of these essays, pointing out some of the ways methodologies could be improved, and drawing attention to the problems this nascent discipline faces.

Academics interested in the Indian subcontinent need no extra recommendation to read this book; indeed, many will by now have done so. Environmental historians of other regions might consider reading this work as well: not only will they find chapters that invoke comparisons with their own narratives, they will also gain insights into the construction of other regional environmental histories.

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Dane Kennedy. *The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations and the British Raj*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 264. $38.00.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, argues Dane Kennedy, India's hill stations became central to Britain's imperial designs. Utilizing his own statistics as well as materials drawn from often quite obscure official sources, Kennedy innovatively describes how hill stations were transformed from recreational destinations for touring Britons into military garrisons and administrative centers, eventually becoming, as Mahatma Gandhi put it, "the real headquarters of the rulers" and thus "the symbol of India's slavery" (quoted on p. 147).

Such is not the common image. India's hill stations have long been celebrated not as seats of power but rather as whimsical playgrounds remote from commercial-political India. In a manner reminiscent of sixteenth-century explorers' accounts of North America, the early nineteenth-century promoters of European settlement in India's hills described them as edenic, inhabited only by docile noble savages who could be readily shoved aside. Carved out of supposedly pristine wilderness, more than sixty hill stations were created between 1820 and 1860, with Cotswold scenic effects built to order. Indigenous trees were felled and re-

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placed by ones considered more decorative, and lakes were added wherever feasible. The results, visual as well as social, were curious. The Ootacamund Hunt, for example, pursued an indigenous jackal but did so with imported English hounds. Kennedy discerningly describes these British carryings-on, but he could have made clearer just how bizarre they were by surveying pre-British traditions. India's Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains all endowed India's hills with cultural significance; Mount Abu, for example, was a Jain and Hindu pilgrimage destination centuries before the British refashioned it into a quaint English village. Unfortunately, Kennedy adheres strictly to a British frame of reference even when deriding it.

The centerpiece of Kennedy's narrative concerns the British decision after the 1857 revolt to transfer governmental operations from the coastal metropolises of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras to the seemingly safer hills. Vague physical health justifications for hill residence were offered by British officials citing the dangers of lowland "debility" or "tropical inertia." But the heat avoided by Britons escaping to the hills was more saliently cultural and political, as Kennedy shows through a close analysis of official reports. Similarly, the tonic provided by hill stations was not just a consequence of their chill temperatures but came as well from the invigorating presence of fellow Britons living more or less as they would have in Britain. Indeed, in many hill stations British women and children actually outnumbered British men.

Beginning in 1864, cold, remote Simla in the Himalayas became the seat of India's central government for roughly half of each year. The army moved its headquarters to Simla, and built hill garrisons accommodating a quarter of all troops. Thus fresh (and politically uncontaminated) soldiers were ready when needed to quell disturbances below. Mile-high imperialism nonetheless survived for only a few decades. To British annoyance, the Indian population of hill stations grew rapidly. Meanwhile, faster steamships tempted Britons on holiday to sail back to Britain. Kennedy considers the 1911 decision to move India's capital to Delhi to be an admission that Britain's hill strategy was not working out as hoped. By 1920, India's hills were already returning to what they had been for millenia past: places where Indians seek spiritual nourishment. Perhaps the most enduring legacies of the British period in the hills are coffee and tea estates, which today under Indian management still generate much vital foreign exchange.

The British Indian hill station had little to do with magic or even health and more to do with commerce, politics, and hucksterism. Oddly, Kennedy imagines his book's title will "point to pertinent parallels between the Alpine realm imagined by [Thomas] Mann and the Indian realms invented by the British" (pp. 17–18). The rarefied soul-searching of Mann's *Magic Mountain* has only tangential bearing on Kennedy's theme; the book's subtitle offers a better description of this solidly researched study.

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S. M. BURKE and SALIM AL-DIN QURAISHI. *The British Raj in India: An Historical Review*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xiv, 699. $75.00.

Despite its title, this book is not really a historical overview of British rule in India at all. Rather, it is an account of how nationalism evolved in India from the late nineteenth century and an explanation of why two nations rather than one resulted from that development. The argument is an exposition of the two-nations theory: in India, Hinduism and Islam represented two incompatible civilizations, and the gulf between them was unbridgeable. This basic truth was elaborated into a political philosophy by Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898). It was taken up by the Muslim League after its formation in 1906 and ultimately brought to fruition by Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), who convinced the Muslims that they and the Hindus constituted two incongruous nations who could not live together in a single state.

S. M. Burke and Salim Al-Din Quraishi begin with the British impact on India and then provide brief portraits of the Hindu and Muslim communities with a view to establishing the basic argument. These are followed by an account of Indian politics from the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 through the partition of Bengal in 1905, the effect of World War I, the emergence of Mohandas K. Gandhi, and the various maneuvers by the British up to the outbreak of World War II in 1939. This first half of the book serves as a backdrop to the second half, which provides a detailed analysis of political developments during World War II and its immediate aftermath, when British rule ended. The argument is not new, but it is presented dispassionately and without the polemics that have sometimes characterized books that justify the partition of British India on the basis of cultural incompatibility, the machinations of the Congress Party, and the duplicity of the British. In fact, Burke and Quraishi give balanced judgments on all the major actors and events that led up to the partition of India, and this is the real strength of the book. The Congress leaders are presented as genuine nationalists, although the failure of Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru to accommodate Muslim fears is shown. Jinnah is depicted as neither hero nor demon, but he is treated sympathetically. Even Lord Mountbatten comes out quite well, although his role in meddling with the Radcliffe boundary award, both in substance and in the timing of its announcement, is emphasized.

The authors show that after the war, the overriding desire of the British, and particularly Mountbatten, was to wind up the Raj expeditiously and, if possible, keep India in the Commonwealth, despite the fact that Congress had ruled this out as far back as 1929. To

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achieve this, the British accepted the Congress as the inheritors of their rule. Thus, the Cabinet Mission of 1946 maintained continuous private contacts with the Congress leaders while the viceroy's constitutional adviser, V. P. Menon, also had direct lines to them. Mountbatten in his turn invited Nehru to Simla in May 1947 when he worked out his final scheme for the transfer of power. He showed this to the Congress leader, as a result of which the original "Plan Balkan" was scrapped in favor of Menon's proposal for a transitional period of dominion status. Jinnah received no such consideration from the British. But they got what they wanted: Nehru agreed to dominion status and ultimately to Commonwealth membership, and Mountbatten stayed on as governor-general of independent India. Thus, the British ended their rule as they began: with assiduous attention to self-interest.

Burke lived through the events he describes (he was a member of the Indian civil service from 1931 to 1947 and of the Pakistan foreign service thereafter) and discusses them judiciously, using primary and secondary sources. Sometimes, however, one wishes that he could have injected something more personal into his account. The only occasion on which he permits this is a footnote (p. 277) in which he recounts a conversation he had in 1939 with Abdul Ghaffar Khan in his village, when the frontier leader told him why he had affiliated his Redshirt movement to the Congress. Nevertheless, this work does offer a useful survey of Indian politics under British rule, particularly during the final eight years.

There are mistakes scattered throughout the book and in the bibliography, but only one needs to be mentioned. The Royal Air Force did not shoot down 185 German aircraft on September 15, 1940 (p. 352). That was wartime propaganda, and Winston Churchill himself provided the true figure of fifty-six in *Their Finest Hour* (1949).

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APARNA BASU. *Mridula Sarabhai: Rebel with a Cause*. (Gender Studies.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. ix, 275. $24.95.

Mridula Sarabhai (1911–1974) was an extraordinary woman. The eldest child of a wealthy industrialist, she became a disciple of Mohandas K. Gandhi in her youth, was an activist in the Indian independence movement, and served time in prison for her nonviolent protests against British rule. Sarabhai remained single and always dressed in homespun cloth (hallmarks of the Gandhian), but she was also a maverick in Indian nationalist ranks who differed with the elder men of the movement in matters of women's and minority rights. In 1947, when India was partitioned, she worked in riot-torn areas, risking her own life to confront violent mobs and save lives. Following independence, she worked as a volunteer to assure that women who had been abducted during the partition troubles were returned to their families. She then became a champion of Kashmiri rights and a supporter of Shaikh Abdullah, the Kashmiri leader, during his long incarceration. Sarabhai lived simply, using her considerable wealth to support causes and individuals in whom she believed and sacrificing her own health while caring for others. Like the Mahatma, she was something of a saint.

Aparna Basu's biography of Sarabhai is a welcome addition to the small number of biographies of Indian women nationalists. Basu was granted full access to Sarabhai's private papers by the Sarabhai Foundation, and consequently this biography may be regarded as official. She avoids, however, the usual puff job that the label "official" implies; she is positive without being uncritical. Sarabhai was a courageous woman but headstrong. She occasionally drove her nationalist colleagues to distraction. Denied a slot on the Congress Working Committee in her native state of Gujarat, she ran as an independent and won. For her post-independence championship of Kashmir and Shaikh Abdullah, Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India and a personal friend, expressed exasperation. Sarabhai was subsequently accused, rightly or wrongly, of pro-Pakistan propaganda. The Pakistani government certainly used her press releases on Abdullah's behalf for its own purposes.

Basu reports these episodes straightforwardly and similarly deals with a more controversial aspect of Sarabhai's career. In her zeal to retrieve abducted women, she could not believe that some women preferred to stay with men who had rescued and married them and by whom they had had children. To be taken from their new families for former families, some of whom would regard them as fallen women, was, in effect, a second abduction. Sarabhai could not see that point of view and persisted for years in her rescue activities. Even some of her women colleagues in the rescue operation differed with her on this score.

Basu's biography fulfills the task of revealing an eventful life in a balanced fashion. One could wish for more analysis, but the documentation is thorough and allows readers to come to their own conclusions. A minor problem is that Basu has elected to deal with Sarabhai's life topically rather than chronologically, and this leads to repetitiveness and discontinuities that become obtrusive. A firmer editorial hand would have further improved this volume, which is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the role of women in the Indian nationalist movement.

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UNITED STATES

LEIGH ERIC SCHMIDT. *Consumer Rites: The Buying and Selling of American Holidays*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. xvi, 363. $24.95.

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This book captures the sheer complexity of holidays in the cultural life of the nation. Why do Americans celebrate Christmas as they do? What medley of functions does Mother's Day play in the recital of American wants and needs? Does the commodification of love in a consumer culture make mass-produced valentines intimate in any sincere, personal way? This study raises many questions.

Leigh Eric Schmidt conveys the multidimensional nature of American celebration convincingly. He points out, for example, that the appropriate study of Christmas embraces "folklore, religion, festival, art, music, literature, television, food, education, civic ceremony, gender, family, gift exchange, ethnicity, localism, race, class, and commerce" (p.106). At the same time, Schmidt confesses the practical impossibility of fully encapsulating the multivalent meanings that holidays hold for modern Americans.

How does one analyze joy? Schmidt does not audit the output of candy canes at Christmas to compare it with the consumption of Easter bunnies, some now sold molded into milk chocolate parodies of "model consumers" (p. 224) during another season of sale and celebration. The reader comes to realize, however, that one might have to audit sales in order to assay fully the functions of modern holidays.

Schmidt focuses instead on linkages that join "Christianity and the consumer culture—a relationship that was, by turns, symbiotic and conflictual, complementary and contested" (p.14). He examines the confluence of piousness and plenty in Valentine's Day, Christmas, Easter, and Mother's Day. Although the reader is not told the precise rationale for this particular selection of festivities, Schmidt reveals late in the text that they are the four most card-intensive greeting frenzies of the year.

Valentine's Day led the way in the reconfiguration of Christian holy day as commercial holiday, a novel variety of festivity centered on shopping. During the middle of the 1800s, the word "valentine" itself was redefined; rather than referring to one's love object, the term came to denote an object one sent to express love. Although cards came first in "the market's colonization of ritual" (p.86), florists and confectioners soon found that they could also cash in on sentiment by peddling packaged affection.

The modern American Christmas, to which retailers, advertisers, and consumers all devote the most attention in the panoply of American festivity, is not just a secular substitute for religious commemoration. In perhaps his most useful chapter, Schmidt suggests that it is sanctified in the folk religion of consumers whose spiritual expression finds concrete meaning through the mechanisms of the marketplace. The season harkens back to reveries of the "callithumpians" (pp. 110, 136) of early nineteenth-century New Year celebrations.

For Easter, with its bunnies and crosses, eggs and Jesus and jelly beans, churches themselves spurred the commodification of belief, fashioning an odd fusion of folk custom and religious rite wedded to a cash economy. "Traditional Christian symbols of self-abnegation had come to legitimate luxury, elegance, and indulgence" (p.210). Cash registers ring before bells peal to summon the faithful, bedecked in their new clothes, new shoes, and bright bonnets.

Schmidt is effective in describing the functional fit that has welded the idiom and iconography of Christianity to commercial expression. He tracks the canonization of Santa Claus, at first a motley cultural admixture of Christian saint, elfish puck, and cross-dressing mummer, rationalized by retailers of the late nineteenth century into a generous folk god. Schmidt discovers that even apparently anti-materialistic injunctions to "Keep Christ in Christmas" can simultaneously inspire sales; while insinuating the spirit of giving, the slogan also sells well on sweatshirts and coffee mugs, appropriate gifts, perhaps, for cynics who bemoan the commercialization of American culture.

By focusing on one particular variable, in this case the Christian antecedents, underpinnings, and overtones of modern holidays, Schmidt neglects other factors that are also well worth investigating. In his account of the enshrinement of Mother's Day, for example, he fails to tie the emergence of the new holiday to structural changes in women's roles in early twentieth-century America, although he recognizes that Mother's Day became "in many ways an ironic embodiment of these mounting cultural changes" (p.274). He concedes that its continuing religious resonance is muted by its significance as an occasion for which to shop.

Schmidt advises readers that he intends to incite debate rather than to end it. He hopes to present "a work of many voices, competing, interacting, equivocating, and pronouncing in a conversation without end" (p. 11). In this, in his eloquent way, he succeeds.

VINCENT VINIKAS
University of Arkansas, Little Rock

MARGARET RIPLEY WOLFE. *Daughters of Canaan: A Saga of Southern Women*. (New Perspectives on the South.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1995. Pp. xii, 281. Cloth $37.50, paper $14.95.

Margaret Ripley Wolfe's book is a *tour de force*. In only 207 pages, Wolfe surveys the current scholarship of southern women's history from the colonial era to the present. Wolfe casts a wide net and in so doing captures the reality of most southern women's lives: black, white, Native American, rich and poor, heroines and frontierswomen, plantation mistresses and dowagers, mill workers and sharecroppers, beauty queens and country singers, farm wives and domestic workers, female writers and social activists, and everyone else in between.

Twenty-five years before the publication of Wolfe's book, Anne Firor Scott's path-breaking *The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics, 1830–1930* (1970)

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appeared and almost single-handedly created this new field of historical inquiry. Until then, one could count on the fingers of both hands the number of books on southern women's history. The unparalleled explosion of interest in southern women's history after 1970 enabled this reviewer to organize the Fort Hill Conference at Clemson University in 1989. A dazzling array of eminent historians presented the essays subsequently published in the edited collection, *In Joy and In Sorrow: Women, Family, and Marriage in the Victorian South, 1830–1900* (1991). Moreover, the Southern Association for Women Historians (SAWH), founded in the same year as the publication of *The Southern Lady*, began holding a triennial conference in 1988 to showcase the latest work being done in southern women's history. Wolfe's book thus presents an overview of twenty-five years' worth of scholarly achievements.

Wolfe, a native-born southerner, whose family settled in the 1770s in the region that became Tennessee two decades later, is aptly suited to present us with this classic study of southern women over two centuries. The strength of Wolfe's interpretations derives from her being deeply rooted in place, her sensitive and witty portrayal of the women she describes, and, most of all, her masterful and amazing assimilation of the seemingly inexhaustible and rich sources, both primary and secondary. I particularly like Wolfe's use of illustrations from the highlands of the Upper South. Scholars have become so accustomed to the overwhelming abundance of examples from Virginia, South Carolina, and Mississippi that her inclusion of women's commentaries from the rugged mountains of southern Appalachia are rewarding as well as refreshing.

In Wolfe's overview, most women, including American Indian and African-American women, are included, but the histories of elite white women are more plentiful because of the relative abundance of materials relating to this class of women. Nevertheless, no women are intentionally slighted. What *is* omitted is a bibliography. Since much of the book's significance derives from Wolfe's review of the current literature on southern women, this is a significant omission and will be remedied, I trust, in a second edition.

Wolfe has given us a stylish and authoritative synthesis of the prodigious research and writing being done in southern women's history. Imaginative, well-conceived, and accessible, this saga of southern women is a remarkable achievement worthy of a large general readership, as well as being read with pleasure by students in a variety of courses.

CAROL K. BLESER
Clemson University

MARGARET MARSH and WANDA RONNER. *The Empty Cradle: Infertility in America from Colonial Times to the Present*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 326. $29.95.

With marriage and children such significant elements in the ideological construction of American womanhood, birth control, abortion, and childbirth have developed as primary topics in contemporary historiography. This perspective, however, ignores the other side of the issue: infertility. If motherhood is the defining characteristic of ideal womanhood, what can be said about women without children? How does their state affect their views of themselves and society's acceptance of them? What is the relationship between scientific and medical procedures and attitudes toward the childless woman? These and other important questions are addressed in this intriguing study.

Today, couples in search of biological children visit physicians for advice and submit themselves to a host of increasingly sophisticated and often invasive techniques. This medicalization of infertility dates from the nineteenth century. Before then, religious thought interpreted barrenness as a sign or test from the Lord, though some home medical remedies were recommended as treatments. Furthermore, the colonial family was defined as the household and not limited to the conjugal unit, and thus children could enter it in a variety of other ways. With adoption, guardianship, and the practice of "putting out," adults raised stepchildren and children of deceased siblings as well as children apprenticed to them at an early age. By the late eighteenth century, some physicians began to define infertility as a pathology. Medical practitioners, ranging from the flamboyant James Graham (1745–1794) with his electrotherapy to the somber James Walker, who wrote the first medical volume devoted to the subject (1797), slowly entered the field. Over the century, leading physicians such as J. Marion Sims made sterility a focus of their research. By the 1890s, the treatment of infertility was an important aspect of the emerging specialty of gynecology.

Margaret Marsh and Wanda Ronner, one a historian and the other a physician, recognize that infertility has underlying physiological causes but that it is also culturally conditioned. They present a lucid narrative relating the development of technological, surgical, and drug-related treatments for barren women and the evolution of scientific theories of reproduction and endocrinology within the cultural milieu of the day. Thus, the historical analysis of childlessness goes well beyond a description of increasing medical prowess (even with our faith in medical therapeutics, barely fifty percent of women treated now are able to conceive) to illuminate changing cultural and family values, the role of religious belief, and the position of women in society, as well the growing medicalization of American life. Moreover, Marsh's and Ronner's use of gender analysis is nuanced and compelling. Regardless of the circumstances, this history shows, it is women who have been blamed for a couple's infertility and women who have undergone extensive, invasive treatments. The authors do not paint these women as passive victims of cultural imperatives or medical practitioners. Rather, they present a more complex

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picture in which some women aggressively seek solutions and others resist cultural and medical expectations.

Some of the most intriguing sections of the book poignantly reconstruct the lives of childless married women who meditated on or railed against their situation. For example, Lydia Maria Child (1802–1880) was a successful novelist and well-known antislavery reformer; her private writings suggest that she always regretted her childlessness, though she never sought medical assistance. Somewhat later in the century, in a world defined by the cult of motherhood, reformer Amelia Bloomer (1818–1894) and Civil War diarist Mary Boykin Chesnut (1823–1886) managed their sorrow differently. Bloomer and her husband adopted two children, and, during their early childhood, she moderated her public life to stay home to care for them. Chesnut, despite frequent bouts of ill-health, apparently sought medical help to alleviate her situation. By the twentieth century, a successful marriage and healthy family life demanded the presence of children. As one young wife explained in seeking advice from the U.S. Children's Bureau in 1922, "My only goal in life is to become a mother" (p. 153). Using responses to a query published in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Marsh and Ronner capture both the negative and positive attitudes of late twentieth-century women to childlessness. Though some opted to be "childfree," many others desperately desired children.

As this brief review suggests, Marsh and Ronner have sought to go beyond the published medical literature to disclose the voices of those most affected by the physiological and cultural condition of infertility. Through conscientious combing of memoirs and hospital records, of published literature ranging from medical journals to women's magazines, they have restored to the historical record the anguish and the hopes of women who experienced infertility. This book is a perceptive study that provides critical new insights for our understanding of the transformation of motherhood and the medicalization of American culture. It should be read by anyone who wants to understand the roots of some of our most perplexing health-care questions today.

Rima D. Apple
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Bruce C. Daniels. *Puritans at Play: Leisure and Recreation in Colonial New England*. New York: St. Martin's. 1995. Pp. xiv, 271. $23.95.

During the last three decades, scholars have explored many new aspects of the everyday lives of ordinary individuals in the past. One area that has attracted increasing attention from anthropologists and historians is the study of play. Now Bruce C. Daniels has produced a scholarly and often entertaining study of leisure and recreation in colonial New England.

The traditional interpretation of New England Puritans was that of a group of serious, dour individuals who strove obsessively to contain their emotions and repress their sexual impulses. Subsequent revisionists such as Perry Miller and Edmund S. Morgan tried to humanize the Puritans by demonstrating that they enjoyed ordinary pleasures and had a healthy attitude toward sex as long as it was confined within marriage. Daniels, in a well-balanced and carefully crafted book, takes a middle position: while the seventeenth-century Puritans were much more accepting of the ordinary pleasures of life, they were still deeply ambivalent about leisure and relaxation. Almost all of their statements in support of recreation were coupled with qualifications that cautioned against dangers from any excesses.

In a series of short but insightful chapters, Daniels thoughtfully synthesizes our knowledge of Puritan ideas about play and recreation as well as their actual leisure activities. He covers a wide variety of useful topics such as reading for pleasure, attendance at musical and theatrical affairs, socializing in meetinghouses and taverns, and participation in weddings and dinner parties. He provides a nuanced appreciation of changes over time and shows how more relaxed and accepting New Englanders were about leisure and recreation by the mid-eighteenth century. Moreover, Daniels documents the increasing fragmentation of leisure experiences by age, gender, social class, and location.

Naturally, trying to cover such a large number and wide variety of topics, Daniels sometimes takes positions that other specialists in the field might question. For example, in his chapter on the fragmentation of social experiences, he boldly and somewhat casually asserts that adolescence existed in seventeenth-century Puritan culture. Other family historians are more skeptical of the existence of a stage of adolescence at that time, although some of their disagreement may be semantic: what Daniels terms "adolescence" others have simply labeled a period of "semi-dependancy" or "youth." His brief but stimulating descriptions and discussions of the uses of leisure and recreation over the life course undoubtedly will encourage other scholars to explore his interesting insights much further.

Overall, Daniels succeeds admirably in providing a fuller and better understanding of the changing everyday experiences of New England Puritans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This book will be of considerable interest not only to scholars but to the wider audience for which it was also intended.

Maris A. Vinovskis
University of Michigan

Daniel Vickers. *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630–1850*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va. 1994. Pp. xxii, 347. Cloth $45.00, paper $16.95.

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In this richly textured study, Daniel Vickers stakes a place among long-running discussions about the emergence of wage labor, characterizations of early modern capitalism, social relations of production, the nature of markets in early New England, and more. Vickers buttresses theoretical issues with detailed acounts of the personal lives and the comparative work experiences of farmers and fishermen. He takes the long view of change; indeed, his context for Essex County's development runs far into a customary English past and right up to the county's industrial future.

The economic landscape of Essex farmers is familiar in colonial New England history: labor and capital were scarce, land was plentiful, agricultural technique and land use remained relatively static, and a demographic boom eventually created "crowding." But Vickers qualifies, at least partially, the dominant historiographical models of rising relative prosperity in New England's first century and then Malthusian or declension crises in its second. Although the "forces" of population growth matter, Vickers finds no full "transition to capitalism" in the colonial years. Work, which "was mostly a family affair" (p. 19) in which authority over sons' lives, as well as strategies of production and exchange, were negotiated, lay at the center of striving for a "competency": the security and even comfort of independent land ownership. At first, the chores of building farms prohibited the accumulation of productive wealth or mobile labor, stymied by-employments and regional markets for accidental surpluses, and prevented farm diversification. "It was better economics" (p. 73) for aging fathers to retain their sons' manpower, and for sons to delay marriage and acquisition of their own lands until their late twenties or early thirties, than to hire outsiders for farm work or cut sons loose before they came into an inheritance.

Even in the county's second century there was "nothing . . . that can legitimately be called a transformation" (p. 205). External demand grew, and local exchanges became more complicated, but Essex farmers did not respond by deliberately growing more for long-distance markets. The pursuit of competency still reigned as the ideal, and informal exchange, even barter, persisted alongside a very modest increase in production for sale. Even with the pressures of a growing population, shrinking reserves of land, and accumulating productive wealth on some farms (which created a small need for hired labor), family adaptations were relatively modest. Sons married younger, acquired family inheritances earlier, and some moved away from their families of birth; but change was not deep enough to evoke a shift toward more indentured or slave labor, significantly more day laborers, or free wage workers. Instead, Essex farmers "exchanged works" from day to day, based not on class exploitation but on achieving a complementarity of needs by balancing the "functional differences among households" (p. 242). For those children who faced the dire prospect of having to buy land, rather than inherit it, there was the temporary expedience of "by-employments" or craft production before attaining a competency in farming.

Greater contrasts, and deeper changes, affected the social relations of Marblehead's and Salem's fishermen, who started out "already thoroughly capitalist in [their] productive relations" (p. 10). In the early seventeenth century, merchants and fishermen joined into tight, unequal relations of dependency. "Clientage" (p. 100) provided these fishermen with extensive credit and pay incentives to bring home as many fish as possible in return for leaving control over marketing and sale of the fish in merchants' hands. By the eighteenth century, relations of class were entrenched, but the particular arrangements of clientage withered. Merchants had more capital, so they built bigger ships and financed fewer fishermen, while the latter, pinched by endemic poverty, accepted work in a free-wage arrangement that required more intense competition and work hierarchies among fishermen. Free wages, however, did not improve their standard of living, and the work itself toughened, forcing many men into retirement in their thirties and marking their occupation with chronic underemployment. The distinctiveness of these men's lives is enhanced when Vickers compares their work to the "cottage fishing" of Cape Ann, where young men fished only as a seasonal or temporary household strategy to bolster their competency in farming.

Since the central issues in this study come into relief only as the narrative extends into the nineteenth century, and the depth and pace of change is greater on the brink of Essex County's industrialization, it is unfortunate that Vickers virtually elides the Revolutionary years and condenses the years down to 1850 into a few pages. Indeed, the analysis shifts decidedly from the social relations of work to the external influences of depression, war, protectionism, and consumer preferences. With farming, the most consequential changes emerge when many Essex Countians—across class, age, and skill lines—are drawn to wage work in the urban mills and shops. These final pages are tantalizing: in 1775, says Vickers, only maritime employment incorporated the dependencies of class, but by 1850 "most people" in the county "either worked for wages or toiled at outwork where the terms were largely imposed upon them" (p. 323). But Vickers leaves the reader to trace most of the post-Revolutionary years through other scholarship.

CATHY MATSON
University of Delaware

JARED BROWN. *The Theatre in America during the Revolution*. (Cambridge Studies in American Theatre and Drama.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 229. $54.95.

An English theatrical troupe toured the major towns of the Middle Colonies and the Chesapeake during the 1750s and 1760s but left for Jamaica in 1775, soon after

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a resolution of the Continental Congress denounced stage plays as "a species of extravagance and dissipation." Following the Revolution, professional players slowly reestablished the theater as a legitimate form of entertainment for American patriots, and it began to flourish again in the 1790s. Assuming that the professional theater's survival in America was at stake during the Revolution, Jared Brown asserts that theatrical activity during the war years—most of it centered on productions by British troops in New York and Philadelphia—kept the theater alive and "helped to establish a tolerance" (p. 7) for the stage that shaped post-revolutionary American culture.

To make this argument, Brown draws on a wide assortment of evidence, little of it, unfortunately, directly relevant to his case. He discusses semiprofessional productions performed by British soldiers, propagandistic dialogues written to rouse Patriot and Loyalist belligerence, paratheatrical events such as balls and festivals staged by both sides, "professional" productions by struggling companies near the end of the war, and a few instances of amateur theater put together by American troops. This last is the only unambiguous bit of evidence aligning revolutionary-era theater with later American culture. American military theatricals at the Southwark Theatre in Philadelphia so infuriated members of the Continental Congress in 1778, however, that they passed another resolution against the stage that effectively halted American troop theater for the duration of the war.

As Brown reports, some professional players did produce a ragged repertory in Maryland and New York from 1781 to 1783, but they met with little success. Further, it is not evident that their efforts had much to do with the later popularity of the American stage. Dennis Ryan and John Henry, whom Brown judges the best "American" professionals in the country in 1783, found their most responsive audiences among the British troops in New York City waiting to go home. Concerning the evidence of "dramatic" propaganda, Brown asserts that tracts written by Mercy Otis Warren and other American republicans "represent the first important stirrings of American drama" (p. 84), despite the fact that they were not meant to be staged. Nor does Brown admit that these revolutionary propagandists were deeply suspicious of the corrupting influence of the theater. Further, most of the paratheatrical activities discussed by Brown seem to have confirmed American republicans in their antitheatrical prejudices. Indeed, even an American Tory was put off by the "Meschianza," a neo-medieval festival enjoyed by British officers and Philadelphia Loyalists in 1778; she denounced the celebration as "a shameful scene of dissipation" (p. 55).

Brown may be on firmer ground in concluding that the quantity and quality of British military theater in New York City built an audience for later American professional actors. It is clear from the copious evidence he presents that their repertory of plays was fashionably up-to-date, their productions handsomely staged, and their acting performances, enhanced by the talents of professional actresses, critically acclaimed. More evidence about the response of New Yorkers to this Loyalist theater would help to substantiate his claim, however. Specifically, Brown says nothing about the many republicans in the city who must have resented the theater as a symbol of imperial occupation. Nonetheless, the increasingly lavish productions by the British troops probably convinced some nonaligned New Yorkers that the theater could be an enjoyable and harmless pastime.

Problems of evidence aside, the major shortcoming of this book is Brown's lack of familiarity with the ideology of republicanism that did so much to shape the antitheatrical prejudices of the American revolutionaries. None of the standard discussions of American republicanism are in Brown's bibliography. Despite a prologue that promises to complicate the emphasis past theater historians have placed on religion as the major source of opposition to the stage in colonial America, Brown returns to the tired binary of church-versus-theater throughout the book to organize his narrative. Certainly Dissenter concerns played a role, but they cannot fully explain the revulsion against the stage felt by many republicans, regardless of religious convictions. (Indeed, the legacy of republican civic morality continues to shape the discourse on public funding for the arts.) Lacking a clear understanding of why most revolutionary-era patriots rejected the theater, Brown has trouble explaining why some of them were able to embrace it after the Revolution was complete. Instead of looking at this odd assortment of theater, paratheater, and dramatic propaganda during the war, he might better have examined changes in post-revolutionary republicanism.

BRUCE MCCONACHIE
University of Pittsburgh

MATTHEW SPALDING and PATRICK J. GARRITY. *A Sacred Union of Citizens: George Washington's Farewell Address and the American Character*. Foreword by DANIEL J. BOORSTIN. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 1996. Pp. xviii, 216. $27.95.

When I took American literature in high school, at the height of the Cold War, my teacher made us read—with one exception—every entry in a prodigious anthology. Mrs. Decker omitted George Washington's "Farewell Address," doubtless because of his admonition that the United States distance itself from the enmities and quarrels of foreign nations. In an age when our country was entering into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliances and our brothers and fathers were fighting, and in some instances dying, in an undeclared war in Korea, she must have feared that Washington's advice would trouble our callow minds.

The Cold War has ended, but new threats have

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arisen. A pervasive cynicism toward politics and politicians now exists in the minds of many Americans. Moreover, militia groups and other militant anti-government, libertarian, perhaps even anti-Union zealots have sprung up across the land. Against this new danger, Washington's cautionary instruction, awkward and incommodious in the eyes of some individuals four decades or more ago, might now be serviceable.

Such appears to be the conclusion of Matthew Spalding and Patrick J. Garrity, who have taken a fresh look at the Farewell Address. The result is often surprising and rewarding. They discover much in Washington's counsel that readers over the past century have ignored. The impression has grown that the Farewell Address was concerned solely with foreign policy and the dangers posed by political parties. Spalding and Garrity largely ignore these two portions of Washington's message. Instead, they emphasize Washington's remonstrances on the importance of the Union, rule of law, civic responsibility, and the formation of a national character. In the course of their work, Spalding and Garrity come closer than any previous historian or biographer to providing a compendium and coherent analysis of Washington's political philosophy.

Following a pedestrian summation of Washington's public career to 1796, the authors probe the evolution of the Farewell Address. Like Samuel Flagg Bemis, who published his findings in the *AHR* (1984), Spalding and Garrity conclude that while Alexander Hamilton was largely responsible for the stylistic tone of the document, the ideas were those of Washington. The authors marshall convincing evidence that Washington had previously articulated much that appeared in the Farewell Address, either in his private correspondence, in his Circular Address to the States in 1783 (an initial farewell address composed near the conclusion of the War of Independence), or in his first Inaugural Address in 1789.

Much of the emphasis in this study is on Washington's arguments in support of the national union. In addition to asserting that the Union enhanced the collective welfare of the citizenry by augmenting the nation's safety, tranquility, and commercial prospects, Washington stressed that individual happiness was promoted because peace and prosperity made possible the liberty that Americans held dear. To attain these ends, however, Washington accentuated the duties of citizenship, which he believed included respect for the law made in a republican polity, a reverential attachment to the Union rather than a parochial identification with local interests, and the moderation of individual passions. Washington thought that formal education, as well as religion and morality, could help to shape faithful citizens, but he also advised—though the authors curiously slight this entreaty—that responsible citizenship was fostered by responsible government. Federal officials, Washington said, must exercise caution and restraint in the exercise of power, respect the jurisdiction of the two other branches of government, and deal fairly and honestly with all nations.

Readers are likely to be exasperated by the redundant passages in this book and certainly will be disappointed by an introduction that is devoid of insight and originality. Nevertheless, by taking another look at the Farewell Address, Spalding and Garrity reinforce the notion of Washington's greatness, which has budded and grown with this generation of scholars. In addition to his courage and virtue, which most contemporaries and historians have always conceded, Washington brought a prudence and contemplative wisdom to public affairs that enabled him to see what many others could not discern. He also understood the occasional need to eschew individual self-indulgence in order to achieve collective happiness. Ultimately, Spalding's and Garrity's work is a convincing argument for the importance of Washington's ideas for our time. Unlike Mrs. Decker, I plan to have my students peruse and contemplate the Farewell Address and read this book as well.

JOHN FERLING
State University of West Georgia

ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF. *Benjamin Franklin and His Enemies*. (A Centennial Book.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. xix, 255. $22.00.

This is a lively execution of a novel and interesting angle of investigation on the life of one of the three or four most written-about Americans: it examines not the multitude of people Benjamin Franklin charmed and befriended over eight decades but rather those with whom he quarrelled, whom he despised (and who despised him), and who became his enemies. The list is not really a long one, but it reveals a facet of Franklin's life that departs from his famous advice in the *Autobiography* to express oneself with "modest Diffidence" and in conversation not to use words "that may possibly be disputed" (*The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin* [1964], p. 65). Robert Middlekauff introduces his readers to a cast of characters who, by quarreling with and confronting the man Carl Van Doren termed "a harmonious human multitude," show what Franklin was like when harmony waned and disappeared.

By far Franklin's most bitter, sustained, and entirely unresolved quarrel and enmity was that with Thomas Penn, the proprietor of Pennsylvania during virtually all of Franklin's public life there, 1732–1775. Although the son of the revered founder of the province, William Penn, Thomas did not live in Pennsylvania after 1741, and he became increasingly remote from its affairs and needs, intent principally on protecting his huge land holdings from taxation by the Pennsylvania Assembly. As a member of the Assembly and closely involved both with life in the province and with its politics, Franklin was deeply at odds with Penn by the mid-1750s. Middlekauff shows that for twenty years, whether Franklin was in Philadelphia or London, the

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hostility between them became ever more intense, bitter, and personal. Penn saw Franklin as an ambitious and dangerous tribune of the people, "dishonorable," "intent on doing me . . . mischief," and altogether a "plague" on the province acting out of "private pique and resentment" (p. 105). Franklin referred to Penn as a "low Jockey" for whom he "conceived . . . a more cordial and thorough contempt . . . than I ever before felt for any man living" (p. 66).

Though Middlekauff pursues the personal, irrational bitterness of the quarrel with Penn and draws insightful observations about Franklin's personality and character from it, he misses some of the deep political and ideological cleavage between the two men. Penn was an arrogant, selfish aristocrat who believed in hereditary privilege, autocracy, and a virtually feudal class system. In both his professional career and his service as a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly, Franklin had repudiated such undemocratic precepts as he moved toward the ideology of the American Revolution. (This despite his long effort to keep the colonies in the British Empire and even to substitute royal rule in Pennsylvania for proprietary; he sought always to make government more responsive to the needs of the people.) The serious, principled grounds for Franklin's growing hostility to Penn, that is, more reveal its fundamental character than do speculations about Franklin's irrationality or personal vindictiveness.

The same difficulty attends Middlekauff's account of the "sub-plot" of the dispute with Penn, Franklin's long and bitter quarrel with the Rev. William Smith. Though Smith had notable careers as a clergyman and educational reformer (sometimes working with Franklin), he was basically Penn's agent in Pennsylvania, in his pay and eager to do his bidding. Hence Smith was quick and unrelenting in his attacks, first on Franklin's politics and then on him personally. Franklin and his friends soon responded in kind. For a quarter of a century, the political in-fighting and war of words continued unabated; in 1776, Smith added personal insults to Franklin to James Chalmer's *Plain Truth* reply to Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*. But even when the verbal battle was at its most intense in 1763, Franklin responded to Smith's malice with bemused derision: "I made that man my Enemy by doing him too much Kindness . . . Since 'tis convenient to have at least one Enemy who by his readiness to revile one on all Occasions may make one careful of one's conduct, I shall keep him an Enemy for that purpose" (Franklin to Mary Stevenson, March 25, 1763, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, Leonard Labaree *et al.*, eds. [1969]). Though Middlekauff misses some of the dimensions of this quarrel that others have explained, he keeps generally sure-footed in seeing its connection to larger political issues by following James Hutson's fine study, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1746–1770* (1972).

Middlekauff gives us a wonderfully insightful account of Franklin's relations with his most famous enemies, Arthur Lee, Ralph Izard, and especially the vain, irritable, splendidly principled, and patriotic John Adams. Though Adams clearly got under Franklin's skin with his ceaseless suspicions of French duplicity and of Franklin's indolent indulgence of it, they nonetheless worked constructively together. Yet, Middlekauff may underestimate the controlled and brilliant way Franklin was managing both Adams and French foreign minister Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes. Franklin knew exactly what Vergennes's motives and intentions were, why he was irritated with Adams, what Adams's substantial contributions to the American cause might be, and what needed to be said and done to keep the cash from Vergennes coming and to retain his support for the pending American treaty of peace with Great Britain. There was a cultural chasm between the still stiffly puritan New Englander Adams (and his wife) and the cool, detached, enlightened Bostonian-turned-cosmopolitan that made deep personal empathy impossible; they would never work amicably with each other for long. Again, though, Franklin knew what was going on and conducted himself in a way that allowed the accomplishment of every public purpose. This emerges clearly in Middlekauff's story, providing an interesting conclusion to this welcome and engaging addition to the canon of works about Franklin.

RALPH KETCHAM
Syracuse University

MAX LERNER. *Thomas Jefferson: America's Philosopher-King*. Edited and foreword by ROBERT SCHMUHL. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction. 1996. Pp. viii, 147. $24.95.

It is difficult to know how to assess the unfinished fragments of a work by a major author, compiled or completed by another hand, many years after the original conception. We can never be sure what relationship the fragments bear to the original conception or whether what we have is what the author would have wished to see published. The late Max Lerner appears to have worked on this project intermittently between the 1950s and the 1970s. It is less clear how much time he devoted either to it or to the ongoing literature about Thomas Jefferson and his times between the 1970s and his death in 1992. What attracted Lerner initially was the notion of using Jefferson as a case study of the mind in action, the fusion of personality and ideas; hence the book's subtitle.

Yet this subtitle does not quite reflect the thrust of the work. Lerner was well aware that Jefferson was not a disciplined thinker, and he did not believe that his subject could be grasped by studying the analytical qualities of his mind. Indeed, Lerner perceptively notes that Jefferson, unlike Alexis de Tocqueville, often failed to understand the full significance of many matters that engaged his attention, particularly the potential of science and technology to transform society in ways that Jefferson would come to deplore. At times, Lerner also delivers strongly critical verdicts on

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Jefferson's thoughts and actions, especially during his second presidential term, when he depicts his hero as willful, dogmatic, imperious, and misguided. What we have, then, is less a study of thought and action than some meditations on what has always been the major problem in any biography of Jefferson: his paradoxes and contradictions. If the book has a unifying theme, it is politics rather than philosophy. Jefferson's greatest strength, writes Lerner, lay "in his skill in political warfare, and in his sensitivity to the nuances of popular opinion" (p. 54).

Considered in this light and after allowing for some of its unavoidably dated historiographical perspectives, Lerner's essay is as good an introduction to Jefferson as we are likely to get within the span of little more than one hundred pages. Not all of the paradoxes and contradictions in Jefferson are necessarily explained away, and at times Lerner resorts to the rather formulaic solution of stating that Jefferson's difficulties (often self-inflicted) merely resulted from the defects of his virtues. Nevertheless, the judgments are usually astute and the writing is always elegant, even if Lerner's grip is less sure in dealing with the details of the presidential terms than it is with his discussion of Jefferson's earlier years. The emphasis on politics also sustains the narrative well, despite the fact that Lerner's conception of the politics of the early Republic owes more to class and less to ideology than we would accept today.

The emphasis on politics, however, also means that there is less attention to some aspects of Jefferson's life and career, such as his views on race and slavery, than we would now expect to see. For Lerner, these were peripheral matters, but his claim that Jefferson's views on blacks, the contents of *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1784) notwithstanding, were essentially "liberal" and "enlightened" will undoubtedly be vigorously contested. And it is surely problematic to conclude, as Lerner does, that "Jefferson's act, in his will, of freeing a number of his slaves upon his death, was witness to what he would have wished had he been able to do it while alive" (p. 99). That conclusion seems sadly (and probably unintentionally) inadequate, since most of the slaves freed by Jefferson were members of the Hemings family; and Lerner's amanuensis, Robert Schmuhl, provides us with evidence in his introduction suggesting that Lerner believed that Fawn Brodie may well have been correct in her view that Jefferson had a relationship with Sally Hemings.

These matters aside, the eloquence, compactness, and grace of Lerner's essay can still be read to advantage as one of the best short introductions to Jefferson currently available.

J. C. A. Stagg
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Conor Cruise O'Brien. *The Long Affair: Thomas Jefferson and the French Revolution, 1785–1800*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1996. Pp. xvii, 367. $29.95.

This book's title may attract attention, but it fails to illuminate the subject defined in the subtitle. It has an epilogue on "Thomas Jefferson and the Impending Schism in the American Civil Religion" and an appendix on "Madison Hemings's Story." The intended audience is not clear. Such expressions as "I believe," "I think," "I don't think," "I suspect," or "I don't know" are common. At the same time, endnotes document the work, which is filled with lengthy quotations—sometimes covering several pages—from published sources and the writings of numerous historians, including long passages from Julian Boyd's editorial notes in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (1950-). Criticizing Dumas Malone for not quoting more of Jefferson's own words, Conor Cruise O'Brien does not seem fully appreciative of the fact that by selecting letters and passages he is also interpreting the historical record. In quoting Merrill Peterson, O'Brien includes a sentence regarding Sally Hemings that does not appear in the work cited (p. 111).

Because Jefferson was in France in the years just prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution, watched the events unfolding at Versailles as the National Assembly was proclaimed, and was in Paris when the Bastille was stormed, I would have expected more attention to Jefferson's actions during these opening months of that revolution and less on matters not relevant. There is no discussion of Jefferson's association with the Marquis de Lafayette in relation to the drafting of the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man* (1789). It is impossible to accept O'Brien's argument that "neither Madison nor Jefferson ever thought about the French Revolution in itself. They thought about it *as an issue in American politics*. And they fantasized its relation to the abstract idea of Liberty" (p. 119). O'Brien argues that to Secretary of State Jefferson in 1791, "the French Revolution is not a series of human and terrestrial events and transactions in a foreign country. It is a sacred and static abstraction, and an angelic auxiliary for the cause of freedom in America, and for the discomfiture of Alexander Hamilton and John Adams" (p. 118).

In a concluding chapter, titled "A Thematic Overview," O'Brien describes his purpose as being "to inquire into the relationship between the Cult of the French Revolution, on the one hand, and the interaction between the commitment to Liberty and the fact of slavery, in Jefferson's Virginia, on the other hand" (p. 255). The chapter includes discussion of, and lengthy quotations from, the writings of Robert McColley, Winthrop Jordan, William Cohen, David Brion Davis, Edmund S. Morgan, and John C. Miller, whose writings O'Brien sees as representing a kind of revolution in American scholarship relating to the subject of liberty and slavery in Virginia. Following this section, O'Brien turns to consider "Jefferson's attitude to the proposed extension of slavery (in the 1820s) and to the education of the free blacks (in 1817 and after)" (p. 277). He recognizes that his account of Jefferson's involvement with the French Revolution stops in 1800.

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"But when we are considering the general pattern of Thomas Jefferson's attitudes to slavery," he writes, "and also, not less important, to free blacks—later developments of importance have to be considered" (pp. 276–77).

O'Brien's book might better be described as detailed notes and commentaries on Jefferson and the French Revolution and various other matters. In the end, he argues that "Doctrinally, Jefferson is far more suitable as a patron of white supremacists than of modern American liberals" (p. 321) and that "the Jefferson who made a cult of the French Revolution provides aid and comfort, not just to the far right in government, but to the most ferocious of its militant extremists" (p. 322).

NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
University of Missouri, Columbia

JACK N. RAKOVE. *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution*. (A Borzoi Book.) New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1996. Pp. xvi, 439. $35.00.

This is not an easy book to summarize. Warning his readers at the outset that he found "a measure of repetition" in his presentation "unavoidable," Jack N. Rakove attributes his new book's "somewhat complicated architecture" to its multiple purposes (p. xiv). Selective in the topics he pursues and the approach he takes, Rakove attempts to fulfill in a single work two major ambitions. First, this book is a recognizable sequel to his earlier monograph, *The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress* (1979). In the present work, Rakove carries forward chronologically the story of how Americans forged a national polity by focusing on the complicated interplay among politics, ideas, and interests in the writing, ratification, and early history of the Constitution. Rakove's second ambition is no less challenging and provides, along with the title of the book and no doubt its marketing strategy, a plausible point of analytical focus for the complicated, often densely textured story he tells. Rakove addresses and, to the extent he apparently thinks possible, answers a recurrent question in legal and political circles that erupted into intense controversy while he was working on the book: what authority can and should the Constitution's "original meaning" (or, alternatively, the "original intention" of its authors, or even the "original understanding" of those who debated its ratification) have in shaping its interpretation and its binding legal force in modern times? (p. xiii).

Because of their timeliness, the questions associated with Rakove's second ambition will no doubt attract a readership for his book beyond the historical profession and especially beyond the small circle of academic specialists who will be most engaged by his detailed discussions of so many different aspects of the American founding. General readers with an interest in issues of originalism, however, may find Rakove's approach frustrating and ultimately unsatisfying. In the opening chapter, appropriately entitled "The Perils of Originalism," Rakove nicely explains just how complex and elusive the definitional terms of "originalism" can be before approaching what he subsequently demonstrates to be an almost incredibly messy and complicated historical record. Although he insists that the obligations, methods, and purposes of the serious historian will always be different from those of participants in present-day debates over originalism, he is apparently convinced that there can indeed be a fruitful marriage of the two enterprises. Believing that the originalist quest must be grounded in serious historical research if it is to be something more than an opportunistic, partisan posturing, Rakove proffers with appropriate precision and rigor "a general model of how originalist inquiries might be conducted, with due respect for canons of historical research and explanation" (p. xiv). But whether originalist readers can infer anything useful or precise from Rakove's meticulous history is more often than not ambiguous, which may well be the point.

Rakove wisely avoids even the appearance of taking sides in the current debate between originalists and rival advocates of a living Constitution, and he buries in an asterisked footnote in the preface his "preferred answer" to the inescapable question of whether originalism can possibly offer "a viable or valid theory of constitutional interpretation" (p. xv). Although it is certainly not the author's explicit purpose, a reader might plausibly infer from this book that originalism is a fundamentally flawed and misguided endeavor for historical as well as philosophical reasons. As Rakove's detailed examinations of the Constitutional Convention and ratification make so clear, the historical process involved such "a bewildering array of intentions and expectations, hopes and fears, genuine compromises and agreements to disagree" that it is impossible to discern anything resembling original meaning in the sense that many present-day originalists suggest; indeed, "the notion that the Constitution had some fixed and well-known meaning at the moment of its adoption dissolves into a mirage" (p. 6).

Rakove closes his book with the fascinating and almost brutally ironic story of how James Madison, the star of the show from beginning to end, unsuccessfully pioneered an early version of originalism during the great political turmoil of the 1790s. So much of what happened in the years just after the adoption of the Constitution took Madison by surprise and belied his original expectations for the government that he could scarcely have predicted the evolution of his own posture on the Constitution. His misadventure with originalism offers a telling measure not only of the extent to which he was forced to reconsider some of the fundamental premises of his thought in such a brief period of time but also of the intrinsic problems, which even Madison could not resolve, and the likely futility of any originalist endeavor.

The principal strength and contribution of this book

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ultimately derive more from Rakove's pursuit of his first than his second ambition. Specialists will learn a great deal from his nuanced, richly textured narratives of the great Convention and the ratification process, not to mention his meticulous analysis of such specific topics as federalism, representation, executive power, and the origins and adoption of the Bill of Rights. He has found new ways of making Madison interesting: no mean feat for a scholar who has already written a great deal on that key figure. Perhaps it is the commingling of the author's two ambitions that explains his success. But some historians may find themselves wishing that Rakove had abandoned his concern with originalism and found a different, more satisfying thematic or interpretive hook on which to hang this latest installment in the story of how Americans created a national polity during the Revolutionary era.

DREW R. MCCOY
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DAVID E. KYVIG. *Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776–1995*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1996. Pp. xx, 604. $55.00.

In this insightful work, David E. Kyvig attends to a relatively unstudied aspect of the United States Constitution: the amendment process established by Article Five. Kyvig undertakes two tasks. He chronicles successful and significant-but-unsuccessful attempts to amend the Constitution, and he assesses the role of Article Five in the American constitutional system.

Kyvig's insights into the significance of Article Five seem deceptively obvious, yet they have not often been articulated. Kyvig begins with an orthodox account of the rise of American constitutionalism, with its central tenet that a polity's constitution was a higher law, established by an organic act of the people and superior to ordinary legislative enactments. Like Bruce Ackerman, whose influential *We the People: Foundations* (1991) and law review articles have excited legal scholars and political scientists, Kyvig argues that the American political system operates on two tracks. The routine political system stresses simple majoritarianism. When creating and amending fundamental constitutional rules and principles, however, American politics operates on a higher level and requires a greater degree of consensus to establish the legitimacy of the resulting decisions. The first United States constitution, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution of 1787 each required supermajorities to go into effect. A special, supermajoritarian procedure for amendment was the natural corollary of the system, reaffirming the difference between the Constitution and ordinary law.

Kyvig avers that the inclusion of Article Five made ratification itself possible. Only the promise of immediate amendment to add a bill of rights won over enough opponents to secure ratification. By requiring supermajorities for both the ratification of the Constitution and its amendment, the framers prevented narrow majorities from imposing their will, forced the compromises necessary to achieve broad consensus, and ensured that the result would be accepted as legitimate. Kyvig points out that the United States Constitution was the first to provide a peaceful mechanism for fundamental change in government, rendering obsolete the Lockean remedy of revolution. As George Washington put it in his Farewell Address, the Constitution, "till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all" (p. 1). Thus, the ability peacefully to amend the Constitution reinforced its legitimacy.

Kyvig provides satisfying accounts of both successful and unsuccessful efforts to amend the Constitution from 1789 to 1995. He argues persuasively that the process has fulfilled the framers' intentions, being flexible enough to allow fundamental change but permitting only those changes reflecting the broad consensus imposed by the supermajoritarian test. Amendments have come in four waves—the Bill of Rights, the Civil War amendments, the Progressive-Era amendments, and the amendments of the 1960s. Although not equally profound, all represented important transformations in the constitutional system. Abortive amendment efforts—such as the Christian-nation amendment, the amendment to ban child labor, segregationist states-rights amendments, school prayer amendments, and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)—failed because their backers could not secure the broad consensus the framers intended. Kyvig demonstrates that in no case did smaller-than-intended minorities obstruct proposed amendments or smaller-than-intended majorities secure them.

Most of Kyvig's accounts of amendment movements are based on insightful readings of secondary sources. He is particularly adept at showing the overlapping relationships among opponents of constitutional reform from the turn of the century through the New Deal. Kyvig's discussion of New Deal-era constitutional amendment proposals is based on his own research into primary sources. His analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to try to pack the Supreme Court rather than amend the Constitution makes a significant contribution to New Deal historiography, even if readers remain unpersuaded by Kyvig's conclusion that Roosevelt erred in deciding against the amendment route. That decision, Kyvig argues, prevented the New Deal's revolution in constitutional interpretation from acquiring the legitimacy and ultimate acceptance that the Article Five amending process secures. Kyvig thus explicitly challenges Ackerman's argument that constitutional transformations can be legitimized equally effectively outside Article Five's formal amendment process. Kyvig also provides informative historical analyses of present-day proposals for amendments to require balanced federal budgets, to permit school prayer and other accommodations of religion, and to allow state and federal regulation of abortion. Although he generally repeats the narrative and analysis of recent work on the failure

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of the ERA, he stresses the hitherto under-appreciated role that North Carolina's Senator Sam Ervin played in killing it.

Kyvig's book would have been even more useful with some tables providing basic information about the number, subject, and resolution of proposed amendments—at least, the successful ones—as well as the text of the Constitution as amended. It has a very helpful bibliography. This is a graceful, informative work that belongs in general as well as research libraries and in the personal libraries of all scholars of the United States Constitution.

MICHAEL LES BENEDICT
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CHARLES F. HOBSON. *The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law*. (American Political Thought.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1996. Pp. xv, 356. $35.00.

Charles F. Hobson provides an excellent historical introduction to John Marshall's jurisprudence. Editor of the ongoing Marshall Papers publication project, Hobson is a sympathetic and admiring biographer, but he does not invoke his subject's authority to promote any present-day jurisprudential agenda. Hobson's Marshall is not the founding father of an activist law-making judiciary that wrote the script for a powerful federal state. Instead, he is a provincial Virginia common lawyer who sought to "'legalize' the Constitution, to make it amenable to the familiar and routine methods of resolving legal disputes" (p. 181). Marshall bridged the gap between fundamental law and ordinary adjudication so successfully that judicial review came to seem routine and unremarkable. Though he may have inadvertently prepared the way for later, more aggressive Courts, Marshall employed judicial review primarily as a defensive weapon to preserve the independence of the judiciary, to resist encroachments by the states on the national government, and to protect private rights" (p. 69).

Hobson depicts Marshall as a "classical republican," though that language no longer explains much. Perhaps Hobson's intention here is to temper or qualify the prevailing tendency to see Marshall as a visionary "liberal" dedicated to making the new regime safe for property rights and capitalism. A "classical republican" chief justice looks backward and therefore may be distinguished from the unintended consequences of his jurisprudence. Yet for Hobson's Marshall, as for the James Madison who emerges in brilliant recent studies—Drew R. McCoy's *Last of the Fathers* (1989) and Lance Banning's *Sacred Fire of Liberty* (1995)—"back" means back to the American Revolution, not to some classical, precommercial Golden Age of agrarian virtue. Madison and Marshall "both were dedicated to preserving the constitutional settlement of 1787, and for both the events of that decade were central to forming their understanding of the meaning of that settlement" (p. 211). Marshall's "constitutional nationalism" was thus "essentially defensive," designed to secure a fragile federal union against external threats and "centrifugal forces emanating from the states" (pp. xiii, 210).

Marshall's judicial career was shaped by his realistic assessment of persistent dangers to the survival of the union. This circumspect, defensive posture was imperative when Marshall began his tenure and Thomas Jefferson's "Revolution of 1800" signaled the resurgence of the Antifederalist impulse and the failure of a more energetic strain of Hamiltonian High Federalism. Political realities thus reinforced Marshall's natural jurisprudential bent toward securing the Court's independence in the federal constitutional balance and resisting the efforts of latter-day Antifederalists to reverse the settlement of 1787 by strictly construing the Constitution into a replica of the Articles of Confederation.

Hobson's reading of Marshall's jurisprudence is developed through the deceptively old-fashioned format of exegeses of the great cases. This approach may be seen as the author's oblique tribute to his subject, for Hobson works within the rhetorical and interpretative conventions of constitutional history, just as Marshall remained true to the common law. The great cases did not loom as large for Marshall as they have come to seem in retrospect: the vast majority of his opinions were concerned with relatively uncontroversial private disputes, many arising from commercial transactions in the emerging national economy. It was in these less contentious areas of adjudication, where the fundamental character of the regime and the limits of the Court's own jurisdiction were *not* under question, that Marshall played such an important role in making the Court seem legitimate, even indispensable. If Marshall was able to "legalize" constitutional questions, it was precisely because—through the great bulk of the Court's ordinary business—he was so successful in constitutionalizing the law. "More than anyone else," Hobson writes, "John Marshall invented American constitutional law, a novel branch of law that brought constitutional interpretation into the ordinary task of adjudicating lawsuits" (p. 212).

Marshall's common law jurisprudence, concisely sketched in an introductory chapter on "The Common Law Background" and in an excellent concluding chapter on "Principle, Precedent, and Interpretation," provides the interpretative framework for Hobson's readings of the familiar great cases. Contract clause cases get the most extensive play, because it was in these cases, Hobson persuasively argues, and not in commerce clause decisions, that Marshall most conspicuously displayed his determination to shore up federal authority and secure the vested rights of individuals against challenges from the states. Far from seeking to conjure a federal leviathan or to unleash the creatively destructive force of corporate capitalism, Marshall's contract clause opinions were meant to restrain centrifugal forces that jeopardized the new regime. It was in this same spirit that Madison had, at

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the Constitutional Convention in 1787, proposed a congressional veto of state legislation.

Hobson's Marshall is very much a man of his own troubled times, and that should be a warning to us against efforts to enlist him as an ally in our own controversies over the modern Court's role. As an advocate of "fair construction" (p. 199), Marshall was committed to judicial discretion and the rule of law; any notion that the Court should exercise its own law-making will was utterly alien and unacceptable to him. Indeed, it was his "continuing endeavor . . . to preserve the distinction between law and politics" (p. xiii). Yet this is a distinction that we moderns are hard pressed to discern. So, too, it is a challenge for us to recover a sense of the urgency of Marshall's struggle to preserve a federal union that would be destroyed within a few short decades of his death. Hobson's estimable achievement is to give us a clear and concise sense of the context and contours of Marshall's thought. His book is a most welcome addition to the historiography.

PETER S. ONUF
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R. DOUGLAS HURT. *The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720–1830*. (A History of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1996. Pp. xv, 418. $35.00.

ANDREW R. L. CAYTON. *Frontier Indiana*. (A History of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 340. $35.00.

These books by R. Douglas Hurt and Andrew R. L. Cayton are two excellent volumes in the History of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier series published by Indiana University Press under the general editorship of Walter Nugent and Malcolm J. Rohrbough. They deal with the periods from the earliest European contact with Native American societies through the 1830s for the Ohio volume and through the 1850s for the Indiana volume. As is the series practice, there are no footnotes or endnotes, but both have extensive annotated bibliographies. Both have photographs, collected in one place in the Cayton volume but scattered in the Hurt volume, and both have maps, but those in the Hurt volume are more helpful.

Of necessity, these volumes deal with much of the same material, but because of individual state differences and because of the interest and focus of the two authors, these volumes are distinct studies that complement each other well. The Hurt volume is the longer and more descriptive narrative; the Cayton volume is briefer and more interpretive. Each tends to use the technique of the pivotal incident to introduce the chapters, and in Cayton's case, the technique is the defining mechanism for the book. His chapters are a series of interpretive essays on topics ranging from the Miami Indians and the French at Vincennes through George Croghan and George Rogers Clark to Little Turtle, Tenskwatawa (the Prophet) to Anna Tuthill Symmes Harrison and Jonathan Jennings, the first governor. The Hurt volume ranges through more traditional chapter titles such as the Clash of Cultures, The Revolution, Fallen Timbers, Ohio Fever, Farm Country, Frontier People, Religion, and the Confederacy and War.

The books clearly reflect the research strengths of each author. We have come to know Cayton from his work on political institutions and ideology in the Northwest Territory, and his volume has a more extensive analysis of the growth and transformation of the governing institutions of Indiana and their underlying ideologies than is found in Hurt's more descriptive treatment of Ohio politics. (Cayton, of course, has already done some of this for Ohio in an earlier volume.) By the same token, Hurt's extensive work in agricultural history and Native American culture clearly comes through in his volume. Here are extended discussions of both Native American and frontier agriculture, the growth of the Scioto Valley cattle industry, grains and foodstuffs, even the work of John "Johnny Appleseed" Chapman. Hurt also discusses in detail the establishment of the land survey system in the first seven ranges—only mentioned in the Cayton volume—but does very little with the French settlements farther west, which receive extensive treatment in Cayton.

Hurt devotes a full chapter to the establishment of the various religious traditions in Ohio, from the Methodists and camp meetings to the Separatists at Zoar. Cayton discusses religion in the context of political ideology, what one might call a Presbyterian-Whig nexus favoring internal improvements, education, and moral regeneration opposing an Evangelical (read Baptist/Methodist)-Democratic nexus favoring local control and traditional family responsibilities. Because Indiana was "far more southern and rural" (p. 294) than other states in the Northwest Territory, the opponents of internal improvements and education had more success in Indiana. In Ohio, there was also early opposition, but when the first sections of canal opened July 4, 1827, Ohioans "were nationalists to the core" (p. 388). Hurt also provides a more extensive discussion of the settlement of different towns across Ohio than Cayton does for Indiana. In truth, with Marietta, Cincinnati, and Cleveland, among others, he also has more to work with than Cayton does with Vincennes. As a result, we know Vincennes more intimately than we know Cincinnati or any other Ohio community.

Both volumes, of course, deal extensively with the cultural conflicts between European and Native American cultures, and both do so with sensitivity and insight. Hurt gives a more extensive background of the histories of the tribes in Ohio. Both must deal with the broader issues of French-English conflict, the frontier clashes during the Revolution, the famous military failures of Josiah Harmer and Arthur St. Clair before Anthony Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers. These

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discussions in both volumes are detailed and probe the motivations and concerns of each side, but maintain a good flow of the narrative. With his focus on personal narratives, Cayton may provide the greater insight into the Native American mind, especially in a figure like the Miami Chief Little Turtle who turns from great military leader to leading accommodationist. Hurt, however, clearly sees Little Turtle as the only native leader who assessed correctly the weakness of the Indian situation in the Fallen Timbers campaign. Since the crucial 1790s battles took place on Ohio soil, there is a more comprehensive description of these military engagements in the Hurt book. Cayton, however, has opportunity to examine closely the comparative approaches the French, English, and Americans had toward the land and the native occupants, and that motif is a continuing one throughout his volume.

Clearly, neither of these volumes could have been written two decades ago. They are both fully informed by the new (or not so new) social histories—community, women, Native American, demographic, family—and the many monographs published in recent years. Cayton can use the life of Anna Tuthill Symmes Harrison not only as the vehicle for a discussion of William Henry Harrison's role as territorial governor, but for that of gender roles, household organization, population demographics, and the value systems that underlay the frontier enterprise in Indiana. In one of his most revealing discussions, Hurt describes the pain of Indian parents and spouses at losing adopted white family members when Col. Henry Bouquet ordered the return of all white captives following the collapse of Pontiac's uprising in 1764. Some had to be bound to be turned over, and parents followed the army for miles to delay final parting (p. 53). The perspectives in such narratives are a far cry from the old frontier stories like the escape of Mary Draper Ingles from Shawnee captivity.

In the end, both authors see the American relationship to the land as the defining characteristic of the frontier period in both states. In Indiana, the era had been a "struggle for the power to control the development of the region" (p. 300). In Ohio, even with its bustling towns and early manufacturing growth, it was "Farmers, First and Last" (p. 345).

New syntheses like these are valuable contributions to both the general and the informed reader. The Trans-Appalachian Frontier series has found its niche and will make a significant contribution if all volumes are as successful as these.

R. Eugene Harper
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Jon Gjerde. *The Minds of the West: Ethnocultural Evolution in the Rural Middle West, 1830–1917.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 426. $39.95.

Since entering its dynamic phase in the 1960s, American immigration and ethnic history has tended to concentrate on southern and eastern Europeans in cities and industrial areas. In recent years, however, scholars such as Kathleen Neils Conzen and Jon Gjerde have reexamined the rural settlement of northwest European immigrants, principally in the Middle West.

Westward migration had reached such proportions by the 1830s that "the West" appeared to be the crucible of America's future. This inspired hopes that the established patterns of American society would replicate themselves across the continent. But in addition to controversy over the spread of slavery, it also aroused apprehensions over the large influx of foreign elements into the region. During the 1830s, "new" immigrants, chiefly Germans (Catholic and Lutheran), Irish Catholics, and Scandinavian Lutherans, began to establish themselves in the rural Middle West.

The "minds" that Gjerde analyzes and compares in this absorbing study are the mentalities and value systems of the "American" and "European-American" inhabitants of the midwestern patchwork of ethnoreligious rural settlements. Differences between them essentially revolved around their understanding of American liberty. The "American" or "Yankee" view stressed the freedom of the individual in the pursuit of happiness. European Americans of non-Protestant and/or non-English-speaking origins warmly embraced American liberty but interpreted it as freedom to preserve their traditional communal values and ways of life. Indeed, Gjerde shows that this gap widened during the nineteenth century, due to a growing European reaction to revolution and the Enlightenment and increasing American emphasis on untrammeled individualism.

Midwestern communities were based primarily on religion and ethnicity, often deriving from specific home localities. Their leaders, characteristically clergymen, strove to preserve inherited values and purity of faith. For "Yankees," this meant a high degree of individualism, including a pietistic religious tradition that stressed the personal search for salvation. Immigrant communities typically built on inclusive confessional churches.

Conceptions of family were of central importance. In the "Yankee" tradition, every individual was free to make his or her own way. This implied the free choice of companionable marriage partners and considerable independence for children, placing heavy demands on the conjugal bond and risking neglect of aging parents by often absent offspring. Old World tradition stressed the family unit, for whose welfare all members should sacrifice purely personal interests and subordinate themselves to the male head of the household. This provided economic advantages and future security for the parents but resulted in inequities and often high levels of frustration and conflict within immigrant families.

Ethnic societies, both "Yankee" and European,

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reacted to cultural conflict by seeking to insulate themselves against outside influences or through political mobilization. Clergymen and newspapers inveighed against contamination by outside ideas threatening to faith, family, and community. Parochial schools, both Catholic and Lutheran, indoctrinated children in traditional values. Immigrant farmers bought out outsiders in their midst or formed new daughter colonies to prevent dispersal.

Contact with unfamiliar peoples and faiths meanwhile tended to "ethnicize" immigrant groups and, by implication, "Yankees" as well, with political consequences. Three issues above all tended to polarize ethnic blocs: public schools, women's rights, and prohibition. Strong support for these reforms by "Yankee" and certain Protestant immigrant Republicans, especially Scandinavian, revealed a new factor in the equation: readiness to use state power to implement nationwide reforms. This position was resolutely opposed by conservative immigrant groups, mainly Democrats, both Catholic and Lutheran, who saw it as a threat to the sanctity of faith, home, community, and essentially to their American freedom to be different. Only the devastating nativism of the World War I years tipped the scales decisively in favor of "Americanization."

Gjerde's Middle West is in effect the Upper Middle West, where both European and Yankee settlement were most prominent. His "Americans" are thus New Englanders and New Yorkers; those of Appalachian or other background play virtually no part. Something more might have been made of old American communal traditions as well as of those liberalizing trends in northwestern Europe that affected many emigrants even before their departure. No real attention is given, for example, to free-thinking elements among the Germans, Czechs, or Scandinavians. Conversely, extreme Protestant ethno-religious communities like the Mennonites and Hutterites could have added contrast. A look at the tensions of the time between rural and urban America—cutting in part across ethno-religious lines—might have been instructive. Striking parallels with immigration and ethnic relations in the United States today likewise invited commentary.

It is nonetheless the sign of a truly important work of synthesis that one can only note what the author did not choose to cover rather than fault the overall interpretation. Gjerde has indeed made a groundbreaking and highly thought-provoking contribution to American history.

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Mark J. Stegmaier. *Texas, New Mexico, and the Compromise of 1850: Boundary Dispute and Sectional Crisis*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 434. $39.00.

Historians who deal with the Compromise of 1850 have traditionally emphasized three central elements that helped postpone a clash of arms between North and South for another decade: California statehood, territorial slavery in the Southwest, and the explosive fugitive slave question. At the same time, scholars have stressed the role played by key congressional orators and those who guided the Compromise package through nine months of tortuous debate and political maneuvering, including Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Stephen A. Douglas. Only incidentally have these writers mentioned the Texas-New Mexico boundary dispute and its relationship, in the final settlement, to the Texas debt. Now Mark J. Stegmaier sheds new light on the sectional conflict by placing the Texas-New Mexico question at the center of the controversy, arguing convincingly that it became the issue on which the fate of the Compromise and even the survival of the Union depended.

Stegmaier begins by tracing the origin of the boundary dispute, which involved what is today the eastern half of New Mexico, the area east of the Rio Grande. The issue originated in the struggle for empire between France and Spain in the eighteenth century, with the region becoming Mexican when that nation won its independence from Spain in 1821. The Texas Revolution of 1836 renewed the controversy, as the Lone Star Republic insisted on a Rio Grande border, even though the disputed region was dominated by Native American and Mexican rather than Texan settlers. The issue remained unresolved when the United States annexed Texas in 1845. The treaty ending the Mexican War (1848) gave the disputed region to the United States, but this served only to intensify the conflict between New Mexico and Texas. It also became a sectional issue, with New Mexicans opposed to slavery and Texans hoping to expand slave regions with their claim.

Stegmaier details the dispute from the perspective of New Mexicans, Texans, and government officials in Washington and presents a story that has rarely been told. Especially significant is his account of those in New Mexico, backed directly by the United States Army under Colonel John Munroe and indirectly by President Zachary Taylor, who sought immediate statehood as a solution to the crisis. In contrast, Texan Robert Neighbors was sent by the Austin government even as the legislature declared the disputed territory to be part of Texas. Stegmaier will lose some readers to excessive detail and complex cast of characters (made up mostly of names unfamiliar even to students of the Compromise). His account of congressional maneuvering after Taylor's death in July 1850 details every roll call and every amendment, major or minor. It is an account whose thoroughness few will find necessary. Yet the result is an authoritative and exhaustive study of a dispute that came close to causing bloodshed in large part because of its implications for the expansion of slavery.

Stegmaier maintains that Taylor was stubbornly

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inflexible in his insistence on defending New Mexico's claims, even to the point of military defense against a possible Texas attack. Millard Fillmore surprisingly emerges as the hero of the piece, the man whose moderation and flexibility allowed Congress to work out a settlement without executive interference. Some may find unacceptable Stegmaier's dismissal of opponents of the Compromise in both North and South as fanatical extremists. Although he distributes the blame in both directions, Free Soilers like Salmon P. Chase and Joshua Giddings are treated with unnecessary harshness despite, or perhaps because of, their resistance to any and all demands of slaveholders. Although Stegmaier devotes some attention to the impact of the dispute on Native Americans, especially the Pueblo, and slightly more to that of the Mexican population of New Mexico, one wishes that he had developed their roles more extensively.

Still, few can dispute the contribution Stegmaier has made. His work is based on exhaustive research in traditional manuscript collections, official documents, and newspapers (especially those of Texas and New Mexico) and a thorough grounding in secondary sources relating to the Compromise. A useful series of maps allows the reader to sort out the often bewildering boundary claims of the disputants. With the publication of this important monograph, no longer will historians be able to ignore the Texas-New Mexico issue as a most significant aspect of the Compromise of 1850.

FREDERICK J. BLUE
Youngstown State University

STEPHEN W. SEARS. *Chancellorsville*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1996. Pp. x, 593. $35.00.

In a war noted for high drama, colorful personalities, and horrendous casualties, few campaigns stand out more boldly than the Chancellorsville campaign in the spring of 1863. Following its disaster at Fredericksburg in December 1862, the dispirited Army of the Potomac needed a vigorous new commander to rejuvenate it before it could resume offensive operations. Although he had grave misgivings about Major General Joseph Hooker's suitability, President Abraham Lincoln gambled that Hooker's vaunted fighting skill would overcome his fondness for intrigue and produce a decisive victory in the eastern theater. Lincoln's gamble initially showed promise, as Hooker quickly reorganized the army's command structure, consolidated its cavalry units, improved its logistics, and restored its morale. Hooker also formulated a campaign plan that promised to avoid or minimize the futile and costly frontal attacks of the past. If successfully implemented, the plan would place the bulk of Hooker's army south of the Rappahannock River squarely on the flank of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia without a fight. When coupled with a cavalry raid to sever Confederate supply lines, it would force Lee either to flee south or to fight a desperate offensive battle.

Lee's predicament was complicated by the fact that he had earlier detached two of his best divisions to southeastern Virginia, leaving him outnumbered two to one, a fact known to Hooker's efficient Bureau of Military Information. By May 1, four days after the plan was implemented, Hooker's heavy flanking column was located a few miles west of Fredericksburg at the edge of a tangled, second-growth forest called the Wilderness, while a smaller force threatened the city from the south. Suddenly, Lee recognized his danger and struck back hard. Dividing his small army again and again, Lee seized the initiative and forced the Federals back relentlessly in hard fighting. By May 6, Hooker's army had withdrawn across the Rappahannock in defeat. The cost was high: 17,304 Federal and 13,460 Confederate casualties, the latter including Stonewall Jackson. Nevertheless, Lee had restored the status quo and his army seemed invincible. Hooker's star dimmed, and the long-suffering Army of the Potomac continued its search for a successful commander.

Since the end of the campaign, analytical accounts of Chancellorsville generally have reached the same judgments on the performance of the opposing commanders. Conventional wisdom for years has credited Hooker with managerial skill in rebuilding the Army of the Potomac and imagination in developing and initially executing his complex campaign plan. There has been widespread agreement that Hooker's fatal mistake was the halting of his advance on May 1, when he could have pushed beyond the entangling Wilderness without undue cost. This disastrous shift from offense to defense yielded the initiative to the Confederates. Concerning the performance of Hooker's opponent, Lee, consensus also exists. Although initially surprised by the Federal moves, Lee responded correctly and brilliantly at every decision point in the crisis. Realizing the importance of gaining the initiative, he split his meager command as often as necessary to confuse the Federals and boldly acted as if the numerical advantage were his. Working in perfect harmony with Jackson, Lee first outflanked Hooker's army and then pounded it into submission and forced its withdrawal. Save for the catastrophic loss of Jackson, Chancellorsville was indeed "Lee's greatest battle."

In light of this long-standing consensus, is another massive study of Chancellorsville necessary? Stephen W. Sears's answer to this question is a resounding yes. In perhaps the most elegantly written and best researched study of the campaign to date, Sears attempts to prove the Chancellorsville stereotype wrong in major aspects. Most controversially, he argues that Hooker never planned to wage the campaign differently than he actually did. While interesting (and plausible, since Hooker left so few statements of his intentions), this argument does not yet carry the day against the battalions of earlier scholars who interpret "Fighting Joe's" actions differently. Sears is perhaps

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on surer ground when he chastises Lee for allowing James Longstreet's two divisions to escape his control in time of need. Although not definitive, Sears's analysis of both Hooker and Lee is provocative and contributes significantly to discussions of the critical role that personality plays in war. Coupled with his illuminating account of the technical side of the campaign, from logistics to signals, Sears's effort to force a new evaluation of this significant campaign makes his book a study that all future students of the subject must take into account.

WILLIAM GLENN ROBERTSON
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RAIMONDO LURAGHI. *A History of the Confederate Navy*. Translated by PAOLO E. COLETTA. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1996. Pp. xx, 514. $39.95.

This book is an impressive piece of scholarship. Unconvinced that writing a comprehensive history of the Confederate navy was impossible because its records were burned during the evacuation of Richmond, Luraghi spent some twenty years digging in nearly fifty archives in four countries. The results of his odyssey are displayed in 107 pages of footnotes and a forty-one-page annotated bibliography.

Luraghi focuses primarily on Confederate naval strategy, operations, and technology, but he also covers finance, warship construction, and diplomacy. He devotes only a few pages to personnel issues, sheds no new light on the lives of common sailors, and strangely, for a Civil War book, ignores the role of African Americans.

Luraghi joins William N. Still, Jr., in overturning the view that the Confederate navy's strategic objective throughout the war was to break the Union blockade. In *Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads* (1971), Still advanced the thesis that after the summer of 1862, the Confederates built ironclads to defend rivers and harbors, not to break the blockade. Luraghi goes a step further. From the perspective of Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory, he argues that the initial strategy was to defeat the Union navy by means of "technical surprise," using armored ships, rifled ordnance, commerce destroying, and submarine weapons to break the blockade and to seize command of the sea. The loss of the upper Mississippi, New Orleans, eastern North Carolina, and the first five ironclads built in the South led Mallory to refocus his strategy on defense against Union amphibious operations.

Difficulties arise with Luraghi's analysis of the results of that strategy. He concludes that for four years the small Confederate navy "contributed substantially to retaining control of the port cities through which vital supplies arrived" for rebel armies (p. 346). Of the six coastal cities finally seized by the Union, he declares, five, including Richmond, fell because of the collapse of the land front.

The principal problem with this conclusion stems from Luraghi's relative lack of attention to Union naval strategy. An analysis of the interaction between Union and Confederate strategies might support his contentions about the impact of the Confederate navy. But Luraghi presents little evidence to show how Confederate actions might have shaped Union planning and operations. To say, as Luraghi does, that Wilmington, North Carolina, held out to the end of the war is like saying that the French held out against the Germans from September 1939 until June 1940. Union forces did not mount an offensive against Wilmington until December 1864, when a joint Union army-navy force set out to capture Fort Fisher, the city's principal defensive work. Of this attack, Luraghi writes that despite "one of the most fearful bombardments in history," Fort Fisher "held" and the Union was "compelled to give up in humiliation" (p. 334). Absent from this discussion is Major General Benjamin F. Butler's decision not to assault the fort with the land force under his command. Three weeks later, the same ships and troops, under a new general, succeeded in capturing the fort. Nowhere does Luraghi present evidence from the Union perspective that Confederate naval action deterred Union forces from attacking earlier. Luraghi's evidence fails to support his conclusions about the Confederate navy's accomplishments in several other instances as well, particularly in his analysis of Union operations against Charleston.

Furthermore, some of his contextual material, especially with regard to ordnance, does not withstand close examination. For example, his assertion that the Brooke rifle "proved superior to any enemy cannon" (p. 98) is supported only by a footnote citing an article published in 1958 but not by any comparison to Union ordnance or explanation of why one gun was better than another.

Luraghi's book merits comparison to Rowena Reed's *Combined Operations in the Civil War* (1978). Although critics have roundly condemned Reed for her positive interpretation of George B. McClellan, her book is the best available on joint operations during the Civil War. Similarly, while some of Luraghi's conclusions about the success of the Confederate navy do not hold up under close scrutiny, his discussion of the development of Confederate naval strategy and how the rebels attempted to implement that strategy is without peer. His book easily supplants J. Thomas Scharf's *History of the Confederate States Navy* (1887) as the best one-volume work on the subject.

In sum, everyone interested in the Confederate navy should consult Luraghi's book, but they should proceed with caution.

ROBERT J. SCHNELLER, JR.
Naval Historical Center

BROOKS D. SIMPSON. *The Political Education of Henry Adams*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. xvi, 154. $24.95.

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Few Americans outside public office have proved more controversial in "afterlife" than Henry Adams. The publication of Adams's so-called autobiography, *The Education of Henry Adams* (1918), just six months after the author's death at age eighty, caused an immediate stir. *The Education* became an immediate classic and has now been read by at least four generations of Americans. Not many who have experienced *The Education* emerge with a neutral feeling toward Adams. Some have found him a brilliant and profound critic of American life, while others have marked Adams as an intolerable whiner who took out his largely self-inflicted disappointments on the more successful men of his time or blamed his shortcomings on larger cosmic forces over which he had no control.

Brooks D. Simpson's study clearly falls into the latter category. While not without some sympathy for his subject, Simpson holds Adams wholly responsible for his failure to succeed in politics. Yet Simpson is careful to pass judgment only on Adams's self-proclaimed political goals, which did not include elective or appointive office but focused on becoming a leader of political opinion during the post–Civil War period.

Simpson appropriately begins his analysis of Adams's politics while his subject was in England (1861–1868) serving as private secretary to his father, Charles Francis Adams, who was then the American minister to London. Alarmed over the calamitous breakdown of the American political system that secession and civil war had wrought, the younger Adams was much influenced by the contemporary writings of John Stuart Mill, who believed that representative governments could not function successfully without an educated elite to mold opinion for the masses. Such ideas meshed well with the Adams family's own theories of classical republicanism, beginning with Henry's great-grandfather, John Adams, who believed in government by a natural aristocracy of well-educated and virtuous men that left little room for political parties.

Returning to the United States, Adams set himself up as a freelance journalist in Washington at the same time that he allied himself with a cadre of political reformers appalled by the spoils system of partisan appointment and then by the cascade of scandals within the presidential administration of Ulysses S. Grant. By refusing to operate within either of the major political parties, Simpson concludes, Adams deprived himself of any real influence. The partisan system was a permanent facet of the American scene and Adams had no choice but to work within it if he wished to have any political influence (much as his younger friend Theodore Roosevelt would do several decades later).

Also self-defeating, according to Simpson, was Adams's decision to publish his political opinions in elite journals with small circulations, such as *The Edinburgh Review* and *The North American Review* (which Adams himself edited from 1870 to 1876). If that were not enough, Adams went out of his way to alienate the very men, such as Grant, whom he wished to influence. This approach was purposeful, for Adams, like his famous forebears, believed that unpopularity was proof of complete independence and incorruptibility.

Then there is the matter of personality. Simpson believes it was the greatest obstacle of all to Adams's success as an opinion maker: "subject to emotional extremes, he could be exhilarated and boastful one day, only to sink into deep depression and despair the next" (p. 29).

Although he admits that Adams went on to much greater successes as a historian and man of letters, Simpson concludes that Adams utterly failed in his goal as a shaper of political opinion. This assessment stands wholly at odds with Edward Chalfant's recent biography of Adams's middle years, *Better in Darkness* (1994), wherein Chalfant views Adams as the most successful politician of his age. Those interested in Adams and in the politics of America's Gilded Age would do well to read these two biographies in tandem. Both present well-researched and well-crafted arguments; neither is likely to still the continuing debate over Adams's place in American politics.

DAVID R. CONTOSTA
Chestnut Hill College

JOHN KING FAIRBANK, MARTHA HENDERSON COOLIDGE, and RICHARD J. SMITH. *H. B. Morse: Customs Commissioner and Historian of China*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. 1995. Pp. xiv, 314. $39.95.

This book by John King Fairbank, Martha Henderson Coolidge, and Richard J. Smith has much to offer students of the histories of China, North America, the British Empire, and the North Atlantic-centered world order of *c.* 1860 to 1940. It would be a wonderful departure gift, provoking long thoughts and several kinds of misgivings, for someone about to join the World Bank or take up a foreign advisor's position outside the "advanced industrial world."

Hosea Ballou Morse graduated from Harvard in 1874 and immediately joined the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service. For thirty-four years, he served in a fascinating variety of posts in that service, which met the needs of the Ch'ing state for a new source of stable and honestly collected revenue and a mediator in dealing with the demands of the intrusive maritime powers, as well as the needs of those powers for efficient management of customs and related functions and for a non-confrontational medium of communicating the imperatives of the modern world system to the Ch'ing elite. Morse served on the China-Vietnam frontier, where the Customs Service served British and Ch'ing interests as a counterweight to Ch'ing encroachment; at Tamsui on Taiwan at the moment of the Japanese invasion, 1894–1895; and as commissioner at Hankow. At Hankow he was responsible for opening the customs post at Yochow, the first treaty port in Hunan, the province most resistant to

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foreign residence and influence. He served two tours in the Customs Statistical Service and ended his career as its director. The statistical work suited Morse's talent for quick and accurate mastery of detail and led directly to his remarkable second career as the most important scholar of his generation in English on the history of Sino-Western relations, the author of ten volumes of document-based summary of enduring value.

The foreign officers of the Maritime Customs conceived of themselves as honest friends of China and ministers of its government, advisors on the imperatives of progress and coping with the modern world. Morse never seems to have doubted this picture; in a 1932 letter to Fairbank, he wrote of "how the foreigner came to be engaged to show China how to collect revenue without graft." In his last posting at Hankow, we find signs of a much less simplistic view of the imperatives of progress and their relation to Chinese anti-foreignism; Morse acknowledged that the vigor of gentry and retired-official opinion in Hunan, which stood behind the resistance to foreign encroachment, also gave the province the most efficient and least corrupt administration in the empire.

The close summaries of Morse's career in this book are vintage Fairbank, alert to key detail, and wasting no words. He clearly retained a good deal of sympathy for the attitudes and sense of mission of Morse and his colleagues but summarized and quoted a great deal of excellent material that can be used by scholars with different perspectives. Fairbank notes that there is no evidence that Morse had any Chinese friends. Mrs. Morse found little in China but isolation and ill health. The evocation of these ground-notes of alienation and frustration is laconic but unmistakable.

This is probably the last fresh work we will have from the hand of John King Fairbank (1907–1991), and it is a fascinating coda to his remarkable career. (Coolidge and Smith did additional research and editing before and after his death.) In the early 1930s, Fairbank, just out of Harvard and embarking on his studies of the Western presence in nineteenth-century China, sought out H. B. Morse in retirement in England. He was rewarded with much advice and information, warm encouragement, and many letters of introduction, and he took the first steps in the research that ultimately led to this book. Fairbank's "Introduction" closes with some fine bits of his deadpan wit and dogged empiricism. "For a historian who lives long enough, a time-lapse of sixty years between a book's conception and its completion is no big deal. Persistence pays." Noting the over fifty years that separated him from Morse, he anticipates that a generation born after 1950 will ask and answer new questions. "Such questions, however, need not be answered. A biography reports on a life. It settles few issues."

JOHN E. WILLS, JR.
University of Southern California

NORMAN E. SAUL. *Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867–1914*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1996. Pp. xviii, 654. $55.00.

At a time when the future of Russia and of American-Russian relations are fraught with uncertainty, it is instructive to examine previous relationships between these two powers. Norman E. Saul, arguably the leading American expert on Russo-American relations, provides us with a rich, carefully researched survey of these relations from the Alaska Purchase of 1867 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. This book represents the sequel to his much lauded *Distant Friends: US and Russia, 1763–1867* (1991). Currently, Saul is hard at work on a third volume dealing with the turbulent 1914–1924 decade in the Russo-American relationship.

Saul utilizes previously unused or little-used American and Russian archives and a wide variety of memoirs, travel accounts, and newspaper articles to examine diplomatic, economic, social, and cultural dealings between the two modernizing giants. His treatment of these abundant materials is both scholarly and admirably objective, resulting in an impressive volume that is roughly equidistant between scholarly monograph and general survey. Saul's purpose is to reveal the extent and nature of a shifting relationship, characterized at times by warmth and mutual admiration, at others by tension, frictions, and misunderstandings.

Saul begins by discussing the aftermath of an Alaska purchase that "was badly mishandled by all concerned" (p. 10). Nonetheless, Tsar Alexander II, viewed favorably in the United States for emancipating the serfs and other liberal reforms, expressed the hope that "good friendship between our two countries would forever remain unbroken" (p. 2). Indeed, 1867 marked an intensification in Russo-American relations, fostered by the first Russian-speaking American diplomats. The simultaneous, disappointing decline in Russo-American trade, however, provoked periodic threats in Congress to eliminate American consulates in Russia.

Saul presents his materials chronologically. He devotes much attention to American diplomats in Russia, such as the colorful and erratic Cassius Clay and Eugene Schuyler, secretary of the American legation in St. Petersburg, who wrote extensively about Russia's penetration of Central Asia. Americans generally, notes Saul, viewed that expansion, paralleling their own "manifest destiny," as part of the inevitable advance of a superior Western civilization (p. 102).

Saul describes tourist visits, incidents involving Jews, and shifting perceptions on both sides of the oceans. Portrayed in some detail are the repeated and well-received visits of Grand Duke Alexis, a son of Alexander II, to the United States. Their echo was Ulysses Grant's visit to Russia in 1878, the last by a former American president until Richard Nixon's visit over a century later. The impressive quantity of contacts

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between the two countries reflected easier travel, the absence of serious frictions, and the generally liberal regime of Alexander II.

That monarch's tragic assassination in 1881, notes Saul, marked a turning point in Russo-American relations, followed by the reactionary, hard-line Alexander III. During his reign, terrible pogroms against Jews in Russia and official anti-Semitism troubled Russo-American relations. Growing American perceptions of Russia as an autocratic, repressive country were influenced profoundly by the lectures and extensive writings of George F. Kennan on the Siberian exile system; countering such negative perceptions was the growing popularity of Russian writers such as Leo Tolstoy and Ivan Turgenev. Harvard University introduced the first Russian-language courses in 1896. Similar to Americans' fascination with Siberia as a potential El Dorado was the fascination of Russian Finance Minister Sergei Witte, among others, with America's "economic miracle." The traditional pro-Russian attitude of Americans concerning the Far East was mostly reversed by the aggressive Russian expansion there that provoked the 1904 war with Japan.

Summarizing the ups and downs of Russo-American relations, Saul notes that the powers were drawn together by common experiences of rapid industrialization, a pioneering spirit, and cultural exchanges. Most serious American observers considered Russia a mystery, however, and Russian views of the United States were equally uncertain, although Russian radicals such as P. L. Lavrov and N. G. Chernyshevskii often idealized America as the land of milk and honey.

I was impressed by Saul's extensive, painstaking research, well reflected in his daunting bibliography. The quantity and quality of the data should attract scholars, college students, and many general readers. Fortunately, the numerous, highly informative footnotes come at the bottom of each page of the text. Appendixes supply valuable lists of American envoys to Russia and Russian diplomats in the United States.

DAVID MACKENZIE
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

BRUCE KUKLICK. *Puritans in Babylon: The Ancient Near East and American Intellectual Life, 1880–1930*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 253. $29.95.

One of the enduring monuments of nineteenth and early twentieth-century Western scholarship was the rediscovery of a series of lost civilizations that had flourished thousands of years earlier in such sites as the Tigris-Euphrates River valley, the island of Crete, the Indus River valley, and the jungles of Mesoamerica. Despite their brilliant achievements, the Sumerian, Minoan, Harappa/Mohenjo-Daro, and Mayan civilizations had largely disappeared from memory until adventurous travelers and scholars stumbled upon their ruins. The subsequent excavations of the sites and decipherment of their languages (a process that is still incomplete) has greatly enriched our understanding not only of these civilizations but of our own.

Bruce Kuklick' s new book traces the fascinating story of the American contribution to knowledge of the ancient Near East and particularly of ancient Sumer, now regarded as the world's earliest civilization. While the main focus is on Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt and Israel are also discussed. The book is divided into two parts. Part one focuses on the earliest American archaeological fieldwork in southern Mesopotamia, a twelve-year dig at Nippur carried out from 1888 to 1900. In part two, Kuklick sketches the organization of ancient Near Eastern scholarship in the United States as an academic pursuit. Based primarily on the voluminous records of the Nippur expeditions and the papers of major participants, the volume reveals wide reading across several disciplines. The focus on Near Eastern scholarship represents a new direction for Kuklick, who is best known for such earlier works as *The Rise of American Philosophy* (1977) and *Churchmen and Philosophers: Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey* (1985).

The story that Kuklick unfolds is not a pretty one, suggesting that academic in-fighting and unseemly professional attacks are hardly modern developments. Though the Nippur expeditions were certainly a success, if measured by their recovery of thousands of cuneiform tablets that have revealed much about the history of the ancient Sumerians, the enterprise was a disaster in human terms. The key participants and sponsors responsible for the expeditions engaged in constant attacks on one another while seeking to exploit any discoveries for their own advancement. The prime villain in this regard seems to have been Hermann Hilprecht, one of America' s first trained Assyriologists, who came to the University of Pennsylvania from Germany. Despite a very limited role in the Nippur excavations, Hilprecht managed to gain personal control over access to the cuneiform tablets, which he denied to other scholars. His constant self-promotion, sycophantic behavior toward administrative superiors, and attempts to destroy his rivals eventually united most American Near Eastern scholars against him. Although Kuklick's rather detailed narrative of the rivalries of the key participants might have been condensed, the account is certainly memorable, featuring not only treachery but also anti-Semitism, homophobia, and racism.

Kuklick uses the Nippur experience not only to shed light on the beginnings of ancient Near Eastern scholarship but also as a case study of the emergence of the American university and the increasing secularization of knowledge. He observes that while originally based on a German model, American scholarship on the ancient Near East, as in other fields, evolved toward a more pluralistic and democratic system. In defining the increasing split between secular and religious outlooks, he contrasts the careers of James Henry Breasted, the

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eminent American Egyptologist, who embraced a nonreligious perspective, and William Foxwell Albright, the country's leading Old Testament archaeologist, who reasserted a Judeo-Christian perspective.

In the book's final pages, Kuklick confronts the charges raised by Edward W. Said (*Orientalism* [1978]) and others that Western scholars have greatly distorted the histories and cultures of Middle Eastern societies as a result of their European, colonial biases. While conceding that nineteenth-century American students of the ancient Near East were assuredly "sexist, racist, and homophobic" (p. 199), Kuklick argues that these early scholars and their European predecessors laid the theoretical foundations and provided much of the information we now possess about the ancient Near East. These arguments are persuasive.

In general, this book may be recommended. Its strengths are its broad, cross-disciplinary investigation based on extensive research and its interesting and up-to-now largely untold story of the formative years of American ancient Near Eastern scholarship. In my judgment, the book's major shortcoming is that Kuklick has bitten off more than he should have in a volume of barely 200 pages. He attempts not only to describe the beginnings of American Near Eastern scholarship, a worthy project on its own terms, but also to include analyses of the growth of archaeology as a separate field, the evolution of university museums, the transformation of the American university, and the critical debate arising from the conflict between an older Judeo-Christian viewpoint and a more secular scientific view. While suggestive, the attempt to deal with all of these sub-themes in a brief book seems excessively ambitious. The book is an excellent study of the beginnings of ancient Near Eastern scholarship, however.

CARL T. JACKSON
University of Texas, El Paso

DAVID PETERSON DEL MAR. *What Trouble I Have Seen: A History of Violence against Wives*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 244. $39.95.

This is a fascinating book, with a bold and clear argument and a host of insights into family life and standards. If it ultimately claims more than it delivers, it nevertheless constitutes an important step in dealing historically with male abuse of wives and the factors involved. David Peterson del Mar assesses patterns of male spousal violence in Oregon, focusing on the period of initial white settlement at the turn of the century and then on a set of trends launched in the 1920s that have continued into recent decades.

Violence was common in the settlement period. Immigrants from Missouri brought family violence with them, and frontier conditions, including the scattered residences of the relatively scarce women, on the whole exacerbated the pattern. Racial intermarriage could intensify violence as well, and important sections describe Native American patterns and reactions. Community response was weak, with few men punished and churches usually advocating the importance of maintaining even violent families. Lack of privacy in housing added to the mix. The range of incidents and facets considered in this section—and, to a degree, in the book as a whole—is impressive, making the study a vital contribution to many aspects of family and gender history. In all sections, details (mainly from court records) on the attitudes and other attributes of violent husbands are intriguing and significant, and del Mar handles them well.

Violence against women declined around 1900, thanks to more structured communities and Victorian ideals of moral womanhood. Public reactions stiffened, as evidenced by the passage of a law penalizing convicted husbands by whipping (though few were actually whipped). Women became more defenseless physically, although the rise of divorce provided a new option. Del Mar concludes that, on the whole, industrial self-discipline bolstered male self-control in the home—thus joining his study to other conclusions about larger patterns of crime and violence in this period.

From the 1920s onward, male spousal violence began to escalate again. The author notes new ambivalence about women and families, due in part to a gradual increase of women's work activities and more egalitarian and affectionate family ideals. Late Victorian paternalism, protective of women, declined. More men now thought that it was quite acceptable to knock their wives around occasionally. Important summaries of new legal and community reactions and the rise of feminist protection activities, including shelters for battered women, round out the study. These developments are unsurprising but the case-study precision is welcome.

With an exciting argument and frequently gripping data, the book nevertheless has three drawbacks. First, it is less class and group-specific than might be desired. For the final period, particularly, husbands sometimes seem undifferentiated. There is no claim that all are violent but not much effort to see if certain factors, other than accident, predispose some to violence more than others.

Second, the most sweeping causal claim for the trends of the fnal period is unproved and improbable. Consumerism, del Mar argues, loosened the discipline of the later nineteenth century. "Exercising self-restraint has become countercultural" (p. 172). But most husbands are not wife-beaters, and even some who are exercise self-restraint in other areas of their lives (or at least they may; the book understandably does not inquire). The image of the progressive deterioration of Victorian rectitude is a common one, and it surely describes some real trends, but it is a half-truth at best. The author is on stronger ground with his empirical presentation.

Finally, and most crucially, we cannot know for sure

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that the trends del Mar cites are correct. He offers lots of cases—the research has been painstaking—and strong cultural impressions. He also offers percentage rates based on court actions for divorce, and an admirably clear and modest appendix clarifies the limitations involved. But per capita developments over time are at best suggested. This does not undermine the whole study, but it does dictate a need for caution that the author oddly eschews in his larger conclusions. Even the obvious issue of changes in reporting mechanisms and probabilities, though referred to, is not incorporated strongly into the analysis. This is another reason to be skeptical about some of the larger causation cited, for it may be invoked to explain changes that were less sweeping than this book implies.

These caveats are serious, and greater attention to them would actually have improved a strong book. But the argument, and certainly the presentation of cases, deserve attention anyway. This is a misleadingly vigorous historical read, but even with objections kept firmly in mind, it is stimulating, often plausible, and important.

PETER N. STEARNS
Carnegie Mellon University

MARY E. ODEM. *Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and Policing Adolescent Female Sexuality in the United States, 1885–1920*. (Gender and American Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1995. Pp. xiv, 265. Cloth $39.95, paper $14.95.

Mary E. Odem's fine book reminds me of two delinquent daughters in my Progressive Era course. The first is Maggie, the "girl of the streets" in Stephen Crane's 1892 novel, daughter of the dissolute, drunken Mary, who casts the "ruined" girl out of her house. The second is the unmarried, pregnant daughter of a desperately poor German immigrant woman, who appears in the chapter entitled "Problems of Poverty" in Jane Addams's *Twenty Years at Hull House* (1910). The responses of Crane and Addams loosely correspond to those of the two generations of moral reformers in Odem's book: the first blamed evil men for women's sexual delinquency (Maggie is seduced by the smooth-talking Pete: "Say, Mag, I'm stuck on yer shape"); and the second blamed the urban environment ("the vice of the city").

Odem argues that the increased anxiety of middle-class moral reformers about the delinquent sexual behavior of working-class women reflected their new freedom in factories, shops, dance halls, movie theaters, and amusement resorts and resulted in the reformers' increased reliance on the state to regulate such behavior. The first generation, which included the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), women's clubs, and the National American Woman's Suffrage Association (NAWSA), successfully lobbied for raising the age of sexual consent. The second generation, which included the Women's Trade Union League, settlement workers, and the National Consumers' League, worked for more humane juvenile courts, detention homes, and reformatories, administered by women professionals.

Odem tells a wonderfully complex, inclusive story. Although middle-class reformers remain her focus, she also describes the conflict within working-class families—native-born and immigrant, white and African American—in which daughters' sexual activity violated parents' norms of female chastity. Both parents and reformers sought support for their own authority from officials of the state, who were also powerful players in this intricate drama.

Firmly grounded in empirical reality, particularly the criminal and juvenile court records from Alameda and Los Angeles Counties, Odem's treatment is admirably even-handed. White female reformers ignored the sexual exploitation of African-American women, leaving their protection to black club women. Even the reformers' best-intentioned efforts sometimes had unintended, unfortunate consequences: raising the age of consent led to humiliating vaginal examinations of young women involved in statutory rape cases; during and after World War I, female professionals acceded when the federal government used reformatories and detention centers to confine thousands of women and girls suspected of being prostitutes or of carrying venereal disease. Young women were less often the victims of smooth-talking seducers than willing sexual partners; yet their new sexual freedom brought dangers such as out-of-wedlock pregnancy, venereal disease, or rape. Working-class parents feared for their daughters' loss of sexual respectability and their own loss of the pregnant daughters' wages; parents ignored the fact that daughters were often sexually abused by family members.

During this quarter of a century of change, there appears one bleak continuity: the inability of middle-class reformers and working-class parents to protect daughters from sexual abuse and exploitation. Most male judges, probation officers, lawyers, and police officers consistently protected and endorsed the sexual double standard, handing down lenient sentences or probation for accused men and punitive treatment for women, including courtroom harassment and commitment to harsh correctional institutions.

Stephen Crane hinted that Maggie took her own life; Jane Addams confessed she could do nothing for the pregnant German girl. Mary E. Odem suggests more specific, although not more happy, endings to the life stories of these delinquent daughters.

MARIAN J. MORTON
John Carroll University

WILLIAM IRWIN. *The New Niagara: Tourism, Technology, and the Landscape of Niagara Falls, 1776–1917*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1996. Pp. xxiii, 276. Cloth $45.00, paper $17.95.

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Prior to World War I, few places in the United States consistently matched Niagara Falls as a tourist destination. Attractive initially for its sublime natural beauty and raw power, the cataract not only maintained but increased its popularity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even as the land around it was profoundly transformed by grand civil engineering projects, extensive industrial development, broad-scale electrification, and heavy-handed manipulation by landscape architects. This radical alteration and the cultural reactions to it form the heart of William Irwin's outstanding book.

The combination of technology and the environment writ large was a powerful and seductive force in the late nineteenth century. Rarely had technology looked so thoroughly promising, so fundamentally organic. Following a beautifully written survey of early American settlement and sightseeing at Niagara Falls, Irwin follows with a series of self-contained essays that explore the utilitarian developments that transformed the cataract into a tourist and manufacturing mecca, including the world-renowned bridges built across the gorge, the elaborate architectural efforts to preserve and improve the falls' vistas, the harnessing of water power to generate unprecedented amounts of electricity and the conspicuous applications of that new electric power, the utopian images fostered by the Pan-American Exposition of 1901, and the short-lived social revolution brought about by the model factory established to manufacture Shredded Wheat. Irwin brilliantly captures the faith so many people shared at that time that technology could, if properly guided, improve and enhance nature and in so doing uplift family and community life itself.

It is hard to imagine a better setting to examine the long-range tension between technology and the environment than Niagara Falls. It is so revealing precisely because it was so monumental and sublime, characteristics that induced both nature lovers and technologists to keep this interaction in mind. While Niagara's growing fame during this era came as much from its engineering marvels as from its natural wonders, the irresistible urge to develop the cataract was accompanied by an equally strong pull on those inclined to treasure its natural beauty. Niagara Falls therefore became one of the first spots in the United States to be widely hailed by preservationists. Ironically, the late nineteenth-century movement to preserve the falls, led by Frederick Law Olmsted, drew as much on carefully altering the landscape as it did on maintaining its existing contours.

This cultivated mix of technology and the environment gained an important addition in 1901 when the Natural Food Company—producers of Shredded Wheat—built its model factory in Niagara. Like so much else at the falls, the factory was designed to attract sightseers, which it did (to the tune of over 100,000 visitors a year during the early twentieth century). Advertisements for Shredded Wheat linked the natural ingredients of the cereal, the natural elements of the falls, and the technological modernism of Niagara's industrial community.

Despite Irwin's masterful job of examining how this "New Niagara" was created, he offers relatively little explanation of why it fell so quickly from grace after hitting its zenith around the turn of the century. "By the 1920s," he asserts, "Americans viewed Niagara Falls less as a place of special majesty and meaning than a divided landscape of industry and sentimental tourism" (p. 206). It is unfortunate, perhaps, that he chose not to make comparisons with other places in America and abroad. It would have been instructive, for example, for Irwin to have commented on how special or typical Niagara's case was or to assess the extent to which technology had been used at other natural sites to enhance their tourist appeal.

These minor points aside, the book does a splendid job of highlighting the interconnections among nature, technology, and culture. In addition to its clear prose and well-chosen illustrations, it engages the scholarly literature in a meaningful but understated manner. It is, in short, that rare kind of book that is well suited for a broad array of undergraduate courses, including those in environmental history, the history of technology, historical geography, American studies, and American history.

JEFFREY K. STINE
National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution

SUSAN E. LEDERER. *Subjected to Science: Human Experimentation in America before the Second World War.* (The Henry E. Sigerist Series in the History of Medicine.) Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1995. Pp. xvi, 192. $32.95.

Say the words "medical experimentation" to historians and most will think immediately of the Nazi-era horrors perpetrated by the infamous Dr. Josef Mengele, among others, or of the shocking cruelty of the Tuskegee syphilis study. Outside of a few notorious examples, the history of human experimentation has been little studied and its links to the growth of scientific medicine, laboratory research, and the new sciences of bacteriology and pharmacology little explored. It is Susan E. Lederer's mission to fill these historical lacunae.

She begins by showing how the growth of nineteenth-century scientific medicine and the emergence of the modern doctor-patient relationship influenced the development of human experimentation. Expected to refrain from injuring others in the name of science, physicians were, nonetheless, permitted to use hospital patients as clinical subjects—as long as the treatments offered were presumed to be beneficial. When the need to test unproven therapies arose, some practitioners conducted tests on themselves, their colleagues, and their students. Others, however, turned to prisoners, the mentally ill, orphans, or, in the case of the

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famous Cuban yellow fever experiments, paid volunteers. Thus, the "human subject" was created.

The most vigorous defenders of these subjects were the antivivisectionists, who extended their defense of animals to include members of the human species. Although they interpreted the cruelties of medical research in moral and cultural terms, they ultimately challenged their medical enemies in the political arena and came close to winning legislative victories that would have halted or significantly slowed the research enterprise. Antivivisectionists revealed to the public many egregious examples of unethical conduct, which gave them both moral and political power. Lederer presents chilling accounts of experiments conducted on children, prisoners, soldiers, and paid volunteers. Yet she also shows how the medical profession was able to organize and defend its position with growing success over the course of the twentieth century.

In the 1930s, medicine reigned as the premier profession, and physicians who experimented on themselves or who lost their lives in research efforts (often experimenting with x-rays or investigating infectious organisms) took the stage as heroes. Lederer brilliantly describes Hollywood's portrayal of these martyrs of medicine in films such as "Yellow Jack" (1938), and "Men in White" (1934), noting that while antivivisectionists continued to question experiments conducted on animals and humans, their voices were increasingly muffled by the cheers from the audience. Not only did medical scientists win acclaim on the silver screen, they made significant breakthroughs in the understanding and treatment of disease that seemed to justify the experiments that had paved the way. Indeed, by World War II, it was a patriotic duty to volunteer as a research subject.

Lederer's careful contextualizing permits us to see how emerging biomedical paradigms—particularly the germ theory of disease—provided the intellectual scaffolding on which the justification for human experimentation was erected. More provocatively, she asserts that the intellectual underpinnings of antivivisectionism lay in "Darwinian ideas about evolutionary descent [that] encouraged a new sense of kinship between humans and other animals" (p. 59). Seen in this light, opponents of human experimentation appear to share in the culture of modernity being created in part by members of the scientific community—a suggestion that perhaps deserves more investigation.

This book is an engaging and important work that probes a neglected subject and sheds new light on the history of medical research and the growing cultural authority of medicine. Its significance lies both in its vivid depiction of the individuals who served as human subjects and in its explanation of how these subjects became the silent and often unwitting participants in the biomedical enterprise. In a tantalizingly brief epilogue, Lederer describes how, in the postwar era, exposures of abuses led to the federal regulation of human experimentation and spawned doubts about the moral authority of medicine. I hope she will explore these subjects in greater detail in a future work.

JANET GOLDEN
Rutgers University, Camden

VANESSA NORTHINGTON GAMBLE. *Making a Place for Ourselves: The Black Hospital Movement, 1920–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xviii, 265. $45.00.

For two decades now, American medical historians have focused on how the hospital became the central artifact and defining feature of modern medicine. They have, for the most part, touched only incidentally on issues of race in their accounts. Vanessa Northington Gamble has reconstructed this often overlooked dimension of American medical history. Gamble's account of the black hospital movement is more than an exercise in compensatory history, however important that itself would be. Gamble sensitively engages the dilemmas confronting black physicians trying to protect their beleaguered professional positions against the backdrop of the evolving hospital and the transformation of American medicine.

Black-sponsored hospitals of the early twentieth century were like most other hospitals, only more so. Most of the 118 black institutions existing in 1919 were small and inexpensive to organize and operate. Possessing minimal medical technology, they housed and cared for patients more than they treated them. Many of the smaller institutions were ethnically or racially identified; they offered affiliations and opportunities to immigrant and minority physicians and served as emblems of community solidarity and achievement. These hospitals were, in retrospect, ideal environments for the strategy of racial accommodation to take hold.

The stakes rose in the 1920s, as hospitals grew in medical importance and in their significance to medical and nursing careers. Indeed, early twentieth-century efforts to make medical practice more scientific led in the 1910s and 1920s to a nationwide movement to raise hospital standards. Correctly fearing that these new standards might force the closing of many black hospitals (as they might threaten all small hospitals), the black National Medical Association proposed lesser accreditation requirements to protect black hospitals while modestly raising standards. Many black physicians realized that without hospitals of their own, their continued exclusion from white hospitals would deny them advanced training, specialty practices, and the credentials increasingly necessary for the practice of modern medicine. Others rejected the strategy of medical separatism and self-help, arguing that separate hospitals would maintain the despised color line.

Gamble traces the debate over whether blacks should opt for separate hospitals through various settings. At New York's publicly supported Harlem Hospital, black physicians divided in the 1920s over

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whether they should join with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to press for the full integration of blacks into the medical staff (in an institution then serving a black neighborhood!) or support instead foundation-funded planning for a separate hospital. At Tuskegee, the NAACP originally opposed federal planning for a segregated Veterans Bureau Hospital, but it joined in a unified black campaign to press for black medical control over the institution once it was built. In both Harlem and Tuskegee, black political pressure led to victory, although victory in a northern city meant an integrated medical staff, while victory in the rural South meant the achievement of black control over a segregated institution.

Gamble also surveys the roles of the Duke Endowment, Rosenwald Fund, and Rockefeller General Education Board in supporting segregated facilities at southern hospitals; she details the emerging black resistance to transforming Chicago's once-independent Provident Hospital into a segregated and white-controlled outpost of the University of Chicago Medical School in the 1930s; and she chronicles the long and ultimately successful struggle of black physicians to open a voluntary hospital in Cleveland over NAACP opposition. Blacks divided among themselves in all these cases.

Gamble frames her deeply nuanced account in terms of the difficult choices facing black physicians who sought to maintain professional opportunities and a modicum of health care for their communities in racist environments. World War II and the ensuing civil rights era made other choices increasingly possible. (Appropriately enough, the first post–World War II medical civil rights victory reversed the most notable post–World War I victory, as black activists successfully opposed plans for another segregated Veterans' Administration Hospital in the South.) As prospects for integration strengthened, separate black hospitals became increasingly marginal to black medical careers. One by one the hospitals closed, until only eight remained in 1993.

MORRIS J. VOGEL
Temple University

SPENCIE LOVE. *One Blood: The Death and Resurrection of Charles R. Drew*. Foreword by JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. xix, 373. $29.95.

On April 1, 1950, while traveling to a medical conference at Tuskegee, Alabama, Dr. Charles R. Drew was killed in a one-car accident near Burlington, North Carolina. At the time of his death, the forty-five-year-old Drew was one of the nation's most prominent African-American physicians. A graduate of Amherst College and McGill University, he was the first African-American to receive the Doctor of Science in Medicine degree from Columbia in 1940. In 1941, Drew assumed the chairmanship of the department of surgery at Howard University School of Medicine, where he trained most of the black surgeons who received board certification in general surgery between 1941 and 1950. Drew also had a reputation as a distinguished medical researcher. His research on the preservation of blood plasma led to his selection in 1940 as the medical director of the Blood for Britain project, an effort to supply British soldiers with plasma. A year later Drew set up the American Red Cross's first blood bank. In 1944, he received the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) Spingarn Medal, awarded to the black person who had reached the highest achievement in his field of activity.

Yet, despite these professional achievements, Drew is frequently remembered only for the events surrounding his death. After the accident, he was taken to Alamance General Hospital, a small, segregated hospital, where two white surgeons vigorously worked to save his life, but their efforts proved futile. His fellow passengers confirmed this account of the physicians' medical attention, but within hours of Drew's death, rumors about alleged mistreatment began to circulate in the black community. One held that Drew bled to death because he had been refused treatment at a segregated hospital. Although his family and colleagues have tried to refute the myths about Drew's death, erroneous accounts are still repeated today.

In her penetrating and well-researched book, Spencie Love examines the professional and personal life of Charles Drew. It is clear that Love admires Drew; however, he comes across as a larger-than-life, inaccessible person. This is a minor weakness because Love's book is less a biography of Drew than an examination of his rise as a popular black folk hero. Love notes that several myths and legends, not just concerning his death, have developed about Drew. Inaccurate stories persist that he had created blood plasma and had taken a very public role in protesting the World War II blood segregation policies of the American Red Cross. Love traces the origins and evolution of these myths and examines why they have become so deeply entrenched in the African-American community. Her goal is not to dispel these stories but to show that, although not literally true, folk beliefs can be fertile ground for historical analysis because they provide valuable clues to historically based realities.

Love's argument is certainly provocative, but she cogently supports it. For example, she uses the legend about Drew's death as a prism to understand the impact of racism, especially in medicine, on the lives and collective memories of African Americans. She shows that the legend became so widely believed because, although not true in Drew's case, other black people had found themselves the victims of segregated medical practices. One such victim was Maltheus Reeves Avery, a veteran and college student. Love poignantly describes how, eight months after Drew's accident, Avery had an accident under circumstances

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similar to those alleged for Drew. Avery was also taken first to Alamance County Hospital, but he was sent to Duke Hospital, thirty miles away, because of the nature of his injuries. Duke Hospital refused to admit him because all of its black beds were full, and Avery died after his transfer to a black hospital.

This study provides an insightful view of the role that issues of race and racism have played in the development of American medicine. Love describes how Drew was initially denied admission to the American College of Surgeons and the American Medical Association and how black physicians were limited to a separate, but never equal, black medical world. She also details how racism in medicine contributed to the death of one man and devastated his family. This is an important book that deserves a wide audience.

VANESSA NORTHINGTON GAMBLE
University of Wisconsin, Madison

ROBERT E. WEEMS, JR. *Black Business in the Black Metropolis: The Chicago Metropolitan Assurance Company, 1925–1985.* (Blacks in the Diaspora.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1996. Pp. xvii, 158. $35.00.

In this volume of the *Blacks in the Diaspora* series, Robert E. Weems, Jr., discusses the history of the Chicago Metropolitan Mutual Assurance Company (CMMAC) and its derivatives from its founding in 1925 to its last high point, the 1985 renovation of the home office complex. Weems uses the introduction to place the study in historiographical perspective, acquainting readers with other works on the black insurance industry, especially Walter B. Weare's *Black Business in the New South: A Social History of the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company* (1973), and Alexa Benson Henderson's *Atlanta Life Insurance Company: Guardian of Black Economic Dignity* (1990). The book's seven remaining chapters "discuss the various programs and projects established by the company (over time) to enhance black community life" (p. xi).

CMMAC began in 1925 as a burial association, the Metropolitan Funeral System Association, with Otto Stevenson, local businessman, and Daniel Jackson, a successful funeral home director and "acknowledged czar of black Chicago gambling activities" (p. 2) as co-founders. Less than two years later, Stevenson withdrew from the venture when it ran into financial difficulty, and Jackson asked Robert A. Cole, manager of his most prosperous gambling club, to run the business. This began an involvement with the enterprise that lasted almost thirty years (1927–1956). Cole left his mark on the enterprise, and under his paternalistic leadership, the company built a new two-story headquarters building in the heart of southside "black" Chicago's (then known as Bronzeville) business district, which eventually included Parkway Ballroom, the best facility of its kind in Chicago for African Americans, and the adjoining Parkway Dining Room, a fine restaurant. The company converted from a burial association to a mutual assurance company, the Metropolitan Mutual Assurance Company (MMAC), in 1946 and catered to low-income African Americans who could not receive mortgages and insurances from white banks and insurance companies. It became the pride of African Americans in Chicago, and soon management established branches in other Illinois cities—East St. Louis, Peoria, and Springfield—and in other states: Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio.

The Metropolitan Mutual Assurance Company faced many challenges in its relatively short history and generally fared well. It survived the Great Depression and successfully defended the right to have the word metropolitan in its title. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company sued, claiming that MMAC attempted to profit from the similarity in their names. MMAC argued that since Metropolitan Life Insurance Company did not have black agents, when its agents went into black neighborhoods, everyone knew whom they represented. The judge agreed, ordered the white company to pay the black company's legal expenses, and directed MMAC to change its name to Chicago Metropolitan Mutual Assurance Company to avoid future confusion. The company was also successful against agents who picketed the home office in 1957 to protest a reduction in weekly commissions made to withstand a revenue shortfall. Because of the strike, however, the company became a union shop for agents, and the family atmosphere that Cole had fostered disappeared. Integration dealt a deathblow to CMMAC, as upper and middle-class African Americans patronized white-owned insurance companies and ballrooms that had formerly discouraged their patronage, while whites refused overtures from CMMAC. Moreover, low-income African Americans lost earning power, causing them to default on home mortgages on which the company had relied. Although the company began to write group insurance, it was unable to survive. Thus, in 1990, CMMAC agreed to a friendly acquisition by Atlanta Life Insurance Company and became a stock insurance company, Chicago Metropolitan Assurance Company.

The major shortcomings of Weems's work are its narrow focus, disconcerting repetitions, and omission of key photographs. The volume could have benefited from including demographical information on Chicago's southside, an overview of the black business community, and comparative information on the black insurance industry nationwide. Both black insurance companies in Chicago failed. Weems missed an excellent opportunity, therefore, to discuss the situation in that city at length and to shed light on why Durham, North Carolina, and Atlanta have proven to be more supportive communities for black insurance companies than Chicago with its huge population of African Americans. The study also suffers from poor organization. Weems discusses the agents' strike, for example, in two chapters, and we are told of its effects at

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least four times, but its leaders are never identified. Weems mentions the Parkway Ballroom and Parkway Dining Room often; nevertheless, their interiors are not included among the sixteen pages of pictures. It is difficult to believe that none exist. Finally, the work cites *Black Enterprise* in its notes and mentions it in the text, but this magazine is not included in the bibliography.

In spite of these shortcomings, Weems's book is well written, grounded in primary source information, and fills a void in the literature. In these ways, it contributes to our understanding of the black insurance industry.

WHITTINGTON B. JOHNSON
University of Miami

RONALD H. BAYOR. *Race and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century Atlanta*. (The Fred W. Morrison Series in Southern Studies.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. xvi, 334. $29.95.

Many recent books have explored race and the city, including Henry L. Taylor, Jr.'s edited collection, *Race and the City: Work, Community, and Protest in Cincinnati, 1820–1970* (1993), Christopher Silver's *Twentieth-Century Richmond: Planning, Politics and Race* (1984), and, of course, Arnold Hirsch's *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (1983). In *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (1993), sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton disclosed the historical durability of urban segregation patterns, which cut deep fissures in the social and physical space of the nation's cities. Ronald H. Bayor here takes the study of race and urban development further by operationizing race as the key variable influencing the physical and institutional form of the city ballyhooed as "too busy to hate." Bayor's book is not a history of Atlanta's African-American community; rather, it dissects Atlanta's racial interstices, revealing the dynamics of southern urban apartheid—especially its stubborn determination to achieve total racial domination—and the ways that white efforts to marginalize the black community socially, politically, economically, and spatially molded the social and physical fabric of modern Atlanta.

The study encompasses Atlanta's racial history from 1900 to 1990 but focuses mainly on the post–World War II era. After briefly sketching the city's grim record of race relations from the reestablishment of white political rule in 1871 through the heinous 1906 Atlanta race riot, Bayor undertakes a systematic topical analysis of race-based city building in the twentieth century. From this vantage point, Atlanta's growth reflected white decision makers' use of political power—in zoning, comprehensive planning, transit, school and hospital construction, and the other tools of city building—to confine black citizens to a separate and unequal world. Active, not passive, blacks responded by mobilizing weak but growing political and institutional resources to assert their political rights and to preserve limited access to jobs and housing, police and fire protection, educational and medical services, and urban space itself. Bayor unveils a host of white strategies employed to thwart black political empowerment, residential mobility, and economic opportunity, from zoning and suburban annexation plans to boulevards and roadway schemes, including erecting the "Atlanta Wall" against black advance into a white west-side neighborhood. White Atlanta denied blacks park space, sewers, sidewalks, hospital care, decent and sufficient schools, and housing. Government programs to destroy slums and build public housing usually further confined blacks without greatly expanding services.

Bayor endeavors to reveal black Atlantans as agents, not victims. African Americans fought politically and organizationally against the white power structure. Voter registration drives in the 1940s and political legerdemain helped, as did an expanding black population and growing organizational strength, which in the 1950s enabled black voters to block bond issues beneficial to the white community. The emergence of influential civil rights groups such as the Committee on Appeal for Human Rights (COAHR) and the Atlanta Summit, combined with a rising black voter registration that topped forty-nine percent in 1973, the year after Atlantans elected Julian Bond to Congress, signaled a coming of age. Significant court victories in the 1950s and 1960s and the tactical use in that era of peaceful protest and the threat of violence also strengthened the black position and enabled blacks to parry white segregationist thrusts more effectively. Nor does Bayor ignore the importance of Supreme Court victories, the Kennedy-Johnson civil rights legislation, and key government agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in promoting racial progress in Atlanta. Maynard Jackson's mayoral victory in 1973 promised to incorporate blacks as partners in the Atlanta planning and city-building process. But rising political power and greater access to health, transit, educational, and housing services failed to offset surging *de facto* segregation and a nagging lack of success in breaching the economic barriers to black opportunity. Tragically, the "dual agenda" (urban versus black) discussed by Bayor survives, as attested to by the white manipulation of black residential space in planning and building for the recent Olympic games.

Bayor's topical approach produces some occasional and annoying redundancy and requires some scurrying back and forth by the reader to reconstruct from one chapter the framework for events in another. Mayor Hartsfield's name and organizations such as COAHR, SNCC, and the Summit appear constantly and sorting out their key roles from chapter to chapter can prove challenging. Still, this book is a richly detailed, perceptive examination of the powerful force of race in shaping the American city. Bayor has expertly and graphically portrayed the enormous burden in time,

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energy, dollars, human pain, and wasted human resources levied by urban racism and the policy of apartheid.

JOHN F. BAUMAN
California University of Pennsylvania

CLARENCE TAYLOR. *The Black Churches of Brooklyn.* (The Columbia History of Urban Life.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1994. Pp. xix, 297. $16.50.

From its title alone, one might not expect to find in Clarence Taylor's study of the black-led churches of Bedford-Stuyvesant several of the elements that appear most prominently. The presence of institutional histories and the parsing of denominational traditions could have been predicted, but the reader also encounters engaging biographical vignettes, case studies of social activism, and even political analysis. Each aspect emerges from a mixed bag of scholarly contents, some pedestrian and others provocative, but all of them interesting. But perhaps, on second thought, this mixture is not so surprising, for just as Oscar Handlin concluded that the history of immigrants to the United States truly *was* American history, so the history of black congregations is really the history of the African-American communities in which they are located.

To reconstruct this history, Taylor spares little effort. He combines perusal of neglected secondary accounts with consultation of statistical directories, retrieval of church anniversary volumes, interviews with elders in the congregations, and a painstaking reading of the community press of Brooklyn over an entire century. At times, the sheer volume of material and the attractions of its richness overwhelm the author, and he is reduced to repeating lists of names, places, and accomplishments. Taylor obviously strives to fashion some thematic order out of his sources, yet the documentary record overtakes him in a few of the chapters and drives the exposition, leaving a clearer impression of life in the churches themselves than of the relation between black churches and the wider society.

This tendency would pose less of a problem if the portions of the work underpinning the detailed narrative were theoretically sound. At crucial points, however, when the application of some perspective would be helpful, Taylor veers into leaden language touting "culture as a mode of resistance" (p. 32) and chastising particular black leaders for shunning alliances with the secular left and not "challenging the hegemonic power of the state" because they "lacked a class analysis" (p. 127).

One sees Taylor's preferences starkly in his contrast between the black pastors of the 1930s through the 1950s and the ministers who, during the summer of 1963, sparked demonstrations to impede construction of the Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn until the government met their demand that one quarter of the jobs on the site be held by black or Puerto Rican workers. He faults the old-timers for their devoted participation in the two-party political system and their careful avoidance of "belligerent tactics" and "aggressive action" designed to "force" an official response (p. 117). Clergy in the latter group he lauds for their militancy and vision.

Yet Taylor does not directly address the empirical question of which stance was most likely to produce better results for the ordinary members of black congregations. In fact, he seems to withdraw his endorsement of confrontation when, as in the later case of the Reverend Al Sharpton (whom he identifies with understatement as "the most controversial minister in the borough" [p. 209]), the approach yields negative effects.

The good news about Taylor's book is that such reflection is limited and mostly superimposed rather than integrated into the analysis, so that one need not accept any of it to appreciate what the author has achieved with his research. Moreover, there are segments, including chapters on black churches and popular culture and African-American women in the leadership of congregations, that successfully resist oversimplification. Finally, to its special credit, Columbia University Press has given users of this handsomely designed work added value with sections of copious illustrations and a thorough index.

KEVIN J. CHRISTIANO
University of Notre Dame

EWA MORAWSKA. *Insecure Prosperity: Small-Town Jews in Industrial America, 1890–1940.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. xxv, 369. $35.00.

Why is this town different from all other towns is the query posed by Ewa Morawska. The title of her book is misleading, because the only small town it deals with is Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Others are used as a basis of comparison or contrast, like Terre Haute, Indiana; some are merely mentioned by name as possibly similar, but Johnstown is a paradigm for no other place, since none like it have yet been investigated. Morawska encourages more research in this area of ethnic and immigration studies, especially by younger professionals. It is a worthwhile suggestion, as this book is an altogether necessary, albeit difficult, read.

The heaviness of the prose may not be Morawska's fault; it was her editors' collective obligation, I think, to make this work more accessible to a lay audience. As it stands now, its unique scholarship is compromised with thick, complex, hard-to-assimilate sentences (see, for example, pp. 29, 187, 199, 211). Morawska attempts to mitigate the impact of "sociologese," especially in the book's final three chapters, but the first three are a challenge. Perhaps someone could have found a way to present the data in a more narrative and less tabular fashion. The overall effect is forbidding.

But it is worth the trip, if you are sufficiently stalwart. Morawska brings an assortment of primary materials to bear on a discussion of mobility within a

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Jewish community of approximately 1,300; the period of time is fifty years, or the passage of two generations. Census reports, city maps, credit ratings, occupational data, statistics on family participation in business, college attendance tables, and bankruptcy figures are presented in support of Morawska's thesis that "ethnicization," which I take to mean acculturation or Americanization, occurred more gradually among Johnstowners than among urban Jews of, say, Cleveland and New York. The immigrant generation, a significant number of whom originated from the single Byelorussian village of Antopolie, conformed to certain occupational, cultural, and social patterns. The men were entrepreneurs in apparel, shoes, dry goods, or furniture. Some were peddlars, some were jewelers, and most replicated comfortable Old World trading patterns, especially with regard to their Christian clientele. East European Jewish businessmen fell back on their own kind for financial support, abjuring even the smaller German Jewish community. Among the common practices were having one's children work in the shop without pay and one's wife "help out" but not as an equal. Synagogues were traditionally Orthodox. In terms of housing, these Jews were upwardly mobile. By World War II, three-fifths of Johnstown's Jewish families had vacated the central city and its environs for the more affluent suburb of Westmont. Despite their arrival in an ostensible "comfort zone," they remained occupationally as well as socially marginal and preferred it that way. In a town dominated by Slavic factory workers and Anglo-Protestant steel managers, the Jewish community's "low visibility" in local affairs and organizational memberships was in no way accidental. Morawska indicates that this was a conscious, studied, and learned behavior transplanted from the *shtetls* (villages) of Eastern Europe and retooled to fit an American situation.

It is not surprising that immigrants transplanted their memories and values to the United States. What is most compelling in this study, though, is the persistence of these European traits, with certain modifications, into the second generation, which persevered through crises of its own, namely the 1936 Johnstown flood and the Great Depression. In many respects, the sons, literally and figuratively, minded their fathers' stores. To be sure, the synagogue altered its form, as did the home, with women elevating their levels of participation in both, but throughout, Johnstowners remained millennial rather than dynamic changers, movers but not shakers. Theirs was a less dramatic, more syncretic response than that of their sophisticated, secularized, and urbanized "big city" kin. In Johnstown, Jews sympathized with the plight of Slavic and Hungarian workers but were careful to remain neutral during strikes at Bethlehem Steel. By their own admission, they did not make waves. Politically, they were "superficial" Republicans; according to those interviewed, it was the "necessary" choice, an expedient thing to do. College was not as important to the offspring as adaptability and optimism. To be a "good" son was not to be steeped in book learning but to be responsible and obedient. For them, New York City or Cleveland were distant stars, irrelevant to and therefore absent from their purview.

The brilliance of Morawska's conclusion lies in its simplicity: that if there is any claim to Jewish exceptionalism, it may not be vested in material achievement, collective genius, or individual creativity. Instead, examine endurance, flexibility, and pragmatism, which are the virtues of everyday people.

STUART E. KNEE
University of Charleston

MICHAEL ROGIN. *Blackface, White Noise: Jewish Immigrants in the Hollywood Melting Pot*. (A Centennial Book.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. xvi, 339. $24.95.

Michael Rogin tells us that this book was inspired by a single image: "Al Jolson, born Jakie Rabinowitz in *The Jazz Singer* and reborn as Jack Robin, singing "My Mammy" in blackface to his immigrant Jewish mother" (p. 5). It is in his reading of this image that Rogin displays the interpretive brilliance that marks much of his recent work.

Rogin's thesis, simply put, is that Jewish entertainers like Al Jolson Americanized themselves by blacking up, quite often in worshipful celebration of "mammy," an American icon as evocative as Uncle Sam. In blackface, Jews called attention to their "whiteness" and ritually "entered, even as they helped to create, the American melting pot" (p. 53).

Rogin places blackface and "mammy" at the center of his interpretation of twentieth-century American culture and society. He reminds us that not only was "blackface minstrelsy . . . the first and most pervasive form of American mass culture" (p. 26), but, as late as 1927, when *The Jazz Singer* opened, *Amos and Andy* was "on the verge of becoming the most popular radio show in the United States," and *Showboat* featured a character in blackface (p. 29). The following decades saw the production of what Rogin refers to as "New Deal blackface" musicals, including several starring Al Jolson or Larry Parks playing Jolson, and others in which "mammy" figures watched over and protected white families. In the 1940s, although blackface disappeared from the screen, the African American remained effaced. The postwar films that confronted racial prejudice did so in the form of "anti-Semitism rather than antiblack racism" (p. 213), although in a curious inversion of blackface masquerade, an African American stood in for the Jew in one of the era's most important social-problem films, *Home of the Brave* (1949).

This is a reinterpretation of recent American history that "places race relations at the center of mass politics and culture" (p. 18). Drawing on Eric Hobsbawm's work, Rogin argues that American nationalism, like all nationalisms, was dependent on and rooted in the conceptualization of "an idealized, imaginary folk" (p.

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47). By putting on and taking off blackface, white, working-class, predominantly Jewish entertainers symbolically embodied this "folk." But in doing so, they excluded African Americans from participating in their own representation. Blacking up was not, Rogin argues in opposition to students of minstrelsy like Eric Lott, an act of identification with African Americans. It was an act of replacement, of obliteration. By grounding Jewish/African-American relations in this blackface act of representation/replacement, Rogin effectively complicates our understanding of "the links that have bound Jews and African Americans together, supportively and problematically, in popular culture and liberal politics" (p. 18).

Since, as Rogin reminds us, repeating the mantra of the new cultural history, "politics and culture do not exist in separate, watertight compartments" (p. 23), he attempts to reach beyond or behind the filmic images to the larger meanings they disclose. Unfortunately, the reader is too often trapped in dense readings of particular static images, with no clear pathway from the singular representations to the larger social meanings they shape and reveal. There is little attention to the process or personalities through which these images were constructed and no discussion of their reception. Rogin's readings of these images are often insightful and incisive, but he is not concerned with interrogating their relationship or resemblance to the readings of the audiences for whom they were intended and by whom they were received.

Rogin's virtuosity as a cultural critic too often gets in the way of his larger historical project. In his discussion of "New Deal blackface" musicals and postwar social problem films, for example, he metaphorically enlarges and distends the definitions of blackface and "mammy" to the point where he risks depriving them of their force and focus.

Historians who are not already familiar with the filmic images and plots that Rogin so fiercely interrogates will not have an easy time here. But they will be rewarded in the end. For me, at least, the explanatory power of Rogin's interpretation is such that he must be forgiven his excesses and congratulated for his daring.

DAVID NASAW
City University of New York

KENNETH J. BINDAS. *All of This Music Belongs to the Nation: The WPA's Federal Music Project and American Society*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1995. Pp. xiv, 164. $24.00.

Although several excellent monographs have been published on the artistic divisions of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), including the Federal Theatre (FT), Federal Writers' Project (FWP), and Federal Art Project (FAP), Kenneth J. Bindas's book is the first full-length study of the Federal Music Project (FMP). For this reason, among others, it is a welcome addition to the literature of the New Deal.

Bindas has done thorough research in the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, and in various state historical archives. He has read relevant government publications, dissertations, books, and articles. He has not, however, interviewed persons who worked for the FMP. This is a pity. It is the abundance of interviews with participants that enlivens Jerre Mangione's *The Dream and the Deal: The Federal Writers' Project, 1935–1943* (1972). Similarly, such participant accounts would have dramatized the ways in which real people were affected by the activities, policies, accomplishments, and failures of the FMP.

When, in 1935, Congress appropriated $4.8 billion for emergency relief, Roosevelt established the WPA to administer the funds and conduct small projects. In September of that year, he allocated $27.3 million for the WPA's newly created Federal Project Number 1, consisting of the FT, FAP, FWP, and FMP. The project was charged with employing jobless artists, bringing the arts to the people, and "inherently rediscovering and defining American culture" (p. x). The FMP soon became the largest of the arts endeavors, hiring 15,842 musicians at its peak in 1936. Through August 1939, more than 148,000,000 people had heard FMP performances.

Bindas claims that the FMP was more conservative and less innovative than its sister arts projects. He attributes this to FMP's director, Nikolai Sokoloff, and to the fact that the majority of its employees were members of the American Federation of Musicians (AFM). Neither Sokoloff nor the AFM allowed radicals in their ranks. When asked by the head of the FMP in New York City how to handle Communist and other radical agitators, Sokoloff instructed him to fire them. Further, Sokoloff saw the primary goal of FMP as the promotion and encouragement of "cultivated" as opposed to "vernacular" music (p. 6). Folk, ethnic, and popular musical groups were employed, but they received less of the FMP's resources than symphony orchestras.

The FMP shared with its sister projects a cultural nationalism that sought to advance American arts and artists. It recommended to state units that at least one-quarter of every program be made up of pieces composed by Americans. Bindas demonstrates that FMP afforded a generation of young American composers, conductors, and soloists their first exposure to wide audiences.

Additionally, Bindas examines the FMP's treatment of blacks and women, discovering a mixed record. About twelve percent of FMP employees were African Americans, but they were "often segregated, stereotyped and . . . denied the same credibility and pay of their white cohorts" (p. 71). Women never comprised more than sixteen percent of the FMP's ranks as opposed to twenty-seven percent of the FT and forty percent of the FWP. Nonetheless, Bindas finds that the FMP "made great strides toward acceptance of women as musical equals" (p. 86). At a time when women had barely made a dent in the classical music world, the

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FMP played the works of women, gave them their first opportunities to conduct, and sexually integrated FMP symphony orchestras.

Bindas ends his study in 1939, when Congress killed Federal Number 1. WPA music activities continued, however, under state and local sponsorship until 1943. It would have been interesting to learn how these music projects fared. Despite Bindas's terminating his monograph too abruptly, he has written an informative, worthwhile book.

BARBARA BLUBMERG
Pace University

LAWRENCE SUID. *Sailing on the Silver Screen: Hollywood and the U.S. Navy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1996. Pp. xiv, 307. $45.00.

In *Guts and Glory: Great American War Movies* (1978), Lawrence H. Suid explored the image of the American military in Hollywood feature films. He discussed not only what was on the screen but also what took place behind the scenes in the symbiotic relationship—or mutual exploitation—between Hollywood and the armed forces, demonstrating that, when military leaders cooperated with movie producers, each expected a return on their investment. Producers looked to the financial bottom line. Military bureaucrats measured the return by the portrayal of the armed services on the screen. Brave men, victorious battles, noble causes, heroic sacrifice: these were the coins of the realm, the rewards for cooperation. And these images, Suid made clear, influenced and conditioned how millions of Americans perceived the armed forces and interpreted military actions.

In this new work, Suid continues his study of relationship between the military and Hollywood. As the title suggests, it is the U.S. Navy's story; the book traces the rise of the navy's stock in Hollywood from the earliest silent films to such recent films as *Top Gun* (1986), *The Hunt for Red October* (1990), *Patriot Games* (1992), and *Clear and Present Danger* (1994). Once again, Suid's central concern is with the military's and Hollywood's mutual exploitation and "how the Navy has used motion pictures for almost ninety years to create, maintain, and ultimately rehabilitate not only its own image, but the image of the entire military establishment since the Vietnam War" (p. x). He is not concerned with film as art or the techniques of such directors as John Ford, Otto Preminger, or Stanley Kramer (all of whom made films about the navy); rather, he studies such films "as the products of the interaction between the Navy and filmmakers, not unlike the weaponry that results from the service's dealings with the military-industrial complex" (p. x). The image is apt: as far as the navy was concerned, what Hollywood put on the screen was part of the process of indoctrinating troops and winning wars.

But, as Suid points out, the game of image-making is a dangerous one. At several crucial points in the twentieth century, Hollywood created an image of a navy peopled by dynamic, competent officers in command of state-of-the-art ships that differed wildly from reality. Suid suggests that Hollywood's preparedness message before World War II may have bred public complacency and fostered a false sense of security, making the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor all the more traumatic. And he maintains that part of the reaction against the military during and after the Vietnam War may have been the result of the splendid sales job Hollywood accomplished during the late 1940s and 1950s. Given the emotionalism of the Cold War and the need for Hollywood to satisfy the military's image concerns to win Pentagon cooperation, the film industry created an armed forces that appeared above serious mistakes or losing a war.

Suid's study is solidly based on primary sources, including personal papers, Department of Defense files, studio production records, and an impressive collection of interviews. His method is to move chronologically from picture to picture, carefully examining the negotiations between Hollywood studios and navy bureaucrats. He often devotes more attention to behind-the-scene activities than what finally appeared on screen. Suid does not, however, ignore the changes in the film industry that affected its relationship with the navy; rather, he shows that the shift from studio production to independent production resulted in a more critical view of the military. At a time when film books tend to gather at the poles of buffdom and theory, Suid's insightful study occupies the middle ground, offering fascinating reading for military, film, and cultural historians.

RANDY ROBERTS
Purdue University

PHILIP GLEASON. *Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 434. $35.00.

Philip Gleason's history of American Catholic higher education in the twentieth century is masterful. Incorporating a lifetime of research, it is the most important study of the topic since Edward J. Power's *History of Catholic Higher Education in the United States* (1958). Gleason's critical account covers the first seventy years of the present century and is focused on the academic, intellectual, and ecclesiastical influences that shaped and challenged Catholic institutions. He analyzes this ground from the perspective of the educators, intellectuals, and church leaders who were striving to understand and contend with *modernity*, the intellectual and organizational grounding of twentieth-century American higher education that prompted change in Catholic institutions. By taking this approach, Gleason hopes to avoid the pitfall of examining the field merely from the perspective of critics who have asserted the general weakness of Catholic colleges and universities. History, he asserts, teaches that the experience of minorities is invariably richer than outsiders perceive. The book supports that assertion.

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In the first of three sections, Gleason describes the impact of contemporary influences on Catholic institutions between 1900 and 1930. Dominated by the Jesuit educational tradition, turn-of-the-century Catholic institutions were increasingly at variance with the organizational and academic features of the modern American school system. Vatican directives against theological innovation made Catholic intellectuals cautious but did not hamper structural change. To conform to the American pattern, preparatory schools were separated from college divisions, generally by expanding programs that had earlier reflected the middle portion of the high school/college curriculum. Graduate schools were also added. Reflecting the move toward accreditation, the National Catholic Educational Association (NCEA), organized in 1899 as the Catholic Educational Association, promoted flexibility and higher standards. During World War I, the placement of Student Army Training Corps units at selected campuses further emphasized the need to enforce standards deserving of outside recognition. In the 1920s, enrollment at women's colleges grew to one-third of the total; by 1926, when eighteen colleges had over 300 registrants and ten institutions had 1000 or more enrolled in graduate and professional studies, Catholic higher education had adapted structurally to the modern age without compromising its distinct identity.

The book's middle section describes the impact of the "Catholic Renaissance" that flourished after 1930. With formal encouragement from Rome, a revival of scholastic philosophy and theology—centered on the teachings of Thomas Aquinas—became the hallmark of Catholic educational life. By providing "rational grounding for faith" (p. 141), Thomism afforded a self-confident countercultural identity to Catholic institutions, stressing an ideal that was distinct from modern culture, a self-enclosed Catholic way of life that harmonized intellectual understanding, moral values, and spiritual fulfillment. During these years, Catholic thinkers emphasized philosophy in the curriculum, took steps to upgrade the older model of catechetical instruction to the level of academic departments of theology or religion, and found important allies, including Robert M. Hutchins at the University of Chicago. Challenged by their secular counterparts, Catholic schools began to seek faculty members with PhDs, the nucleus of the group who assumed leadership in the postwar years.

Between 1940 and 1960, enrollments at Catholic colleges and universities surged from 162,000 to 426,000, and faculties increased from 13,000 to 24,000. Such figures boded well for the Catholic enterprise; but, Gleason argues, a third developmental phase, fed by several sources, was beginning. Around 1950, responses to anti-Catholic assertions of incompatibility between Catholic structures of authority and democratic life triggered a defense of the usefulness of Catholic ideals in a pluralistic society that downplayed the separatism of the Thomistic revival. Greater use of graduate schools brought a new research ethos into Catholic schools. By 1960, the old consensus about Thomism was yielding to debates about its meaning and proper presentation. Soon afterward, Vatican II's stress on lay participation in institutional life and the need to utilize lay collaborators more effectively led to the appointment of lay boards of trustees, surrendering the exclusive control once exercised by the religious communities who sponsored institutions. In 1965, with activism mounting, the NCEA pledged full academic freedom for member institutions. Two years later, a group of prominent Catholic educators asserted the right to independent governance and academic freedom "in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community" (p. 317). By then, Gleason concludes, Catholic educators were at peace with modernity. They had found a means of incorporating the structures and approaches of contemporary academic life into their institutions. What remained was to define and assert a satisfactory vision to justify a distinctive Catholic approach to higher education.

In adopting this analytical structure, Gleason largely omits developments in the last quarter of a century, a period too recent to be subject to the penetrating historical examination this book involves. As it stands, the third section is more theoretical and less connected with summaries of data. The author omits discussions of problematic areas like the connection between athleticism and the mission of Catholic education, competition for enrollment, and the need to enhance endowments. Nevertheless, he has succeeded admirably in contextualizing and explaining the development of America's Catholic colleges and universities over seven decades. His explanations are wise and convincing, and his descriptions of the accomplishments of educational leaders from Peter Guilday to Theodore Hesburgh are particularly enlightening. This book will serve for years as the standard in its field.

ANTHONY J. KUZNIEWSKI
College of the Holy Cross

ROBERT S. ORSI. *Thank You, St. Jude: Women's Devotion to the Patron Saint of Hopeless Causes*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xxi, 303. $30.00.

This is a social-historical study of American Roman Catholic devotion to St. Jude Thaddeus, patron saint of "hopeless" causes. Why Jude, one of Jesus's twelve apostles, is the object of this particular cult is obscure, but it is general throughout the Catholic world. As British hagiographer Donald Attwater wrote in his *Penguin Dictionary of the Saints* (1965), "St. Jude enjoys great popularity as a powerful intercessor for those in desperate straits, as students of the publicity columns of *The Times* newspaper are aware" (p. 206). Robert S. Orsi, author of a previous well-received study of Catholic popular religion, *The Madonna of 115th Street* (1985), restricts himself to a contemporary period of the devotion and to its American history. His

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story is centered in Chicago and begins in 1929. The Claretian congregation of missionary priests had been assigned the charge of the Mexican-American mission church of Our Lady of Guadalupe on Chicago's far south side. Seeking a firm financial base for the operation, the pastor, a Catalán named Jaime Tort (1880–1955), remembered a holy card depicting St. Jude that he had found on a church bench. Tort hit on the idea of promoting devotion to the little-known saint, which proved to be a way of attracting support from middle-class Chicagoans. Improbably enough, St. Jude also became patron and protector of the Chicago police force.

Ironically, Tort's Mexican parishioners were at first lukewarm to the new devotion, preferring the tried-and-true cult of Guadalupe. A "national shrine" of St. Jude was established at Our Lady of Guadalupe church, but, unlike more traditional cultic sites, the St. Jude devotion also entered the modern communications revolution. The devotion spread by word of mouth, through the League of St. Jude and, from 1935–1963, through a pious magazine, *The Voice of St. Jude*, which chronicled petitions and responses to prayer to the saint. When a more mainstream religious publication, *U.S. Catholic*, replaced the *Voice of St. Jude* in 1963, *St. Jude's Journal* took up the chronicle of favors. Membership in the League mounted into the hundreds of thousands, spurred by the Depression, World War II, and the Cold War. The devotion was headed by a succession of Claretian priests, and a fictional "Father Robert" answered heavy mail, but in fact the national office was staffed by women who responded to an overwhelmingly female constituency's problems and questions.

The object of most petitions were men. Petitioners prayed for the health of the seriously ill, for protection of absent soldiers, for relief from neglectful, alcoholic, or abusive spouses, and, especially in the depths of the Depression, for the unemployed. The *Voice* was but one among many Catholic devotional magazines. In 1959, there were 585 of them with twenty-five million subscribers, each responding with its own brand of popular piety to the needs of Catholics confronting problems common to all Americans in difficult times, "Americans generally seem to have been gripped by an urgent desire to communicate their anxieties and frustrations directly to some single powerful figure who would attend to them personally, acknowledge the depth of their fear, and offer them some hope that they could not attain by themselves" (p. 20). For thousands of Catholics, particularly women, that powerful figure was St. Jude, patron of hopeless causes. The cult was not only vertical, directed to St, Jude. It had a cooperative horizontal element as well. Devotees shared their wants and hopes with one another and eagerly recruited new clients. Devotional aids multiplied and were shared: holy cards, medals, statues and, in wartime, steel-encased pocket Bibles to be carried in a breast pocket.

In addition to studying and using a wide range of Catholic religious and devotional literature, Orsi analyzed the correspondence files of *The Voice of St. Jude* and *St. Jude's Journal*, sent questionnaires to a select list of those whose letters appeared in their pages, conducted interviews with staff members and devotees, and set up an 800 number to invite further responses. He acknowledges the possibility that this devotional genre allows practitioners to avoid confrontation with the realities of physical and mental pain without resolving fundamental problems but balances his hesitations with instances of the fierce, self-confident independence of many of the letter-writers, who have found in prayer for St, Jude's intercession a sense of genuine hope. The intensely subjective nature of his material means that Orsi must step carefully and judiciously. He does so quite successfully.

JAMES HENNESEY
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PAMELA TYLER. *Silk Stockings and Ballot Boxes: Women and Politics in New Orleans, 1920–1963*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1996. Pp. 323. $40.00.

Pamela Tyler's colorful study of the lengthy struggle waged by New Orleans's upper and middle-class women against the "chronic political rascality" (p. 10) of city bosses and the Long machine offers a richly nuanced analysis of the transition from indirect to direct political participation by the post-suffrage generation. Linked by their early connections at Sophie Newcomb College, their membership in the Social Register, and their well-connected husbands, these Crescent City women were prefeminist, elite southern reformers working for traditional women's issues: clean government, morality in the home, care of children and women, education, and citizenship. Not one of them, Tyler asserts, "overtly embraced the concept of 'women's rights' or knowingly participated in a women's movement" (p. 4).

In the 1920s, political activity and even voter registration lagged until the elite women were galvanized by the emergence of the person and policies of Huey Long. Describing the Kingfish as "Willy Loman turned loose in an Edith Wharton novel" (p. 45), Tyler powerfully details the women's moral outrage and social revulsion, concluding that they "hewed to anti-Long principles with a Manichaean vengeance" (p. 239). In each chapter, Tyler deals with organization and leaders in the Long/anti-Long divisions. The first organized challenge mounted by the Women's Committee of Louisiana was led by Hilda Phelps Hammond, a former debutante and carnival queen, whose husband was ruined by Long. Hammond organized a persistent barrage of letters to the United States Senate and lobbied in Washington and Baton Rouge (supported by funds raised in sacrifice weeks, when the well-to-do women sold heirlooms, paisley shawls, laces, china, and rare books for the cause).

Crediting Hammond with creating an independent women's movement, Tyler then traces women's polit-

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ical activity in two directions: the issue-oriented, good government efforts of the Women's Citizen's Union (WCU), a coalition of twenty-two organizations, and the nonpartisan New Orleans League of Women Voters (which emerged out of the WCU), both led by socially prominent Martha Robinson; and the partisan political activities of the Independent Women's Organization (IWP), led by equally socially prominent July Waters. In the 1946 mayoral elections, the IWO, aided by Hale Boggs and Lindy Boggs, Mary Morrison, and other young professionals, elected the handsome war veteran, deLessups Morrison. Pledged to a clean sweep with Morrison, they led a March of Brooms, canvassed, poll watched in the rain (with one poll watcher receiving a roundhouse blow to the eye from a Long supporter), and won an eighty percent voter turnout, a reputation as a vote-getting organization, and access to the "good boss" Morrison.

The complexities of this success are demonstrated in veteran Martha Robinson's campaign for a seat on the City Council. Spurning a place, reluctantly offered by Morrison, on the sample ballot of the Crescent City Democratic Association, "No Deal" Robinson could not lift the campaign from personal issues of class, age, and gender (she was perceived as too cocky). Robinson was seen "on TV as an old, fat, growling, fog-horned fat frog woman instead of the vibrant young women depicted in her years-ago-photos" (p. 183). With IWO women divided in their support, Robinson lost. Her focus on good government, Tyler concluded, led to her neglect of good politics and her defeat.

Tyler's final elite leader, Rose Freeman Keller, did not found an organization like Hammond or Robinson. Serving on the boards of the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), the Urban League, and the segregated Flint-Goodridge Hospital and Dillard University, Keller quietly worked for racial tolerance and access. Using her social position, she became the conservative middle-class blacks' mole in the white establishment, a persistent, courageous agent for change.

Throughout this finely researched study, Tyler demonstrates the social status and tight connections of the inner circle of New Orleans women. She mixes oral history, biography, organizational history, and the "whole bizarre gumbo" (p. 8) of New Orleans. In the process, she adds significantly to our understanding of Anne Firor Scott's southern women, of Arlene Kaplan Daniel's civic leaders and volunteers, and of Karen Blair's clubwomen. This is an example of the best of the new political history.

DOROTHY M. BROWN
Georgetown University

LIVA BAKER. *The Second Battle of New Orleans: The Hundred-Year Struggle to Integrate the Schools*. New York: HarperCollins. 1996. Pp. xii, 564. $32.00.

During the first battle of New Orleans, in 1862, Union forces occupied the city. Liva Baker documents a struggle that took a century to unfold. That second battle of New Orleans was over school integration, and to this day the outcome remains a source of deep controversy. Baker's story is a good one, full of heroes and villains, victories and reversals, like any major battle in a major war.

Baker's book is chronologically arranged into twenty-two chapters. Chapter one sets the stage, with background information on New Orleans and a few of the principal actors: Leander Perez, political boss of Plaquemines parish, corrupt even by Louisiana political standards, and white supremacist to the bitter end; J. Skelly Wright, the self-professed "southern boy" and federal judge who overcame his social origins; and Alexander Pierre ("A.P.") Therreaud, the African-American Louisiana lawyer who steadfastly made civil rights the heart of his career and who successfully argued the case against the New Orleans school board in front of Judge Wright. Chapters two through six narrate the struggle through World War II. Chapter two contains a well-written, albeit standard, account of *Plessy v. Ferguson*. Chapter three documents the early life of Therreaud against the backdrop of Jim Crow laws and the Great Migration of blacks to northern cities, and chapter five does much the same for Skelly Wright. Chapters seven through ten continue the tale through *Brown v. Board of Education*, with a detailed discussion of the origins of *Bush v. New Orleans* and capsule accounts of other relevant court decisions. In her treatment of *Brown*, Baker takes a conventional view, accepting the moral basis for the Supreme Court's decision ("separate-but-equal is inherently unequal") and arguing, with the benefit of hindsight, that desegregating "with all deliberate speed" was arguably a mistake.

The remaining chapters describe the remarkable legal ploys white Louisianans adopted to delay the implementation of *Brown* in New Orleans until the moment of truth: "D(esegregation) Day," November 14, 1961. The New Orleans school board interpreted "all deliberate speed" to mean that they needed to do nothing except to study repeated requests to implement *Brown*. Fed up their with noncompliance, Wright finally ordered the schools desegregated in September 1961 but permitted one final delay. In the subsequent months, the state legislature attempted to take over the New Orleans schools by edict and the state superintendent arbitrarily declared November 14 a holiday, but nothing got by Wright or his superiors on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. When D-Day finally came, it brought the worst out in white New Orleans, and Baker is at her best describing the terror felt by blacks who endured racial taunts and much worse. After a year of turmoil, tempers died down, and the schools opened in 1962 on schedule and largely without incident. The book concludes with a brief afterword that recounts the subsequent personal histories of Wright, Therreaud, and others involved in the battle.

This book has some important flaws. Baker is not

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particularly up to date on relevant historical scholarship. For example, her discussion of Reconstruction politics would have benefited from familiarity with J. Morgan Kousser's *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One Party South, 1880–1910* (1974), which is not cited. Like many other works on school desegregation, Baker's is a top-down story. We learn much about the elites of the movement but not much about how ordinary New Orleans residents felt. In a book nearly five hundred pages long, I would have expected more than a chapter on post-1961 events.

Despite these criticisms, Baker's book is a fine account of a seminal event in modern American history. Although it is not as wide ranging as Richard Kluger's *Simple Justice: The History of* Brown v. Board of Education *and Black America's Struggle for Equality* (1976) or as analytically compelling as Marc Tushnet's *The NACCP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925–1950* (1987), Baker's book is suffused with deep emotion and moral purpose, and it deserves a wide readership.

ROBERT A. MARGO
Vanderbilt University

NELSON LICHTENSTEIN. *The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor.* New York: BasicBooks. 1995. Pp. xiii, 575. $35.00.

The New Deal recovery program created unprecedented opportunities for organized labor and for young radicals such as Walter Reuther who sought to use the workers' militancy for their own and the workers' benefit. Reuther's legendary rise and long tenure as president of the United Auto Workers (UAW), though well known, have never been the subject of a full-scale scholarly biography. The present volume fills that gap. Though Nelson Lichtenstein is most interested in Reuther's political activities, his book will be a benchmark for all subsequent studies of Reuther's career.

Reuther (1907–1970) exemplified the opportunities of his era. A tool and die maker by trade, he sought his fortune in Detroit in the late 1920s. Working at Ford, he moved up rapidly and began to take college courses in preparation for a managerial career. The Depression devastated his prospects and awakened an interest in politics. By 1932, he had become a leading figure in Detroit's radical subculture. In 1933, he and his brother Victor went to the Soviet Union to help set up a new auto plant. Returning in 1935, at the height of the decade's labor upheavals, Reuther became a full-time organizer and union official. He created a large local in Detroit, used it as a stepping stone to leadership of all the General Motors (GM) locals, and built up the union at GM, a remarkable achievement at the time. By 1940, he was the best-known UAW official. Like other union leaders, he faced great challenges during and after World War II. He survived the intense infighting that distinguished the UAW and finally won the union presidency in 1946. Quickly consolidating his position, he achieved stunning gains at the bargaining table and became nationally prominent. If not exactly a rags-to-riches story, Reuther's rise was surely a demonstration of the utility of talent and ambition.

Was it also a story of political opportunism? Lichtenstein devotes much attention to Reuther's shifting political ties in and out of the union. A leftist whose closest friends and wife were socialist activists, Reuther avoided labels and dogma. One colleague described him as "a trade union politician with socialist sympathies" (p. 123). After 1940 he identified closely with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and for a quarter century was a leading advocate of economic planning, welfare state programs, and civil rights; Scandinavian social democracy was his model. In short, Reuther's opportunism was largely a matter of tactics and political survival. The real issue was not his compromises but his effectiveness. Despite his reputation and resources, Reuther never was more than a peripheral influence in Democratic policy making. After years of limited success, he thought his work was about to bear fruit in Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society, only to be thwarted again by the Vietnam debacle. If anything, Reuther's long, frustrating political career suggested that labor unions were not adequate or even appropriate bases for political careers or political crusades.

Lichtenstein's preoccupation with Reuther's political attachments is both a strength and a weakness of the book. In the chapters on the 1940s and 1950s, he succumbs repeatedly to the temptation to editorialize on Reuther's apostasy from the true faith. He also neglects issues he might have addressed, such as Reuther's unwillingness to seek larger arenas for his talents, his apparent refusal to consider elective office, and his neglect of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) after becoming president in 1953. Nor does Lichtenstein consider the downside of Reuther's collective bargaining triumphs: the gradual transformation of bargaining relationships based on mutual self-interest into complex, legalistic agreements that poorly served both sides. Still, Reuther the agitator, politician, and executive stands out clearly. Perhaps he was not the "most dangerous man in Detroit" (George Romney, who coined this phrase, presumably forgot about Reuther's neighbor and rival, James R. Hoffa of the Teamsters), but he was the most notable labor leader and one of the most talented individuals of his age.

Lichtenstein adds new perspective to the wealth of Reuther material, particularly the story of Reuther's early years and later career. His book is a welcome addition to the study of labor activism during the middle third of the twentieth century.

DANIEL NELSON
University of Akron

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FRANCIS MACDONNELL. *Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 244. $35.00.

The term "fifth column" is said to have had its origins in the Spanish Civil War: as four columns of fascist troops advanced on the legitimate government in Madrid in September 1936, a fifth was supposed to undermine the city from within. Francis MacDonnell sets out to explore the workings of the fifth-column idea in American society, beginning his tale with the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, well before the fascist uprising in Spain. In calling for a declaration of war against Germany, Wilson emphasized the problems of German espionage, sabotage, and propaganda within the United States. His outrage was widely shared and made the American people receptive, according to MacDonnell, to similar concerns in the period from 1938 through World War II. Fifth-column worries extended to embrace the threats posed by agents of Italy, the Soviet Union, and Japan, but, above all, they focused on Germany.

The exposure of the Nazi spy ring in America in 1938 was the immediate stimulus to a new wave of anxiety that swept the nation as war clouds gathered in Europe. By this time, the term "fifth column" had entered the U.S. vocabulary. Leon G. Turrou, a former agent who had helped to expose the spy ring and arrest its leaders, left the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to publicize his deeds and the fifth-column threat in a series of public lectures as well as through the media. He broke the trail for others only too glad to follow in his footsteps, notably J. Edgar Hoover and William J. Donovan, who used the fifth-column specter to boost the agencies they respectively headed, the FBI and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The British, especially after the outbreak of war in 1939, encouraged American fears of Nazi infiltration and manipulation.

As MacDonnell points out, those who talked up the fifth-column threat usually had an agenda that encouraged them to do so. It was this agenda that drove them on, for the threat itself amounted to very little in either world war: German secret agents had their moments but, by and large, did not represent a serious challenge to the national security of the United States. The fifth-column scare throve not because it was based on reality but because it sold movie tickets, comic books, and pulp fiction. It played into the hands of ambitious members of the House Un-American Activities Committee and conferred a veneer of legitimacy on the schemes of those who wished to expand the American intelligence community. Finally, and by no means least, President Franklin D. Roosevelt used the fifth-column scare to drum up support for preparedness. He had argued along similar lines as assistant secretary of the navy in the years preceding World War I. As a second world war approached, he used the fifth-column myth to tar his political opponents, the isolationists, with the brush of treason, thus weakening opposition to the idea of another American declaration of war.

MacDonnell handles the last issue and indeed the rest of his still-sensitive subject matter with maturity and impartiality. Although his book gives only limited coverage to the FBI's important battle against fascism in Latin America, it is on the whole a thorough exposition of an important yet hitherto neglected topic. It is well written and researched and represents a distinguished addition to the literature on contemporary American history.

RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES
University of Edinburgh

THOMAS F. TROY. *Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 259.

Objecting to a version of the origins of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that has "held sway" (p. 3), Thomas F. Troy sets out to put the record straight in this study of certain aspects of the history of World War II. A former CIA officer, Troy objects to accounts stating that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the World War II precursor of that Cold War agency, emerged from suggestions to President Franklin D. Roosevelt by William J. Donovan, whom Roosevelt had sent on fact-finding missions to England and the Mediterranean in 1940–1941. An alternate version that Troy also sees as flawed gives the credit to Sir William Stephenson, Winston S. Churchill's "Quiet Canadian," whose activities in the United States before Pearl Harbor have been popularized under the rubric of his wartime code name, "Intrepid."

Years ago, when Troy still worked for the CIA, he wrote a secret report to disentangle these strands. Completed in 1970, that report was published as a special issue of the CIA's secret journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, in 1974. After retiring, Troy published *Donovan and the CIA* (1981), which covered this and other ground in considerable depth. In 1987, according to Troy, the CIA report he had authored was released to the public, although it had been declassified in 1976 (the distinction is not clear, because the term "release" was often used during Jimmy Carter's administration to denote declassification of a document; perhaps Troy refers to a later news conference at which public-information officers actually handed out copies of the document). In any case, it concludes briefly that Stephenson indeed played a substantial role in the creation of the unit known as the Coordinator of Information (COI), which became the OSS, which after the war became the CIA.

This saga is worth recounting because the age of Troy's work shows. This book suffers from an overly long gestation. Troy's report from 1970 constitutes the bulk of the book, reprinted with just minor emendations to take account of details such as the deaths of important figures. Although, in 1970, some importance may have attached to the details of the creation of the

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COI, in 1997 this seems little more than a footnote to history. Other scholars have also supplemented the historical record. There have long since been accounts more accurate than the parodies Troy cites in his introduction, and it is not clear that older versions of the creation myth really do any longer hold sway. For example, Clayton D. Laurie's *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade against Nazi Germany* (1996), which is likely to become the standard history of the COI and another successor, the Office of War Information, duplicates much of Troy's material while exploring other antecedants in greater depth. John J. McCloy, who appears as significant in Laurie's work as William Donovan's patron Frank Knox, receives exactly one mention in the Troy report.

In some respects the most interesting part of this book is its last third, in which Troy has appended chapters on a number of related subjects. Among the subjects discussed are whether the British succeeded in penetrating the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whether Bill Donovan had been a British spy during World War I, how close Stephenson really was to Churchill, and whether deception occurred with respect to the postwar official history and records of the COI, among other subjects. In these commentaries, Troy seeks to settle accounts with a number of other historians. Some may find these sallies amusing, others will be put off. From the standpoint of historiography, the most useful aspect of this book is that Troy, beginning with his CIA years, watched the successive books on the subject emerge, and he here talks about their relationships to Stephenson and the British records. Unfortunately, its lack of relevance to present-day issues and narrow scope mean that this book will be of interest only to specialists.

JOHN PRADOS
Washington, D.C.

HARVEY KLEHR and RONALD RADOSH. *The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 266. $29.95.

Early in 1945, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) analyst was astounded to see his own top-secret report about wartime Thailand printed almost verbatim in *Amerasia*, a small, left-wing journal of Asian affairs. Breaking into the magazine's office, OSS operatives found a huge cache of similar government documents; taking charge, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) tapped, bugged, and tailed *Amerasia*'s publisher, Philip Jaffe, and his circle of contacts. In June, six people were arrested, including Jaffe and John Stewart Service, a State Department China Hand whose reporting had so angered U.S. Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley that he was sent home from Chungking.

A seemingly air-tight case of stolen secrets ended with puny prosecutorial results. Jaffe and another man pleaded to minor infractions, and the other suspects escaped indictment. Conservative promoters of the politics of anticommunism cried foul. In 1946, the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives was forced into a grudging inquiry, which critics promptly labeled a "whitewash." *Amerasia* remained a political abrasion. In 1950, the panel led by Senator Millard Tydings that examined Senator Joseph McCarthy's initial charges conducted another tepid investigation of the case.

Right-wing critics suspected a "fix," that the prosecution had taken a dive. Liberals dismissed the episode as redbaiting or just overzealous journalism, as a Washington "leak" atypical only in that the leakers got caught and, in Service's case, suffered for being on the losing side of an internecine State Department policy rumble. (The book makes clear that the case stayed salient partly because of leaks triggered by J. Edgar Hoover's pique at Truman administration insinuations that FBI failures had unstrung the prosecution.)

Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh prove that the Right got it mostly right: the lackluster prosecution did result from a fix. The key player was Thomas G. "Tommy the Cork" Corcoran, the ebullient ex-New Dealer, now Washington insider, who had business ties to the Chinese Nationalist government. He got involved at the bidding of Lauchlin Currie, a presidential aide (and subsequent target of anticommunist accusers). His manipulations aided—or appeared to aid—the State Department, which did not want Service or its own dirty linen subjected to a trial; Attorney General-designate Tom C. Clark, then seeking confirmation; and the Chinese Nationalists, who stood to suffer if the *Amerasia* documents reflecting on that regime's performance and stability were exposed in court.

As reconstructed by Klehr and Radosh, the affair reflects badly on everyone: arrestees, prosecutors, fixers, and the Truman administration itself. The authors find not just over-enthusiastic newsmaking but efforts to spy on behalf of the Soviets. The latter seem to have been the ego-driven Jaffe's ambition, in pursuit of which he contacted Communist Party chief Earl Browder and Joseph Bernstein. (The treatment of Bernstein, whom the authors suspect of ties to Soviet intelligence, is the book's least conclusive part.) Even Service, though not privy to Jaffe's deeper game, was not the political *naïf* his defenders termed him. Klehr and Radosh illuminate the infighting over China policy, the slovenly security that allowed sensitive documents to take wing, the squalid tone of *fin-de-guerre* Washington, D.C., the coverup, and the case's long-term reverberations.

Klehr's and Radosh's able explorations are based on enterprising research in records of FBI surveillance of not only the *Amerasia* principals but of Corcoran, whose phone had been tapped because President Harry S. Truman suspected him of hostile political intrigues. They have mined other sources and interviewed numerous participants. I wish they had also used the personal papers of members of the Tydings

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committee—and gotten General Albert C. Wedemeyer's name correct. Cavils aside, they have reconstructed a remarkable, if amateurish, effort at espionage taking place in an atmosphere redolent of a Gene Hackman detective film.

RICHARD M. FRIED
University of Illinois, Chicago

ROBERT P. NEWMAN. *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult.* (Rhetoric and Public Affairs Series.) East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 1995. Pp. xv, 272. $34.95.

A wag once defined a cult as a religion more bizarre than your own. The "Hiroshima cult" in Robert P. Newman's title refers to those "revisionist" writers who argue that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were militarily unnecessary and were motivated by anti-Soviet atomic diplomacy, and/or racism, and/or political or careerist opportunism, and/or bureaucratic momentum. According to Newman, these "cultists" are supported in Japan by a powerful Marxist constituency that seeks to promote a "Japan-as-victim cult" (p. xi). One might add that conservative Japanese nationalists also embrace a victimization rhetoric. Newman's cult, in fact, encompasses a heterogeneous collection of critics of the atomic bombings, not all of whom agree on many key points. In lumping them together, Newman obscures rather than clarifies important differences. Apparently, if you are not a true believer in the orthodox gospel of the necessity and morality of President Harry S. Truman's atomic bomb decision, you are a member of the Hiroshima cult. It should be noted that I am included among these heretics.

Newman's frequent recourse to caricature and *ad hominem* arguments diminishes rather than strengthens his case. In his admittedly judgmental and impassioned attack on these critics, Newman marshals his evidence to answer a series of questions, such as "Why did Truman drop the bomb?" Answer: to save lives that would have been lost in an invasion. In rebutting the idea that Japan was about to surrender months before the planned invasion, Newman criticizes the overreliance by some critics on the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) conclusions, first published in June 1946, that Japan would have surrendered before the invasion even without the atomic bombings. Such an assertion, says Newman, is "a counterfactual proposition of breathtaking scope" (p. 36). Of course, his argument that, absent the bomb, only an invasion would have produced Japan's surrender is also counterfactual. But Newman is correct in noting that the USSBS's principal author, Paul Nitze's, *ex post facto* opinion was special pleading by an advocate of conventional strategic bombing and was based on a less than exhaustive analysis of all the evidence. Even some cultists would agree that the USSBS is a biased second guessing of Truman's atomic bomb decision. Its importance lies mainly in that its publication spurred Truman, his former Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and other faithful defenders of the bomb decision to formulate the official orthodox version of history. As Truman was fond of observing when confronted with such apostasy: "Any schoolboy's hindsight is worth more than all the generals' foresight."

Newman's own bias is revealed in his treatment of the primary source evidence, such as Truman's Potsdam diary and private correspondence, written not in hindsight but at the time he gave final approval for the bombings. Newman asserts that there is "no warrant" for believing that Truman thought the Japanese were on the verge of surrender (p.20). Words in Truman's own hand warrant such a conclusion. Rightly or wrongly, Truman had concluded in July 1945 that "the Japs" were about to "fold up." In Truman's opinion, this collapse would be brought about either when Russia, then Japan's last hope for a negotiated peace, declared war in mid-August ("Fini Japs when that comes about," diary, July 17) or "when Manhattan [the atomic bomb] appears over their homeland" (diary, July 18). Clearly, the latter scenario was Truman's preference. Newman dismisses such direct unambiguous documentary evidence as "not a considered judgment" on Truman's part (p. 14) and any reliance on it as "imaginative" and "not a legitimate interpretation" (pp. 19–20). We are instead to take on faith what Truman said and wrote after the fact: that no such thoughts ever entered his mind in connection with the bombings. They not only entered his mind, but he committed these thoughts to paper. Apparently some evidence after the fact, if it comes from Truman, is more legitimate than other evidence written by Truman at the time.

Therein lies the problem with this and many other such briefs on behalf of one side or the other in the seemingly never-ending debate over the atomic bombings. Both sides must necessarily rely to some extent on counterfactual or ahistorical arguments to "prove" their case. The controversy surrounding the decision to use atomic bombs on Japanese cities in August 1945, stirred by the media's and publishers' exploitation the fiftieth anniversary of the event and the fiasco of the Smithsonian Institute's Enola Gay exhibit, will probably continue into the next century. Presumably by the one-hundredth anniversary in 2045, passions will have cooled and the personal and political agendas of the debaters will, literally, have died out. Still, the fundamental issues will remain unresolvable by current historical methodology. Perhaps some virtual reality computer reenactment will someday claim to settle the issue, but I suspect that a future historian will be there to say "garbage in, garbage out."

ROBERT L. MESSER
University of Illinois, Chicago

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MICHAEL S. SHERRY. *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 595. $35.00.

Americans, according to Michael S. Sherry, have lived "in the shadow of war" since the late 1930s. Militarization transformed American life while, ironically, national myths continued to reinforce a self-image of a people devoted to peace. Analyzing the incremental militarization of the past half century, Sherry argues against those who suggest that the military-industrial complex grew primarily in response to Soviet threats or that the pursuit of militarized containment finally cracked the Soviet system and successfully ended the Cold War.

According to Sherry, militarism had deep roots in New Deal rhetoric, in World War II, and in the dynamics of postwar domestic trends, especially Americans' fascination with technology, alliances between defense contractors and local boosters, and a growing obsession with all kinds of threats to the new concept of "national security." Moreover, he argues, Americans "repeatedly looked to war or its surrogate to overcome their own distrust of government action" (p. 503). The Soviet Union became the "galvanizing focus," but "the Cold War alone did not *cause*" militarization (pp. 124–25).

The end of the Cold War came only as an inadvertent consequence of President Ronald Reagan's arms buildup, a remilitarization so extreme and so poorly focused that it exposed the hollowness of endless military competition and eroded the foundations of the Cold War order in both superpowers. Militarization had helped promote technological innovation and prosperity in the United States during the early days of the Cold War, but, by the 1980s it was contributing to "imperial overstretch" abroad and to economic stagnation and a variety of cultural wars at home.

In tracing the course of the militarization of American life, Sherry advances provocative judgments. He implies that the Korean War, which helped to complete and reorient a broad plan for the country's militarization, was an excessive response in terms of foreign policy objectives. He paints a rather sympathetic, though certainly not uncritical, portrait of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his failed but sincere efforts to restrain militarism. He sees Lyndon B. Johnson's and Richard M. Nixon's administrations as the triumph of a war mentality, the rhetoric and domestic policies of both presidents being suffused with war metaphors. Although the Nixon years ended with a general popular distrust of participation in future wars, there was no dismantling of military structures, and politics seemed to require even greater rhetorical "toughness," as President Jimmy Carter discovered. A reconstructed "patriot culture" during the 1980s fed militarization as a domestic *posture*, although this culture rarely related to a clearly mapped *policy* of foreign policy objectives.

Within this political chronology, Sherry interweaves successive sections on economic, social, and cultural changes and does not neglect dissenters or counterhegemonic movements. He is particularly adept at integrating mass culture and gender analyses into the narrative. Drawing a complex picture of socio-economic change, Sherry espouses no single theory of causation; there is no "power elite," nor economic determinism, nor other hidden manipulators.

The book's final chapter contains a fascinating discussion of the persistence of the war metaphor in American life. By the mid-1990s, Sherry writes, "warlike states of mind that many Americans indulged about one another" presented a more "intractable legacy" than armies or defense budgets (p. 497). Consideration of this cultural legacy fits one of the major themes of the book: that militarization all along stemmed from domestic even more than international circumstances. Although the final chapter's title—"A Farewell to Militarization?"—conveys Sherry's hopes for the post–Cold War era, its punctuation underscores his doubts.

Sherry is a critic of the militarized culture in which he has lived his life, and his book adroitly synthesizes much of the scholarship that has constructed the postwar antimilitarist tradition. Even readers who disagree with some of his interpretations will find his critique sophisticated and well researched. As in his previous books, he displays an eye for fine detail and an engaging style. Encompassing an amazing sweep of social, economic, and cultural, as well as military, trends, Sherry presents a comprehensive survey of the period that is both provocative and readable.

EMILY S. ROSENBERG
Macalester College

DAVID A. HOLLINGER. *Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth-Century American Intellectual History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 178. $24.95.

There once was a time in academe when the word "scientific" had positive connotations and respected scholars could talk about their faith in the value of knowledge without being laughed at. The carriers of that faith, the subjects of David A. Hollinger's exploration of American intellectual life from the 1930s to the 1960s, participated in and were shaped by a universalizing discourse that made the celebration of scientific inquiry central to the nation's academic culture. Many of these people were Jews; and, for Hollinger, the connection between the ethnicity of this particular cohort of intellectuals and the infusion of secular, cosmopolitan, and universalistic values into the academic mainstream was no accident.

In alliance with a sympathetic strain of free-thinkers within the WASP establishment, these Jewish intellectuals nurtured a set of ideas that not only facilitated their own assimilation into the culture of academe but also transformed that culture by rendering it more secular and thus more hospitable to them personally as

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well as more open to the scientific spirit of inquiry that they espoused. The process took thirty years, and it was not until just before World War II that the academy—or at least its most prestigious institutions—abandoned the "generic Protestantism" (p. 20) of the genteel (and gentile) tradition that had characterized it for so long. Even as late as 1932, a school like New York University was still struggling to fend off the physical presence of Jews and the secularizing influence they represented.

Hollinger goes beyond the essentially institutional analysis of scholars like Stephen Steinberg, Marcia Graham Synott, and Dan A. Oren to explore the cultural ramifications of the academy's assimilation of Jews. There was, he notes, nothing identifiably ethnic about the ideas of this particular cohort of Jewish intellectuals, but rather a universalistic, cosmopolitan, essentially liberal set of beliefs that by 1940 had become the "common possession of the American intelligentsia" (p. 51). Science, or rather the open-mindedness and intellectual integrity that supposedly characterized the practice of science, undergirded the ideology these people embraced.

Not only did the sanctification of science open space for the Jewish intellectuals' entry into the academic mainstream, but it also gave that mainstream a credo that commanded enormous prestige. Codified by the early 1940s (most notably at the hands of Columbia University sociologist, Robert K. Merton), the scientific ethos could, and did, supplant religion as the primary source of validation for the academic community. So pervasive was the notion that scientists comprised "a peculiarly virtuous community" (p. 111) that their intellectual practices came to be viewed as the embodiment of the nation's most cherished political and cultural values.

Although such an identification seems, in the light of today's post-Kuhnian sophistication about the social construction of knowledge, naive or worse, Hollinger makes a convincing case that the mid-century intellectuals' celebration of science was actually a political rather than a cognitive project. By stressing the interdependence between the universalism and meritocratic practices that characterized the scientific community and the democratic social structure that supposedly allowed that community to flourish, this cohort of intellectuals, Hollinger claims, not only developed an "effective . . . vindication of democracy" (p. 83) against the challenge of fascism (and later communism) but also provided a moral underpinning for the newly secularized academic world.

Although sympathetic to many of the liberal values these academics espoused, Hollinger nonetheless recognizes how readily the invocation of "free inquiry" was transformed into what he calls a "laissez-faire communitarianism" that, under the aegis of elitists like the World War II research tsar Vannevar Bush, sought to prevent outside scrutiny of scientists and their work. Such autonomy should ideally preserve academic freedom, but, as Hollinger's case study of the University of Michigan's response to McCarthyism shows, the academic community redefined its notion of scientific integrity to favor institutional solidarity over a commitment to the unfettered mind.

Perhaps because most of this book originated as conference papers and public lectures, it contains considerable speculation about the contemporary fate of the mid-century liberals' secular beliefs. Hollinger is clearly searching for some multicultural middle way that will preserve the openness of the earlier scientific discourse without abandoning the more nuanced approach of contemporary postmodernists. In addition, as he notes in an intriguing but undeveloped observation, the cultural transformation that he analyzed was never completed. Compared to other Western nations, the United States experienced a "relative failure of secularization" (p. 17), as the current resurgence of religious fundamentalism makes all too apparent.

Unfortunately, provocative as many of Hollinger's insights are, this volume suffers from the defects of its form. Because it is a collection of previously published occasional pieces, the book is full of repetition, while its thesis remains tantalizingly underdeveloped. Gaps that a more unified treatment might have filled are all too evident, as, for example, in the failure to deal more explicitly with the protean influence of John Dewey. Reviewers err in asking for books that authors did not write. Still, I wish Hollinger had transformed this ephemeral collection into the fully fleshed-out treatment of the American intelligentsia at mid-century that he could have easily written.

ELLEN SCHRECKER
Yeshiva University

HUGH WILFORD. *The New York Intellectuals: From Vanguard to Institution*. New York: Manchester University Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 260. $39.95.

Writing about the New York intellectuals has become something of a cottage industry. After the appearance of several nearly simultaneously published works a decade ago (including my own *Prodigal Sons: New York Intellectuals and Their World* [1986]), there has been a steady production of monographs about this coterie. Every year or so, another is published. How much is there to say about this group and, more significantly, are they that important?

Hugh Wilford thinks that his contribution revises what he believes to be the "standard leftist view" (p. vii) of these intellectuals. Although previous analysts have differed among themselves, Wilford argues that they all see the move of the New York intellectuals from an autonomous avant garde to institutionalized positions in mainstream culture as a *trahison des clercs*. He wishes to reverse the equation, critiquing the vanguardism of the New Yorkers as well as suggesting that they "could not withstand . . . powerful recuperative, hegemonic processes" (p. viii) despite efforts to resist.

He develops this argument through an extended

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analysis of the path of *Partisan Review* from the 1930s to the 1950s, supplemented by shorter investigations of Dwight Macdonald's *politics* and the London-based *Encounter*. Wilford believes that, as "the magazine article was the intellectuals' preferred means of written expression" (p. viii), we can best view their struggles with institutionalization through these journals. There is much to be said for this approach and much to be learned from his analysis. It is not clear, however, that he achieves the revision he intends. Part of the problem comes from trying to identify the great days of the New York intellectuals. In one sense, the late 1930s stand out, the time when *Partisan Review* helped mold the political culture of the era. In another sense, the postwar years are the period of greatest influence and recognition. Depending on the criteria, a case can be made for either.

The long analysis of *Partisan Review* covers the same territory and many of the same issues of previous works, making it less revisionist than Wilford believes it to be. There is little doubt that, after 1945, the place of intellectuals became more central in American life and that the hand-to-mouth existence of many of these intellectuals became less appealing. Moreover, the fusion of the intellectual and the academic world created institutional homes for many of them and their magazines. Explaining his acceptance of a faculty appointment, Philip Rahv wrote to Allen Tate, "The *Zeitgeist* has got me down. There's no escaping it."

Wilford spends two chapters discussing Macdonald's *politics* and the failed attempt of left intellectuals to create a non-Marxist postwar radicalism. These chapters are worthy and well-argued, but Macdonald and his journal represent an off-shoot of the New York intellectual world. More instructive would have been a chapter on the creation of *Commentary*, which grew in the postwar years to be a central journal of New York intellectuals. Unlike *Partisan Review*, which ultimately sought academic affiliation, *Commentary* began as—and remains—the creation of the American Jewish Committee. The committee desired "a Jewish *Harper's*," Norman Podhoretz recalled, but "instead they got a Jewish *Partisan Review*," but one that would be for "consumers" of ideas, where *Partisan Review* had been for "producers" (*Making It* [1967], p. 130). This shift is telling about postwar America, where a culture of consumption grew on many fronts.

It is not the institutional connections of intellectuals that proved questionable but the resulting political and intellectual products. Wilford's final chapters are on the secretly CIA-funded Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) and its journal *Encounter*. One can argue for *Encounter*'s autonomy and cite numerous places where the magazine and the CCF, as well as its U.S. affiliate, the American Congress of Cultural Freedom, criticized the U.S. government. What is problematic is the manipulation of intellectual life and the degree to which the agenda of the CIA and the worldview of independent intellectuals coincided. Wilford is correct in asserting that the New York intellectuals did not betray their radical principles. The concerns are that their ideas fit so neatly with those of the establishment and that their radicalism—even their liberalism—eroded as they moved to the center and, for some, to the right. Just because institutions became more hospitable does not automatically make one's connections with them less significant.

In the end, Wilford concludes that "the very idea of the detached, autonomous dissident" (p. 244) is problematic, and he seeks a program that takes into account intellectuals' institutional location. Ironically, many of the intellectuals who moved to the right and others who joined them have severely critiqued just such a program. The assaults on "tenured radicals" and revisionist historians suggest that it is possible to combine institutional affiliation and intellectual distance. Perhaps, then, what is instructive about the New York intellectuals in the frame Wilford sets is that they provide an example of the potential pitfalls that accompany intellectual institutionalization.

ALEXANDER BLOOM
Wheaton College

GREGORY D. SUMNER. *Dwight Macdonald and the* politics *Circle*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1996. Pp. x, 272. $32.50.

Gregory D. Sumner's valuable intellectual history of the *politics* group, despite its title, maintains more of an institutional than biographical focus. Emphasizing the character of the journal (which operated from 1944 to 1949) rather than the life of Dwight Macdonald allows Sumner to investigate the European connections of *politics*. Important European contributors to American thought such as Andrea Caffi and Nicola Chiaromonte populate Sumner's account more vitally than does Macdonald, the editor and writer who helped transfer their ideas to an American audience.

The European influence on the New York intellectuals (those like Macdonald who orbited around such journals as *Partisan Review*, *Commentary*, *Dissent*, and *politics*) has so far been explored insufficiently. Earlier histories of the New York intellectuals have noted the group's connection to figures such as Arthur Koestler and Stephen Spender in Britain, Raymond Aron and Andre Malraux in France, and some members of the Frankfurt School in Germany. Sumner's account fills out this list of cultural cousins with a portrayal of the contribution to mid-century American thought of the Italians Caffi and Chiaromonte, among others.

While the influence of many of the Europeans after the war sharpened American antitotalitarianism, Sumner shows how Caffi and Chiaromonte emphasized an outlook that departed from Old Left preoccupations and began to set the groundwork for what became the New Left. Like the Old Left, the voice of *politics* was pragmatic and anti-utopian, opposed to messianic ideologies. But even more, initiating early New Left assumptions, *politics* began to abandon Marxism and

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class analysis and shifted instead to cultural perceptions.

Instead of redesigning the economy or addressing matters of formal politics, Macdonald's journal began to promote a cultural radicalism based on personal morality and the transformation of consciousness. With his Italian friends, Macdonald emphasized a more liberated psychological climate, while contributor Paul Goodman called for greater sexual freedom—all values taken further by a younger counterculture in the following decades. As an alternative to the overwhelming power of mass society and the megastate, the *politics* circle suggested a decentralized politics among friends and small organizations, a grass-roots dissent operated out of living rooms and restaurant booths.

Yet Sumner's book, in some respects, is as narrow as the mere five years it covers. As he acknowledges, *politics* almost completely ignored the American tradition that harmonizes so well with Caffi's and Chiaromonte's anarchist recommendations, and Sumner ignores it, too. In the 1940s, influenced by the war and the gray dawn of the Cold War, Macdonald became preoccupied with Europe. Yet for most of his life, both before and after *politics*, Macdonald was fascinated by America. As the son of Phillips Exeter Academy and Yankee middle-class radicalism, his gaze remained focused on the American cultural landscape.

Had Sumner, even in a cursory manner, integrated the 1940s European Macdonald with his earlier and later outlook—had he introduced the echoes of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, or Theodore Parker—this volume would have produced an even clearer and more compelling intertwining of vital European and American visions. True, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, like the rest of the American pantheon, were absent from *politics*. Yet it was their influence that made Macdonald so susceptible to the ideas of Caffi and Chiaromonte immediately after the war. Although Macdonald kept it out of the pages of his journal, Sumner needs American air in order to explain *politics* intelligibly.

Still, Sumner's useful account describes a journal that functioned as a bridge between Old and New Left, tied together the concerns of the early and late twentieth century, and brought together ideas from both sides of the Atlantic at mid-century.

NEIL JUMONVILLE
Florida State University

JAMES TRACY. *Direct Action: Radical Pacifism from the Union Eight to the Chicago Seven*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1996. Pp. xv, 196. Cloth $34.95, paper $10.95.

This study focuses on the origins, continuity, and impact of a group of American males committed to radical pacifism and nonviolent protest. James Tracy has identified a dozen such men, but focuses mainly on David Dellinger, A. J. Muste, Bayard Rustin, and Staughton Lynd. Some of these men, such as Dellinger, began their active work in World War II as seminarians rejecting the military draft and were still busy during the antiwar demonstrations of Richard M. Nixon's presidency.

Tracy's thesis is that the radical pacifism and direct-action philosophy that informed their activities helped create a new wave of protest in the United States in the 1960s. In order to understand the youth revolt of the 1960s, one must appreciate the work of this small group. He relies mainly on published material, supplemented by oral interviews and a few manuscript collections, such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) files at the Hoover Institution and the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, especially the files for the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

This is a brief and clearly written account that offers a sympathetic view of a group of idealists who risked life and limb for their principles. In another age, they would undoubtedly have founded religious orders, led crusades, and developed cults. The basic ideas that drove them included a keen sense of social justice, hatred of war, and an almost absolute distrust of the state. Like many medieval saints, all of these men sprang from the upper social class. Their family backgrounds offered them opportunities for the best in American education and society. On the basis of Tracy's work, one must assume that poverty fails to produce pacifism.

Although we are in Tracy's debt for providing such detailed information on a group of inspiring figures in recent American history, the reader may still leave the work with a sense that the larger thesis remains unproved. As he admits at one point, "the mass movements they had a hand in founding or even leading were not movements consisting primarily of people committed to pacifism" (p. 84). The radical pacifists seem more opportunists than prime movers in later protest. They were always ready to challenge the overbearing state.

Fully half the book deals with racial conflicts, especially the work of the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE). But these conflicts and groups were only indirectly identified with pacifism. Even Martin Luther King, Jr. came to the idea late in his career. Many black leaders were dubious of the pacifist desire for personal catharsis rather than practical goals. Although it is true that Rustin promoted nonviolence in the King movement, he also urged the minister to avoid taking an anti-Vietnam stand.

What made the older radicals relevant to the later revolt was their commitment to attacks against the establishment, their rage at the increasing corruption of society, and their faithfulness to moral absolutes in the face of an overbearing state apparatus. It is true, as Tracy writes, that the older radical pacifists moved away from a class-based rebellion to one based on race and opposition to militarism and that they emphasized the decentralization of organizations. But the rebels who flowered in the 1960s drew on many other sources

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to fuel their revolt. The new social and political context seems more important than the older radicals in understanding the new protest.

GEORGE Q. FLYNN
Texas Tech University

NORA SAYRE. *Previous Convictions: A Journey through the 1950s*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1995. Pp. xi, 462. $37.95.

This "memoir of mentalities" (p. 3) offers a balance between insightful personal recollections and broader reportage about the 1950s. Nora Sayre explores "the relation between our private lives and public events" (p. 4), conducting her research on both sides of this vital boundary. Her biographical sketches, gleaned from many interviews, deepen our understanding of the culture of the 1950s. She remarks: "I found I was depicting communities that no longer exist . . . Many of those I consulted did not write their memoirs. So I'm intent on preserving a kind of history that could be lost" (p. 11).

Sayre's history confidently constructs an expansive self through discussions of sexuality in the 1950s, conflict with parents and their peers, engagement with desegregation and other issues of civil justice, and involvement with the artistic avant garde. She structures the memoir around three different generations: her parents' society of the 1920s, her own world of the 1950s, and the radical movements of the 1930s. The arrangement aligns the book with the development of Sayre's own consciousness and fights against the chronological template that often stiffens autobiographical narratives. She begins with a generation that "shared a species of exuberance in their unshadowed early years that none of their successors had known" (p. 19) and moves to consideration of her peers, who faced the unanswerable question of how to "rebel against persons who are more liberated than yourself" (p. 151). The 1930s come last because, as Sayre states succinctly, "I became acquainted with the radicals after I knew the writers of the Twenties" (p. 6).

Sayre's best commentary presents the political and cultural repression of the first postwar decade from the point of view of those facing the choice of resistance, acquiescence, or silence. She does not use the shorthand of McCarthyism, because it is plain from her epilogue that she views attacks from the cultural Right as a persistent theme in American life. The Free-Speech Movement at Berkeley and the quiescence of the *New York Times* are competently handled, but her treatment of red-hunting and the case of the Hollywood Ten is extraordinary. Looking at the persecution and ostracism of these writers and directors in 1947, Sayre is able to show both the timidity of the emerging 1950s and the radical traditions of the 1930s that persisted after the war.

Sayre's portrayal of friends and acquaintances gives her memoir its greatest warmth. Donald Ogden Stewart's ruined career gives flesh and sweat to her portrayal of the Hollywood Ten. Walker Evans, Dwight Macdonald, and James Thurber animate tableaux depicting aesthetics, radical politics, and psychological dysfunction in the 1950s. Sayre's acquaintance with the Poets Theatre in Cambridge and Beat writers introduces the subject of personal politics and the definition of maturity to a generation waiting to be the right age. The best vignette, however, is given to the polymath and autodidact Edmund Wilson. Wilson, surely one of the most formidable minds of the century, stumbles into Sayre's life early in her childhood, stashing his dog in her bedroom during a party. She discovers in him a worthy playmate whose disciplined concentration appealed to the single-minded, yet curious world of the child.

This long, engaging book also has its limitations. It focuses on an elite; the mentalities Sayre describes were shared by only "some Americans" (p. 3), those who feared the nonintellectual temperament of the masses. She considers New York—perhaps annexing Harvard Square—as ground zero for the cultural explosions of the 1950s; the centrifugal force of postwar suburbanization and the extrusion of a plasticized, middlebrow culture in the consumerist era escape her gaze. Sayre's book is nevertheless a fine example of memoir writing that offers the reader insight into the formation of the most gifted segment of what *Life* magazine called "the luckiest generation" (p. 224).

ERIC J. SANDEEN
University of Wyoming

PAUL R. GORMAN. *Left Intellectuals and Popular Culture in Twentieth-Century America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. 242. Cloth $39.95, paper $15.95.

During the past twenty years, the impact of America's mass culture has attracted the attention of academics both in the United States and abroad. Indeed, in Europe and in other parts of the world, the interest in America's culture may be even more intense, among specialists in American Studies as well as among political leaders and ordinary citizens, than it is at home. Overseas, as in America, the shops sell Nikes and Levis; the movie marquees publicize the latest Arnold Schwarzenegger epic; a Burger King is just around the corner. The overwhelming presence of these cultural and culinary artifacts increases the fear that the planet is becoming thoroughly "Americanized"—a phenomenon that threatens not only to obliterate local cultures but to make people passive receptacles mindlessly ingesting and internalizing the messages of the American media.

In the view of its critics, America's mass culture converts domestic and foreign audiences alike into a collection of zombies, docile and compliant, too drugged to discriminate between art and trash, too hypnotized to switch off the television set or stay away from the mall. The American media allegedly makes people not only acquiescent but helpless, incapable of

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eluding or moderating its influences or of having any thoughts and feelings of their own.

These notions themselves have a history. It is this history, at least as it evolved in America among intellectuals on the left, that Paul R. Gorman describes with erudition and verve. His well-written book locates the origins of the intellectuals' disdain for popular culture at the dawn of the twentieth century, among conservatives who believed that the values of the entire country were being degraded by vaudeville, circuses, and amusement parks like Coney Island. The conservatives, however, never supposed that much could be done about the preferences of the commoners. This mission was taken up instead by Progressive reformers who hoped to civilize the masses by elevating their tastes and exposing them to the more uplifting benefits of art and high culture.

Unfortunately, the masses proved resistant to improvement. Gorman traces the intellectuals' disenchantment with mass culture and mass society from the "modernist" preoccupation with aesthetic form and technique in the 1920s, the Communist efforts in the 1930s to celebrate "folk" culture as an alternative to the radio and Hollywood, to the "New York" intellectuals' scorn in the 1940s and 1950s for such middlebrow fixtures as Rodgers and Hammerstein and the Book-of-the-Month Club, all of this culminating in Dwight Macdonald's proclamation that there would always be two cultures—one for the cognoscenti and the other for the mob.

Underlying these critiques of popular culture was the assumption that its audiences were victims manipulated by the media, a point Gorman makes with considerable eloquence. But only in an all-too-brief epilogue does he discuss the more recent proposition that people are not merely containers into which the media pours its instructions and images. On the contrary, as Gorman suggests, audiences both in America and throughout the world are active participants in determining the effects of mass culture, constantly reinterpreting its messages to fit their own social or personal circumstances.

This argument deserves more space than Gorman provides. And it should be supplemented by another perception: that mass culture is more limited in its influence than its critics normally insist. People are not permanently plugged in to their computers, their television sets, their Walkmans, or their VCRs. They spend most of their time doing other things. They walk, read, converse with their spouses and neighbors, and play with their children. In all of these activities, they are influenced less by the media than by the events of their childhoods, by how their parents raised them, by the opinions of their peers, by their experiences at work, and by the environment in which they live.

Furthermore, people are selective in their reactions to mass culture. Residents of the modern world, continually exposed to the modern media, they are accustomed to its endless chatter. But they do not silently submit. They tend to be skeptical, accepting some information while distrusting most of what comes over the airwaves. They filter out political and cultural messages that sound jarring or implausible, discarding whatever has no relevance to their daily concerns. As a consequence, audiences may be more sophisticated about and more unaffected by mass culture than the media critics—either in America or elsewhere—give them credit for.

Gorman has written an important history of how and why so many American intellectuals castigated the popular culture of their countrymen and women. Had he been willing to respond at greater length to what his writers said, he would have made his own arguments even more persuasive than they already are and strengthened his otherwise excellent book.

RICHARD PELLS
University of Texas, Austin

TED V. MCALLISTER. *Revolt against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and the Search for a Postliberal Order*. (American Political Thought.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1996. Pp. xv, 323. $29.95.

Historians have only begun to explore the intellectual roots of postwar conservatism in America. Analyses that are sympathetic yet also scholarly and critical are few. For this reason alone, Ted V. McAllister's book is a welcome addition to the literature. McAllister has written an in-depth study of the antimodern critique of two European émigrés who had a profound impact on neoconservatives in the 1950s and 1960s.

After World War II, a cross section of political and cultural commentators struggled with the philosophical lineage of totalitarianism. Several concluded "that modernity encompassed Nazism, communism, and liberalism" and that the times demanded a systematic critique of modernity (p. 7). McAllister admits that Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin never really considered themselves part of the American conservative movement, but their pointed analysis of the "modern project" won a significant audience for their work among conservatives. Both had been born and educated in German-speaking Europe, and both escaped Nazism in the 1930s by emigrating to the United States. The two were accordingly driven by a concern to demonstrate that totalitarianism was the logical product of modern philosophical and political ideas.

Strauss and Voegelin agreed that the core problem was a set of modernist assumptions that ruled out of order the most fundamental philosophical questions. Nevertheless, their particular historical analyses of the emergence of modernity were distinctive. From Strauss's diverse writings, one can construct a rogues' gallery of the "modern project" that included Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Martin Heidegger. In his *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (1958), Strauss argued that the Italian theorist was a true innovator, indeed a "fallen angel" who had been steeped in the

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wisdom of the ancients but who had successfully deleted their larger moral considerations from political discourse (p. 95). Strauss's view of Nietzsche was more appreciative. He emphasized that nineteenth-century historicism led inexorably to the sort of thorough moral relativism that one encounters in Nietzsche. Nevertheless, Nietzsche saw a "way out" of this path (even if he declined to take it himself) by "recognizing the necessity of God" (pp. 140, 144).

Voegelin's exploration of the origins of the modern predicament highlighted the negative contributions of a hitherto obscure twelfth-century theologian, Joachim of Fiore, whose philosophy of history anticipated the progressive schemas of nineteenth-century grand theorists. For Joachim, "each age is progressively more spiritual than the previous . . . which culminate[s] with the third and perfect period" (p. 22). Voegelin thus saw the immanentist thrust of most philosophy since at least the Renaissance as a form of gnosticism, a term he used rather indiscriminately. For Voegelin, all modern ideologies were essentially gnostic in that they all exhibited "a belief in the power of knowledge to transform reality, [and] to create earthly perfection" (p. 21). John Calvin and the Puritans also contributed to this pervasive gnosticism in their systematizing of belief and their "doctrinalizing" of the Bible (p. 119). But Voegelin highlighted G. W. F. Hegel as probably the most important modern culprit in this regard, portraying him as a megalomaniac and a "sorcerer" (p. 128).

The prescriptions of Strauss and Voegelin to save what was still noble in the American system were also distinctive. McAllister shows that Strauss defended the political faith of the American founders, who had blended a more modern theory of natural right with a premodern commitment to Christian morality and republican virtue. Moreover, it was these "two parallel tracks"—resurrecting the quest for natural right and reconstructing "a defensible religious faith"— that underlay much of Strauss's writing on modern political philosophy (pp. 220–21). Voegelin's prescription emphasized the critical role of religious faith more than had Strauss. Voegelin's alternative political vision called for a deep appreciation of the interaction between human and divine. Without such a balanced understanding, liberal society in the United States was headed down a dangerous path, functioning as it was with "a decapitated metaphysic" (p. 175).

Together, the two émigrés contributed a historical depth to conservative analysis of the contemporary crisis. Strauss and Voegelin helped many to identify the central actors and turning points in the complex story of the "modern project." McAllister concludes with a probing critical account of the conservative political resurgence of the 1970s and 1980s, noting how this principled traditionalist element was marginalized. He correctly observes that the exclusion of traditionalists "truncated" the conservative spectrum with tragic results (p. 277). McAllister concedes that he has examined his subjects "almost in isolation from any intended audience," and I was occasionally frustrated by the author's reluctance to draw these admittedly complicated connections more explicitly. Nevertheless, McAllister handles difficult ideas well and manages to make the daunting, often obscure work of Strauss and Voegelin engaging and relevant. The result is a book that enriches substantially our understanding of the intellectual life of the 1950s as well as speaking to our own post–Cold War dilemmas.

GILLIS J. HARP
Acadia University

ROBERT CANTWELL. *When We Were Good: The Folk Revival*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 412. $24.95.

The United States has a long folk music history. Derived from its diverse immigrant and migrant cultures, music of "the people," generally unwritten and often unfamiliar beyond proscribed boundaries of region, race, or class, has formed an integral part of the text of American history. After World War II, this country experienced a two-stage resurgence of interest in folk music, even as the popular and rock music industries experienced tremendous growth. The first phase of the postwar revival focused on generic social commentary in a Cold War context that limited the expression of singers and writers who opposed prevailing political and cultural certainties in the 1950s and early 1960s. The second stage, which included folk-rock along with the strophic song and talkin' blues, featured a free-wheeling discourse of protest on topics ranging from civil rights to Vietnam in a language and style that sometimes challenged standards of propriety and civility.

Robert Cantwell presents a more unitary paradigm of the folk revival that he dates from 1958–1964. His book is a collection of essays on the post–World War II enthusiasm for folk music. Each of these essays presents a case study whose connection to the book's larger theme is sometimes muddled by a narrative that skips freely from the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) of the early twentieth century to the Composers' Collective and the Communist Party prior to World War II to the Newport Folk Festival. Cantwell is frequently distracted by his sources, allowing the ideas of Edmund Burke, Archibald MacLeish, Marshall McLuhan, Elaine Tyler May, and Raymond Williams to stand in for his own analysis.

The book begins with a discussion of the Kingston Trio and their popular version of "Tom Dooley," released in 1958. Although folk music had never completely disappeared from the labor movement or the left-wing summer camp, "Tom Dooley," along with Tennessee Ernie Ford's "Sixteen Tons" (not mentioned in this volume) and notable hits by the Weavers (who receive scant attention as a group) represented the "arrival" of folk music on the popular music scene in the 1950s. Cantwell offers Arthur Godfrey as an exemplar of "the new minstrelsy" of the 1950s, al-

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though this popular television personality had little relationship to folk music. The description of Godfrey is an example of prose that strays far from the central theme of the book. With his signature ukelele, according to Cantwell, an "emblematically amateur holiday instrument, an icon, along with the lei and a white Navy uniform, of the Pacific theater, Godfrey was almost camp, unconsciously recalling, even as he addressed the lower-middle-class migrant Californian with Iowa grandparents, the homosexual sailor on a weekend pass" (pp. 49–50). The reader is hard pressed to figure out why Godfrey makes such a significant cameo appearance in this volume.

Succeeding chapters on the historical connections among folk music, activism, and ideology cover familiar ground. Anticipating his thesis that earlier flowerings of American folk music were decidedly ideological in character while the post–World War II revival represented "a refusal of ideas" (p. 120), Cantwell recalls the role of a people's music in enshrining heroes like John Henry and in stirring working people to action on their own behalf. However, Cantwell's "pop prose" undermines his own arguments, as when he refers to the Wobblies as "the singingest of the singing labor movements" (p. 90). One cannot help wondering how T-Bone Slim or Joe Hill might have reacted to such an appellation.

Chapters on the sources from which 1950s folk musicians drew their inspiration and much of their material are excellent. Cantwell gives due credit to Moses Asch's Folkways record label and the *Folkways Anthology of American Folk Music* (1952), and the discussion of Henry Smith as collector, editor, and annotator of this important collection is a significant contribution to the literature of the folk revival. But important as the Folkways *Anthology* was and is, it is difficult to sustain the claim that its release signaled "the birth of a counterculture" in this country (p. 199).

Sections of this book on *Sing Out!* magazine and the career and music of Pete Seeger are useful, although they cover little new ground. The psychologizing of Seeger cannot take the place of a more serious discussion of his contribution to the early folk revival. Perhaps more important, by ending his analysis in the early 1960s, Cantwell misses the opportunity to discuss Seeger's role in inspiring singers whose causes have ranged beyond civil rights and Vietnam to the environment, United States intervention in Central America, and the antinuclear movement.

The book is an eclectic and personal history that is powerfully informed by the realities of the Cold War. Cantwell seems disdainful of the folk revival of the later 1960s, which he describes as having had "no political agenda, beyond being vaguely against racism and war" (p. 285), an oversimplification to be sure. There is a sense in these essays of being stuck in a time not yet troubled by multiple social movements or the heresy of Bob Dylan plugging in at Newport.

There are some odd omissions. Oscar Brand and members of the Weavers other than Pete Seeger receive less attention than Pete's father, Charles Seeger, whose career was only tangentially related to the postwar folk revival. Malvina Reynolds, Odetta, Judy Collins, and Eric Weissberg are nearly absent, and Tom Paxton, whose biting humor thumbed its nose at Cold War conformity and injustice, receives no mention at all. Minor problems of grammar and word use could have been picked up with more careful editing; David Sear is misidentified as Dave Sears (p. 268).

The folk revival, even in the truncated form presented here, is an important topic for historians of American culture and politics. Cantwell has offered his version, just as others have testified before him. There is room, as in the folk process itself, for yet another retelling.

BARBARA L. TISCHLER
Columbia University

JAMES T. PATTERSON. *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974*. (Oxford History of the United States, number 10.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. xviii, 829. $35.00.

The tumultuous decades since World War II have captivated historians in recent years. Unlike earlier eras, which have been written and rewritten over time, the postwar era is still fresh, indeed, not only in the archives but in the memories of historians writing about it. Not so long ago, the postwar era was not even considered a legitimate area of inquiry for historians—it was too recent to be written about with appropriate distance and hindsight. But that sentiment no longer prevails, and a rich literature now exists documenting the dramatic years since 1945. James T. Patterson's exhaustive and encyclopedic synthesis of the historical writing on the first three decades following World War II is a monumental achievement. Effectively bringing together much of the historical literature about the era, Patterson covers virtually every major development that marked American life during those years.

Patterson provides a compelling, often dramatic, narrative of the major events of the postwar years. The overall theme, as the title suggests, is that "grand expectations" characterized the era, expectations that were sparked and encouraged by the heady feeling of triumph following World War II, the unprecedented prosperity that reached large numbers of Americans, and the growing sense among Americans that full rights of citizenship, as well as access to jobs, education, and the good life grounded in affluence, should be available to all regardless of race, class, or gender. Patterson notes that, from the beginning, such expectations extended beyond what was realistically possible, contributing to frustrations as well as to the "rights revolution" that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Although prosperity, as well as opportunities, did expand during these years, the increasing gap between expectations and realities led to major social tensions and disillusionment by the late 1960s and early 1970s.

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The argument, while not particularly novel, provides a useful frame for managing the enormous amount of material and the complex and often contradictory developments that emerged during these years.

The book has many strengths. For one thing, it is a really good read: no small achievement in these days of impenetrable academic jargon. Long as it is, the narrative is lively and filled with historical actors whose personalities as well as actions come to life. The discussion is both historical and historiographical, providing readers with various interpretations of complex situations. Patterson generally gives credit to both sides of an issue. Taking events that remain highly controversial, such as the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he takes a middle ground between those who claim that the bombs were necessary to end the war and those who argue the bombs should not have been used at all. While questioning the wisdom of dropping the second bomb on Nagasaki—President Harry S. Truman "could have waited longer"—he writes that "[s]everal conclusions seem fair concerning these heated debates" (p. 110). President John F. Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis is treated with similar balance. Patterson notes the incendiary rhetoric as well as the military restraint Kennedy displayed in averting a major catastrophe. On the still hotly contested questions surrounding the escalation of the Vietnam War, Patterson shows how leaders such as Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, while certainly expanding the conflict with unnecessary bravado and machismo, also acted with restraint in certain circumstances.

Such balance and moderation also reflect a limitation. Overall, there are few major new interpretations in this synthesis, the tenth volume in the *Oxford History of the United States*. Focusing primarily on political events, Patterson documents the major developments in domestic and foreign policy from Truman to Richard M. Nixon. The book opens with a chapter on "Veterans, Ethnics, Blacks, Women" that examines the issues of race, class, and gender that festered throughout the era and sets the social context on which the stage of action is constructed. The narrative is interspersed with similar background chapters that cover major trends and developments from the baby boom to the sexual revolution, the therapeutic culture and the rise of experts, and mass consumerism and popular culture (including radio, movies, TV, and rock 'n roll). These chapters serve as backdrop to the main drama of the political events of the era: the emergence of the Cold War, the civil rights movement, the rise and fall of the labor movement, McCarthyism, Korea, and Vietnam. The action takes place largely in the realms of power struggles—the White House, the Pentagon, Congress, the battlefields of protest at home and warfare abroad—and among leaders in government, civil rights, and labor. Changing gender roles and the dramatic transformations in the lives of women are also documented in the book, but feminism is given relatively little attention compared to the labor movement, black activism, or the antiwar movement.

In many ways, the book replicates the ways in which academic historians traditionally carve up the world. Public life is separate from private life, popular culture is removed from politics, and women's lives are distant from the heady world of men in power. Patterson missed an opportunity to offer a new type of synthesis that would break down these artificial boundaries. Such an ambitious undertaking as a survey of postwar America presented the possibility for a bold new approach or an innovative interpretive framework. Still, by including so much of the cultural and social history of the era, Patterson's synthesis goes far beyond the scope of traditional political history. It is undoubtedly one of the most comprehensive narratives of the thirty years following World War II written to date.

Ultimately, Patterson emphasizes the good things that happened during the postwar era, at least until the late 1960s, when expectations far exceeded the nation's capacity to make good on its promises. Although sensitive to the deep divisions that plagued the nation, he nonetheless sees the years from 1945 until the late 1960s as promising, hopeful, and overall beneficial to large numbers of Americans who gained from expanding prosperity and increasing opportunities. Progress for racial minorities, workers, and women and the increasing availability of the good life for Americans of all classes characterized the era. Although Patterson fully documents the horrors of war, Cold War, McCarthyism, and what many saw as the stultifying culture of consensus and conformity for the white middle class, along with the persistence of racism, violence, and poverty plaguing people of color and the lack of opportunities for women of all races and classes, he nevertheless sees the glass half-full rather than half-empty.

Students born too late to remember these years will find this book to be a vivid account. Those whose memories are as strong as their passions about the events recounted will be reminded that there are other reasonable opinions besides their own. Those looking for a dramatic new reading of postwar America are likely to be disappointed. But all readers will finish the book with a fuller understanding of the many tensions, pressures, tragedies, and triumphs that made the postwar era among the most horrible, as well as marvelous, epochs in our history.

ELAINE TYLER MAY
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GARETH DAVIES. *From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1996. Pp. xii, 320. $35.00.

Gareth Davies joins the lengthening list of scholars attempting to explain the breakup of the New Deal coalition and the resurgence of American conserva-

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tism. Davies offers not a comprehensive account of this breakup but a single strand of the story. In his own rather awkward terminology, Davies's contribution is to trace the transformation from opportunity liberalism to entitlement liberalism. More precisely, he shows how liberals in the 1960s abandoned a service strategy to fight poverty in favor of a guaranteed income, a move that violated American traditions and alienated middle America.

According to Davies, successful reform politicians in the twentieth century adapted rather than repudiated "the nation's central individualist ethos" (p. 29). Disdaining dependency and hand-outs, reformers typically emphasized self-help and jobs for the able-bodied poor. Franklin D. Roosevelt regarded relief as a temporary and undesirable expedient, soon replacing it with the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and social insurance financed partly by worker contributions. Only certain categories of the poor—the aged, blind, and fatherless children—were deserving of the cash assistance provided by the historic Social Security Act. In this tradition, Lyndon B. Johnson sponsored a war on poverty in 1964 that sought to create employment opportunities for individual poor people by providing them with education and job training. Johnson's war was initially popular, Davies argues, because it offered an alternative to public assistance consistent with the ideology of individualism. Boundless faith in the capacity of new knowledge to solve the problems of the disadvantaged fueled the War on Poverty. The race crisis of the mid-1960s knocked it off track.

Davies contends that the architects of Johnson's anti-poverty program did not at first consider black poverty to be a special problem. It was the Harlem riot of July 1964 that exposed the alienation of the black poor and led liberals to abandon individual opportunity in favor of race-targeted policies. At Howard University in June 1965, Johnson himself asserted that black poverty was different, that equal opportunity alone could not cure it, and that policy must now overcome the special disabilities suffered by blacks not as individuals but as a group. After the Watts riot in August, Johnson found himself caught between the promise of his Howard speech on the one hand and the white backlash on the other, a paralyzing dilemma from which he was never able to escape.

By 1966, black riots had discredited the assumptions of the poverty war, while Vietnam had undermined Johnson's political authority. Distancing themselves from an unpopular president, congressional liberals in 1967 began to explore the possibility of a new politics. By then, civil rights groups and organized welfare recipients were denouncing the false promise of individual opportunity and demanding that the government provide poor persons with a guaranteed income as a right. Though liberal politicians hesitated to embrace a concept so manifestly unpopular, the power of the idea among constituencies of the new politics continued to grow.

The unlikely hero of this book is Richard M. Nixon. His Family Assistance Plan, submitted in August 1969, proposed a floor under the cash income of the poor while at the same time honoring the American tradition of individual responsibility. Nixon's plan offered benefits to the poor who already worked and imposed a work requirement on recipients who could work but did not. In the end, the plan was defeated by a coalition of conservatives wanting tougher work requirements and liberals favoring hugely expensive alternatives. In 1972, George McGovern, the candidate of the new politics, campaigned for the Democratic nomination by endorsing a guaranteed income scheme that offended popular ideology and contributed to his repudiation in the general election.

Davies might have worked a little harder to guide his reader through the thicket of his argument. He might also have applied his considerable analytical skills to policy as well as to politics. He exaggerates the significance of the liberal switch to a guaranteed income, which was not a revolution, as the title claims, but an "abortive" revolution (p. 239), as conceded in the text, a political wrong turn that liberals quickly abandoned and that played only a minor role in their long-term decline. Davies leaves the reader still wondering at the end why liberal politicians embraced the guaranteed income to the detriment of their own electoral prospects.

Virtues outweigh weaknesses in this book. The author places his story in the broad context of the period, of which he possesses truly impressive knowledge. He has a keen sensitivity to the political pressures operating on the leading actors, and his research in a variety of manuscript collections lends his account real authority. Not least, he is a clear thinker. Scholars of recent American history will profit from Davies's insightful inquiry into the march of the liberals away from the center and into the political wilderness.

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DAVID RUDENSTINE. *The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1996. Pp. x, 416. $34.95.

The Supreme Court's decision in *New York Times v. United States* and *United States v. Washington Post Company* in 1971 were among the most dramatic it has rendered. The government had sued two newspapers, seeking an injunction forbidding them to publish information from the secret Defense Department study, known as the Pentagon Papers, about how the United States became involved in the Vietnam War. These cases rocketed through the federal judicial system; less than two weeks after the government first asked a district court for an injunction, the Supreme Court handed down a decision. Its ruling in the Pentagon Papers cases is the most important it has rendered on the subject of prior restraint (whether and under what circumstances the First Amendment permits a judge to

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prevent information from being communicated). Enhancing the importance of what the justices had to say on this issue was the evidence the Pentagon Papers contained that the United States government had deceived the public about the war, information highly relevant to the intense political debate that was raging at the time over when and how to end American military involvement in Vietnam.

Although the *Post*'s Sanford Ungar produced a highly readable journalistic account of the legal and political battle over the Pentagon Papers (*The Papers and the Papers: An Account of the Legal and Political Battle over the Pentagon Papers* [1972]), David Rudenstine's book is the first true history of these notable cases. It is also a major contribution to the rather thin literature on the legal and constitutional history of the Vietnam conflict, a field that cries out for exploration by scholars interested in more than just whether Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon abused presidential power by waging a war never declared by Congress. Ironically, Rudenstine makes an important contribution to our understanding of the disintegration of the imperial presidency in the wake of Vietnam, providing a useful supplement to Stanley Kutler's monumental *The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon* (1990). He argues persuasively that "The Pentagon Papers affair . . . led directly to the unraveling and final disintegration of the Nixon presidency" (p. 6).

Rudenstine makes some other interesting and novel arguments as well. It has always been somewhat difficult to understand why the Nixon administration fought so hard to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers, since dissemination of the information they contained served mainly to embarrass its Democratic predecessors. Disputing the theory that this lawsuit was part of a campaign to intimidate the press, Rudenstine insists that Justice Department lawyers, led by Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian, pressed the president to initiate a prior-restraint action because they genuinely believed release of the papers would threaten important national security interests. Nixon acceded to their entreaties because Henry Kissinger convinced him he would appear weak in the eyes of foreign leaders if he did not do something about this massive leak of classified information.

Rudenstine agrees with those who contend that publication of the Pentagon Papers did not harm the military, defense, or international interests of the United States. He insists, however, that although the papers were largely historical in nature, they did contain some information that could have inflicted injury. Thus, the concerns of Mardian and the national security officials who supported the Justice Department's prior-restraint action were not entirely groundless. Although he stresses the significance of the Supreme Court's decision in the case, he minimizes the significance of the massive release of government secrets that it facilitated. Rudenstine thinks this affected debate on the Vietnam War but had no impact on the course of the war itself.

For the most part, Rudenstine effectively supports his contentions. Only his argument that the Pentagon Papers contained information truly damaging to national security is unpersuasive. Forced to convince the Supreme Court that they did, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold (who admittedly lacked adequate research time) could identify only eleven items in forty-seven volumes that he thought supported such a contention. Although the last four volumes did contain diplomatic documents, release of which could have hampered American diplomacy, the significance of most of the information contained in the Pentagon Papers was historical and political. This material should not have been withheld from the public by classifying it as "secret."

Mardian's objective was a judicial ruling that the government could restrain publication of anything on which someone had slapped a security classification stamp. Rudenstine skillfully elucidates the extent to which his extreme views determined the government's litigation strategy and impaired its chances of success in court. He also admirably points out that what is generally viewed as a case about the First Amendment was considered by the man who argued it for the *New York Times*, Yale Law School Professor Alexander Bickel, to be primarily a dispute about separation of powers. Rudenstine notes that several judges accepted Bickel's contentions if not his approach.

Although impressive in many respects, Rudenstine's book is marred by a number of small but troubling errors. For example, he misspells the name of political scientist Samuel Popkin, refers to Republican Senator John Tower as a Democrat, and misidentifies the John Marshall Harlan Papers at Princeton as the John Marshall Papers. Although such mistakes are bound to raise concerns about his scholarship, this is a competently researched monograph, solidly grounded in judicial opinions, unpublished legal documents, manuscript collections, and numerous interviews. The pace at which Rudenstine discusses legal arguments and judicial opinions is somewhat plodding, but otherwise he writes well. This book is a readable and worthwhile monograph that merits the serious attention of both constitutional historians and students of the Vietnam era.

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LAURA KALMAN. *The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 375.

This is a rewarding and insightful book that seeks to explain where, intellectually and politically, contemporary liberal legal academics stand and how they got there. Laura Kalman defines her subject, "legal liberalism," as a "trust in the potential of courts, particularly the Supreme Court," to effect desirable and nationwide social change, especially improving the conditions of favored groups such as blacks, women,

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and workers (p. 2). The "strange career" of her title refers to the twisting efforts of liberal legal academics to sustain over time the activist constitutionalism of the Supreme Court under Earl Warren against a series of challenges to its efficacy and legitimacy.

As late as the 1960s, Kalman writes, legal academics overwhelmingly favored the results of the Warren Court and debated only "the means it used" (p. 49). Their disagreements constituted merely "a family quarrel between Warren Court activists and process theorists, two wings of the realist tradition" (p. 48). In the 1970s, however, things changed. The entry of significant numbers of women and minorities into the profession heightened diversity; *Roe v. Wade* and affirmative action split liberals deeply; the country grew increasingly conservative, cost conscious, and wary of government; Ronald Reagan's administration reshaped American politics and effectively advanced "originalism" as a device to delegitimate liberal constitutionalism; and a reconstructed Supreme Court moved rightward and began experimenting with its own brand of conservative judicial activism. Those challenges proved especially distressing to liberal academics because, at the same time, a range of ideas, methods, and stances that were eventually yoked together under the label of postmodernism invaded the law schools from other academic disciplines. The ideal of interdisciplinary scholarship and the apparent utility of postmodernist modes fired the imagination of many legal liberals, but the new approaches exacted a high price. Postmodernism scattered them intellectually, undermined their normative assumptions, robbed them of the hope for objectivity, and led them toward ever more debilitating theories and ever more profound crises.

Against this background, Kalman's book examines some of the major debates that filled the law reviews. She focuses on the oblique but powerful claims of the attacking conservative originalists, the uses of the era's heralded theoretical turns (cultural, hermeneutic, linguistic, and historical), and the strained if serviceable responses of the counterattacking Republican revivalists and neo-Federalists. One of the book's major contributions is the way it situates for those outside the legal academy some of the disparate, puzzling, and sometimes seemingly perverse claims that law professors have recently advanced and debated.

At the heart of Kalman's book lies a deep concern with the perplexing relationship between law and history. Reflecting on the historical turn in constitutional rhetoric during the past two decades, she probes for a coherent line to identify and distinguish between proper historical and legal scholarship while at the same time exploring ways in which historians may legitimately illuminate and assist the work of lawyers. Professionally trained in law as well as history, Kalman tells us that she feels like "something of an outsider to both disciplines" (p. 9). Although her remark finesses the substantial differences that separate practicing lawyers from law professors, it does point to the amazingly tenacious disciplinary assumptions that often wall off supposedly related academic fields, and it suggests further the extent to which multidisciplinary training can be professionally enervating as well as intellectually liberating.

More particularly, Kalman's remark highlights the fact that the work of the historian and the lawyer—in spite of their multiple and intimate overlaps in both subject and method—are not only distinct but, in critical ways, inconsistent. Her dual training allows her to understand the professional ethic of each field and to experience deeply their conflicting injunctions and aspirations. Although she offers some optimistic words about their compatibilities, she remains understandably vague and uneasy. "Once again," Kalman concludes at one point, "historians and law professors are talking past each other in their dialogue of the deaf" (p. 229).

Inevitably, a book of such complexity has its flaws. Kalman's definition of legal liberalism, for example, does not encompass the "objective" foundations of law that the book seems to see as intrinsic to it. Further, she too readily accepts the importance of Alexander Bickel's statement of "the counter-majoritarian difficulty" (*The Least Dangerous Branch* [1962]) without exploring the contingent social factors that made his formulation seem so new, central, insightful, and self-evident. Finally, the book provokes fascinating questions that readers will wish Kalman had pursued in greater depth. Why have American academics revived grand theory so vigorously? Why do legal academics continue to focus so inordinately on the words of the Supreme Court rather than on the court's role in the complex dispute-settling and norm-enforcing practices that give the law its practical meaning and significance? To what extent have postmodern modes led legal academics away from exploring more deeply the meaning of the late Robert Cover's blunt reminder—starkly distinguishing, among other things, the work of the lawyer and historian—that "death and pain are at the center of legal interpretation" (p. 118)?

Kalman has written a sophisticated and highly informative book that provides an illuminating map of key debates that helped drive legal academic discourse during the past three decades. It will be essential reading for anyone interested in the intellectual history of the contemporary law teaching profession or the perplexing interplay between between law and history that original intent constitutionalism inspired in the 1980s.

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MICHAEL J. SANDEL. *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 417. $24.95.

This book contains a long, often insightful, but flawed jeremiad. As have so many other recent social critics,

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Michael J. Sandel laments the loss of what he calls civic virtue. This threatens self-government, or what Sandel calls "democracy" but might better refer to as a "good republic." By civic virtues, he means certain developed character traits that lead to an unselfish, even at times sacrificial, commitment to a larger community. He finds, particularly in this waning century, a steady erosion of such character. Replacing an earlier sense of social responsibility is an indulgent type of individualism. Yet Sandel is not primarily a cultural critic but a political one. In the main chapters of this book, he traces, at times very perceptively, the gradual loss of an older commitment on the part of policy makers to government policies and programs that are conducive to a virtuous citizenry. Instead of such goals, policy makers have abdicated any responsibility to further a good society and have moved very far toward creating a morally neutral state. They have placed the highest value on self-expression and self-definition, leaving individuals free to choose their own values and goals.

Unfortunately, Sandel displays none of the precision and rigor appropriate to moral philosophy. What he loves most of all are labels and very abstract ideal types. His first identified devil is just such an abstract type. This is what he sees as a prevalent, even fashionable, view of the self, a view that he defines as "voluntaristic liberalism," a label that confuses much more than it clarifies. In this view, unencumbered individuals are free to choose their own values as well as their goals. But no one that I know, or can identify, affirms this view of the self, although they may in unguarded moments sound as if they believe in it. Sandel's type combines nonsense with a truism. An unencumbered self—one without values, without developed likes and dislikes—is no self at all. Nothing is there to choose. It is the always encumbered (shaped, formed) self that chooses. Identity guides choice but is not an object of choice. Of course, our choices may help shape our future identity. At the same time, an ability to choose goals consistent with our taste is essential to almost any definition of freedom. It is truistic to point this out. Since governments have no access to beliefs and preferences and no way to control our imagined goals, the problem of a good society is one of determining what constraints a government places on what we do to achieve our goals (such constraints are almost definitional of government), and what opportunities it offers for the attainment of socially acceptable goals.

Another devil for Sandel is what he calls a "procedural republic." In most of the chapters of this book, he traces policies and legal decisions that earlier gave meaning to the idea of civic virtue. These were often conflicted, for Americans often disagreed on which policies would serve such ethical goals. Sandel searches carefully for critical moments when policy makers deserted the goal, when they finally gave up on any version of a good society and simply tried to protect the right of contending individuals to define the good for themselves. This meant a dramatic increase in the leeway for self-expression, or what Sandel refers to as an emphasis on rights. He consistently confuses the traditional, moral meaning of the word "rights." In the natural-rights tradition, a right was a moral claim tied to what our founding fathers believed were universal ethical principles. The opposite of a right was a wrong. Sandel, like so many contemporaries, has confused this older understanding with a conception of a right as what a govemment allows one to do in the way of self-expression. Thus, he talks about the ascendancy of "rights over the good." What he reaily means is that traditional rights, which define the proper end of govemment (to assure justice or to protect life, liberty, and property), have given way, even become subordinated to, an almost unlimited leeway to do what one wants, with government playing the role of referee when self-affirming individuals or groups get into a fight with each other. Of course, as Sandel sometimes admits, even a public concern about fair procedures can rest on certain morally significant values (one thinks of civil rights laws). Also, however much policy makers have deferred to cultural diversity, most of our laws still reflect a moral consensus. Almost by definition, legislation reflects moral standards, and in many areas the reach of moral sensibility, and images of a good society, have expanded in this troubled century (one thinks of environmental regulations).

Sandel tries to identify all the critical decisions that led to national declension. It first began with the Supreme Court, which, by the early twentieth century, increasingly accepted a morally neutral stance. It climaxed in public policy with the Keynesian revolution of the 1930s, when the federal government forgot about the civic good supported by the ownership of productive property and instead committed itself to such morally vacuous goals as more and more production and consumption. Sandel does not clarify, in detail, other foundations for civic virtue, but he recognizes that some types of nationalism can create communal bonds and suggests that religious faith may be conducive to such virtues (echoes of Alexis de Tocqueville). He makes clear, throughout, that it will not be easy to define and retrieve any consensual conception of the good. Mobility, cultural diversity, the role of corporate and governmental bureaucracies, and even a global market all war against the virtues of the village. He seems less aware, less concerned about, the darker side of solidarity and community. Surely one has to ask: which community?

This book illustrates a central dilemma of many contemporary social critics, particularly those that embrace some form of neo-communalism. Sandel easily, and with some justifiable nostalgia, celebrates the possibilities of community and the solace of consensual ethical principles, even as he worries about indulgent forms of self-expression. He joins a contemporary chorus in all this, with plenty of cheers from both the right and left sides of the galleries. But what is lacking

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in this jeremiad is any grounding, any appeal to philosophical or theological authority, even any clear image of a good society. The reader floats in abstractions and yearns for some utopian passion. Sandel applauds religious belief in the most general and unfocused manner but never identifies a specific religion or even seems acquainted with any living faith. It is as if religion, any religion, was a good in itself. He condemns policy makers for their moral neutrality but never clarifies a specific civic ethic that he is willing to defend to the death. One completes the book with a suspicion that Sandel, with plenty of lamentations but no prophetic vision, illustrates the very lack of clear commitment that is the object of his sermon. Perhaps he is the now anxious and concerned product of "voluntaristic liberalism" and a merely "procedural republic."

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ALLAN YOUNG. *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. x, 327. $35.00.

Through an analysis of the developing recognition of a psychiatric condition, Allan Young presents an ambitious and richly informative account of the growth and progress of modern psychiatry itself and particularly of the intimate relationship between that discipline and its broader social and political context. As a model study of the construction of mental illness, this book represents a significant contribution to the history of science and medicine.

In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association included in its standard diagnostic manual a condition termed "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder" (PTSD), a grave complex of symptoms that characterized individuals who had suffered extreme stress, especially in wartime. Since then, the disease has been widely diagnosed and employed to explain a variety of other behaviors and conditions; retroactively, it has even been identified in historical and literary figures as distant as Gilgamesh! If the disorder is so common, the question arises of why therapists were so slow to identify it. A potent mythology recounts how gallant and enlightened pioneers struggled to overcome entrenched prejudices, until the psychiatric profession was finally convinced by the campaigns of the 1970s. Young, however, adopts a very different emphasis, asserting that "the disorder is not timeless, nor does it possess an intrinsic unity. Rather it is glued together by the practices, technologies, and narratives with which it is diagnosed, studied, treated and represented and by the various interests, institutions, and moral arguments that mobilized these efforts and resources" (p. 5). From this perspective, the doctor appears less as an objective professional or scientist and far more as a creative artist, constantly inventing and reinventing the characters of the patients who cross his or her path.

A brief review can do little justice to this finely crafted and convincingly argued work, which traces the history of concepts of memory and trauma from the late Enlightenment through the present day. It will be of great interest to scholars from a wide range of periods and disciplines, not least military historians, as so much of the crucial evidence grew out of the experiences of service personnel during the two world wars and Vietnam. In fact, the creation of PTSD was in large measure a response to the activism of an emerging interest group of Vietnam veterans and their political allies. By far the best section of the book concerns the interpersonal transactions in a Veterans' Administration hospital, viewed through a series of ethnographic observations that permit us to observe the interplay of ideology and narrative in the therapeutic process.

Although impressive in its integration of historical, medical, and sociological views, this stimulating book might benefit from a little more consideration of the other interest groups that contributed to the formation and exploitation of the PTSD diagnosis in the last two decades. This protean complaint was of inestimable value for feminist groups seeking to establish the harm and lasting consequences of acts such as rape and childhood sexual exploitation, which were thus presented as the psychic equivalent of battle-induced trauma. PTSD was also a godsend for the legal profession, whose access to media and politicians is generally far superior to that of medical experts. With the psychiatrists and medical theorists, these groups contributed to the process by which the scientific "fact" of PTSD was determined and promulgated.

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CANADA

SUSAN SHEETS-PYENSON. *John William Dawson: Faith, Hope, and Science*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1996. Pp. 274. $44.95.

Sir John William Dawson (1820–1899) was one of the leading scientists and educators of late nineteenth-century Canada. He made notable contributions to the study of Carboniferous fossil reptiles and Devonian plants, based mainly on work in his native Nova Scotia. But Dawson remained an inveterate opponent of evolutionism and was increasingly regarded as an isolated figure attempting to stem the tide of scientific advance. His commitment to his Christian faith was certainly an important factor in his life. An earlier biography by Charles F. O'Brien, *Sir William Dawson: A Life in Science and Religion* (1971), focused on Dawson's intellectual milieu, but Susan Sheets-Pyenson, while not ignoring this side of his life, concentrates on his career as a teacher and administrator. She has made extensive use of the archives at McGill University, which Dawson turned into a scientific center of international repute after being appointed its

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principal in 1855. Here again, Dawson emerges as a figure conscious of his isolation and provinciality despite his increasing fame.

Dawson's father emigrated from Scotland to Nova Scotia, and it was at Edinburgh University that Dawson received his main scientific education. He returned to continue his scientific work in Nova Scotia and then received the call to McGill. There can be no doubt about the importance of his achievements there: the university flourished, as did the Montreal Natural History Society. In 1882, he played a role in the founding of the Royal Society of Canada. The British Association for the Advancement of Science met in Montreal in 1884, and two years later Dawson became the association's president. Yet for all his success, Dawson felt isolated from the main centers of scientific activity. He also saw himself as the champion of Protestant values in a hostile, French-speaking and Catholic society. In 1854 and 1855, he tried unsuccessfully for the chair of natural history at Edinburgh; in 1871, he was again unsuccessful in a bid for the principalship of that university. Yet a few years later, he turned down James McCosh's offer of a chair at Princeton, arguing that he could not abandon Montreal while the fight for Protestant values was still not lost. As Sheets-Pyenson shows, it was precisely because he felt so threatened that Dawson fought so hard to develop the institutions he loved.

The episode in this account that perhaps most clearly reveals Dawson's increasing isolation from the scientific community is the reception of his Bakerian lecture, given to the Royal Society of London in 1870. In itself, the offer of the lectureship was a recognition of Dawson's contribution to paleobotany, but publication in the society's prestigious *Philosophical Transactions* was blocked by the Darwinian Sir Joseph Hooker because of the anti-evolutionary opinions expressed in parts of the text. By this time, Dawson's continuing commitment to the idea of divine creation was beginning to mark him out as a figure who—for all his expertise in describing the fossils—refused to participate in the central theoretical debates of late-nineteenth-century biology. The honors he gained in the later part of his career were, if this impression is valid, given more in recognition of his administrative achievements than of his contributions to science.

Sheets-Pyenson concentrates on the former, which are important to Canada's history. Her work thus serves as a valuable antidote to the image of Dawson as a figure increasingly isolated by his religious opposition to Darwin. Historians interested in Canada's scientific, cultural, and educational development will certainly welcome this book. Historians of science, too, will find Sheets-Pyenson's account of Dawson's multifaceted relationship to the international community of interest, although they may want to think a little more about the contrast between his intellectual isolation and his administrative achievements. Dawson's anti-evolutionism was soon outdated, but there were still many scientists who rejected the Darwinian view of evolution on philosophical and religious grounds, especially in America. Here the link to McCosh is of interest, and we are left wondering about Dawson's relationship to those students of Louis Agassiz who tried to create an evolutionism that would retain a sense of order and purpose in nature. We are told (pp. 132–33) that Alpheus Hyatt welcomed Dawson's critique of Darwinism; why, then, is there little evidence of his further involvement in the American anti-Darwinian movement? An account of Dawson's life that explores this aspect of his thought in more detail might even more helpful in situating him within the international context of late nineteenth-century science.

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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

DAVID BARRY GASPAR and DARLENE CLARK HINE, editors. *More Than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the Americas*. (Blacks in the Diaspora.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1996. Pp. xi, 341. Cloth $39.95, paper $18.95.

This compilation of fifteen essays is part of a long-term endeavor to bridge women and slave studies. The editors, David Barry Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine, have organized the work into two sections: "Life and Labor" and "Slavery, Resistance, and Freedom." I would like to highlight two key issues addressed more or less systematically in all essays (including the introductory chapter by Claire Robertson): the varied workings of slave systems (or, more precisely, expressions of power relations and their intensity, patterns of mobility within slavery, and opportunities for manumission) with special regard to slave women; and the sexual division of labor and, within it, the tensions between race and gender issues, as well as the matrifocality debate.

Quite correctly, Gaspar and Hine acknowledge that the book does not have a "comprehensive geographical or regional coverage within the Americas" (p. ix). The first section of essays presents overwhelming evidence from the United States (five of the section's nine essays, written by Richard H. Steckel, Cherryll A. Cody, Robert Olwell, Wilma King, and Brenda E. Stevenson), but the section includes only two essays on Brazil (by Mary Karasch and Robert W. Slenes) and one on the Caribbean (by Hilary Beckles). In contrast, the second section—dealing with resistance—contains more works on the Caribbean (five out of the six essays, written by Barbara Bush, Gaspar, Bernard Moist, David P. Geggus, and Susan M. Socolow). The only essay on the United States in this section (by L. Virginia Gould) describes the experiences of an urban female slave in Louisiana when it was still in Spanish hands. These thematic and geographical accents are not random. They reflect past and current focuses of

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research and reveal something both about how slavery worked and how it has been analyzed in each region, in spite of the increasingly blurred divisions between "life and labor" and "resistance," as more daily acts become construed as expressing resistance.

Often, research tendencies are driven by present-day political debates. By comparing African and American slave systems, Robertson illustrates how, in the United States, the ways in which we assess slavery have a bearing on welfare policy. By documenting the existence of slave families in the past, the tendency of African-American families to be headed by females today is detached from its roots in African culture or as a legacy of slavery (Robertson, p. 14). African-American families are headed by females because they are poor (or maybe they are poor because they are headed by females). In this argument, a class issue replaces a falsely constructed historical record and the shift explains—at least partially—why we know much more about slave women and families in the United States than we do in other parts of the Americas. Another explanation is, of course, the greater research potential, although I agree with Slenes that research on slavery in Brazil (and I would add the rest of South America) is unavailable in English (p. 127).

It is important, however, to acknowledge that in the Caribbean and Brazil (and maybe elsewhere in South America) research on slave resistance and its multiple expressions is part of a process of identity construction. By underlining the mechanisms slaves used to survive and resist slavery, Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Caribbeans become recognizable as historical actors, in contrast to their past systematic exclusion. The dialectics between identity and exclusion help explain the ongoing research emphasis on resistance and why only recently women (the principal carriers of daily resistance) have merited more attention. The notion that, by creating a culture of daily resistance, slave women "built more ambitious schemes of subversion that matured into collective political resistance or insurrection" (Gaspar, p. 220) is more recent in Latin America than in the United States. To "political resistance" one might add historical and social consciousness. In short, then, these essays eloquently suggest that we not only need to establish some kind of thematic equilibrium across regions (starting maybe with some translations) but, even more importantly, that we must be aware of the present-day determination of our research agendas and its implications.

The growing rigidity of the slave system in the United States toward the nineteenth century meant more exploitation of slave labor in an industrializing context, whereas in Brazil, "manumission and miscegenation were common, and emancipation was accomplished smoothly." Moreover, in Latin America, freed persons filled "essential economic slots, and many slaves bought their own freedom" (Robertson, p. 8). For the Brazilian case, Karasch calls our attention to Indian-Black miscegenation, an important component of slavery not found in the United States (p. 83). As a consequence, she argues, the Brazilian and Caribbean slave systems were closer to those of Africa in that they allowed for multiple ways out of slavery. In the United States, in contrast, slavery implied a truncated continuum and race became a caste marker.

Although there are some discrepancies in the individual chapters on the issue of matrifocality—Stevenson, for example, claims that "matrifocality was the most common characteristic of their household and family styles" (p. 177)—most of the authors agree that, although slave women had some economic independence, there existed gendered spheres of political action and men made the decisions. Furthermore, female autonomy involved poverty rather than power. Men's predominance was jeopardized because slavery was not conducive to the maintenance of family life or to allowing slave men to make decisions on family matters. Evidence from both hemispheres, however, shows a high degree of slave-family stability resulting from slaves' ability to rescue at least some family life and from slaveowners' own interests. Strengthening the male role in slave families gave male slaves some leverage: "by vilifying female-headed households patriarchal ideology facilitates class oppression of black families" (Robertson, p. 15). Thus, by allowing slave men some control over their families and diminishing the value of slave women's work, the family was, in the hands of slaveowners, a mechanism of social control.

This interpretation is linked to how the sexual division of labor is assessed. As documented by most of the authors in this book, growing evidence shows slave women's economic involvement in the plantation, the household, and the market. Overall, the slave family was not an instrument of equality or liberation: the higher the level of autonomy a slave family had, the stricter was the gender division of labor. A similar set of conclusions holds true for "family arrangements" between masters and slave women.

The compilation contains some original pieces of work. Slenes provides one of few accounts we have for Latin America that contrasts reality with prejudice and discourse on slaves. King vividly illustrates children's socialization into slavery and how their mothers prayed to enhance their children's endurance; we still know little about slave childhood in either hemisphere. Stevenson shows us how ex-slave women, in their recollections of the past, rescue their femininity and moral purpose. Socolow and Beckles, in turn, offer two of the few systematic readings of the meaning of differentiation within the ranks of free and slave Afro-Americans. Other interesting (but less systematically presented) ideas, such as how age and gender function as organizing principles in slave communities, the connections between the weakening of lineage ties and the strengthening of conjugal ties, and the relationship between size of holdings and marital stability, are brought up and envisaged—correctly—as future research agendas.

The compilation has some weaknesses. Comparative conclusions without an assessment of the frequency of

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occurrences is doomed to remain vague and susceptible to criticism, and to establish frequency is not always possible. But, more than signaling the possibly unchangeable limits of comparisons, the main weakness is that the questions raised and the conclusions drawn are anchored in a reading of slavery in the United States. Tellingly, the great absent actor in most chapters is the church. As a consequence, some oversimplifications occur, as when Robertson writes that "slaves were not allowed legal marriages but viewed customary forms as binding" (p. 17). This does not hold true for most of the Caribbean and South America, where the church played a crucial role in defining marriage for slaves and thus opened a whole set of interesting questions about property rights and religious obligations. *Cofradias* (brotherhoods)—as emphasized by Karasch (p. 89)—were one of the many strongholds of the church. These entities played a major role in congregating slaves and free blacks (especially women), and their importance has long been documented for other areas.

Paralleling the higher church involvement in Latin America, slaves and freed slaves often resorted to legal mediation and, most importantly, so did women. In the United States and the Caribbean (Gould, p. 307), there are no records of a slave prosecuting a master for rape or sexual exploitation (or mistreatment?). The judicial alternative had strong bearings not only on how slaves were treated but also on how slaves negotiated the terms of their enslavement, often in combination with a reassessment of their relative blackness, that is, their degree of miscegenation. So maybe even when we seek to accentuate a gender perspective, institutions should not be left aside.

One last issue that reflects the strong United States accent in the interpretation of slave systems and gender issues is the selected bibliography at the end of the book. There are few titles dealing with slavery in the Southern hemisphere. There is, however, a valuable effort to incorporate interesting work on Africa, especially concerning the role of women in varied African cultures. This other comparative dimension urgently needs to be incorporated into our understanding of slavery, especially in Latin America. In this sense, the editors have an enormous task ahead of them, and they are right in their endeavor. Roger Bastide, Frank Tannenbaum, and maybe even Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman need to be—in a sense—engendered.

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SHIRLEY C. GORDON. *God Almighty Make Me Free: Christianity in Preemancipation Jamaica*. (Blacks in the Diaspora.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 159. $39.95.

Keeping white people uninformed was a slave survival technique, Shirley C. Gordon observes in this remarkable book (p. 63). Yet, Gordon manages to extrapolate enough information from white people's documents to give us an insightful study of Afro-Jamaican response and agency in the Christianization of Jamaica from the arrival of Moravian missionaries in 1754 to the final abolition of slavery in 1838. Gordon distinguished herself as a pioneer scholar in the documentation and writing of West Indian history at a time when the British Caribbean was emerging from colonialism and the history of the region was not yet included in the syllabi of West Indian schools. Her previous research and writing on the history of West Indian education prepared her well for this book's focus on a key aspect of education in Jamaica, the preaching and teaching of evangelical Christianity in an Afro-creole slave society.

Missionaries in Jamaica before 1838—first Moravians, then Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Anglican evangelicals, and Independents—were faithful correspondents and diarists of their work, recounting their perceived successes and failures in saving the souls of the slaves. What their reports fail to reveal, Gordon points out, is the growth of slave initiatives and aspirations over the more than eighty years covered in her study. A further challenge for the historian attempting to document slave initiative is that the majority of Christian slaves during the period were converted by nonwhite teachers and preachers. These were initially North American freedmen who had belonged to loyalists and had fled to the West Indies during the American War for Independence; later, they included slave leaders, deacons, and catechists chosen by white missionaries whose own limited numbers precluded the possibility of their ever administering to the largest slave population in the British Caribbean without the mediation of black helpers. Most of the slave and free nonwhite preachers were not literate, and those who were did not have the responsibility that white missionaries had of writing regular reports to metropolitan headquarters. They therefore left little of a written voice.

That muted voice provides Gordon's main challenge as she pursues multiple theses. That Christianity in Jamaica was overwhelmingly the achievement of black and mixed-race teachers, that accepting Christianity was part of black aspiration for freedom and sociopolitical recognition, and that Jamaican forms of Christianity became core parts of Jamaican national identity are her key propositions. Gordon recognizes that her theses constitute a tall order for one study and warns that she intends her book to be suggestive rather than conclusive.

Gordon's book complements Mary Turner's *Slaves and Missionaries* (1982). Turner made it clear that the disintegration of the slave system was hastened by the relationship between slaves and missionaries, which allowed slaves to make a radical break from their moral and physical subordination in plantation society. Turner's study ends with the recognition that Afro-Jamaicans made their own struggle for freedom under their own leaders. That recognition becomes Gordon's

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main point of departure, and she pursues it not only with a fresh and efficient examination of documents other scholars have used, but also by original explication of primary sources that have not previously been adequately mined. This is particularly true of her use of Moravian material, not only as evidence but also as sources for narrative coherence.

A fine example is her telling of the story of Aneaso, born an Ebo about 1799, captured into slavery at the age of ten and transported to Jamaica. There his name was changed first to Toby and then Archibald Montieth, after his owner. Gordon traces Aneaso's conversion, education, and his becoming a preacher. The most revealing aspect of Aneaso's preserved testimony is that, after many years under the strictest of Moravian instruction, he should appeal to the approval of the ancestors, "our fathers in Africa," as the final validation of his Christianity (p. 39).

Gordon's larger theme is the emergence of a Jamaican identity. That identity varied from the creole nationalism characteristic of a middle class that originated with the free-black and mixed-race sectors who, during slavery, had allied themselves with the nonconformist missionary churches to the assertions by the black majority of independent worldviews, as manifested in the Afro-Christian syntheses of Myal and Revival. In the postemancipation years, these processes became more obvious, and Gordon promises an extension of her study into that era. The informed speculation and empathetic reconstruction of cultural interaction in the slave period that she displays in this book should make readers eager for her next one.

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ARIJ OUWENEEL. *Shadows over Anáhuac: An Ecological Interpretation of Crisis and Development in Central Mexico, 1730–1800*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 429. $60.00.

This ambitious book by Arij Ouweneel, originally published in Dutch in 1989, deals with rural Indian society in the central Mexican valleys of Mexico, Toluca, and Puebla during the closing decades of the colonial period. It is innovative in that it employs an "ecological approach" and concepts from medieval European historiography that are uncommon in colonial Mexican studies. Economic development is Ouweneel's primary concern, and his central thesis is demographic: not just population growth, but a condition of overpopulation is invoked to account for changes in Nahua communities between 1780 and 1810. Eschewing models that emphasize the power of the colonial regime and Indian responses to it, Ouweneel is more concerned with laying bare the "multilayered interdependency" (p. 318) of various segments of late colonial society, especially Indian elites and commoners, *hacendados*, merchants, and Spanish political officials.

The "trigger" in this portrait of economic change lies in the combination of high population growth with a series of bad harvests due to drought between 1770 and 1810. This led to greater social differentiation within Nahua communities and the increased dependence of the poor on Spanish *hacendados*, Indian elites, and *gobernadores* who had access to irrigated lands. As more people were forced below the "subsistence line," overpopulation became a problem. One response was the proliferation of artisan trades and associated commercial activity, but most of the economic benefits of these activities were canceled out by overpopulation. At a time when the urban economy was flourishing, rural Indian society faced growing impoverishment after 1800.

Much of the book analyzes the local indigenous responses to this economic crunch, including the continued power of community elites, the central role of the *gobernadores*, land tenure arrangements, municipal finance, and participation in the *repartimientos de comercios* (politically organized trade). Proceeding on the assumption that peasant life in central Mexico was not much different from that in Europe, Ouweneel relies heavily on the German concept of *Herrschaft*, or lordship, and applies it to preconquest Nahua polities, relations between Indian nobles and commoners in the colonial period, and the ties between *gobernadores* and their constituents in the late eighteenth century. Where others have seen corporate peasant communities or systems of class or ethnic relations, Ouweneel sees the continued vitality of a basic Nahua form of patronage and political rule that was similar to vassalage in feudal Europe.

Theoretical concerns loom large in this work, and the author acknowledges that he lacks sufficient data to test some of his hypotheses. Yet this book is also based on a prodigious amount of archival research, and its arguments are advanced through discussion of a large quantity of case materials from numerous places in central Mexico. These are used to particularly good effect in a revisionist discussion of the *repartimientos de comercios*, which are seen as more beneficial than exploitative for the Indian economy. This and other recent treatments carry the debate over the *repartimiento* to a new level, reminiscent of earlier contests over the nature of black slavery and hacienda labor in Latin America.

This book takes forceful, even bold, positions on a range of important issues. Ouweneel's arguments are clever and worthy of consideration, but they will not convince everyone. The key concept of overpopulation is difficult to verify empirically, as studies in ecological anthropology have shown, and those who are not already believers are unlikely to be converted by the discussion here. Others will question the identification of the role of the *gobernador* with that of the pre-Hispanic Aztec lord. I was not won over by Ouweneel's rejection of "external" political-economic analysis in favor of an ecological paradigm that rests on an "internal" dynamic. Rather than being forced to

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choose sides, scholars will all be better off in the long run, in my opinion, if we look for new and better ways to combine the use of internal and external dynamics in our work.

In sum, this is a creative and stimulating rethinking of the economic forces impinging on eighteenth-century Nahua society. It also provides a wealth of new data on a number of important topics. Specialists in colonial Mexican economic and indigenous history should read this book; they may not agree with all of its interpretations, but at the very least they will be stimulated to reexamine their own views.

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Film Reviews

THOMAS JEFFERSON. Produced by Ken Burns and Camilla Rockwell; directed by Ken Burns; written by Geoffrey C. Ward. 1996; color; 180 minutes. Distributor: Turner Broadcasting Systems and PBS Home Video.

From the opening frame, the familiar hand of veteran filmmaker Ken Burns is very much in evidence. Haunting fiddle music begins with the first scene, actors read passages penned by Thomas Jefferson and his contemporaries (Sam Waterston supplies the voice of Jefferson), and darkened branches silhouette countless sunsets. Actor Ossie Davis narrates. But historian Joseph Ellis warns early on that had Jefferson been a statue, he "would be the sphinx," and Burns never really uncovers the riddle. Part of the difficulty is Jefferson himself. The shy, private, intellectual Virginian makes for an elusive subject. But the disappointing failure of this film to draw a coherent portrait of the third president ultimately rests with decisions Burns made.

Burns attempts a comprehensive film biography but neglects to grant himself the time necessary to do it properly. Having been roasted by his critics for banishing African Americans and women from his Civil War saga, for example, the filmmaker here devotes a good deal of time to the issue of slavery. As in much recent scholarship, the master of Monticello comes off badly. Paul Finkelman easily dismisses the presentist defense. "We don't build monuments to people who are just like their neighbors," Finkelman observes, while comparing Jefferson to George Washington, Edward Coles, and John Randolph, all of whom emancipated their slaves. Clay Jenkinson suggests, with some exaggeration, that Jefferson "proposed more than a dozen pieces of legislation" that would have resulted in gradual emancipation, but finally concedes that Jefferson postponed action on slavery, just as "America postponed the issue of slavery." Only Natalie Bober, who refers to one of Jefferson's human properties as "servant Bob Hemings," seems determined to dodge the issue.

Unhappily, Burns fails to make much sense of this criticism. Viewers are left with the impression that Jefferson failed to move against the peculiar institution, but no clear explanation as to why is offered. Jenkinson hints that Jefferson believed his political career to be at stake, but only John Hope Franklin notes that Jefferson's "transgressions [were] of the mind as well as the heart." Jefferson's determination to live the life of a patrician, even as he claimed for all men the right to life and liberty, forced him to rationalize his continued participation in the system, or, as Franklin observes, to "fritter away his time speculating about how blacks smell or how they reason."

No modern treatment of Jefferson would be complete without a mention of Sally Hemings, and Burns dutifully wades into the debate. Thomas Cooley, a Hemings descendant, offers up two hundred years of (often inconsistent) oral testimony, while Bober relies on the character defense. Sally Hemings remains an enigma, however, as she admittedly does in most scholarship. Burns neglects to inform his audience that she was almost certainly Jefferson's sister-in-law, and her ultimate fate, like that of her children, goes unmentioned. (She was freed by Jefferson's daughter two years after his death.)

Once again, Burns's longtime collaborator Geoffrey C. Ward authored the script. The errors are few enough, and most are minor. Only one stands out. The narrator asserts that in 1800 Jefferson and Aaron Burr ran against a Federalist ticket of John Adams and Thomas Pinckney, even as the camera slowly pans across a newspaper showing the name of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. The chief flaw in the film, however, is not one of data but of balance. Having devoted eighteen hours of film elsewhere to the sport of baseball, Burns decided to present the life and thought of that most enigmatic of presidents in less than three. The result is an incoherent, high-speed discussion of Jefferson as a public figure.

Part 1 of the documentary—the first ninety minutes—is divided into three unequal sections: "Life" (childhood and marriage), "Liberty" (the revolution), and "The Head and the Heart" (the years in France). The second half examines the remainder of Jefferson's long life and career. Burns races through a treatment of the Washington administration, Jefferson's single term as vice president, his tenure in the executive mansion, and the founding of the University of Virginia. Every notable event, from Jefferson's battle with Alexander Hamilton to his ill-fated Embargo Act of

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1807, receives mention. This inclusiveness forces the writer, Ward, to oversimplify at every turn, and his text often fails to achieve even a high school textbook–level of sophistication. Jefferson's stormy tenure in the State Department is accorded less than eight minutes. Hamilton is depicted as the close "friend [of] John Adams." The Louisiana Purchase becomes a simple hosanna to progress. Even the briefest reference to Jefferson's dangerous and often duplicitous diplomacy with Napoleon and Spain, the role of Toussaint Louverture, and the protection of slave property in the new territory fall victim to time constraints.

Because the private aspects of Jefferson's life require less elaboration, Burns does a better job at exploring the inner man than he does in explaining his complicated political career. Historian Andrew Burstein is particularly good at revealing the husband, father, and correspondent. Perhaps this is what Burns should have focused on all along. A meditation on Jefferson at Monticello would be within the filmmaker's self-imposed limits, but this too-brief attempt at a comprehensive life has little to offer either students or specialists.

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KANSAS CITY. Produced and directed by Robert Altman; written by Robert Altman and Frank Barhydt. 1996; color; 116 minutes. Distributor: Fine Line Features.

In many of the interviews he gave after the release of *Kansas City*, Robert Altman said that his jazz-infused film was "constructed like jazz." As with all of Altman's films, the actors engaged in jazz-inspired ad-libbing during rehearsals, but most of the film was more carefully planned and researched than any jazz improvisation. Set in Kansas City in 1934, the film's automobiles, hairstyles, telephones, and Beaux-Arts Union Station are all as accurate as can be expected from a Hollywood film. Altman and co-author Frank Barhydt, both of them Kansas City natives, have been just as meticulous with the historical details: "Boss" Tom Pendergast, Missouri governor Guy Park, the respectable criminal John Lazia, and the killings at a polling place on election day are all straight out of the history books. At one point, the wife of a local politician even gives a speech about "goats and rabbits," although the film never explains that these were nicknames for local political factions.

With the same understated fidelity to jazz history, *Kansas City* represents the artists who invented a distinct style of music in that wide open city. Altman has once again worked with Hal Willner, who assembled a jazz group for Altman's *Short Cuts* (1993), a loose assemblage of stories by Raymond Carver held together almost entirely by the music. For *Kansas City*, Willner brought in established and emerging jazz artists to portray the canonical musicians of the early 1930s, sometimes with stunning results. For example, when pianist Geri Allen appears as Mary Lou Williams with her hair worn up, she bears an uncanny musical and physical resemblance to the legendary pianist/arranger whom Allen herself has admired and studied. Altman and Barhydt have also accurately placed Addie Parker at a Western Union office and then at a house where boarders occupy rooms on the second floor. It is possible to watch the entire film without knowing that this woman's son is Charlie Parker, also faithfully portrayed as a fourteen-year-old saxophonist in his school's marching band. At its most esoteric, the film has the black gangster Seldom Seen (Harry Belafonte) mention "that doctor friend of Bennie Moten," a reference to the Kansas City bandleader who died in 1935 while having his tonsils removed by the same doctor with whom he had socialized the night before.

Nevertheless, *Kansas City* has at least one detail of jazz history wrong. In the film's musical centerpiece, Coleman Hawkins (Craig Handy with his dreadlocks concealed inside a large hat) fights a tenor saxophone battle with Lester Young (Joshua Redman in a modified pork pie). Hawkins did in fact square off against Young in Kansas City, but the legendary encounter took place in December 1933. Hawkins left for England in March 1934, and thus could not have been present in Kansas City on election day later that year, when the action of the film takes place. But this was not one of the complaints that jazz purists lodged against the film. Most felt that the musicians who dressed up in period costumes did not successfully recreate the energetic but elegant swing that flourished in Kansas City. Press reports suggest that the musicians began by attempting to imitate recordings from the 1930s, but that they eventually decided to relax and play in their own, more extroverted styles while keeping their forebears in mind.

A completely accurate recreation of sixty-year-old Kansas City jazz, let alone one that would satisfy the implacable jazz aficionados, is impossible. In fact, given the miserable fate of jazz in Hollywood movies (detailed in my *Jammin' at the Margins*, 1996), *Kansas City* may be among the most thoughtful of all American jazz films. Except for the young Charlie Parker, none of the musicians in the film speaks, but their interactions regularly comment on the film's plot. In what is perhaps the most striking juxtaposition of story with music, Seldom Seen's henchmen kill one of their own in an alley, stabbing him repeatedly with knives, at the same time that the two saxophonists try to outdo each other with a rapid exchange of short phrases. Hawkins and Young engage in a cutting contest of their own, but it all takes place within the inherently collaborative context of a jazz performance. While some black men kill each other, others engage in the richest kind of cooperation.

Indeed, no two people in the film ever connect as exquisitely as do the musicians. The plans of virtually every other character in the film, black or white, go wrong at one point or another. Without romanticizing or pathologizing the musicians, Altman has held up

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jazz as a vivid contrast to everything that was wrong with Kansas City in 1934. Paradoxically, the corruption and violence of the city gave us the extraordinary music, the era's one great monument. Altman, who has always loved paradoxes, evokes the brutality and corruption of his home town as faithfully as he represents its music.

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FRESA Y CHOCOLATE [*Strawberry and Chocolate*]. Produced by El Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematograficos; directed by Tomás Gutiérrez Alea and Juan Carlos Tabío; screenplay by Senel Paz. 1993; color; 100 minutes. Spanish with English subtitles. Distributor: Miramax.

This film explores the lives of two men who develop a friendship in Havana during the early 1980s. Their relationship is controversial, however, because it is between a homosexual artist, Diego, played by Jorge Perugorría, and a heterosexual university student, David, portrayed by Vladimir Cruz. What happens between the two characters allows the filmmakers to examine not only the issue of homophobia in revolutionary Cuba but a host of topics, including Cuban sexuality, revolutionary identity and ideology, as well as the government's aversion to democracy and the repression and punishment of artists and intellectuals who refuse to support revolutionary ideology and goals.

The film begins in a hotel room where David has taken his girlfriend, Vivian, to consummate their relationship. The scene sets the stage for David's encounter with Diego by underlining David's sexual naïveté. Vivian convinces him not to have sex, because, after all, sex is what all typical Cuban men desire. In order to disprove her assumption about Cuban males, and to demonstrate that he is a good revolutionary, David promises Vivian that they will abstain until they are married. Soon after, however, a despondent David is shown witnessing Vivian's marriage to an older man.

Distraught about his life, David goes to Coppelia Park to have some chocolate ice cream. There he meets Diego, who tells David how wonderful the strawberry flavor is. Diego immediately informs David of his sexual orientation and displays stereotypical gay body language. Although David is suspicious and disturbed, Diego convinces him to go to his apartment to get some things, including a number of banned books. Paintings and sculptures fill Diego's apartment. His art disturbs David but inspires his curiosity. The apartment becomes the venue where much of the story unfolds, a space in which the filmmakers address the issues and problems of intolerance, discrimination, and the lack of personal freedoms experienced by some Cubans.

The first conversations between Diego and David make it clear that most Cuban men consider homosexuality both deviant and counterrevolutionary behavior. According to Lois M. Smith and Alfred Padula, revolutionary leaders and the Cuban public have been very homophobic (*Sex and Revolution*, 1996). This sentiment was reflected by the declaration of one of the state newspapers, *Revolución*, in the middle of the 1960s: "No homosexual represents the Revolution, which is a matter for men, of fists and not feathers, of courage and not trembling, of certainty and not intrigue, of creative valor and not of sweet surprises." Although international criticism prompted Fidel Castro and other government officials to call for an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation by the end of the 1980s, Smith and Padula claim that hostility to homosexuals continues among the Cuban public. It is not surprising that David only sees Diego again after his college roommate convinces him that they will need evidence to prove Diego is a counterrevolutionary. As a strong supporter of the revolution, David agrees to spy on Diego.

During David's second and subsequent visits to Diego's apartment, their friendship develops. At the center of this process is the varying perspective each has on the revolution, based on their own experiences. Diego confesses that he is gay and religious. He has had trouble with "the system." His neighbors, who belong to the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution, watch him; some follow him everywhere. They are also upset because of his refusal to perform voluntary work on weekends. David defends himself, saying that he is a Marxist who believes everyone has the right to do whatever he or she pleases. He also promises to prove to Diego that not all communists are uncivilized. Their exchange makes David realize that the revolution has not been as tolerant and inclusive as he thought. David agrees to be Diego's friend but only if they do not acknowledge each other in public. David's friendship becomes unconditional after his roommate informs him that the information he is gathering can be used to arrest and imprison Diego.

David's declaration of loyalty to Diego is followed by the most dramatic and elaborate scene in the film. Their conversation raises a number of questions. Does a person's sexual orientation preclude him from being decent, patriotic, and a revolutionary? Can Cuban society remain homophobic and undemocratic as it constructs socialism? Is all art propaganda? Regarding the latter, Diego states: "Art is art, and propaganda is propaganda ... The Cuban government no longer knows the difference." Diego attacks the revolution and David defends it. David asks Diego not to judge the revolution based on his experiences alone, declaring, "After all, I am the son of peasants who is now attending the university." David apologizes for the acts of repression of the government. "Mistakes occur under revolutionary processes, and one day everyone will benefit from the revolution." This eloquent scene ends with both men reconsidering their perspectives.

Undoubtedly, such reconsideration is the objective of the filmmakers. They pose other questions through-

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out the film. Can Cubans successfully construct socialism without reexamining the revolutionary values, beliefs, and institutions developed since 1959? Can Cubans consider their country a truly egalitarian and democratic nation if they continue to stigmatize, repress, and jail homosexuals, artists, writers, and others who do not share the revolutionary values and beliefs? David and Diego's conversation ends with David saying, "Nothing is ever given. It must be fought for."

Carollee Bengelsdorf convincingly argues that the reason Cuba has failed to construct an egalitarian and democratic socialist state is because Castro and other leaders have concluded that the development of democratic values and institutions is incompatible with V. I. Lenin's blueprint for state-constructed socialism (*The Problem of Democracy in Cuba*, 1994). Influenced by a hostile international community led by the United States, Cuban leaders have decided that Cuba can only succeed by creating and maintaining a military society that offers elements of democracy only to supporters of the revolution, according to Mariseli Pérez-Stable in his book *The Cuban Revolution* (1997). It is within this context that *Strawberry and Chocolate* ought to be interpreted.

The film's critical examination of Cuban society ends with Diego informing David that he has lost his job. His lifestyle and nonconformity have led the government to ban him from future employment as an artist. Diego's only option is to leave the island. David kisses him and declares his friendship as they enjoy ice cream at Coppelia Park. This time, David has the strawberry; Diego takes the chocolate. *Fresa y chocolate* is an excellent film that critically examines the issues of intolerance, discrimination, and the nature of the Cuban government. The filmmakers suggest that all Cubans must address these problems if they are to succeed in constructing an egalitarian society. The film illuminates the tensions in revolutionary societies, as well as what happens to individuals who must live in societies confronting a global context of opposition to socialism.

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Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

GENERAL

JACQUELINE MURRAY and KONRAD EISENBICHLER, editors. *Desire and Discipline: Sex and Sexuality in the Premodern West*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1996. Pp. xxviii, 315. Cloth $60.00, paper $21.95.

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ARTICLES

TO THE EDITOR:

Among the 16,000 or so members of the AHA are many hundreds of young scholars for whom publishing an article in the *AHR* would give a boost to their careers. I know that was true in my case way back in 1960. Yet in the June 1997 issue of the *AHR*, you have chosen to take up twenty-six pages discussing a book by Seymour Martin Lipset that *you* yourself acknowledge is "not explicitly a work of history." Of course, Lipset's book deserves to be thoroughly discussed, but why in the *AHR*, in view of the value of the journal's space as a venue for exhibiting the capabilities of younger members of the AHA, for whom a twenty-six-page or even thirteen-page article in the *AHR* can be a crucial determinant in their careers? How can you justify what you have done? I submit it was thoroughly unprofessional and indeed unethical to have taken up this space on Lipset's book, for which your three critics had nary a good word!

There is something else that puzzles me. Back in the 1960s, the concept of American exceptionalism was identified with Richard Hofstadter and Louis Hartz. What has happened to them? Hofstadter in particular in the mid-60s was one of the elite of our profession. From reading the June issue of the *AHR*, he never existed? How do you explain that?

NORMAN F. CANTOR
New York University

THE EDITOR REPLIES:

Norman Cantor's charges of unethical and unprofessional behavior on my part warrant a couple of responses.

First, the primary mission of the *AHR* is to publish and review significant historical scholarship, including that of younger historians, that speaks as much as possible to the common concerns of historians. Indeed, two such pieces by younger historians were published in the issue that has incurred Cantor's wrath. However, the pages of the *AHR* are open to all historians; quality of scholarship, not age, membership in the AHA, or the number of pages availabe, is the governing standard of judgment.

Second, the multiple reviews of the Lipset book subjected an issue of constant debate among American historians to a cross-cultural analysis. The intent was to raise issues beyond the conventional ones and to suggest why debates over American exceptionalism might be of interest to historians of other times and places. Readers must judge for themselves whether asking historians of Canada, Germany, and Japan to address the question of American exceptionalism by reviewing the book succeeded in achieving those goals. They can also judge whether the review essays warrant Cantor's condemnation.

MICHAEL GROSSBERG
EDITOR
American Historical Review

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

TO THE EDITOR:

I am writing in response to J. R. S. Phillips's review of Frederick C. Suppe's *Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire, A.D. 1066–1300* (*AHR* 101 [December 1996]: 1532). For the most part, I am in agreement with Phillips's positive assessment of Suppe's book. However, there is one point that I believe needs to be addressed: the presumed Welsh origins of the longbow. In his review, Phillips accepts this feature of Suppe's argument.

The best coverage of this issue is offered by Henry Pancoast's article "The Origins of the Long-Bow" (*PMLA* 44 [March 1929]) and Jim Bradbury's book *The Medieval Archer* (1985). Robert Hardy, in his book *Longbow: A Social and Military History* (1976), accepts

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the Welsh origins of the longbow uncritically, which is surprising, given that he also demonstrates that longbows were in use throughout Europe since Neolithic times. To begin with, both Pancoast and Bradbury point out a simple but often overlooked fact, the term "longbow" was first used only in written records of the mid-fifteenth century. As such, prior to the later Middle Ages, written documents made no distinction between a "short bow" and a "longbow."

Like Suppe, many authors have offered the observations of the twelfth-century Anglo-Welsh cleric, Giraldus Cambrensis, as evidence for the Welsh origins of the longbow. The most commonly quoted passage is in Book 1, chapter 4 of Giraldus, *Itinerarium Cambriae: The Journey through Wales* (1978): "The bows they use are not made of horn, nor of sapwood, nor of yew. The Welsh carve their bows out of the dwarf elm-trees in the forest. They are nothing much to look at, not even rubbed smooth, but left in a rough and unpolished state. Still, they are firm and strong. You could not shoot far with them; but they are powerful enough to inflict serious wounds in a close fight" (p. 113).

Both Pancoast and Bradbury note that a number of the important details provided by this description are in conflict with the nature of the classic longbow. As a keen observer, Giraldus was quick to comment on anything that he considered to be unusual. Why then would he have stated that the Welsh bow was "nothing much to look at" if, as longbows, they were nearly twice as large as the bows used by the Anglo-Saxons and Normans? In fact, his description of a rough, unpolished bow corresponds well with the weapons depicted by the late thirteenth-century Liber A drawings of Welsh archers. Similarly, his statement that "you could not shoot far with them" contradicts one of the most distinctive and important features of the longbow, its tremendous range. (In all fairness, Robert Hardy contests this translation of Giraldus's Latin text, stating that it should read "not only able to shoot an arrow a long way, but also to inflict very severe wounds at close quarters" [p. 36]. While I myself am not learned enough in Latin to determine the correct translation of this passage, I find it hard to believe that so many other translators of *Itinerarium Cambriae* would have repeatedly made the same mistake in their translations, and there are many translations of this popular work.) Significantly, Bradbury appears to have reached his conclusion that there was no evidence that the longbow originated in Wales independently of Pancoast's article, as it is not listed in Bradbury's bibliography.

The question of the longbow's origins would merely be a technical point. But, as Phillips notes in his review, it serves as one of the most important examples in Suppe's thesis of how the Anglo-Normans borrowed military technology and techniques from their Welsh opponents. It is also an important factor concerning the issue of why the Anglo-Normans/English failed to conquer all of Wales before the reign of Edward I. If the Welsh did not have the advantage of the longbow, this further reinforces Phillips's assertion that it was the acceptance of a rough accommodation between native and settler in Wales that helped to preserve the independence of the Welsh for so long.

PAUL V. WALSH
Springfield, Pennsylvania

J. R. S. Phillips does not wish to reply.

THE EDITORS

TO THE EDITOR:

In Feroz Ahmad's review of my study *The Young Turks in Opposition* [*AHR* 101 (December 1996): 1589], Ahmad states that "the vocabulary of nationalism scarcely existed in the Turkish or the Arabic or the Kurdish language of that period." He accuses me of rendering "the term *millet*, which meant a religious community, . . . as 'nation,'" and also rendering "*ummah*, the universal Islamic community . . . as 'nation.'"

It is surprising to see Ahmad performing a literalist reading of the terms *millet* and *ummah*. I agree that *millet* in its original meaning and usage had the same implications that Ahmad attributes to it. But the Ottoman Turkish language, like the society that invented and kept renewing it, remained alive throughout the history of that society. The language came to serve as a means of conveying new concepts by recirculating current forms of expression, which individuals found to be capable of adapting to new and added meanings.

There is no doubt that *millet* meant "religious community" for many centuries. However, into the nineteenth century, it began to acquire different connotations. Whereas in the earlier, historical usage of the term, it had both connotively and denotively the meaning of a religious community, by the end of the century and early part of the twentieth it was recoined and made to convey the meaning "nation." Since the meaning of a term is usually derived from the context, the time, and the social groups that use it, it is not very surprising that we find late Ottoman thinkers and literary figures resorting to their own living language to express new concepts. It was simply a case of retrofitting. At least, this is how I explain how Ottoman writers came to use *millet* to mean nation. Similarly to the term *millet*, the term *ümmet/ummah*, which had for centuries meant universal or Islamic community, acquired a new meaning and began to connote nation in both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish.

Beginning with the mid-nineteenth century, at least in the elite rhetoric, *millet* referred to three things: first, it was the equivalent of "nation" in the Ottoman language. As a matter of fact, Freiherr von der Goltz's book *Das Volk in Waffen* (A Nation in Arms) was translated into Turkish in 1884 under the rubric *Millet-i Müsellaha*, and there is a footnote in my study (p. 357) about this translation, which was unfortunately

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missed by Ahmad during his review. Second, the term referred to the Ottoman nation composed of many groups, such as Greeks, Turks, Arabs, Bulgarians, etc. As a matter of fact, one of the pamphlets referred to in my book (p. 288) was entitled *Millet-i Osmaniye Bir Hitabe* (An Address to the Ottoman Nation). Obviously, here, the term refers to an imagined Ottoman nation, and the title cannot be translated as "An Address to an Ottoman Religious Community," since many people from different faiths had been living in this imagined nation.

Third, the term referred to various ethnic groups in the empire whose elites viewed themselves as a nation. For instance, in a prefatory article in *Hürriyet*, the famous journal of the Young Ottomans, the phrase *Türk milleti* (Turkish nation) was used, and the relevant passage was translated by a prominent scholar as follows: "Are not the Turks the nation [*millet*] in whose *medresses* Farabis, Ibn Sinas, Gazalis, Zemahşeris propagated knowledge?" ([Namık Kemal], "Hubb al-Watan min al-Iman," *Hürriyet* 1 [June 29, 1868]: 1; and see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought* [Princeton, N.J., 1962], 328). Also, when the journal *Basiret* raised the question "whether a Turkish *milliyet* (nationality) is really something shameful as some people supposed," in 1875 and an article in *Ikdam* carried the title "The Contributions of the Muslims, and especially the Noble Turkish Nation [*Millet*] to Medicine," in 1901, both of these articles used *milliyet* and *millet* to refer to nationality and nation respectively (David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908* [London, 1977], 23).

It is true that in the Istanbul press many other examples can be found in which *millet* retained its traditional meaning. However, during the last decade of the nineteenth century, even those who had defended the use of the term in its traditional (religious) meaning, such as Şemseddin Sami, "widely used it in [its] non-religious sense" (Kushner, 106). It is interesting to note that Sami claimed in his Turkish lexicon that it was better to say "Turkish *Ummah*" instead of "Turkish *Millet*" (Şemseddin Sami, *Kamus-i Türkî* [Istanbul, 1317, rpt. 1900], p. 1400). (Neither of these is agreeable to Professor Ahmad.) However, in a French-Ottoman dictionary, Sami provided three possible words for translating the term "nation" into Turkish: *millet*, *ümmet*, and *kavim* (Sami, *Resimli Kamus-i Fransevî* [Constantinople, 1901], p. 1517).

In the Young Turk usage, *millet* always referred to a given nation (such as, "Throughout history no example can be found that Germans really helped a nation [*millet*]"; see "Türkiye'de Alman Nüfûzu," *Osmanlı* 56 [March 15, 1900]: 2) or to the Ottoman nation ("We do not ask for anything new. What we really want is to restore a right once granted to the Ottoman nation [*millet-i Osmaniye*]"; see "Maksad-Meslek," *Kanun-i Esasî* 1 [December 1896]: 3), or to given nations within the empire, and was never employed in a religious sense. In my study, whenever this term had been used in reference to the Islamic or universal community, I did not render it as "nation." The Young Turks always defined it carefully when they referred to the Islamic community: the terms they employed were the Islamic *ummah*, the *ummah* of the Prophet, and the *ummah* of Muhammad. Since the meaning of the term in this sense is obvious, I have not even translated it (see pp. 200, 203). However, *ummah* also meant "nation" in the elite rhetoric of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it referred to given nations. Long before the Young Turk movement and the publication of the Arab journals discussed in my study, *ummah* acquired a broader meaning (see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789–1939* [London, 1962], 194).

In the Arab journals quoted in my study, *ummah* and *millet* referred to "nation." In the quotations on pages 45 and 160 in my study, as opposed to what Ahmad claims, *ummah* and *millet* respectively refer to the Ottoman nation. The patriotic rhetoric speaking about Ottomans in the first example leaves no doubt that the term had been employed in a nonreligious meaning. In addition, this journal always used *ummah* to refer either to certain nations within the empire or the Ottoman nation itself.

This and many other examples published in the journals in question referred to an Arab nation when employing *ummah* and *millet*. In the second example criticized by Ahmad (p. 160), *millet* again refers to the Ottoman nation. The appeal in which the term is used was addressed to the Muslims; however, since Muslims were also members of this Ottoman nation, they were required to save the nation. It would be strange to think that Muslims were excluded from the Ottoman nation.

M. Şükrü Hanioğlu
Princeton University

Feroz Ahmad replies:

After reading Şükrü Hanioğlu's letter complaining about my review of his monograph, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, I can only conclude that he unwittingly confirms my statement that "the vocabulary of nationalism scarcely existed in the Turkish or the Arabic or the Kurdish language of that period." He admits that "there is no doubt that *millet* meant 'religious community' for many centuries. However, into the nineteenth century, it began to acquire different connotations." That is the whole point: the word *began* (my emphasis) to acquire "different connotations," but the sense of religious community remained dominant well into the republican period, long after the years discussed by Hanioğlu. Some people rendered the term "nation" as *millet* and even *ümmet*, but confusion about how to translate the term "nation" into Turkish persisted and is reflected sharply even in the example that Hanioğlu gives of the lexicographer Şemseddin Sami proposing three words—*millet*, *ümmet*, and *kavim*—to render the term into Turkish. This hardly made for precision and

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led to confusion that historians are still trying to sort out, not always successfully.

I based my argument largely on my reading of twelve years of debates in the Ottoman Legislative Assembly and the Senate during the years 1908–1920, when the questions of identity were discussed, debated, and contested. Hanioğlu deals with an earlier period that ends in 1902, and relies on individual authors. Had he been familiar with this later period during which the idea of nationalism began to flower, he might well have seen my point. Of course, the words *millet* and its derivatives *milli* etc. were used when the Ottomans wanted to render the term "nation" or "national" into Turkish: thus the Committee of National Defence became Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti. However, the term retained its original meaning of religious community in its wider usage. Take the example of the term *Rum milleti*, which is used throughout this period. It meant the Greek Orthodox community and not "the Greek nation" (as Hanioğlu might have rendered it), and Greek Catholics were excluded, though not Arabs who belonged to the Orthodox church. In 1919, when the Greek army invaded western Turkey, the Greek Catholic *millet* in Izmir sought the protection of its Italian co-religionists! How do we translate *Musevi milleti*? As the "Jewish nation" or more literally "the nation of Moses"? Hardly. This community of Sephardic Jews did not support Zionism and also produced some of the most articulate ideologues of Turkish patriotism. Christian deputies and senators described themselves as *anasırı Hırıstiyaniyye* (Christian elements) or simply *Hırıstiyanlar* (Christians). Muslim deputies and senators described themselves as *Müslüman anasır* (Muslim elements) or *ahali İslamiyye* (Muslim population), and their villages as Muslim villages (*İslam köyleri*).

The Ottomans feared the idea of nationalism, for it threatened the very existence of their multi-ethnic empire. Thus when they used the term *Millet-i Osmaniye*, it was not intended to mean nation; with a little imagination, it might be rendered as the "Ottoman commonwealth" of various *millets* or religious communities. It simply does not make sense to speak of an "Ottoman nation of nations." Contemporaries continued to find *millet* a perplexing term to define; as late as 1917, even Ziya Gökalp, the nationalist ideologue, was still having to explain what a millet was! (See his article "Millet nedir?" [What Is a Millet?] *İcimaiyat Mecmuası* 1/3, Istanbul, 1917).

Even after *millet* and its derivatives (*milli*, *milliyet*, *milliyetcilik*) were adopted in the republic, they retained their religious connotation, and Islamist parties have made use of the word in their names: thus Millet Partisi, Milli Nizam, and Milli Selamet Partisi. The secular nationalists have attempted to replace these terms with *ulus* and *ulusculuk* but with no great success. However, the late Niyazi Berkes, a discerning scholar of Ottoman-Turkish history, used *ulusculuk* (nationalism) when he wanted to give the word a secular meaning and *milliyetcilik* when it was religious. (See *Batıcılık, Ulusculuk ve Toplumsal Devrimler* [1965], *Arap Dünyasında İslamiyet, Milliyetcilik, ve Sosyalizm* [1969], and *İslamcılık, Ülusculuk, Sosyalizm* [1969]. Finally, the aim of the Young Turks was to save the state and not the nation (as Hanioğlu would have us believe!), since there was no nation to save. The question they asked was: How can this state be saved?—*Bu devlet nasıl kurtarılabilir*?

FEROZ AHMAD
University of Massachusetts, Boston

TO THE EDITOR:

It seems reasonable to expect a scholarly reviewer to discuss the contents of a work under consideration in at least equal proportion to its wider historiographical context. As the subtitle suggests, my book *The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia: Conservatives, Bureaucracy, and the Social Question, 1815–70* deals with the reaction of Prussian conservatives and officials to the social problems of their age. Justice to the content of the study is not done by viewing it merely from the angle of the *Sonderweg* debate, as Eric Dorn Brose does (*AHR* 102 [February 1997]: 121–22). My treatment of Germany's "special path" took up eighteen pages—less than one-fifteenth of the book—yet these eighteen pages drive Brose's entire review. The detailed examination of the social question in the introduction and the extensive exposition of the development of social conservative thought in chapters 1 through 4 are, in his review, worth no more than passing references. There is no discussion of the workings of bureaucratic rule (Chap. 5), of rural pauperism and the controversial issue of freedom of movement (Chap. 6), of the bureaucracy's struggle with its more liberal elements (Chap. 7), or of the introduction of social legislation (Chaps. 8 and 9). The archival research, on which four of my five bureaucracy chapters are based, challenges previously held assumptions in the rich and multi-faceted literature on the Prussian bureaucracy—Brose hardly touches on this central reevaluation.

In the epilogue (the subject matter of the review), my empirical findings are placed in the context of the historiographical issues captured by the *Sonderweg* debate. Anyone familiar with the increasingly sophisticated literature on the subject will be careful to avoid sweeping generalizations by approaching the issue with the caution it deserves and by making far-ranging historical interpretations judiciously. While I postulate an affinity between Prussian social conservatism and national socialism, I have been careful to point out differences between the two. It is thus preposterous to argue (as Brose does on page 122) that I walk through German history in "seven league boots," thereby implying that I approach the issue in the indiscriminately accusatory way of the "from Luther to Hitler" condemnations prevalent during World War II. Whoever makes this claim has not read the book carefully.

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Another of Brose's criticisms—that the study contains "too many errors" (p. 122)—remains unsubstantiated, as the examples he puts forward qualify at best as matters of interpretation, not fact. Brose writes: "We are told, for instance, that conservatives' emphasis on the social responsibility attached to the ownership of property was unique for this period, when in fact the Neo-Thomist movement in the Catholic camp that began with Kolping and Ketteler and culminated with Leo XIII placed a much stronger emphasis here" (p. 122). Apart from the fact that Brose's own interpretation is open to debate and that Leo XIII issued "Rerum Novarum" in 1891, whereas my discussion centers on the 1830s and 1840s, Brose is comparing apples and oranges. It is made clear throughout my book that the analysis focuses exclusively on the relationship between conservatives and officials and does not extend to other groups, as interesting as their notions about property might have been.

Similarly with Brose's second point: "Beck writes that there was little state involvement in the Prussian economy after 1815" (p. 122). Since this is not a direct quote from the book, the source of Brose's statement is unclear. Does he refer to my discussion of conservative attitudes toward state intervention in the economy? Or has he simply inferred from my examination of civil servants' liberalism that this might be a point I was likely to make? Given that half the book deals with a specific form of state intervention—bureaucratic social policy—Brose should have backed up his claim with precise quotations in context. Any reference to "little state involvement" in the economy of Prussia—a classic case of pervasive state intervention—was obviously made in a qualified sense. A sound review of my analysis would have provided the reader with the context in which a specific statement was made to clarify rather than obscure the author's intent. Brose's claim of "too many errors" as applied to matters of interpretation is not only misguided but also contradicts his own acknowledgment at the beginning of the review that "the book is well researched" (p. 121). Internal contradictions in one and the same review are rarely a recommendation for the reviewer.

Brose's allegation that my "writing style is another blemish on the overall effort" (p. 122) strikes an odd note, given that others have praised the book for being particularly "well written" (*Central European History* 29 [1996]: 420; *Choice* 33 [1995]: no. 3). One is led to wonder at the motivation behind a review based on such inconsistencies.

HERMANN BECK
University of Miami

ERIC DORN BROSE REPLIES:

I have opted to reply to Hermann Beck privately rather than respond at length in public, thereby triggering some kind of polemic. To Beck's hint that there was more than a purely professional motivation behind my criticism, I must state that this charge is completely without foundation—as anyone who knows me will assume goes without saying. I stand by the original review.

ERIC DORN BROSE
Drexel University

TO THE EDITOR:

In the *AHR* of February 1997 (vol. 102, p. 130), reviewer Geoffrey Cocks refers to the *Scharnhorst* as a "battlecruiser." Admiral Karl Dönitz, who ought to be the greatest expert on the subject, says on page 163 of his *Memoirs*: "Later, in January 1941, the heavy cruiser *Admiral Hipper* and the two battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* steamed out into the Atlantic."

BERNARD SINSHEIMER
University of Maryland
European Division

GEOFFREY COCKS REPLIES:

Bernard Sinsheimer has raised what turns out to be an interesting matter of terminology. Although it is true that in his memoirs Dönitz describes the *Scharnhorst* as a "battleship" (*Schlachtschiff*), that is not the end of the matter. Battle cruisers (*Schlachtkreuzer*) constituted a specific class of naval vessel dating from the initial era of the "all big-gun ships" prior to World War I. These ships carried the same main armament as battleships but had reduced armor protection for greater speed (Nathan Miller, *The War at Sea* [1995], p. 24n). Before the war, Germany planned for thirty-eight battleships and twenty-two battle cruisers by 1920, while Great Britain envisioned forty-eight and twenty-four, respectively, by 1919 (Holger Herwig, *Politics of Frustration* [1976]). After the war, the Germans exploited the restrictions of the Washington Treaty on the world's naval powers and a loophole in the Versailles restrictions on German naval tonnage to construct armored ships (*Panzerschiffe*), the "pocket battleships" of Western press accounts, that could outrun battleships and outgun cruisers.

With the advent of unrestricted Nazi re-armament, however, the plan for a fourth "pocket battleship" of 10,000 tons was changed into one for a 26,000-ton (actual displacement 31,800 tons) battle cruiser. This was the *Scharnhorst*, which like its sister ship *Gneisenau* "sacrificed gunpower, and not protection, for speed" (H. T. Lenton, *German Surface Vessels*, vol. 1 [1966], p. 9). By contrast, the new German battleships *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz* displaced 41,700 and 42,900 tons, respectively, and carried fifteen-inch main armament compared to the battle cruisers' eleven-inch guns.

Why, then, would Dönitz refer to the *Scharnhorst* as a "battleship"? Because that term is often used generally. The Webster's definition—distinct from that of "battle cruiser" as "a large, fast warship less heavily armed than a battleship"—reads: "a warship of the

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largest class carrying the heaviest armor and guns . . . usually displac[ing] over 25,000 tons." It is also synonymous in German dictionaries and encyclopedias with *Kriegsschiff* (warship) and *Linienschiff* (ship of the line). That the term is always spelled as a single word speaks to this generic quality. Its use by Dönitz was also especially appropriate in the context of a comparison with the heavy cruiser *Admiral Hipper*, a ship with smaller guns, thinner armor, and shorter range than a battle cruiser. But even though the battle cruiser was more like a battleship than anything else, the German naval high command itself recognized the capabilities of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* as something less than—or at least different from—those of a battleship. In a conference on September 7, 1939, for example, they were termed battleships but assigned the role of protecting *Panzerschiffe* from British battle *cruisers* (*Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlhabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939–1945* [1972]). After the war, Vice-Admiral Friedrich Ruge likewise called them battleships but noted they "were really belated battle cruisers" (*Der Seekrieg* [1957], p. 30).

According to Richard Garrett (*Scharnhorst and Gneisenau: The Elusive Sisters* [1978]), the German navy *always* called the two ships battleships, while the Royal Navy used "battlecruiser" (see, for example, Capt. S. W. Roskill, *The War at Sea 1939–1945* [1954]). But this difference was in fact not absolute. In *Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe* (1941), Rear Admiral Walter Lohmann speaks of *Grosskampf-* or *Schlachtschiffe* as comprised of *Linienschiffe* and *Schlachtkreuzer* (see also Karl Peter, *Schlachtkreuzer Scharnhorst* [1951]). In light of this, use of the term "battleship" by Dönitz or anyone else might best be regarded as reasonable shorthand. It is also worth remembering in this regard that Dönitz's background was in submarines and not surface vessels.

It would be interesting and worthwhile to speculate on the historical volatility of these terms. What meanings imparted by history, experience, and power(lessness) accompanied or determined the use of one word over the other? For example, to what extent might the use of the word/term "battleship" by a German naval officer have carried with it conscious and unconscious perceptions and feelings as well as unintended meanings associated with Germany's (recent) national and military history, contents (and discontents) not conveyed by the term "battle cruiser"? The same elaborating criteria might also apply to German—or British or American—use of "battle cruiser."

GEOFFREY COCKS
Albion College

TO THE EDITOR:

Is it not astonishing that Andrzej Korbonski begins his review of my book *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War* (1995), in the *American Historical Review*, upbraiding historians for their abiding interest in World War II? [*AHR* 102 (February 1997): 143–44].

That war was the most shattering event for centuries in the history of Europe, and for all of Western civilization, including, in this case, the European territories of the former Soviet Union. It was unarguably the decisive contribution to the relative decline in European fortunes and to the current Western malaise. One has only to think of deaths in the tens of millions, of the German catastrophe and the mass murder of the European Jews, of Poland senselessly mauled about east-central Europe, as if by a pair of rogue elephants, with the loss of perhaps 20 percent of its population; of the disaster Stalin's adventurist game with Hitler to move the Soviet Union west soon brought to all the Soviet peoples; and, of course, to the years of conflict and wasted human energies given up to an ensuing Cold War. New facts on any of these shed new light on all. Historians have been busy, as well they should be.

Korbonski, a political scientist, asserts that historians who have worked the newly opened former East Bloc archives have produced "meager" results and contributed "little if anything" to revise previous "interpretations." This is grossly untrue. The remark establishes the reviewer's utter lack of information on current bibliography and international historical discussion on World War II.

Perhaps Korbonski's peculiarly dismal humor stems from contempt for what many historians do, and are supposed to do. In any event, it, or something, made him forget to do the first duty of a reviewer. That is, to tell what is in the book, like it or not. Surely the editors of the *American Historical Review* notify their reviewers of this responsibility.

Since that essential task was neglected by Korbonski, allow me to give the obligatory summary of my history: I contend on the basis of extensive research in recently opened East Bloc archives (in Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, and Moscow—four of them former party archives—KPD and SED, PZPR, KSČ) and also in Western archives, as well as in published materials, older and recent, that there is continuity between Lenin's policy of sending the Red Army into central Europe after World War I and Stalin's policy of encouraging another European war in 1938 and 1939. His advance to the west, beginning with wars on Poland (in collaboration with Hitler following their notorious pact) and Finland, and his expectation of ensuing wartime chaos, and of mass killing and social disarray deriving from Hitler's war in Europe, were based on Lenin's earlier plans connected with their mutual experience of the events of the later years of World War I. Stalin expected Hitler's war to lead to revolutions, quickly supported by the Red Army, in German-occupied Europe (and perhaps beyond). His schemes to expand Soviet power to central and even western Europe during and just after the war reflect the same program adapted by him as best he could to later different circumstances.

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My account of Soviet war plans for 1938 to 1941, by the way, corresponds with the increasingly massive post-Soviet Russian and German bibliography on Stalin's war schemes, 1939–1941. The Russian and German historians reporting on them, collectively auguring a sea change in our understanding of the war, have been provoking lively current controversy even in the popular press in Russia and Germany. But, strangely, rarely a word on the subject is to be found in the professional and popular media in the United States. So far, to my knowledge, only one other writer has published on it in North America.

Korbonski does not mention all of this, thereby neglecting another reviewer's task: to put the author's material in the context of up-to-date bibliography on the subject.

Nor did Korbonski recognize that there was some effort directed toward methodological innovation in my book: the employment of all too often neglected audio-visual sources as historical proofs. Historians up-to-date in methodology may want to know of that effort, successful or not. Korbonski did not mention it. Perhaps political scientists are not interested. Many historians are.

Korbonski writes, in the two sentences of his review actually dedicated to revealing some of the book's contents, that I "repeat the thesis first presented by George F. Kennan in *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (1961) that Stalin's main purpose in signing the treaty with Hitler was not only to gain time and territory but also to prepare the ground for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe." First of all, the invasion was to begin with Germany and German-occupied Europe (not "Western" Europe). Second, Kennan did not at all write what Korbonski attributes to him (on Stalin's scheme at the time of the signing of the pact: Kennan, hardcover edn., 333, 346, 351; some years later, on the same subject, in *Survey*, 21: 24).

Moreover, Korbonski opines, I acknowledge Kennan's work "sparingly." Shall we go to the numbers? In my introduction, I quote Kennan's early versimilitudinous reporting on Stalin and the Soviet threat to Europe at length. I cite his words approvingly twice more in the text and twice in the footnotes. In the whole text, of 168 pages, five of Kennan's writings are cited.

Augustine credited God with the power to determine that two times two equals five. Stalin was confident he had bettered God, saying the Red Army could make foes admit that two times two equals sixteen (see *Stalin's Drive*, p. 99). Korbonski, too, fudges arithmetic, or can he determine that the above numbers are "sparing"? The reader comparing his other expressions of quantity, as in "sprinkling of archival documents" and "little that is new" will, I believe, find them to have the same relationship to quantity as his use of "sparingly" in his reporting on my use of Kennan. For me, the author, the issue was always, in every case, quality.

Finally, the reviewer is also erratic in his admixture of metaphor. It should, indeed, be flattering to be metaphorically compared to a mountain, as I (as well as other unnamed historians) actually have been in his text. Yet I suspect the flattery was unintended. He clearly meant in regard to me and my book to report, as we usually say in English, "An elephant labored, and gave birth to a mouse." But inattentive to language as well as to fact, content, recent bibliography and historiography, he seems to have translated the lackluster Polish metaphor, "góra urodziła mysz," into English. Still, it is, nonetheless, pleasant not to be compared to an elephant, whatever the reason.

R. C. Raack
EMERITUS
Berlin

Andrzej Korbonski does not wish to reply.

The Editors

To the Editor:

I am grateful to Ann Macy Roth for her informative and thoughtful account of *Not Out of Africa* and *Black Athena Revisited* and of the controversial issues with which they deal [*AHR* 102 (April 1997): 493–95]. But I was puzzled by her statement that in *Not Out of Africa* I make a "plea for administrative action by universities against professors who teach what is 'untrue.' " In fact, I only suggest that manifestly false claims be met with discussion by qualified members of university faculties. I simply try to draw a distinction between academic freedom and freedom of speech. Freedom of speech must be defended at all costs, but academic freedom must be matched by academic responsibility, so long as we wish to claim that universities are concerned with learning and the dissemination of knowledge.

I also wonder why Roth thinks that I view "Afrocentrism as an attack on scholarship and democracy." To the extent that Afrocentrism supports historical revisionism that encourages resentment for crimes that were never actually committed, then it—like Eurocentrism—certainly should be open to question. But when Afrocentrism encourages the study of Africa, and the appreciation of African civilizations for their own sake, then it performs a valuable service. An example would be the new interest it seems to have aroused in the study of ancient Egypt.

Roth also suggests that because I show that there was never such a thing as an "Egyptian Mystery System" with universities and courses of study, I also believe that Egyptian religion was not mystical or systematic. My point was, rather, that the secret knowledge of Egyptian priests and the established rituals of Egyptian religion were substantively different from Greek religious practice. Even in the Hellenistic era, when Greeks were living in Egypt, there appears to

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have been remarkably little Egyptian influence on the content of Greek thought.

MARY LEFKOWITZ
Wellesley College

ANN MACY ROTH REPLIES:

Mary Lefkowitz believes that I misrepresented her position in my review when I wrote that she makes a "plea for administrative action by universities against professors who teach what is 'untrue.'" She concluded in the penultimate paragraph of her book, "University administrators ought to ask whether we need courses in . . . Afrocentric ancient history" and "[A]cademic deans and curriculum committees . . . have the authority to ask why a course needs to be offered and to request an explanation of why instructors choose to ignore and/or suppress evidence." This struck me as administrative action; I apologize if the phrase necessarily implies more repressive action that this.

As for my statement that she sees Afrocentrism as an attack on scholarship and democracy, let me again quote two passages: "Any attempt to question the authenticity of ancient Greek civilization is of direct concern even to people who ordinarily have little interest in the remote past. Since the founding of this country, ancient Greece has been intimately connected with the ideals of American democracy" (p. 6). "Despite allegations to the contrary, virtually all the claims made by Afrocentrists can be shown to be without substance" (p. 8). Lefkowitz does occasionally characterize the Afrocentrists she is disparaging as "extreme," but (so far as I remember) she neither explains what this entails nor distinguishes the "extreme" form from the kind of Afrocentrism she describes more positively in her response.

Finally, Lefkowitz has *not* shown that there was "never such a thing as an 'Egyptian Mystery System' with universities and courses of study." We do not have enough evidence about the Egyptian educational system, and specifically about the education required of priests, to prove *or* disprove this, or that "the secret knowledge of Egyptian priests and the established rituals of Egyptian religion were substantively different from Greek religious practice." Without such evidence, Lefkowitz must argue for a lack of mystery in Egyptian religion generally, saying that "in reality the festivals of the Egyptian gods were open to the public and not restricted to special groups of initiates" (p. 94). This is not "in reality" true: Egyptian rituals were performed by priests in small dark spaces in the back of temples, to which access was very restricted; the public saw only processions to and from the temple. Lefkowitz also argues that hieroglyphs had no mysterious contents, because "we now know they were used primarily to represent specific sounds, like an alphabet" (p. 104). In fact, in the temple texts where it survived in the Late Period (the period when the Greeks and Romans would have encountered it), hieroglyphic writing had become increasingly enigmatic and intentionally difficult, as evidenced, for example by two texts at Esna temple, one written almost entirely with crocodiles and the other written almost entirely with rams. The arcane and mysterious readings given in Greco-Roman sources are indeed far different from the uses of the system in the classical periods of Egyptian history, but they may reflect quite accurately the hieroglyphic writing system of the period in which they were written.

The problem of Egyptian religious rituals and initiations is that we cannot know whether they were like the later Greek mystery religions or not; both were by definition secret. My point was simply that there exist in Egyptian culture elements that correlate better than Lefkowitz allows with the postulated "mystery system," and that here, as in the related question of Egyptian influence on Greek thought, we simply do not have enough evidence to speak with the assurance Lefkowitz assumes.

ANN MACY ROTH
Howard University

TO THE EDITOR:

John Henry Schlegel's review of my book *The Hidden Holmes: His Theory of Torts in History* [*AHR* 102 (April 1997): 544–45] has me "sorting through [the] mud" between "similarly different, clearly identifiable epistemes." Schlegel identifies these bracketing modes of thought only as the "early eighteenth-century world of the American common law and the world of American law after World War II." I am portrayed as mucking around in the "intervening years." Apparently, my findings that Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized the importance of industrialization and economic analysis for tort law upsets Schlegel's premise that his epistemes are "perfectly clear and complete and radically incommensurable." In short, for Schlegel, Holmes comes out too modern for his time.

Schlegel's charge is false that I neglect the distinctiveness of Holmes's language and social context. Beyond merely asserting that I lost the "pastness of the texts" while "working in the mud between epistemes," he offers no evidence of example for support. Nor does he address any aspect of my elaboration of Holmes's theory of torts and related innovations in jurisprudence. Schlegel ignores that Holmes created and justified strict liability as an effective means of securing safety, compensating injury, and spreading the costs of industrial accidents; adopted Jeremy Bentham's deterrence rationale for tort liability; advocated the legislative, public policymaking function of courts in crafting and applying the rules of tort law; modeled his jurisprudence for developing general theories of torts and other common law areas on the methods of empirical science, particularly as exemplified by Charles Darwin's theories of classification and evolution, and Charles Peirce's critical perspectives of pragmatism;

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and called for lawyers and judges to become social engineers, utilizing the knowledge and rational approaches of economics, statistics, and political theory to redesign tort law. Schlegel also ignores my showing that Holmes's contemporaries in academia and on the bench recognized his support for strict liability in industrial cases.

In part, my book seeks to question the reality of incommensurable intellectual paradigms, such as Schlegel's postulated epistemes, and illustrate how presupposing their existence shackles and prefigures historical interpretation. I suspect that the polemics of Schlegel's review stem from the instinct to protect his turf.

DAVID ROSENBERG
Harvard Law School

John H. Schlegel does not wish to reply.

THE EDITORS

TO THE EDITOR:

In his review of my book, *The Great Los Angeles Swindle* (*AHR* 102 [April 1997]: 549), Roger Olien writes that the book fails "largely because the sources . . . relied on are questionable," and that, in order to "produce a frequently engaging text," I relied primarily on Los Angeles newspapers as "substitutes for the germane, if drier, archival materials that scholars commonly employ." Since my book, as is clear from the bibliography and notes, made extensive (not cursory) use of federal and local court records, voluminous receivership files, grand jury transcripts, FBI files secured under the Freedom of Information Act, U.S. Senate hearings, a careful analysis of newspaper advertising (as opposed to news stories), daily stock price and volume fluctuations, drilling records, reports of the California Division of Oil and Gas, collections of personal papers and other materials secured from most of the major archives in California, I would appreciate it if Olien would specify which of the dry archival materials relevant to the Julian Petroleum scandal I overlooked or under-utilized, or where my use of newspaper reports misrepresented the events I described.

Olien also charges that "Tygiel occasionally misrepresents the quality of his sources, as when he identifies Albert Atwood, a popular writer for the *Saturday Evening Post*, as a financial expert (pp. 24, 333)." Yet nowhere in the text or notes of my book is Atwood identified as anything other than a journalist. The example that Olien cites on page 24 reads, "Financial experts later estimated that between 1918 and 1921 over 270 similar Texas oil schemes took root in Los Angeles." The annotation on page 333 reads, "On Texas oil schemes in Los Angeles, Atwood, 'Oil Flood,' 86." In no way does this indicate Atwood was one of the "financial experts" referred to, rather that his article was the source of this information.

I do not mind having the content of my work criticized, but I deeply resent Olien's unwarranted and unsubstantiated criticism of my research skills. I trust that those familiar with my work will not be misled by this review.

JULES TYGIEL
San Francisco State University

ROGER OLIEN REPLIES:

In his response to my review of *The Great Los Angeles Swindle*, Jules Tygiel takes issue with my assessment of the evidential base of his book as inadequate. As he points out in his letter, his bibliography lists an impressive range of materials, archival and journalistic. As I discovered, however, the footnotes reflect overwhelming reliance on highly partisan Los Angeles newspapers. For sections of some central chapters, identified separately in the notes, few sources other than the newspapers appear. Readers of the book, or readers of the *AHR* who are interested in our disagreement, should consult the text and the notes. I believe that their observation will support my opinion.

As to the example of Albert Atwood, Tygiel refers to "financial experts" unidentified except with regard to Atwood, whose article appears in the notes. If the author did not consider the journalist as an expert, he did see fit to let him select the experts and validate their information. Atwood, a journalist with a fine eye for local color, was used to provide it about a dozen times in chapters 1 and 2 of *The Great Los Angeles Swindle*, a highly effective use of the source. By contrast, newspaper accounts of sensational trials I have studied have proven to be highly selective, at best, usually highlighting the human drama, with scant attention to the actual testimony or exhibits. For this reason, I believe that credible accounts of legal proceedings should be based on transcripts of testimony, exhibits, and records of motions and judgments. The canon of "best source" is not prejudicial nor is it irrelevant to an evaluation of Tygiel's book. Without more reliable sources, his moral outrage is not well grounded.

I will also stand by my original evaluation of Tygiel's prose style: the book is beautifully written, reminiscent in this regard of his earlier work.

ROGER OLIEN
University of Texas, Permian Basin

ERRATUM

Donald D. Johnson's book *The United States in the Pacific: Private Interests and Public Policies, 1784–1899* was completed by Gary Dean Best and reviewed in the April 1997 *AHR* (p. 574). Regrettably, Matthew Calbraith Perry's middle name was printed as "Galbraith." This was the fault of the editors and not the authors or reviewer, Arthur Power Dudden.

THE EDITORS

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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